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SUMMARY 
Derrida's claim that there can be no concept of time that 
escapes from the sphere of the metaphysical presents ui with 
three major questions: (1) Why does Derrida make this claim ? What 
does he mean by it ? (2) How, in the light of this claim ought we 
to read Husserl and Heidegger who aimed at just what Derrida rules 
out ? (3) How can we square the claim with other things Derrida 
says about time and about metaphysics ? 
We undertake a critical reading of the two major works on time 
by Husserl and Heidegger respectively, arguing that while each of 
these two texts does indeed subscribe to such metaphysical values 
as fundamentality, certainty , unity, identity and wholeness, they 
nonetheless make a substantial contribution to our release from the 
domination of 'the ordinary concept of time'. Furthermore, we argue, 
Derrida's own writing is marked by the same ( perhaps inevitable) 
Imetaphysicallshadow, albeit in an exemplary self-conscious manner. 
To Derrida's claim about the impossibility of a non-metaphysical 
concept of time we reply (a) he elsewhere endorses a 'pluri-dimens- 
ional' temporality, and (b) when being careful, he admits that it is 
not concepts per se that are metaphysical, but their mode of textual 
articulation. 
From these two concessions our double strategy develops. 
I. His denial of an; original, primitive time, coupled with his 
understanding of metaphysics*in terms of textual articulation licences 
a programme for the description of temporal structures and represent- 
ations of time, one abjuring any foundationalist pretensions, and 
resisting the temptation to spatializing interpretations. 
II. We redescribe the 'moment' in a way that breaks utterly with 
any representational element whatever. This approximates in temporal 
terms the time-dissolving moves found both in the latter Heidegger, 
and also in Derrida. 
No theoretical synthesis of these two strategies is attempted. 'Time 
as absolute openness to the other' and 'time as complex textuality' 
displace the value of 'presence' at two distinct levels - time as 
primitive events and time as articulated structure. Their inner unity 
must remain, for the moment, a question. 
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Foreword 
Had a systematic devotion to the reider's pleasure guided the 
writing throughout, a leaner, tighter text might have emergedq one 
that could scorn a preface, and one in which any departures from 
absolute transparency would unfailingly excite the reader's desire. 
To the extent that this text can only recognize this ideal without 
fulfilling it, a few words of orientation may be helpful. It is 
divided into three main parts ( with an important Appendix) . Each 
of the first two parts centres on a substantial and detailed critical 
reading of a single text - the first by Husserl and the second by 
Heidegger - to which the surrounding chapters are satellites. The 
inclusion of these readings is largely responsible for the bulk 
of the typescript. We have tried to show in a detailed way a number 
of tensions at work within each of these texts - between the desire 
to illuminate time and temporality anew, and drawing ontological 
significance from this, between plurality and unity, dispersion and 
focussing, and so on. Their value stands or falls onthe success 
with which these tensions have been displayed. 
The third section consists of a set of largely self-contained 
papers linking up questions of time, textuality, metaphysics, 
deconstruction and style. Together they argue for, and with luck, 
demonstrate that there is time after deconstruction. 
THE DECONSTRUCTION or TIME 
Introduction 
It is perhaps a common a recurrent claim among philosophers 
and other who think about time that there is, something, wrong with 
four ordinary conception of time'. The fault may be diagnosed in 
different., even incompatible ways. There are those who think that the 
linear representation of time is responsible for its mistaken assim- 
ilation to space. There., are those who argue that the metaphorical 
comparison of time with a river is, responsible for-the, illusion that 
time'flows' . -There'are those who think that our very possession of 
name-like words for 'past', 'present', Ifuture!, erroneously leads us to 
suppose that these each in some sense still or already exist, like 
distant parts of space. More recently, there has been an attempt to-. --. 
rescue our understanding of time, from-Imetaphysics', a reading that 
treats most of the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics. 
It is a reading announced in this radical form by Nietzsche, developed. 
by Heidegger, and further radicalised by Derrida. Quite what is meant, ý 
by Imetaphysics'-and why'it might be thought valuable or necessary ( or 
possible, or impossible ) to overcome it, is a matter we shall have to 
concern ourselves-with in-detail later. For the moment what-is especially 
noteworthy is the, suggestion, made by Derrida that if we do succeed in 
overcoming our, ordinary ( -, metaphysical) conception of time,. it will 
involve the elimination of the, concept of time altogether, that it is 
not possible to purify the concept of time of-, the metaphysical, for 
2 
there is an intimate connection between time, however we conceive of 
it, and metaphysics, such that time and metaphysics would stand or fall 
together. For someone for whom the history of philosophy is a series of 
footnotes to Plato, his linking of truth to the eternal might seem to 
lend support to this view. But our argument here has a more general 
form. 
The argument in its most general form is simple. It is that qua 
metaphysics, the history of philosophy is the history of the privileging 
of a certain temporal/evidential value, that of 'presence'. This value 
both supplies and is confirmed by an interpretation of time, one which 
privileges the present. It can already be found at work in Aristotle's 
treatment in the Physics, and thereafter, in various different forms in 
all subsequent treatments of time, until perhaps Nietzsche. 
For reasons of influence as well as objective historical importance, 
we could not attempt to assess this claim without offering an account of 
the theories of time supplied by Husserl and , later, Heidegger. Each 
of them made a sustained and brilliant attempt to correct our ordinary 
understanding of time, each saw this understanding as historically sedi- 
mented in the history of philosophy, and each saw its correlation as requ- 
iring a radical change in general philosophical method and practice. Yet 
despite these self-conscious attempts at radical new departures it has been 
claimed that they do nothing but reproduce the very values that they are 
trying so hard to question. In parýlcular it has been claimed that their 
revision of our understanding of time moves within the limits they take 
themselves to be transcending. For Derrida there is a very general reason 
for this failure: 'time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality'. 
If one supposes that belonging to metaphysical conceptuality is in 
some way something from which one would like one's thinking to take a 
distance, then this is an enormously strong claim. There can be no 
adequate philosophical reflection on time that could successfully retain 
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the concept of time. The precise relation to metaphysics that we are 
being recommended to take up, by Nietzsche, by Heidegger, or by 
Derrida, is nothing as simple as Irej'ection', or 'transcendence'. Indeed 
most if not all the critical terms one traditionally uses to describe 
the relation of one account to another account ( even 'more or less 
adequate', even supposing them to be 'of the same thing') could be 
claimed to depend 9b assumptions which are' themselves no less 'meta- 
physical'. The strategies possible in this area will have to be dis- 
cussed -in-some depth . But there is no doubting the significance of an 
analysis that succeeds in showing that a supposedly radical aýcount 
actually reproduces at one level or other the lineaments of the position 
it was attempting to distance itself from. 
We have just referred'to Derrida's insistence on the metaphysical 
status of the concept of time. Let us read it in full: 
I The concept of time belongs entirely to metaphysics and it 
designates the domination of presence. 
if something connected with time but which is not itself ; i*m*e needs to be thought of outside the determination of Being 
as presence, we are no longer dealing with anything which could 
be called time. 
,,, it is rZt-possible to oppose to it 
[that is to the whole historic- 
. -ally developed system of metaphysical concepts - 
DCW] a different 
conception oft-time, because time in general belongs to metaphysical 
conceptuality. ' (our translation) 1 
These remarks first appeared in 1968, in an essay by Derrida. entitled 
"Ousia et Gramme' : note sur une note de Sein und Zeit" as one of a 
collection of essays published in honour of Jean Beaufret, a respected 
French Heideggerean. What Derrida tries to do in this essay is to show 
that Heidegger's attempt to develop a new existential concept of time 
in opposition to the metaphysical one traceable to Aristotle, does not 
face up to the more radical possibility that there may be an essential 
connection between the concept of time ( and 2M concept of time) and 
4 
that consolidated collection of Greek concepts that has determined 
the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics. 
2 
If this 
connection can be established, Heidegger's revisionary project in 
Being and Time would have to be rethought, and Derrida does exactly 
that, in this essay and ip others. 
This connection with Heidegger is only one of a number of features 
of Derrida's general philosophical position that makes his approach to 
the specific discussion of time for our purposes exemplary and critical. 
In a massive output that began with his book length introduction to the 
French translation of Husserl's short late essay "The Origin of Geometry" 
Derrida has addressed himself directly or indirectly not only to most 
of the important traditional philosophical discussions of time, but also 
to the possibility of understanding the history of philosophy as a 
single tradition marked by allegiance to certain determining values which 
historically speaking at least, define it and limit its scope. Derrida's 
name for the most dominant of these values is presence, understood as a 
fusing together of evidential, spatial, and above all temporal motifs. 
Derrida's position is for us exemplary because he poses in the most 
general and yet scholarly way the question as to the relationship between 
time and philosophical conceptualisation, a question which is not, merely 
offering a--(new) philosophy of time, '- bLLt exploring the 
dependence of the philosophical tradition on our interpretations of time. 
These interpretations are claimed to exhibit a superficial plurality 
but an underlying unity: the coEmitment,., to the value of presence. His 
position is critical in the sense that it takes up and works with, and 
to some extent within a tradition 
3 
that in our view has beian the most 
original, productive, and far-reaching in its thinking in this area. 
It includes Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl , Heidegger and recent 
5 
structuralist thought. The judgement on our part as to the value of 
-this tradition is no so much directly defended by the thesis as 
presupposed by it. But that there is such a tradition is something that 
even those who have not felt the urgency of its problems or tasted its 
delights should be able to agree on. In our discussion of the problems 
connecting time and metaphysics weshall remain largely constrained by 
the way these problems have been developed within this tradition, and 
for positive reasons. 
Within this tradition, for example, there is a keen awareness of the 
difficulty of d6ing justice both to our intuitive sense of the intellect- 
ual transparency of time as experienced - we seem to directly witness 
its shape, its action every moment of our lives - and to a growing 
awareness that the concept of time 
4 
can only be understood by reference 
to the role it plays in a range of different theories, and indeed that 
it only ever appears with some such tacit or explicit theoretical 
implication. This problem is at least a stage beyond the problem of 
producing a theory of time compatible, with our intuitions. I 
once we are convinced of the variety of the, theoretical complicities 
of the concept of time we ate confronted with the further question as 
to whether there is some order of priority among these theoretical 
dependencies ( eg. physical time more basic than literary time) 
5 
such 
that we could arrive at the fundamental features of the concept of time 
by way of such a heirarchisation. Derrida'slanswer, as we. shall see, works 
at three levels. First he credits a certain physical conception of time 
(derived from Aristotle) with having enjoyed a historicalprivilege in 
relation to other concepts such that they were typically modelled on it. 
Second, he questions the legitimacy of that privilege. Third, he claims 
that there are fundamental features of any concept of time by which it 
has a certain complicity with metaphygics. This last level will raise the 
6 
important question as to whether Derrida does not prematurely reunify 
our understanding of time, albeit at a formal level. By 'formal' here 
I mean the level of our understanding of the general theoretical 
functioning of any concept of time. ) This would leave undeveloped the 
insight into the plurality of our concepts of time. We will come to 
suggest that there is a conflict within Derrida's own account between 
the recognition of this multiplicityand the underlying'reunification 
6 
wrought by his critical method. 
This tradition is also peculiarly sensitive to what we could call 
'reflexive' problems where the sense of reflexi-Aty is neither purely 
logical nor psychological, but perhaps best understood as formal). And 
this is particularly important for the treatment of time. The history 
of th e philosophical treatment of time ( as of other key concepts - 
truth, language, the subject ... throws up from time to time problems 
in which the proposed account of such concepts seems in the very form 
or fact of its existence to presuppose, or at least to involve or 
suggest answers to the question at issue. For instance, does not any 
theory of truth necessarily give a privileged status to the truth of 
theoretical statements such as it itself consists of) that would 
undermine any attempt to explain the truth of complex statements as a 
product of the truth of primitive or atomic propositions. For the, 
theory would have no legislative value if it were merely a summary of 
a set of primitive truths. And any account of the concept of time 
would have to be such as to allow one to explain and endorse any 
temporal presuppositions built into the term 'concept' That this is 
no empty possibility will be seen when we discuss Derrida's radically 
anti-conceptual 'theory of language'. Derrida and the tradition within 
which he can be located particularly Vietzsche and Heidegger are all 
acutely aware of such reflexive problems. 
The key questions that supply the initial and in part the continu- 
7 
ing direction t6 the thesis are related directly to the quotations from 
. Derrida with which we began: (1) Is there, as he suggests, a necessary 
link between time and metaphysics ? (2) Is the account of metaphysics 
presupposed by this question acceptable ? (3) Is Derrida's account of 
the consequences of such a complicity between time and metaphysics 
adequate,? (4) Can Derrida's remarks about there being no other, concept 
of time than a metaphysical one be reconciled with his suggestions 
7 
that we think of time a multidimensional ? (5) Does the level at which 
Derrida discussesýthe, question of time ( which is quite as abstract 
as any metaphysics could be ) occlude the possibility of developing ia 
more concrete account of the diverse modes and variety of temporal 
structure 
These questions have a clear analytical side to them. Is an, 
alleged connection necessary ? Is a certain account adequate or accept- 
able 7 Can two claims be held consistently ? Does a theory inhibit 
the development of a certain, line of thought ? We do not however, hold 
the view that it is possible to ignore the historical development of 
the concepts and theories to which the analysis is to apply. Of course, 
it is possible to pretend of certain concepts that they have no important 
history, and one can treat certain theories ( eg. those with an itned- 
iate practical import in abstraction from their past. But one always runs 
the risk of intellectual naivety and in so subject is this more true than 
in philosophy. Philosophy does not so much have a tradition,, it is a 
tradition. It does not follow from this that there is any guaranteed 
unity of problems throughout the ages. Tradition need not imply the 
continuous development of concepts or theories. There may be jumps, gaps, 
leaps, discontinuities, losses, as well as continuity, development, 
enrichening, preservation. What all this suggests is that our method 
8 
will have to be historical as well as analytical. 
In this respect, Derrida's position can be used as something of 
an ordering device. If we suppose for the sake of argument that his 
account of the relation between time and metaphysics in some way 
takes in, or is responsive to all of his significant precursors, then 
we can order the historical part of our thesis by asking the question: 
What reading of the history of philosophy leads Derrida to make this 
claim about the time/metaphysics relationship ? This will enable us both 
to reconstruct, indeed perhaps to construct for the first time in a 
comprehensive way, Derrida's own position on time, but alto to traverse 
the territory we would have to pass through if we were to pursue the 
question about, time and metaphysics 'on our own' ( were that to make 
sense) . And in traversing that territory with our critical questions in 
mind we will be in a posiiion to give a historical depth to our answers. 
It might turn out for example that the Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida 
account of metaphysics simply will not adequately cover the whole of the 
history of philosophy, which would radically affect the significance of 
any answer we might give to the relation between time and metaphysics. 
our historical approach both determines and is determined by the 
tradition we have chosen to concentrate on. First of all it suggests 
that whatever the universality of the well-springs of philosophical 
inquiry wonder, astonishment, despair, joy, puzzlement ) this inquiry 
is only ever seriously developed within a written tradition. And in 
such traditions concepts and theories will often be elaborated in ways 
not immediately translateable into other traditions. The assumption 
that all philosophical traditions are dealing in their own way with the 
same problems is easier to cast doubt on than it is to support. And 
this serves as a kind of justification for the self-imposed limitations 
9 
of this study. The particular tradition we have chosen also naturally 
-suggests taking-., a historical approach to'it, for all of it's members 
were themselves keenly ýware of and concerned with their own 
historicity, as an essential feature of their philosophizing. It 
would be either an enormous arrogance or naivety to try to understand 
those thinkers without taking seriously their own historical sense of 
their activity. We'should perhaps add that they did all share a single 
understanding of what might be meant by that historicity. For Husserl, 
the lesson of history was the need for a radically new ( and originally 
I18-- unhiStorical ) approach , and it was only later that he attempted 
anything like a serious treatment of the history of philosophical probl-ý 
For Hegel and Heideggeýr 
*the 
other hand, it is only ems and outlook on 
the history of thought that makes thought possible, even if, for 
Heidegger, it also sets limits to thought, limits that seem to require 
to be surmounted. This general concern with the history of philosophy IS 
not only Something'to be mentioned once and then forgotten. For Derrida's 
method of reading philosophical texts to become clear, we will have to 
relate it to precisely those ways of thinking about and working through 
philosophy's past that his predecessors developed. - So even one's method 
of reading history has a history which needs to be explained. For example, 
Derrida calls his own method deconstru'cti6n, 'which has clear filiations 
with Heidegger's very positive account of 'destruction' in Being and Time. 
Some attempt is made to deal with these questions in the last chapter 
of this thesis - "The Philosophy of the Future" - see below. 
our general critical claim about Derrida's views on time is that 
unless one-supposes thatIall concepts are metaphysical in which case 
the claim about the concept of time in particular is much less interest- 
ing) his conclusion about time does not follow from his premises, unless 
10 
we endorse in his writing a level of analysis ( which we shall call 
. 
quasi-transcendental ) that he himself supplies us with the tools for 
dismantling. Derrida does indeed liberate us once and for all from the 
quest-. '-for an 'original' time, from one which would contain within itself 
some foundational power and evidential primacy. But far from ruling out 
'another concept of time' he actually-opens the way for one. 
Our reconstruction of 'the argument' - the series of analyses on 
which Derrida's general remark about time rests will focus initially 
on two plausible candidates for a 'alternative concept of time' - the 
phenomenological version offered by Husserl, and the existential 
account(s) offered by Heidegger. These present themselves as pivotal 
paradigms because they each do so in the course of a general critical 
reading of the whole history of philosophy ( as metaphysics), because 
there are clear and strong intellectual biographical links between 
Heidegger's account and Husserl's ( Heidegger edited, perhaps somewhat 
perfunctorily, Husserl's lectures ori time-consciousness from 1905 
and 1905-1910, published eventually in 1928, as Vorlesungen zur 
Phenomenologie-des inneren Zeitbewusstseins ), and because Derrida 
has devoted much of his writing to their gbniral philosophical positions 
and to their specific claims about time. Indeed it would not be entirely 
misleading to treat Derrida's 'no non-metaphysical coneeption, of time' 
claim as a conclusion drawn from, and certainly well-exemplified by, 
the difficulties encountered in and ny Husserl and Beidegger in trying to 
fomulate one. 
This thesis offers both a critical assessment of Derrida's general 
argument insofar as it draws conclusions about time, and a constructive 
attempt to supply, if only in outline, and developing certain suggestions 
Derrida himself makes, an alternative , yet non-metaphysical account of 
time and the temporal. 
I. Husserl's Phenomenology of Time 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Intuitional Foundations of Husserl's 
ýPhenomenology and the Requirement, of an 
Original ( Pre-objective ) Temporality. 
, 
The, powerful and enormously productive thrust of Husserl's ,, 
phenomenology, is the affirmation of a value that in his eyes all previous 
philosophy had lacked. Contact, immediacy, fullness, primordiality, 
intuition all cluster round this central value, which could be, called 
112 presence'. Along with a number of other thinkers, (such as Marx and 
Freud) whose thought in, this respect shares, the same structure, Husserl's 
affirmation of. this value sustains a repeated opposition between a public, 
completed, 'objective', derived, inauthentic account of things, and the 
directly. graspable, subjectively-intuitable, original, authentic account 
of things. 
3 As Marx had elaborated an,, ideolbgy-critique, and-Freud the 
practice of, psychoanalysis, Husserl, too developed a special method, for 
prising apart the merely taken-for-granted from the intuitively graspable, 
and for describing delicately and. in detail ýhe region of intuitive , 
transparency that this distinction opens up, This begins with a stage, 
which is variously called an epochi, bracketing out, suspension and 
phenomenological reduction. The operation that takes place at this stage. 
is crucial., for, the whole subsequent course of phenomenology, Husserl 
draws both on the distinction we have just made, between the lived ex- 
perience transparently grasped as such, and the taken-for-granted or, 
'natural' attitude that we unphilosophically take up,,, but also on the 
distinction between Reality as such, and our grasp of it, however primordial 
or., derived this latter might be. . 
Husserl wants. to set,, aside, bracket out, 
12. 
both 'Reality as such' and our 'natural attitude' towards it. 
'we are concerned with reality only insofar as it is 
intended, represented, intuited, or conceptually 
thought. ' (Husserl PITC p. 28) 
Our 'natural attitude' gets 'put aside' not because it is false 
(indeed he will not make that claim) but because part of what is involved 
in this 'attitude' is its lack of concern with the ground of its truth, 
its reflexive complacency. And 'reality as such' is 'put aside' because 
we can only know or say anything about it via an account of our own 
constitutive meaning-giving activity, not as it is 'in-itself'. What 
phenomenology seeks, then, is access to those meaning-giving acts on which 
our grasp of the real depends, and which will illuminate the knowledge we 
already possess by exposing its grounding in such intentional acts. 
It might fairly be said, and Husserl was well aware of this, that 
the possibility of phenomenology rests on negotiating a delicate passage 
between psychologism on the one hand and some sort of linguistic philosophy 
on the other. Husserl's concern lest phenomenology be thought to be nothing 
other than a specialized branch of psychology dealing with mental activity 
was well founded. The logical principles with which he first concerned 
himself could not be the subject matter of an empirical science at the 
same time as being essentially presupposed by any science. Clearly there 
could be (for there is) some psychological interest in logical thinking - 
when it arises, how it develops through childhood, under what conditions it 
is abandoned and so on - but psychology could never tell us what logical 
principles were, or why they were valid. While logical principles can be 
embodied in or be the object of thought nothing guarantees that thinking 
will be logical, and if we are concerned with the common characteristics of 
all thought (such as predication) there is nothing essential that psychology 
- which deals, as does any science, with variations - can tell us about it. 
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Husserl's insight was to have realized that the most general cognitive 
framework of science (- any rigorous/disciplined thinking) could not 
itself be the subject matter of an empirical science let alone be justified 
by such an approach. His solution was not to abandon any attempt to 
ground thinking absolutely, nor to focus in a consequentialist manner 
on where different conceptual systems lead us, but to develop an analytic 
method for describing what he would call the ideal structures of our 
conscious life. And this should not be taken as an exercise in the 
imagination that would idealize its subject matter with flattering artistry, 
but as a method that discerns the actually operative ideal in experience. 
Phenomenology, then, is an analytical method devoted to describing the 
qualitative constants of human experience. In so far as that experience 
has more or less primitive aspects to it, and is an activity, not merely 
a receptive surface, phenomenology is also concerned to bring out the 
constructive, or constitutive depth of experience. 
it is through this concept of ideality (of 'essence') that both 
the method and subject matter of phenomenology can be kept distinct from 
that of any empirical science, including psychology. But it is equally 
important, if we are to retain Husserl's sense of his own enterprise, that 
we steer clear of another false alignment. 
It would be easy to suppose that the ideality Husserl discerns in 
experience is none other than that of the ideality of language. Is it 
not through language that meanings get fixed, that ideality is born? 
4 
But to follow this path would naturally lead to the abandonment of any 
interest in experience or conscious life as such, because there would 
always be a more direct route through some sort of philosophy of language. 
This is not the path Husserl followed. The reasons for this are his- 
torically momentous. If Frege's (1894) critical review of Husserl's 
14, 
Philosophy of_Arithmetic as a piece of psychologism had converted Husserl 
to his own views we would not have had the great divide in the twentieth 
century between linguistic philosophy and phenomenology. Quite how far 
Frege's review influenced the course of Husserl's thought is a matter of 
debate. 5 What is less a matter of debate is that phenomenology claims to 
provide a distinct solution to the problem of psychologism, one that not 
only cannot lean on, or be reduced to, a covert philosophy of language, 
6 
but would itself account for precisely that ideality which language 
exhibits. 
For example, when discussing the difficulties that ordinary language 
- often ambiguous and vague - presents for the development of a scientific 
method, Husserl clearly gives to language the task of adquately representing 
what has already been intuitively clarified. He talks of 
'the requirement that the same words and propositions shall 
be unambiguously correlated with certain essences that can 
be intuitively apprehended and constitute their completed 
"meaning", ' 
Ideas 066 
And even when he describes the countervailing tendency to associative 
ambiguity and dispersal of meaning, the same dependency of language on 
intuition is maintained. He talks of "cancelling" 
I other meanings which under certain circumstances thrust 
themselves forward through the force of habit' 
(ibid. ) 
For Husserl, 'essences' discovered by reflection on our conscious life 
precede language and make it possible. Ideality is a prelinguistic 
phenomena. 
There are a number of ways one can criticize Husserl's phenomeno- 
logical approach. The subsequent history of twentieth century philosophy 
is littered with positions that either explicitly take issue with it 
(Marxism, structuralism, existential phenomenology, to name but a few) 
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or offer alternatives based on premises that phenomenology would dispute 
(such as logical atomism, logical positivism, ordinary language philosophy, 
pragmatism). One could put in question its apparently-foundational model 
8 
of justification. ' One could doubt the very possibility of the pre- 
predicative description that seems to be entailed. 
9- Or one could dispute 
the adequacy, possibility, and viability of, the particular kind of , 
"foundation" Husserl constantly demands. ' We will discuss this later 
when we look at Derrida's critique of 'presence'. 
But before taiing up such external positions it is always worth 
drawing"attention to a philosopher's 'own disc'ussion of, or confrontation 
with, the limits of his thought. This we shall do for Husserl, drawing 
on a number of sections 6f, ldeas 1. 
be helpful here. 
A word about underlying"strategy might 
We hold the value of philosophical criticism (and indeed the claim 
can be extended to other, theoretical disciplines, including the natural 
sciences) to lie not so often in the refutation or confirmation of a 
philosophical position (or theory, or conceptual framework... ) but in the 
demonstration or exploration of the limits of its scope of productiv e- 
appiication. A philosophical'position (etc. ) formulated or held in the 
absence of any reflective grasp of the limits of its application could be 
said to be formulated or held metaphysically. 
10 From the point of-view 
of intellectual productivity this can be, at different periods in the 
life of-a position, a 'good' thing, or a 'bad' thing, 'necessary' or 
'remediable' etc. Thus it may be important that a position be initially 
formulated in an exaggeratedly universalistic way to seem to be a plausible 
successor to a current position similarly formulated. 
one danger with such talk of limits, that we would hope to avoid 
is the ultimately complacent assumption that all successfully 'limited' 
16. 
philosophical positions could be compatibly ranged or articulated in a 
single conceptual space. On this view, criticism would be analogous to 
the proceedings of an international boundary commission in that it would 
suppose that the nature of this 'space' was not itself a matter of 
philosophical debate. Furthermore, and to prevent any misunderstanding, 
we should also add that we do not at. all deny that philosophical positions 
can be plain incoherent, inconsistent, based on false premisses etc. and 
that criticism can in these cases be healthily destructive. We are not 
proposing to establish a rest-home for lame ducks. 
We shall now turn to a discussion of the limits of Husserlian 
phenomenology, which will prepare the way for a critique of his attempt 
at a radically anti-metaphysical 'theory of time'. 
" 
one of the key areas in which Husserl gives expression to the 
limits of phenomenology (without himself conceiving these limits nega- 
tively) is in his discussion of phenomenological method. This is hardly 
surprising for two reasons: (1) it would seem quite generally true that 
one's philosophical method is something that is always already at work 
(or in play) as soon as one writes. If one subsequently returns to 
question it, that questioning would constitute a further elaboration of 
one's method. Does not that resultant complex strategy ultimately just 
stand or fall without further justification, and this constitute a 'limit' 
to any philosophical position? (2) Such a general argument seems to be 
especially important for phenomenology because its claims for philosophical 
renewal rest on adopting a radically new method. 
I shall focus first on a remark Husserl makes in Ideas 03 entitled 
'Essential Insight and Individual Intuition'. He writes 
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'At first "essence" indicated that which in the intimate 
self-being of an individual thing discloses to us "what" 
it is. But every such What can be "set out as Idea". 
Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into 
essential insight (ideation) -a possibilitZ which is 
itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential 
possibility. The object of such insight is then the 
corresponding pure essence, whether it be the highest 
category or one of its specializations, right down to the 
fully concrete. ' 
p. 54 (our emphasis) 
Husserl is explaining here how essences can be generated as objects of 
a distinctive kind of insight, by a certain transformation of our 
understanding of the essential nature of particular 'things'. We shift 
from thinking of a quality as instantiated in a thing to thinking of it 
in its own right. He will proceed shortly to some of the implications 
of this possibility, but before following him I would like to focus here 
on the apparent circularity of the words I drew attention to above - 
'a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as 
essential possibility'. To see that thi's transformational possibility 
is 'an essential possibility' (and not merely a move that, as it happeng, 
we can perform), we have to be able, presumably, to make it itself the 
object of essential intuition. This involves seeing that the 'essential' 
properties of individuals have a built-in indepenýence of any particular 
individuals in which they happen to inhere ('Whatever belongs to the 
essence of the individual can also belong to another individual', 02)y 
and that it is consequently possible to have a grasp of such properties 
independently of their concrete inherence. This grasp would involve 
'essential insight'. 
But if there is a circularity here it is not vicious. Essential 
intuition does not depend for its validity on being a transformation of 
individual intuition, and 'judgements of essence' do not depend for their 
truth on their being transformable from and into 'judgements of essential 
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generality'. There is rather a quite fundamental assumption as to the 
existence and importance of a distinctive kind of intuition which Husserl 
calls essential. What. appears as a circularity is in fact just the 
recursive use of what is deemed a privileged mode of cognition. When he 
laments Killpe's critique of his 'theory of categorial intuition' (03 n. 1) 
he immediately goes on to refer to it as a 'simple and quite fundamental 
insight'. So the theory of categorial intuition is an insight, Le. an 
intuition. And this confirms our suggestion that what we are dealing 
with in Husserl's work is a repeated appeal to a privileged source of a 
privileged kind of knowledge which precedes and sustains any subsequent 
'theory'. That is, we will not (unless we insist on transforming this 
valuation of intuition into one) find a basic premise, or set of premises, 
underlying Husserlian phenomenology, but rather a certain (alleged) 
cognitive possibility. 
Now it is of course open to us to question whether we do in fact 
possess the capacity for 'essential intuition' as he describes it, and 
whether it has the epistemological status he claims for it. (He claims 
it is the basis of a whole range of 'eidetic sciences'. ) We might argue, 
for instance, that Husserl is not justified in supposing that just because 
an essential characteristic of a thing is independent of its instantiation 
in any particular individual item, it can be grasped independently of any 
instantiation at all. But Husserl's position here is quite subtle. He 
insists that 'no essential intuition is possible without the free possibility 
of directing one's glance to an individual counterpart and of shaping an 
illustration'. In fact, while there is a difference in principle between 
essential and individual intuition, each depends on being convertible into 
the other. Husserl is not advocating a complete separation of essential 
intuition from concrete instances. And interestingly such instances may 
19 
as well be imagined as real. 
our first tentative conclusion is that phenomenolojy rests on a 
primitive valuation of intuition, and this will constitute - not necessarily 
in a negative way - the first limit. 
Our second focus will be on an important chapter in Ideas (section 
ch. 1) "Preliminary Considerations of Method", and certain immediately 
preceding remarks. 
In 060, "The Suspending of the Material-Eidetic Disciplines", part 
of the previous chapter on the Phenomenological Reduction, Husserl is 
explaining the method of reduction by which phenomenology brackets out 
of consideration all that 'transcends consciousness', so that it can fulfill 
its own methodological standard, and claim 
'nothing that we cannot make essentially transparent to 
ourselves by reference to Consciousness and on purely 
inmanental lines. ' 
The question he poses at the start of-060 is whether there are any limits 
to this reductive procedure. Be claims there are: 
'As regards the eidetic fields of study on their material 
side, one of these is of such outstanding significance 
for us that the impossibility of disconnexion can be taken 
for granted: that is, the essential domain of the phen- 
omenologically purified consciousness itself .... we could 
not dispense with the a priori consciousness. A science of, 
fact cannot alienate the right'of making use of the essential 
truths which relate to the individual objectivities of its 
own domain. Now it is our direct intention ... to esea-blish 
phenomenology itself as an eidetic science, as the theory 
of the essential nature of transcendentally purified conscious- 
nesSSI (p. 177). 
Husserl is saying that there are some 'essences' which are instantiated 
in things that transcend consciousness, and others which are instantiated 
within the 'immanent formations of consciousness' itself., An essential 
grasp of the concepts involved in an abstract 'chronology' or 'topology' 
or tmereology'... for example, could be bracketed out, but (I take him 
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to be saying) the distinctions (see section I ch. 1) between fact and 
essence or between transcendent and immanent, for example, could not. 
There is an obvious reason for this. The very value and possibility of 
undertaking these reductions is explicable only using these distinctions. 
If disconnexion, suspensiong bracketting out, could be glossed as 'making 
no use of' certain concepts, then the limit reached would not merely be 
one beyond which the intelligibility or importance, or interest in the 
reductive procedure'might be put in doubt, but a logical limit. One 
simply cannot, in principle, successfully employ a procedure which 
involves applying certain concepts so as to suspend the use of such 
concepts. If one were to 'succeed' one would retroactively annul the 
procedure by which that success had been brought about, and so annul the 
success itself. Briefly, reduction is an achievement dependent on the 
concomitant satisfaction of procedural norms* 
But to say it is a logical limit is just not simply to confirm 
Husserl's claim about the 'right' of any science of fact to utilize its 
own essential truths; it turns one's attention towards the very methodo- 
logical and conceptual framework within which such limits arise. In our 
previous discussion we concluded that phenomenology rested on a primItive 
valuation of 'intuition' (= the transparent grasp of the essence of some 
conscious formation, a close cousin of Descartes' 'clearness and dis- 
tinctness'). And that would suggest that critical distance to Husserl 
could only be taken up by scrutinizing this notion, or the founding value 
he gives it. 
12 
Curiously, perhaps, in his chapter on Method, he gives a somewhat 
different solution to the problems of reflexivity, circularity and limits 
in phenomenology. In 065, "The Reference of Phenomenology Back to its 
own Self", he writes 
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'it might be a stumbling block to someone that whereas 
from the phenomenological standpoint we direct our mental 
glance towards this or that pure experience with a view 
to studying it, the experiences of this inquiry itself, 
of this adoption of a standpoint, and this direction of 
the mental glance, taken in their phenomenological purity, 
should belong to the domain of what is to be studied' 
(pp M-10) 
Husserl gives three different justifications of this reflexivity. 
(1) He begins by claiming that it is not problematic, because it 
is no less true of psychology of logic ('the thinking of the psychologist 
is itself something psychological, the thinking of the logician something 
logical... But this is surely an unconvincing respose, for 
a. it is hard to accept a justification of phenomenological 
, reflexivity which 
involves drawing paralle16 with empirical 
or purely formal disciplines from which Husserl has at all 
other times been at such pains to distinguish it; 
b. while it is undoubtedly true that 'the thinking of, the 
psychologist is itself psychological etc. ' what is 
disturbing (at least potentially) about the self-reference 
of phenomenology is that unlike psychology or logic (at 
least according to phenouienology) phenomenology is concerned 
with its own ultimate grounding, as-. an ordinary factual 
or formal science need not be. 
The question is, does this self-reference have any bearing on phenomenology's 
claim to have achieved, or to be, able to achieve, this grounding? 
Husserl seems to deny that it does: 
'This back reference upon myself would be a matter of concern 
only if upon the phenomenological, psychological and logical 
knowledge of this momentary thinking of this momentary thinker 
depended the knowledge of all other matters in the relevant 
spheres of study, which is, as anyone can see, an absurd pre- 
supposition. ' 
(ibid. P. 190) 
But this implausible exaggeration of the original problem is not a, 
satisfactory response. That problem is: what effect does it have on 
the status of phenomenological scrutiny that this scrutiny (and all its 
accessory features) should itself belong to the field (presumably of 
immanent formations) which is itself to be studied phenomenologically? 
22 
If we were to pretend that such scrutiny, at whatever level it occurs, 
has as its object the awarding of 'epistemological value', this might 
seem an innocent enough fact. But the self-reference in question would 
precisely have the effect of confirming that the method of phenomenology 
did indeed conform to the standards it itself embodied, and thus give 
the appearance of an epistemological status that would block or at least 
deter subjecting these standards to an independent assessments And such 
an assessment might be thought desirable. 
Indeed, having begun by saying that the self-reference does not 
present a difficulty, Husserl goes on to admit that there is a sort of 
difficulty, one that phenomenology shares with other sciences, and this 
leads him into his second justification for reflexivity. 
(2) Husserl in effect offers an account of the development of formal 
sciences (and of the formal structure of natural sciences) in which the 
self-reflexion of phenomenology is*no mere logical possibility, or 
difficulty with which we must somehow come to terms, but the operation 
by which a procedure ('directing our mental glance towards a certain 
experience'), which is first carried out more or less innocently, is 
raised to a more 'scientific' (i. e. refined, precise, self-transparent) 
level, as reflection would do to any practice. In other words, the. 
character of the second 'glance' is different from the first; it is 
specifically concerned to transform the 'unsophisticated form' of the 
procedure into something more rigorously formulated. This is not merely 
a useful means of clarification, it is an essential phase in the develop- 
ment of any science: 
'Without preliminary and preparatory consideration both 
of matter and method, the sketch of a new science could 
never be outlined. i3 
(ibid. p. 190) 
So Husserl is-claiming that the reflection involved is no mere logical 
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possibility but the means by which phenomenology develops itself as a 
science. Self-reflection is defended as a necessity, even a virtue, 
rather than as presenting any sort of difficulty. 
(3) Husserl's, third justification is that the intuitively compelling 
and yet modest method that phenomenology makes use of precludes the 
possibility of difficulties arising: 
'If it figures as a science within the limits of 
mere immediate intuition, a pure Idescripti: on' 
science of essential Being, the general nature of its 
procedure is given in advance as. something that needs 
no further explanation. 
(ibid. p. 190, last emphasis ours) 
This modest self-limitation is, I take, it, an attempt to play down the 
I 
'epistemological validation' side of phenomenology, by referring to its 
descriptive method and its restriction to intuitions. If it does not 
explain or justify and only says what is so clearly the case as to be 
indisputable, no problem could possibly arise. It is interesting to 
note, in the sentence we quoted, the phrase Igivenin 
I 
advance as', for, 
II 
whether Husserl likes it or not, this raises yet again all the questions 
about how far phenomenology is pure description. It is quite true that 
'immediate intuition' and 'description' suggest there is no need for 
further explanation. But this way of thinking might be wholly, illusory. 
Something can be 'given' in a certain way, but not actually be that way. 
This is quite obvious when one thinks of the relation between spatial 
aspects and actual shape. But equally, Husserl's 'given in advance as' 
suggests the kind, of rationally deducible future (insofar as it concerns 
the development-of phenomenology) that might lead one to deduce the 
completeness of arithmetic from, the possibility of providing it with 
formal axioms. 
14 And how many more opportunities are there for gaps 
to develop when one is dealing1with such qualities-as 'need for explanation'. 
Such needs can develop from unsuspected quarters even when not originally 
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apparent. And one obvious way in which such a need carf appear is through 
a reflective grasp of phenomenology's limits, in which internal self- 
satisfaction (eg. about the adequacy of an intuitive ground) is subjected 
to external critical appraisal. 
* 
I would like now to suggest what conclusions we can draw about the 
limits of phenomenology from these probings of the points at which Husserl 
himself has appeared sensitive to the issue. I shall then suggest certain 
lines of criticism, and then show that Husserl's analysis of in ternal 
time-consciousness was intended as an answer to at least one of these lines. 
The most conspicuously reiterated conclusion to be drawn is that 
intuitive transparency is a standard that is so fundamental to phenomeno- 
logy that it not only characterizes the everyday products of phenomeno- 
logical method, but also the results of phenomenological self-reflection, 
reflection on that very method. There is nothing necessarily corrupt 
about this. If another standard did arise at the level of reflection, 
it could undermine the operation of the original standard at the level 
of ordinary phenomenological description. No critique of phenomenology, 
then, could deny that phenomenology was self-critical. But what might 
still be scrutinized is the value accorded to this pervasive standard of 
'intuitive transparency'. 
I would like now to propose three different critical perspectives 
on phenomenology, from which, singly and collectively, the importance to 
Husserl of a theory of internal time consciousness will become evident: 
1. The problem of reconciling the descriptive and legitimating 
aspects of intuition. 
2. The problem of performing (and indeed of making sense of) that 
25 
0 
detachment from the world on which phenomenological self-scrutiny depends. 
3. The problem of giving public expression (in language) to private 
intuition without epistemological corruption. 
1. 
, 
The appeal of phenomenology (and perhaps any positive philosophical 
valuation of intuition), is that it (uneasily) combines (i) the idea of a 
purely descriptive method,, that, after certain purifying procedures, is 
licensed to tell it how it is, and (ii) the, idea that it is only through 
an intuitive apprehension that, the concepts and the principles that organize 
our, scientific knowledge can be legitimated. 
15 Now. it is easy enoughp 
perhaps, too easyq to argue that one cannot derive,, legitimations from 
descriptions unless those descriptions covertly include valuations 
which would deprive them of their status as pure descriptions. As 
strict adherence to Humels, position can easily lead one to being unable 
to understand any valuations as anything other than irrational preferences, 
one might be excused for thinking that the matter was not so simple, and 
perhaps even that this uneasy combination of fact and value in 'intuition, 
might indeed secretly hold the solution to this, problem. This does, not 
.ý (j, 
seem likely, at least in the form that Husserl presents it. What it seems 
to preclude is the undermining of the status of an original intuition in 
the light of the consequences that can be drawn from it. One's moral 
intuitions, for example, are notoriously vulnerable to subversion by the 
deducti_on of unacceptable consequences from them, despite the utter 
clarity. and transparency of-the original insight. And yet it might be 
said that it is not the value itself which is undermined, but the scope 
of its application. It ceases to be thought of as absolute., it loses its 
metaphysical status. 
16 The, recognition that there might be circumstances 
in which one would be prepared to kill does not refute a no killing 
principle, it just limits it, by demonstrating its potential conflict 
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with other values. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of questioning the offerings of moral 
intuition raises the question of whether something parallel is equally 
possible in the formal and empirical sciences. And of course it is. 
Even the self-evidence of certain logical laws has been questioned. 
(Does-the law of Excluded Middle apply to statements about the future, 
or to statements embodying false presuppositions? Have I or have I not 
sold my submarine? ) And the danger for Husserl is that intuition would 
be reduced to being a source of candidates for logical primitiveness that 
would be judged by other standards (eg. hypothesis generating capacity$ 
practical utility, compatibility with the conceptual frameworks of other 
theories, etc. ) 
NOTE: We do not mean to suggest that Husserl was not aware of many 
of these questions. He was well aware, for example, that intuition was 
not a foolproof basis for knowledge, or at least he became aware of this. 
In his "Phenomenology of the Reason" 
17 he brings these issues to the fore. 
One of the most important moves he makes, having pin-pointed self-evidence 
as the feature of intuitive apprehension that gives it its status, is to 
distinguish between adequate and inadequate self-evidence (0138) in which, 
as will be clear, 'self-evidence' is used in an 'extended sense'. Adequate 
self-evidence is that found in eg. simple arithmetical propositions (2+2=4). 
Its chief characteristics are that subsequent experience cannot strengthen 
or weaken it, and that it lacks 'the graded differences of a weight'. 
Yet, 'a thing in the real world ... can within the finite limits of 
appearance appear only "inadequately"' for all our intuitive grasp of 
worldly things is in principle subject to confirmation (harmonious "filling- 
out") or cancellation, fragmentation into a multitude of hypotheses etc. 
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A facade, for example, may lead us to posit a house which closer inspection 
will reveal not to be there. 
Three points should be carried forward from this NOTE for considera- 
tion: 
a. Husserl supposes that the various modes of confirmation, cancellation, 
fragmentation etc. of 'inadequate' self-evidence can be given a rationil 
organization, conform to various standard types. 
b. He takes for-granted (i. e. presumably as 'adequately self-evident') 
the distinction between adequate and inadequate and its corresponding 
application to domains of obj ects distinguished as immanent and transcendent 
(as I understand it). - This would seem to leave somewhat undecided the 
status of 'complex rational objects', if I might so label complicated 
proofs, difficult mathematical equations, theories and so on. Descartes 
18 faced just this problem and his solution - speed reviewing of the simple 
parts and their relations so as tobring them all within a single momentary 
gaze - shows exactly how the problem of time arises for Husserl. 
C. For it is clear that the difference between adequate and inadequate 
self-evidence is nothing but a reflection of the distinction between what 
can or cannot be exhaustively grasped in a single moment, in the present. 
What is inadequately self-evident is in effect only a convincing pointer 
to a fulness that one at that moment merely posits. And yet the idea of 
anything at all taking place in an instant (an infinitely small temporal 
interval) is quite implausible. What is called for, and what, in effect 
Husserl suppliest is a phenomenology of the present. 
Having concluded this long NOTE to our first critical perspective 
on Husserl, we turn now to the second. 
2. The systematic use of intuition as the basis for organized scientific 
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knowledge requires, for phenomenology, the successful completion of an 
act of cognitive purification -a reduction of our conscious life to 
the life of consciousness, and then, as we have indicated, a focussing 
on the immanent structures of that consciousness. 
19 Husserl was quite 
aware of the possibility of scepticism about the possibility of such 
detachment and indeed attempts to deal with it (in 064v "The Self-Suspension 
of the Phenomenologist"). The fact that existentialists make such 
scepticism the backbone of their objection to Husserlian phenomenology 
suggests that this idea of detachment was not wholly convincing. In, 
Heidegger's existential ontology, for example, knowing is just a mode 
of Being-in-the-world, which radically undercuts the status Husserl gives 
to the reductions. Merleau-Ponty thought of the reductions much more as 
a way of focussing on the structures of existence, an operation that can 
never be completed, and not as capable of bringing about any sort of 
ontological self-transformation. Obviously one question'that will concern 
us is how far Husserl's account of time-consciousness is dependent on his 
belief in the possibility of existential detachment. 
The last critical perspective one ought at least to adumbrate is one 
for which we have already laid the groundwork in discussing Husserl's 
charting his course between the Scylla of psychologism and the Charybdis 
of offering-merely a disguised philosophy of language. In his Rules 
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Descartes claims at one point that while intuition is unchallengeable, 
as soon as one proceeds to judgements about such intuitions, fallibility 
immediately appears. The problem is how one retains the virtues of 
pre-predicative insight at the level of linguistically articulated 
expression. For the relation of ladequation' or 'fulfilment' or 
'correspondence' between what it is one has grasped and the conditions 
of presentation that make its public appearance possible is extended to 
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the point of fracture. If phenomenology is not to be forever plagued 
by the problem of the linguistic form of its insights, it must hold one 
of two 'theories' of language: (i) that at some level, whether it be 
the level of the primitive elements of language, such as morphemes or 
words, or that of such articulated complexes as sentences, language must 
be capable of adequately capturing the intuitive contents of phenomeno- 
logically purified experience; or, (ii) that even if language in its 
normal, imprecise form cannot do this, that it can be sharpened upt used 
in careful accordance with definitions, rules etc., so as to achieve this 
result. 
In its broadest form, the difficulty with either view is that even 
if there was some sense to be given to 'language capturing its objects', 
it is hard to see how the ideal of such a precise relationship could survive 
unscathed the material conditions of language use - the permanent sway of 
a pragmatic dimension (context, local conventions of use, range of particular 
intentions in play, etc. ) If speaking/writing/understanding language is 
an interminable process (both, in princiiple, for each item, and because 
of the infinite number of such items) rather than the simple emitting and 
receiving of a message, then the prospect of phenomenology as an apodeictic 
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science would be dim. This line of argument is not weakened by the actual 
existence of empirical sciences, for they do not claim the apodeictic 
qualities of certainty, necessity, clarity etc. that phenomenology makes 
its own. The proper comparison would be with formal sciences like 
geometry or mathematics. Surely they exist, and are successful? And 
yet Husserl claims that to grasp what geometry is about we have not merely 
to be able to do geometrical proofs, but to be able to reactivate the 
original insights that fundamentally sustain geometrical thinking. But 
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if at the level of mere symbolic manipulation, the internal coherence 
of (a particular) geometry may be quite unchallengeable, the introduction 
of another standard - that of the adequacy of one's inner understanding - 
puts in question all that purely terminological and operational precision. 
So, even if the ideal of an apodeictic science were a plausible one for 
phenomenology to aim at, even if comparison with geometry was appropriateg 
one would still be faced with the difficulty that the apodeicticity in 
question remains a property of basic insights, and does not extend to the 
relation between those insights and their linguistic form. 
The question that persists, and in its more complex shape can 
usefully be divided into two parts, is this: (i) even if we allow 'within 
its own limits' the possibility of intuitions grounded in the transparent 
immediacy of present experience, does not the requirement to embody these 
intuitions in a public language - subject to all the vagaries of historical, 
social, scientific, even political pressures - explode the privileged 
interiority of intuition, and deprive the phenomenologist's public version 
of the value he aimed at? 
22 We could call this the problem of the 
clothing of intuition. 
23 (11) More radically we may come to question the 
alleged independence of this intuitional layer from the structure of signi- 
fication found in language. This move, which can be attributed to Derrida, 
has (for us) the important corollary that the whole ideal of a realm of 
(evidential) presencet and of an internal time-consciousness that would 
sustain it, is undermined. Derrida's denial of an alternative non-meta- 
physical temporality is clearly dependent on his view that the epistemo- 
logical function served by Husserl's account of time-consciousness both 
determines the nature of that account in advance, and teaches us a wider 
lesson about the philosophical status of theories of time. Derrida's 
critique of Husserl is discussed at length below (ch. 3). our immediate 
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task is to explain how Husserl's theory of internal time-consciousness 
reflects, depends on and is limited by the theoretical tasks for which 
it was invented. 
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Husserl's Phenomenology of TiMe 
CHAPTER TWO 
Husserl's, Analysis of Time-Consciousness 
'The conclusions we advance in regard to 
these matters, because of the difficulty 
and obscurity, of Husserl's analyses, will 
involve a considerable degree of speculation 
and should be. taken as tentative. ' 
John Brough 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall try to show how Husserl's quest for 
11 
an 'authentic time' leads him to a point at which the very idea of 
time is itself put in question. This startling conclusion sheds 
an entirely unexpected light (and hitherto unnoticed) on Derrida's 
I insistence that time is.. an essentially metaphysical conceptý, I 
begin, however, by trying to answer certain fairly analytical 
questions: 
1. How far is Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousnessla 
complete and successful philosophy of time? 
2, If there is more to be said, does this. mean an expanded phen- 
omenology, or a going beyond phenomenology? 
3. What scope does Husserl claim for it?, 
4. How far does his, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 
(hereafter PITC) rest on questionable/unexamined/optiona1 assumptions? 
What schemas, conceptual frameworks does Husserl make use of? 
Answering these (and allied) questions should help us to judge 
whether Husserl's phenomenology is, indeed 'the highest point of the 
metaphysical tradition' (Derrida) and in particular what the nature of 
the relationship between Husserl and Derrida (so often misunderstood) 
might be. We shall argue in the next chapter that Derrida is perhaps 
even closer to Husserl than he knew. The position of1the PITC is 
critical in this regard, as Husserl (albeit in his own terms) fully 
34, 
understood. If one of the key characteristics of metaphysics is the 
privileging of presence, then a work that actually deals thematically 
both with the temporal and the evidential present, as PITC does, will 
not be a metaphysical work by any failure to reflect, or by its 
temporary commitment to certain themes or procedures, but carefully* 
deliberately and whole-heartedly. This is possible because of what 
Heidegger calls the lunthought' in any thinking, which does not refer 
to shadowy parts of an otherwise. illuminated field, questions one 
just happens not to think about, but to what is structurally hidden 
by, one's,, very method of inquiry. (How, for example,, could a. 
_ 
questioning of reflection as a philosophical method that also made 
use of-reflection as its mode of scrutiny do other than repeat and 
hence endorse at least at some level, that very reflection 
Questions of Scope 
It is a natural or at. least common assumption that whether or 
not we accept Husserl's account of time-consciousnessq that it is a 
candidate for our acceptance as a philosophy of time in general -, indeed 
the correct one. That is to say, it is often supposed not merely 
that it offers an account of experiential time, but that. such an 
account either says all, there is to be said about time, or that 
anything else that could be said would rest on or be derivable from 
such an account,. and that Husserl's own account, of experiential time 
is the correct one (over and against those of Bergson, Brentano, James... 
This assumption will be progressively questioned in the course of this 
chapter, but it will be instructive first to consider Husserl's own 
position on this matter. 
In keeping with phenomenology's general procedure. Husserl begins 
PITC with a double move. He both distinguishes the phenomenological 
treatment of internal time-consciousness from other treatments of time 
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(01,02) and claims a privileged status for the phenomenological 
treatment. So he does not think that a phenomenology, of time- 
consciousness says all there is to say about time, but given-that 
what he distinguishes it from are psychological and other scientific 
studies, the clear suggestion is that there is no other (satisfactory) 
philosophical-treatment of time. Let us look at this double move in 
detail. 
A phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, in so far as 
it is phenomenological, involves (01) 'a complete exclusion of every 
assumption, stipulation, or conviction concerning objective time'. 
The (perfectly natural) assumption that there is a single all embracing 
objective time would be set aside. More importantly, certain ways of 
studying time, based on naturalistic assumptions, such as the psycho- 
physical correlation of objective and subjective measurement of time- 
intervals, are also excluded: 'Psychological apperception, which views 
lived experiences as psychical states of empirical persons ... is 
something wholly other than the phenomenological'. It is consistent 
with Husserl's view of the philosophical radicality of the phenomeno- 
logical approach that he does not specifically mention other 
philosophical treatments of time, with the exception of a passing 
reference to Augustine, and then, at greater length, Brentano, The 
implication, I believe is that it is only by the phenomenological 
approach that philosophy (let alone eg. a particular empirical science 
of psychology) can avoid making naturalistic and hence psychologistic 
assumptions about our relationship to it. If the case of Brentano 
can be taken as exemplary, we see that finally succumbing to some 
form of psychologism is a risk that even the subtlest of philosophers 
can fall prey to. But again, if we take the study of psychophysical 
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temporal correlations to be exemplary, then it is clear that Husserl 
believes there can be other ways of studying time, but simply that 
they are not properly philosophical in the sense of deaiing with the 
essence of time., When they do not pretend to be philosophical, they 
can simply be excluded; when they do they have to be criticized. 
And yet at the same time as Husserl is distinguishing the 
phenomenological from the naturalistic/psychologistic approach he is 
also claiming a-privilege for the former. What the latter approach 
takes for granted (objectivity, objective time) phenomenology offers 
an account of. - It is this move which leads to I ... the most extra- 
ordinary difficulties, contradictions and entanglements' that 
motivates the strictness of the phenomenological method. In giving 
an account of what it distinguishes itself from, phenomenology 
establishes a priority. - 'Phenomenologically speaking, objectivity 
is ... constituted ... through characters of apprehension and the 
regularities which pertain to the essence of these characters. it 
is precisely the business of the philosophy of cognition to grasp this 
fully and to make it completely intelligible. ' So a phenomenology of 
time both distýinguishes itself from any account which takes the 
objectivity of time (or indeed of anything) for granted, and goes on 
to give an account of how that is constituted, But while we can 
separate these two moves analytically, they are one and the same move 
in Husserl's writing. For the distinctiveness of the phenomenological 
approach in fact consists in its dealing with what precedes any 
objective formations, and such formations could have no other basis 
than these immanent acts that phenomenology uncovers. 
However, if we ask what the relationship (of constitution) 
comes to, we have to conclude that it can itself only be understood 
phenomenologically. Immanent acts do not literally constitute objects 
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in the way that cakes or candles are constituted of what they are made 
of. The language of 'act' and 'constitution' cannot be understood in 
any ordinary sense. 'For example, we are not dealing with events that 
occur 'in time', nor indeed with any temporal features at all. A 
closer but not precise parallel would be with a logical or conceptual 
relationship. So if a phenomenology. of time, whether or not the only 
possible philosophy, of time, deals with the most primitive forms of time 
which any other philosophy-of time would have to rest on, this privilege 
is one that it itself explains and justifies.. This would seem to 
suggest that the final answer. to the scope of a phenomenology-of time 
remains undetermined, for all we have is a phenomenological answerp an 
answer, that is, that rests' on the phenomenological concept of constitu- 
tion. Ifow far is this true? Might not phenomenology justifiably 
claim to be simply bearing the mantle of philosophy here? Do we not, 
in other words, accept the general approach that tries to deal with 
time in its fundamental features, rather than with-each and every 
concrete chronological phenomenon? Does not the concept of constitu- 
tion simply give, a phenomenological name to the relationship between 
these fundamental features,. and derived forms? Is it. not simply a 
consequence of it being a philosophical approach that phenomenology 
assesses its. own scope, and no sort of vicious circularity? Again, 
this is precisely phenomenology's position (but need it be ourls? ). 
Thus: 
'From the point of view of theory of knowledge, the 
question of the possibility of experience (which at the 
same time is the question of the essence of experience) 
necessitates a return to the phenomenological data of 
which all that is experienced consists phenomenologically' 
(02, PITC p. 27) 
and again 
'The question of the origin is oriented towards the 
primitive forms of the consciousness of time in which 
the primitive differences of the temporal are constituted 
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intuitively and authentically as the original sources 
of, all certainties relative to time' 
(02, p. 28) 
Husserl is claiming that phenomenology is required by the theory of 
knowledge and his conviction that phenomenology is. not just a more 
or less desirable philosophical option can be seen in his phrase 
'phenomenological data', which, echoing his slogan 'to the things 
themselves', suggests that phenomenology is not just a good method, 
but is in some way an approach required by what it has to deal with. 
This same suggestion appears even more strongly when Husserl refers 
to 'the primitive forms of the consciousness of time ... I We are 
not, it seems, dealing with a hypothesis here, but with a fact (of 
sorts). 
Now, it would be an immense task to try to adjudicate phen- 
omenology's claim to be 'first philosophy', and one that would divert 
us unjustifiably from our own questions, but it is clear that it was 
not Husserl who invented the idea of a theory of knowledge and the 
quest for primitive elements and forms of experiences, the belief 
in the possibility of focussing in on 'lived experience' are common 
ground particularly for that philosophical tradition we call empiricism. 
Phenomenology retains sufficient of the goals and orientations of 
philosophy to be radically philosophical. And certainly, its , 
abandonment of a largely passive and receptive model of experience 
is a great gain. So it would not be unreasonable for us to take 
seriously phenomenology's claim about. the scope of the phenomenology 
of time. But one phrase in the last sentence quoted above gives us 
pause for thought I ... as the originary sources of all certainties 
relative to time'. At the beginning of 07 (p. 42), Husserl asks 
two questions: (1) 'how the apprehension of transcendent temporal 
objects which extend over a duration is to be understood? ' (2) 'how, 
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in addition to "temporal objects", both immanent and transcendent, 
is time itself, ýhe duration and succession of Objects constituted? ' 
These two questions fall either side of another question about 
the relationship between the analysis of time and the theory of 
knowledge, one which our phrase takes one particular side of. The 
role of time or time-consciousness in making possible our grasp of 
temporally extended objects is one in which it is contributing to the 
theory of knowledge. And without an understanding of the role of 
retention, protention and memory in experience, no account of knowledge 
could be possible. On the other hand, Husserl is also concerned with 
time as an object of knowledge in its own right. He asks how time 
itself is constituted, and, as in the phrase just quoted, he is looking 
to account for our 'certainties relative to time', and, as we have said, 
a return to 'the primitive forms of the consciousness of time' is the 
direction he takes. 
Does this link between epistemological issues and the analysis 
of time teach us anything about the scope of Husserl's project here? 
Both a weak and a strong interpretation are possible. On the weak 
interpretation, Husserl is quite right to point out the importance of 
a theory of time to our knowledge of objects. Without temporal 
extension there would be no objects and without an understanding of 
the possible modes of temporal extension our knowledge would be funda- 
mentally deficient. (Consider the differences between, say, objects 
extended in time, objects temporally structured, and objects that 
structure their own time... ) And the concern to get to the bottom 
of our commonsense understanding of time itself is nothing more than 
an attempt to bring relief to those who, like St. Augustine, find 
themselves at sea when they try to get a reflective grip on time. 
Husserl's answer to'obscurity, difficulty, uncertainty is always and 
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understandably, to return to those most fundamental layers of experience 
in which primitive clarity has not yet been obscured. 
The strong (and potentially critical) interpretation would be 
that this two-way involvement with epistemological considerations does 
constitute a real limitation to the scope of Husserl's inquiry. The 
simplest statement of how this limitation can arise would go something 
like this: there is no necessary connexion between truth and. certainty 
of apprehension. Let us for the sake of argument suppose that there 
are indeed two kinds of knowledge that yield certainty - that which 
concerns mathematical and logical truths, and that which concerns what 
is immediately apprehensible. Many would deny the latter, and some 
the former. But even if we were to accept them, it requires an 
enormous act of faith to suppose that all truths can be grasped by 
reduction to one or other of these kinds of knowledge. Logical 
atomism, for example, elegantly orchestrated these two modes, treating 
complex propositions as logical constructions from simple ones that 
could be grasped with certainty. But it requires either faith or 
some sort of stipulative act to suppose that all knowledge can be dealt 
with in this way. And neither faith nor. stipulation are consistent 
with the standards of certainty, clarity and groundedness that such 
programmes affirm. 
Without taking on board all his accompanying intellectual 
baggage, we cannot but agree with Hegel when he wonders whether 'the 
fear of error (might not be) ... the initial error". And the way that 
Hegel and other philosophers like Dilthey developed this, by an appeal 
to 'understanding' rather than 'knowledge' still has some relevance 
today. For what traditional theory of knowledge takes for granted is 
that knowledge is a relationship between a clearly distinguished subject 
and object, and that every putative item of knowledge will appear, as 
41, 
such, as an object of some cognitive act (such as 'apprehension'). 
Only under this kind of spotlight can there by anything like certainty, 
or that clarity and distinctness that Descartes demanded as a standard. 
Now whatever one thinks of the possibility in principle of isolating 
objects of knowledge from the subject grasping them as such, there 
would seem to be clear cases in which such a separation could be 
expected to prove difficult, if not impossible. For example,. widely 
different theorists such as Foucault, Gadamer and Kuhn take this 
impossibility to lie behind the structural impossibility of historical 
reflexion on one's own present period, on the grounds that historical 
detachment cannot be purchased by greater reflective effort. One 
has to wait for the present to become past, for it to be capable of 
becoming an object. This is a negative example. Positively, the 
hermeneutic tradition does suppose that understanding may be possible 
where knowledge in the sense we have discussed above (a relationship 
between an independently identifiable subject and object) falters. 
Understanding (verstehen) proceeds by explication of what is being 
'lived through'. It is appropriate for self- understanding, for 
existential reflection, for historical understanding (at one level), 
for exploring thevealth of our taken-for-granted world etc. 
2 But it 
does not set itself certainty as a standard. That is not to say that 
it treats accuracy and correctness with disdain, but rather that it 
recognizes the inapplicability of the subject/object schema to which 
certainty as a standard belongs. 
Now the question as to the scope of Husserl's PITC can be posed 
anew if it is linked as it seems to be, to 'knowledge'. If, in other 
words, there are aspects, features, etc. of 'time' which are neither 
immediately available to phenomenological scrutiny, nor derivable from 
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those (ie. the primitive features) which are available, then Husserl's 
PITC will for all its virtues not be able to claim to be a philosophy of 
time, but only of time-consciousness. We hope to be able to sITow that 
what Heidegger and Derrida each offer are different ways of limiting 
Husserl's phenomenological treatment, by developing accounts of what 
it cannot adequately deal with. The enormously problematic nature of 
each of these efforts can be seen in the fact that the later Heidegger 
abandons talk of 'tim&I proper, and 'substitutes' a more primitive 
'time-space', while Derrida explicitly claims the metaphysical nature 
of any concept of time. If we were to treat these 'results' as the 
logical conseq uences of abandoning the link between time and epistem- 
ology it would cast a new light on Husserl. 's enterprise, although, as 
with all light, a new shadow will be cast too. For if we come to see 
Husserl as having taken to the limit the working out of the metaphysical 
concept of time, we might judge it either a finite project successfully 
completed, or, with a slight shift in one's angle of reading, as an 
enterprise doomed from the start by its metaphysical blinkers. In 
fact neither of these extreme judgements will quite fit. 
One of the interesting features of Husserl's analysis, as we 
shall see, is that he cannot in fact confine time to the status of an 
object of knowledge precisely because of the second strand of his 
original double claim about its involvement in epistemology - that time 
enters into the constitution of objects of knowledge. It does so both 
at the level of the 'object' aýd at the level of the 'subject', and 
once this latter is established one can begin more easily to ask 
sceptical questions about the possibility of an epistemological 
delimitation of the subject, questions which lead in the direction of 
Heidegger's existential problematic in Being and Time. 
3 And if in 
Heidegger's work there proved to be something called existential time 
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which was not amenable to the kind of scrutiny that Husserl. 's 
phenomenology provides-then it would constitute a positive limit to 
the scope of a phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. if 
there were a distinctive temporality of the unconscious, that too 
might escape the limits of a phenomenology of time. 
4 
5 The Analysis of Time-Consciousness 
To demonstrate the pervasive, andýyet-variable penetration of 
Husserl's account of time-consciousness by, epistemological, concerns 
it is necessary to trace out in detail the path of-, Husserl's thinking. 
-Our remarks will be based on the lectures Husserl gave at 
Gottingeni especially in 1904-5, and from time to time up until 1910, 
lectures edited by Heidegger and published in 1928.6 
The focus and scope of his analysis 
As we have indicated, Husserl begins with an exclusion and an 
apparent'self-limitation, by which his'phenomenological approach'will 
gain its specificity and privilege. But the exclusion of 'Objective' 
time' can be understood in two different ways, and as so much is often 
at stake in the early moves in'a'philosoophical text we shall take* 
the opportunity of elucidating this exclusion by trying to adjudicate 
between the two ways. We can suppose Husserl to be affirming the 
existence of 'world time, real time, the time of nature'-, simply 
saying that he is instead toldeal with 'temporal experiences',, because 
'we deal with reality only insofar as it is meant, presented, looked 
at, or conceptually thought of', or we can suppose him to be leaving 
that question open, putting the external reality of time in question 
from the very beginning. Sokolowski supposes that Husserl is committed 
in these lectures to the first position, which affirms but ignores 
'world time' etc. 
_so 
that by the time of his Ideas (1913) there is a 
definite change. But this is not really convincing. It is not at- 
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all difficult to read Husserl as writing in scare-quotes when he uses 
expressions like world time, real time, etc. and even in the sentence 
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Sokolowski quotes as most conv nc ng in which Husserl finds it leine 
interessante Untersuchung' to relate subjective time-consciousness to 
real objective time, we can quite easily read him as referring to the 
way psychophysicists conceived of their project. The crucial move by 
which the passage from a dualistic position to one that is neutral with 
respect to ontological commitment is achieved is to claim that terms 
like 'real' and 'objective' , and indeed 'time' (in phrases like 'real 
time' and 'objective time') derive their sense from our constitutive 
acts. (Husserl's strong and notorious version of this, which is said 
to commit him to 'idealism' can be found in Ideas And thisq 
it is supposed, compromises the idea that such phrases could refer 
to anything that as such had an independent existence because without 
that constitutive activity there would be no 'as such'. Versions of 
this move are to be found in various places in Husserl's two introductory 
sections. For instance 
(i) ... we make the attempt to account for time-consciousnesss to. 
put Objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the 
right relation and thus gain an understanding of how temporal 
Objectivity ... can be constituted in subjective time- 
consciousness. **' (01 Pp. 21-2) 
(ii) I ... Objectivity belongs to "experience"g that is to the unity 
of experienceo to the lawfully experienced context of nature. 
Phenomenologically speaking, Objectivity is ... constituted 
through characters of apprehension and the regularities which 
pertain to the essence of these characters' (01 p. 27) 
(iii)lthat these lived experiences themselves are temporally 
determined in an objective sense... does not concern us... 
On the other hand, it does interest us that objective 
temporal data are intended in these lived experiences' (02 p. 29) 
The point of bringing into prominence these early remarks is to demonstrate 
that Husserl from the very beginning talks of Objectivity and Objective 
time as being constituted by our lived experiences. And this seems, to 
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us at least, to count against Sokolowskils attributing dualism to 
Husserl at this stage. On our reading, remarks that would lead one 
in that direction are better taken as remarks made in the course of a 
transition from everyday language. to a phenomenologically displaced 
language, and should not be taken as sugges ting a theoretical commit- 
ment to dualism on Husserl's part. So on our reading, there is much 
less need to accommodate Husserl's views here with those in Ideas. 
The exclusion is of 'what is called' reality, transcendent objects, 
word time, etc. Husserl is already ontologically non-committal while 
programmatically anticipating a relationship of constitution . Our 
assumption here is that the relationship of constitution cannot hold 
between independently existing things, and so the more he writes about 
constitution, the less plausible is Sokolowskils dualistic reading at 
this juncture. 
Husserl's initial move, then, is one that distinguishes a subject- 
matter ('lived experiences of time'), that excludes, as preventing a 
solution to the problemany consideration of temporal transcendencies 
that claims to be able to answer the question of the 'essence' of time 
by a phenomenological analysis of such experiences, and that already 
outlines the kind of generative power (in the theory of acts and 
constitution) that such an analysis would have. As a forceful example 
of the latter, for instance, he suggests the possibility of explicating 
the a priori features of temporal order (infinite, two-dimensional, 
transitive etc. ) by reference to time-consciousness. 
8 But what 
precisely is meant by time-consciousness? By 'lived-experiences'? 
The language of 'acts' and 'characters of apprehension' and 'constitu- 
tion' correctly suggests that Husserl's positive contribution will. not 
merely be to have championed subjective time over against objective 
time, but to have established-a rather subtle relationship between them, 
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and to have done so with an account of 'subjectivity' distinct from that 
of St. Augustine, James, Bergson and Brentano, each of whom might 
superficially be thought to have championed subjective time in the same 
way. We can best grasp the particular position Husserl held by 
following his analysis and critique of Brentano's theory of time (03). 
With this analysis we shift from his introductory remarks to an account 
of 'lived experience', albeit one needing correction. If we have 
explained the aim of this move, we ought also to make explicit Husserl's 
justification for it. We passed it over in 01, and it runs like this 
I ... time and duration ... are absolute data which it would be senseless to call into question. To be sure, we also 
assume an existing time: this, howeverv is not the time of 
the world of experience but the immanent time of the flow 
of consciousness' 
and he goes on 
'The evidence that consciousness of a tonal processt a 
meoldy, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as 
to make every doubt or denial appear senseless' (01 p. 23) 
Now these sentences constitute for a (broadly speaking)founda- 
tionalist epistemology a justification for focussing on immanent or 
inner time rather than world time. We are directly aware of it, and 
its principle feature, succession is indisputable. Even if we have the 
most unlikely dreams, the wildest hallucinations, the severest of 
illusions, the fact of temporal succession within and between these 
false images will not itself be, in doubt. (However teleologically 
askew, succession is even found in those dreams in which, as Freud 
reminds us involve an inversion of the proper order of events. ) But 
these sentences are much more than a justification for dealing with a 
specific subject matter (inner time). We can find in these sentences 
the precise form of the underlying question that guides Husserl's whole 
analysis: what must temporal succession be like in order for our 
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evidence for its occurrence to be beyond all possible doubt? And we 
can pose Husserl's difficulty in this way: Is not 'being beyond all 
possible doubt' a feature reserved for what is immediately grasped? 
And does not any grasp of succession involve grasping a relationship 
between what is immediately available (a current sensation) and what is 
now past (a previous sensation)? Yet how can a relationship between 
something immediately grasped and something no longer immediately 
grasped be itself immediately grasped? Is not 'succession' in fact 
a judgement we made about our experience which, however unlikely it 
might seem, could be mistaken, just like any other judgement? Husserl's 
view, quite plausibly, is, I thin14 that succession is not a relation 
built up out of parts and a relation between them, but something primitive, 
and moreover that it does not breach the conditions that 'certainty' 
demands. 
We are now in a position to follow through Husserl's discussion 
of Brentano's account of time with this question in mind. In Os3-5 
Husserl outlines Brentano's theory, and in 06, which completes the 
first (the shortest) section of the book, he criticizes it. 
Husserl's treatment of Brentano 
Brentano clearly shared with Husserl the idea that the question 
as to the 'origin' of time (i. e. its fundamental 'essence') was to be 
answered by isolating its primitive element. Brentano's name for this 
was 'the primordial sensations'. These it was that would account for 
the ideas of duration and succession. The part of Brentano's theory 
(and here I am paraphrasing Husserl; we discuss the adequacy of this 
presentation below) that deals with these primordial associations can 
be summarized in the claimed 'genesis of the immediate presentations 
of memory which, according to a law that admits no exceptions, are 
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joined to particular presentations of perception without mediation'. 
Consider what it is like to listen to a tune. What happens to each 
note as we hear it? If it just disappears, we would never hear the 
tune, but just a succession of isolated notes and we would never even 
know it was a succession. If it stays around unchanged with nothing 
to distinguish it temporally from notes that followed, we would just 
have a simultaneous plurality of sound. The solution must lie in a 
third position. Certainly what seems to happen is that notes etc. 
after first being perceived, come to seem 'temporally shoved back', 
without entirely disappearing without trace. How precisely does this 
happen according to Brentano, asks Husserl? It must be the case 
I ... that that peculiar modification occurs, that every aural 
senation, after the stimulus which begets it has disappeared 
awakes from within itself a similar presentation provided 
with a temporal determination, and that this determination is 
continually varied, can we have the presentation of a melody 
in which the individual notes have their definite place and 
their definite measure of Umd (p. 30) 
I It is a universal law, therefore, that to each presenta- 
tion is naturally joined a continuous series of presentations 
each of which reproduces the content of the preceding, but 
in such a way that the moment of the past is always attached 
to the new' (p. 30-31) 
Crucial, then, to the third alternative, is the idea that instead of 
remaining unchanged, or just disappearing, sensations do not themselves 
linger on, or slowly fade, but generate 'a phantasie-idea like, or 
nearly like, itself, with regard to content and enriched by a temporal 
character'. 
This idea will also generate a modification, and so on. The 
point of this, it seems, is that the arrival of a new sensation, and 
the phantasy modification of a previous sensation will occur at the 
same time, giving rise to a 'primordial association'. One consequence 
of this of course is that one does not actually perceive succession on 
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Brentano's view. It simply offers an account of how-one seems to see 
it. 
But if we have supplied the , basis for understanding temporal 
succession, we need to go further to understand the ideaof time as an 
infinite series. For this we need to consider the role of phantasy 
in creatively generating the idea of the future 'from the appearance 
of momentary recollections'. Husserl's account of Brentano's position 
is quite inadequate at this point. It is not good enough to compare 
the generation of the idea of the future from the Ip ast with transposing 
a melody into a different key. I can only suppose that a fuller 
account of how 'phantasy forms ideas of the future' 'on the basis of 
momentary recollections' would refer to an imaginary self-displa'cement, 
in which one comes to see that the possibility of these being recollections 
is based on those original past experiences being remembered at some 
future date, relative to'their present, namely now,. ' If the past has 
one of its futures realised in the presento then phantasy can suppose 
that this present, when past, will too. " This is the most plausible 
expansion of Husserl's account of Brentano that I can construct; it, is 
odd that contrary to his usual habit, Husserl offers such a condensed 
account. 
Finally, Husserl explains Brentano's insight that the temporal 
modes 'past' and 'future' modify rather than define the ideas they are 
attached to, as do predicates like 'possible', or 'imaginary', while 
'current' or 'present"or loccuring now' are defining characteristics. 
However difficult it may be to swallow, it follows 'that non-real temporal 
determinations (past, future) can belong in a continuous series with a 
unique, actual, real determinateness to which they are joined by 
infinitesimal differences'. So the succession of sensations or ideas 
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should be seen as a perpetual shifting from non-real to real temporal 
determinations. 
Husserl's critique of Brentano's theory of time is an attempt to 
distinguish in that theory those elements which are genuinely phenomeno- 
logical, and can be built on, and those in which naturalistic, psycho- 
logistic presuppositions linger on. These presuppositions are surely 
at work eg. in Brentano's talk of 'stimuli' and 'objects' 'producing, 
sensations in us etc. We can, however, focus instead on the properly 
epistemological (and hence phenomenological) aspects of this theory. 
The crucial first point of scrutiny is Brentano's analysis of (the 
appearance of) succession. Is he correct to claim that a 'now' and 
a 'past' can be unified in a succession only by the 'past' appearing 
in phantasy? Husserl's doubts run like this: we can distinguish, as 
we have done, two levels of Brentano's analysis - the original 
intuition of time (which we perceive as temporal succession) and the 
secondary grasping of the idea_of infinite time. These two are 
contrasted, Husserl claims, by the former being 'authentic' - ie. 
involving direct intuition, while the latter is not. Now there 
clearly is a distinction here, but for Brentano, both are the work of 
phantasy, and 
'If the original intuition of time is indeed a creation of 
phantasy, what then distinguishes this phantasy of the 
temporal from that in which we are aware of a past temporal 
thing, a thing therefore that does not belong in the 
sphere of primordial association and that is not closed up 
together in one consciousness with perception of the 
momentary, but was once with a past perception? ' 06 pp. 36-7 
Husserl's point is that the distinctiveness of Brentano's 'primordial 
association' is threatened by the role of phantasy in its explication, 
for it is just the same mode which is involved in the extension of the 
original intuition to that of infinite time. Brentano fails to grasp 
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that as a merely psychological connection, phantasy. cannot serve to 
constitute an original intuition. 
Husserl proceeds to demonstrate the further inadequacies of 
Brentano's position from the phenomenological, point of view. The 
main difficulty arises from Brentano's ignoring of the 'act' - aspect 
of consciousness. Basically, Husserl claims that Brentano treats time, 
or temporality as a special feature of the contents of consciousness, 
while he himself wants to credit specific acts of consciousness with 
responsibility. But Husserl's claims here seem to waver into inconsis- 
tency. He begins by claiming that Brentano does not make the act/ 
content distinction 
'Brentano did not distinguish between act-and content, 
or between act, content of apprehension, and the object 
apprehended. We ourselves must be clear, however, as 
to where to place the temporal element'. (p. 37) 
but later 
I... even if (Brentano) ... was the first to recognize 
the radical separation between , primary, content and character of acts, still his theory of time shows that 
he did not take into consideration the act-characters 
which are decisive for this theory'. (?. 4-0) 
So, on the one hand Brentano fails to make the act/content distinctiont 
and on the other, he makes it, but fails to employ it at the right 
Let us look more closely at his criticisms to see if we can point, 
resolve this apparent shift of ground. 
Husserl's question is how temporality can arise from a mere 
association of ideas, taking into account only the contents of those 
ideas. How can a temporal difference appear through a concatenation 
of ideas differing only in 'richness and intensity of content'? Husserl 
shows that for all the ingenuity of Brentano's account, the attempt to 
make a particular content of consciousness both be present (a product 
of phantasy) and also bear the quality 'past', or signify 'past' must 
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fail in the absence of any reference to conscious acts, ie. without 
reference to the intentional dimension of time-consciousness. Husserl's 
critical position can be rendered consistent: he is saying that 
Brentano had elsewhere made the act/content distinction but had failed 
to apply it to his theory of time. 
Some doubts about Husserl's treatment of Brentano 
In the course of the discussion'we have just outlined, Husserl 
makes a remark which, if we take it quite strictly, gives us pause for 
thought. 
'It is most extraordinary that in his theory of the 
intuition of time, Brentano did not take into consid- 
eration the difference between the perception of time 
and the phantasy of time, for the difference, here 
obtrusive, is one that he could not possibly have 
overlooked'. 
Husserl is making an even more pointed version of the. kind of remark 
that we met, earlier concerning Brentano's failure to apply to time 
the act/content distinction which he, Brentano, was the first to 
draw in this area. Now Husserl is claiming that he must have seen 
the difference between perception and phantasy but made nothing of it. 
Rather than supposing Brentano to be lacking in intellectual acumen, we 
must suppose that Husserl is accentuating the limitations of Brentano's 
putatively psychological framework, which allowed him to grasp at one 
level, the psychological level, what he could not make use of at another, 
the epistemological. But there is another way of responding to Husserl - 
that indeed Brentano could not, and hence did not overlook the distinction, 
and that consequently Husserl is misrepresenting him. 
The interests of scholarly justice require us here to make brief 
reference to a rather critical, indeed at times polemical assessment 
of the way Husserl deals with Brentano. 
9 Oscar Kraus, who published 
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his paper in 1930, two years after Husserl's lectures on the phenomeno- 
logy of internal time-consciousness had belatedly been made public, 
vigorously defended Brentano against Husserl's criticisms. The main 
points he makes are these 
(1) that either Husserl himself,. or Heidegger as his editor, ought 
to have pointed out that Brentano had abandoned the theory of 
time Husserl critically attributes to him by 1895. i. e. not-only 
before the 1928 publication, but a full ten years even before 
Husserl's original. lectures. Husserl's critique of-Brentano 
was based on notes he had taken at Brentano's lectures (I take 
it during Husserl's visit to Vienna in 1884-6). Certainly by 
1911, with the publication of Brentano's Von der Klassification 
der psychischen Pbýinomene (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot), a. - 
copy of which Brentano sent to Husserl, Husserl knew about 
Brentano's new position, and should have pointed this out to 
his editor. (Or was this perhaps one of those points on which 
it is said he was less than pleased with Heidegger's editing? ) 
(2) Husserl's criticisms of Brentano's attempt to found time- 
consciousness on temporal variations of the object were predated 
by Brentano's own auto-critique. 
(3) Husserl's new position, which makes use of, 'modes of consciousness' 
rather than differences in objects had already been anticipated 
by Brentano by March 1895. There Brentano writes of his new 
belief in a letter to Anton Marty 
(a) 'that every sensation is bound up with an apprehension 
of that which is sensed' (Kraus, op. cit. p. 228) 
(b) I ... before ... we had a limited continual series of 
objects in the proteraesthesis, we now have a limited 
continual series of modes of apprehension of the same 
object' I 
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and he goes on 
'(Perhaps) ... now some things are conceivable that 
were inconceivable before ... I (pp. 228-9 
There is much else of great interest in Kraus' paper which it would be 
out of place to pursue here. With the exception of one or two 
small points, Kraus is largely putting the record straight, criticising 
Husserl's misrepresentation of his own originality. But on the whole 
the value and interest of his published lectures - whoever's views they 
originally were - is not contested. The real value of Kraus' piece 
today, half a century later, is that it shows us that the frame of 
reference within which internal time-consciousness appears as a problem 
was quite widely shared. Kraus' concern for accuracy here is I think 
justified, especially in the light of the importance of Brentano's 
reflections of time for the phenomenological movement, and indeed for 
Brentano himself. 
Husserl's Two Main Questions 
Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness involves hims as we have 
said, in answering two distinct questions, at least initially, the first 
concerning temporal objects, and the second, time itself. He claims 
(p. 43) a priority of the first question over the second 
$a phenomenolgical analysis of time cannot explain the 
constitution of time without reference to the constitution 
of the temporal object' (p. 43) 
(By 'temporal object' he means unified temporally extended object). 
This priority claim is a little complicated by the fact that he also 
claims that 
'all these questions are closely interrelated so that 
one cannot be answered without the others' (p. 42) 
But certainly the approach he makes to his central schema of time in 
section 11 is in contrast with two further deficient theories of our 
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understanding of temporal objects, each of which attempts to solve the 
same problem that Husserl has set himself. The comprehension of a 
temporal object requires an act of cognition in which the temporally 
separate parts are brought into some sort of unity or synthesis. The 
two views that Husserl criticizes differ at this point, over the 
temporality of that act itself. The Herbart-Lotze view (which 
influenced Brentano) is that this unifying act must itself take place, 
at an instant in time. For the grasp of the whole involves transcending 
those temporal differences into which experience has dissolved it. if 
this consciousness of the whole were not momentary, but itself took timeg 
then it would perhaps itself require a further act of unification. On 
the other view, that of the 'specious present' which Husserl attributes 
to Stern 
10 
there are said to be (at least) some cases in which the 
apprehension of the unity of a temporally extended object develops 
alongside it, and is completed with it. Listening to a song would be 
a good example. 
Husserl is not satisfied by either version, for they each fail 
(as Brentano had done) to make certain fundamental distinctions. In 
other words, their presuppositions about the nature of experience were, 
phenomenologically speaking, naive. 
His two main objections seem to be these: that the question of 
how such temporally transcendent objects are constituted (eg. as enduring 
unaltered, as constantly changing) is left undiscussed and unexplained. 
And how, on the momentary apprehension view is it possible to understand 
the apprehension of time itself? (Surely a momentary apprehension of 
flux would have to distort it. ) Against the Lotze-Herbart view, 
Husserl says it is perfectly obvious that the 'perception of duration 
itself presupposes the duration of perception'; perception does not 
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occur at an instant. Hearing a melody is a case of perception, for 
instance . But when we try to explain how this occurs, we so easily 
fall back into talking of a cognitive act that mixes current perception 
with memory and expectation. But even if we focus on the very shortest 
phases of individual tones we remain within the kind of framework 
Husserl criticised in Brentano. 
In all his remarks so far, Husserl has merely been clearing the 
way for, demonstrating the need for, a phenomenological description 
of the most primitive temporal phenomena. 
An Analytical Preview 
We would like to distinguish Husserl's account of Internal Time- 
Consciousness into certain broad categories, which bear some rough 
correspondence to Husserl's own sub-sections. 
The Originary Constitution 1. A description of the modes of appearance 
of Temporal Objects 
of immanent temporal objects. 
2. A description of our consciousness of those 
appearances. 
The Consciousness of 3. An attempt to explicate the nature of the 
Time given via Temporal continuity of our experience of 
temporal 
objects through. commentary on a diagram-- 
Objects 'the diagram of time'. 
The Conscigusness of Time 4. The transition to a more general account of 
the consciousness of temporality. 
More Generally 5. An elucidation ofthe nature of retention. 
6. The distinct role of secondary remembrance. 
Epistemological 7. The scope of 'perception' within this schema. 
Reflections 8. The contribution of recollection. 
Time Beyond Language ? 9. The Constitution of the Absolute Flux. 
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The Immanent Temporal Object 
Husserl's persistent critical stance is that previous accounts 
of time-consciousness have focussed on the contents or objects of 
experience at the expense of the ways in which we experience them. 
His repeated criticisms are designed to show that any such account 
will inevitably leave vital questions unanswered, especially about 
the way temporal objects are constituted, and about the constitution 
of time itself. His phenomenological elucidation begins with two 
parallel descriptions of our experience of 'immanent temporal objects', 
first as they present themselves to us, and second, the possibility 
of using the results of the second description as the basis for a 
general account of our consciousness of time that is free from the 
difficulties Husserl previously found. 
Husserl takes his example of an immanent temporal object from 
the sphere of sound. Initially, he considers using a melody as his 
focus. But the question of how different notes, or tones are unified 
into a cohesive whole already takes for granted the temporal unifica- 
tion of discrete tones, each of which endures. So he takes the 
single briefly enduring tone as his example of an immanent temporal 
object. A tone is chosen, one supposes, because it allows the basic 
structure of time-consciousness to emerge with minimum sensory content. 
Sounds, even treated as material (transcendent) phenomena are 
essentially evanescent, essentially temporal. Arguably persistent 
tones are to time what lines are to space, and it is, accordingly, 
no accident that Husserl resorts to a geometrical schema to ill- , 
ustrate the basic structure of time. And his concern to establish 
the nature of the temporal continuum completes the parallel. 
Husserl's moves here would suggest that it is not the attempt to 
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understand time on the model of space that has prevented an adequate 
grasp of time heretofore, but the particular way that comparison has 
been drawn. At its simplest, if the usual mode makes out time to 
be a line with a direction, Husserl is adding, a 'depth' to that line. 
But as we shall see shortly, the nature of that 'depth' is far from 
simple. 
Let us turn, then to Husserl's pair of descriptions. First 
that of immanent temporal objects and their modes of appearance in 
a continuous flux. 
The first description is of the various ways we are (temporally 
speaking) conscious of an immanent object "as" ... Thus 
'The sound is given: that is, I am conscious of it as 
now, and I am so conscious of it "as long as" I am 
conscious of any of its phases as now' 089 p. 44 
Most of the ways the object present itself "as" are marked in the 
text by scare quotes: "Before", "during", "for a while", "expired". 
He describes quite uncontentiously the way we become aware of a sound 
as beginning, as ending, as coming to an end, as having just finished, 
and being past. He also introduces the key concept of 'retention' 
which will later play such an important role. He describes it as 
the way in which we still hold onto sounds that have ceased to be 
impressions and have 'sunk back' as he puts it. 
'What we have described here', he says, 'is the manner in which 
the immanent temporal object "appears" in a continuous flux, ie. how 
it is given'. And he concludes by carefully drawing our attention to 
the fact (08, p 45) that his description of the manner of the object's 
appearance is not in fact a description of its temporal duration, for 
that duration is part of the immanent. object (the same sound ... ) 
itself, and is presupposed by the whole description. Through the 
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various modes of its appearance the same duration is lived, "expired" 
or remembered. 
The second, parallel description (09) concerns 'the way in 
which we are "conscious of" all differences in the "appearing" of 
immanent sounds and their content of duration'. It is this shift 
that will inaugurate the discussion of the constitution of temporal 
objects through consciousness. 
The key distinction he makes in this passage centres around 
the application of the term 'perception', a term which he will 
discuss thematically in 016; 017, which is the occasion of a great 
deal of careful footwork throughout. Here, Husserl wants to claim 
that while the sound is perceived, we can only say of the period 
of its duration that it is perceived moment by moment. 
'We speak here with regard to the perception of the 
duration of the sound which extends into the actual 
now, and say that the sound, which endures, is perceived, 
and that of the interval of duration of the sound, only 
the-point of duration characterized as now is veritably 
perceived' (our emphasis) 
The significance of the term 'veritable' (eigentlich) will 
only appear during his later, distinction of the two senses (restricted 
and extended) of perception in 017. For now, we need only point out 
that Husserl is setting up the problem of temporal constitution. 
For he is claiming that the sound as a whole, the enduring sound, the 
temporally extended sound is perceived, and yet the interval of its 
duration is only perceived at each now. Strangely making no 
reference to future-oriented constituting modes of consciousness 
(later called 'protentionall) his first stab at an account of temporal 
constitution, at aligning the two levels of perception, at constituting 
a whole out of temporal parts, involves the deployment of the idea of 
retention, and that of degrees of clarity and distinctness in the 
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objects of fretentional consciousness'. The retentional mode of 
consciousness operates at two different levels - both as functioning 
%-Jithin the duration of (eg. ) a sound, in which to every now there 
attaches a retention 'tail' - and with respect to 'the running-off 
of the entire duration'. And coupled with each of these levels is 
a graded loss of clarity and distinctness as the distance from the 
'now' point increases, which again allows Husserl to draw the spatial 
analogy. 
On the basis of these brief remarks, Husserl reiterates and 
clarifies the basic distinction he is making, oneýby which his 
difference from Brentano will be made explicit. The "object in the 
mode of running-off" is involved in constant change and as such is 
'always something other'. (And yet 'we still say that-the object 
and every part of its time and this time itself are one and the same,. ) 
But, again making the analogy with a spatial appearance, this is not a 
form of consciousness, even'if', " as is just as clear, there must be for 
Husserl an analytical interdependence between 'the object-as, and the 
mode of consciousness. 
We have to bear this distinction in mind to enable us to 
understand what precisely is going on in Husserl's 'diagram of time', 
which we must now discuss. 
The Diagram of Time 
Husserl entitles 010 "The Continuum of Running-Off Phenomena- 
the Diagram of Time", and for all his insistence on the distinction 
between 'the object in the mode of running-off' and the consciousness 
for which that occurs, there is very little if any need to refer to 
this latter at all, in understanding the diagram, which, whatever it 
is supposed to be, is actually a representation of the temporal 
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constitution of an immanent, object. Modes of consciousness 
-such as running-off are exhausted, from a diagrammatic point 
of view, by what they 'intend'. Perhaps we should put this 
another way: the structure of Husserl's analysis here, of the 
double continuity of the modes of running-off of the object 
seems to us compatible with various interpretations of the 
status of this Ablaufsph6nomene, so it is not obvious to this 
reader at least that the particular status Husserl wishes to 
claim for them is demonstrated by this analysis or even specifically 
presupposed by it. 'Running-off phenomena' are, for Husserll 
synonymous with 'modes of temporal orientation', which are modes 
of consciousness. And yet the particular concept of conscious- 
ness required by this analysis is at best a passive, registering 
one, rather than one involved in (say) some of the higher order 
complexities of constitution. There is eg. no reference to 
protention, no reference to the epistemological mechanism by 
which an object is identified as this or that x'through time, 
and so on. 
Husserl's real achievement is to have supplied an answer 
to the problem of contfnuity through timet althought as we have 
already suggested, it is in no way complete. For ease of 
reference we reproduce Husserl's diagrams and his explanations. 
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0 
0 E> 
pt 
OE Series of now-points 
W Siaking-down [Herabsinken) 
EV Continuum of phases (now-point 
with horizon of the past) 
E--* Series of nows which possibly 
will be filled with other 
Objects 
C-"- PIM F. +? ) 
To these explanations we ought to add that P-P 
1 is an arbitrarily 
chosen perception or experience or phase of the object somewhere 
between the beginning (0) and the end (E). The first diagram 
concerns the ongoing temporal constitutution of an enduring temporal 
constitution of an enduring immanent object (eg. a sound) and the 
second places such a completed object of consciousness in the frame- 
work of the past and undecided future. 
Two key terms Husserl uses call for comment, 
(1) (modes of) running-off (Ablaufsphdnomene) 
(2) sinking down (Herabsinken) 
When we hear an enduring tone, a sound that last, each analytically 
distinguished phase of each note begins with a 'now' and then reappears 
as something 'past'. These expressions name 'running-off characters'. 
Running-off itself, however, involves understanding these as reflecting 
'modes of temporal orientation'. Presumably, then, this is meant to 
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illuminate the fact that, while at one moment we are aware of something 
happeningg at the next, we are aware of it as having happened. Certain 
of Husserl's formulations suggest that each of these is in-itself, a 
kind of running-off, but I take it that the word 'model points to the 
essential unity of each of these phases, and that the 'running-off' 
itself is the flux from temporal mode to temporal mode. 
'Sinking down' adds the idea that each impression is retained 
in sequence, in a kind of depth of sedimented layers that attaches 
itself to any later 'now'. So essentially the vertical axis just 
repeats the horizontal axis, but having converted something sequential 
into a sedimented depth, it is a repetition that transforms. The 
most important consequence of this transformation is that it generates 
a continuum and it is the purpose of this section to explain more 
carefully the nature of this continuum. 
Husserl does not say so explicitly, but as I understand him, 
a temporal continuum is required for us to successfully 'intend, 
objective duration. That is, we'know or suppose that the sound we 
hear is a 'single enduring sound'. But we may in fact not hear it 
in an unbroken sequence. Nonetheless, we are conscious of it as 
unbroken sequence. Nonetheless, we are conscious of it as unbroken, 
as a single sound. The continuity of our own experience of it forms the 
basis of this. We may then surmise that this continuity will equally 
play a role in allowing us to understand the unity of time itself. So 
how is this continuity explained? 
His first explanation is something close to an assertion, 
coupled with an explanation of why it might not seem to be a continuum. 
He writes 
'With regard to the running-off phenomena, we know that 
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it is a continuity of constant transformations which form 
an inseparable unit, not severable into parts which could 
be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the 
continuity which could be by themselves. ' 
In other words, he is claiming from the start that any talk of bits or 
parts of time (moments, instants ... ) as actually existing is a false 
abstraction from a natural flux. This is quite understandable, and 
indeed something of a commonplace among such theories. But it is quite 
another thing to explain the structure of this confusion. It is Husserl's 
striking claim that we have to do with a double continuum, or rather 
continuity operating at two distinct levels, to which the two diagrams 
correspond. His most concise account of the position is this 
I ... the continuity of running-off of an enduring object is 
a continuum whose phases are the continua of the modes of 
running-off of the different temporal points of the duration 
of the object. ' 010, p. 50. 
Or again 
'Since a new now is always presenting itself, 'each now is 
changed into a past, and thus the entire continuity of the 
running-off of the parts of the preceding points moves 
uniformly 'downward' into the depths of the past' 010, p. 50. 
What I take it he is claiming is this: that if each moment of experience 
is coupled to a continuum of past phases, any subsequent-moment will 
have the previous. moment with its attached continuum as one of its 
own phases. If we allow brackets to enclose attached continua of 
past phases, then we could represent this complex continuity thus 
abstracted point 
moment (starting 
with a as the 
original moment 
1 
a 
b 
c 
d 
structure of 
continuum of 
phases 
'a 
b(a) 
c(b(a)) 
d(c(b(a))) 
etc. 
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We could already call this a 'double continuity' but I do not think 
this is what Husserl means. We call series 1a continuum because 
of the merely abstract nature of the 'now'-points. Or, to put it 
better, what this series a, b, c, d, etc. abstracts from is a 
continuum. Series 11 is a continuum by virtue of its constant 
inclusions of itself. But perhaps Husserl has in mind a different 
conjunction, between series 11 (or the unity of series 1& 11 above), 
and a continuity established among successive past phases of a 
completed sound. This, I take it, is what he means when he says 
(and here he is commenting on the second version of the diagram) that 
'(a) series of modes of running-off begins which no 
longer contains a now (or duaration). The duration 
is no longer actual, but past, and constantly sinks 
deeper into the past'. 0109 p. 50 
This conjunction of continuities would then be established between 
the constitutive continuity of our consciousness of duration of an 
immanent. objects, as it unfolds, and the continuity among our 
retentions or recollections of it, once it has unfolded. And the 
initially constitutive continuum of temporal phases is enclosed as 
completed, within the continuity established by our memorial 
consciousness in its successive phases. 
Nietzschean doubts about Husserl's claims 
How ought we to assess these claims? Husserl's method we 
ought to recall, is purely descriptive. He is not offering us a 
model of how things might be (that we might verify or otherwise), or 
how things ought to be (whether they are or not), but of how things 
are, and how it is perfectly clear that they are when we reflect. 
Confronted with a concept of time as merely flat linear extension, 
it is certainly an achievement to have begun, at least, to shake that 
picture, to have offered an account of what the continuity of lived, 
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experienced time, could look like. But is it more than that? Or 
is Husserl, in effectq offering us a geometry of time that idealizes 
rather than describes our actual experience? To pursue this line 
of criticism, consider the claimed (double) continuity of our 
experience of an immanent temporal object. If the succession of 
sinkings-down (which he will soon call retentions) were a natural 
process, like that of the sedimentation of silt in rivers, then the 
order of succession would indeed be perfectly followed. But if, 
as he claims, retention is an intentional consciousness (or an aspect 
of such), are there not going to be other considerations, interestsp 
motives, than the simple recording of the actual order of incoming 
impressions? 
An example drawn from Nietzsche is apposite here 
'The error of imaginary causes. - To start from the 
dream: on to a certain sensTtion, the result for 
example of-a--distant-cannon-shot, a cause is sub- 
sequently foisted (often, a whole little novel in 
which precisely the dreamer is the chief character). 
The sensation, meanwhile continues to persist, as 
a kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until 
the cause-creating drive; permits it to, step into 
the foreground - now no longer as a chance 
occurrence but as meaning'. 11 
What this example suggests is that if we think of consciousness ý 
as having a central 'meaning-bestowing' function, then not only is 
there no guarantee that this will ensure the faithful reproduction 
in experiencel of the real order of events, but there is every 
reason to believe that this does not always happen. However we 
must not draw this conclusion quite so quickly. Two difficulties 
stand in the way of considering Nietzsche's example as an objection 
to Husserl. First, it could be said, 'he works within a clearly 
pre-phenomenological dualism, in which there are then problematic 
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alignments of objective and subjective times. Second, Nietzsche is 
arguably utilizing a notion of the 'Unconscious' which would be quite 
alien to Husserl. 
Husserl explains to us early on why he is not interested in 
experimental comparisons of inner and outer time. But there is surely 
a difference between experiments demonstrating lengthening and fore- 
shortening of perceived time with respect of 'real time19 on the one 
hand, and demonstrations that between the two there are changes of 
order, structural transformations.. These would have an essential 
(and not merely qualitative) significance. If so, however, it would 
seem to cast doubt on the practice of suspending all consideration of 
'objective time' (assuming it to be possible) as Husserl recommends. 
He takes for granted, I would suggest, that the structural trans- 
formations that occur between the two are limited to those that 
ultimately preserve the original order. 
In fact, we can read Nietzsche's suggestion in two ways 
(1) as suggesting a break between objective and subjective time 
(2) as suggesting a break between the order of sensation and the 
order of experience. 
If it is objected that the former considerations are inadmiss- 
able within Husserl's framework we are surely entitled to consider 
the latter, particularly given Husserl's own reference to sensations 
(hyle). 
What is so interesting about Nietzsche's example is that like 
Husserl he makes use of a concept of retention ('the sensation, mean- 
while, continues to persist, as a kind of resonance') and like Husserl, 
his 'retention', while being a phase of an intentional act is not one 
in itself (see below, p. 71-F ). And yet Nietzsche is not, I believe, 
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claiming that his retention is merely a physical or empirical 
psychological phenomenon. He is, I would say, claiming an 
unconscious retentionality - something which Husserl could not 
envisage. But for all that, Nietzsche's is an account of the 
necessary meaningfulness of consciousness. Here this necessity 
demands that the sound be experienced not merely as an external 
interruption of a'dream sequence, but, suitably interpreted, as ' 
playing a significant part in it. The sound that actually was a 
cannon shot is incorporated into the dream (in, say, a dream involving 
a house) as the slamming of the front door 
The justification of taking such an example seriously within 
a Husserlian framework is this: (1) that if we consider the facts 
of sensation rather than those of 'real eventslo we move on ierrain 
Husserl (rightly or wrongly, from his point of view) has already 
legitimated, (2) that even within Husserl's framework we could say 
that the hyletic level is an unconscious level, in that it does not, 
by itself, constitute consciousness. 
But the gap between Nietzsche and Husserl remains. For Husserl, 
consciousness begins, as I understand it, with the transition from the 
impressional consciousness of a sensation of sound, to a retentional 
consciousness of the same. For Nietzsche, we remain at the level of 
sensation, even with retention added on, until the sound is taken up 
into consciousness by being given a meaning. 
What, one wonders, would Husserl say about such an'example? 
It clearly demands a response. (Freud quite independently discusses 
the way in which dreams utilize inversions of natural order to create 
their effects. ) He could suggest that dreams are not the proper basis 
on which to construct an account of ordinary experience. And yet it 
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is Nietzsche's (and Freud's) belief that it is impossible to restrict 
the scope of these mechanisms (eg. of delay, of inversion) to specially 
contained regions of 'unconscious life,. The demand that our experience 
exhibit a certain sort of intelligible structure underlies our belief 
in the Self, our insistence on causal connections, belief in God, and 
so on. And, to maintain a parallel in conscious life with the specific 
dream example, if we DO come across an event of unknown provenance, we 
assume it has causal antecedents sufficient to explain it, and will 
usually assume it to be of this or that sort. And if Kuhnian accounts 
of experimentation in periods of 'normal' science are to be believed, 
it is much harder to even notice things happening for which we have no 
explanation. This would suggest that a similar sequence of delayed 
registration of sensation -: ý- successful scanning for interpretive 
schema -: ), conscious registration ofsensation, operates in ordinary 
experience. Differential delay in the second stage can cause inversions 
of the sort that Nietzsche has described. This would mean that the 
singularity of dreams would not stand up as an objection. Needless to 
say, even if one were to concede the idiosyncratic character of dreams, 
Husserl would still have to account for such experiences, and it would 
seem that his conceptual framework is far from ideally suited to 
handling them. 
* 
So far, it is the concept of retention that has-been our focus. 
In essence, all of Husserl's arguments are designed to show that it is 
a mode of access to the past that is "originary" notý to be confused 
with any of the ordinary everyday-empirical acts that it itself must 
play a part in constituting, in making possible. It is by this claim 
that Husserl distances himself from any kind of psychologism, which is 
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always presented as a confusion of levels, Retention is an inelimin- 
able and irreducibly temporal phase of consciousness. Husserl's 
discussion-, as we have so far presented it, has focussed on its role 
in constituting immanent temporal objects, objects whose identity 
is inseparable from their temporal extension and whose existence as 
such is inseparable from our experience of them. However successful 
we rate this account, it is a further step to explain how this helps 
us understand how immanent time itself is constituted. This is one 
of the tasks that now faces us. And beyond that we have to ask the 
question whether the immanent time grasped through our consideration 
of temporal objects is not perhaps a limited conception of time, and 
whether any more original temporality could be unearthed. This will 
take us on to consider Husserl's description of Absolute Flux. But 
first we have to realize that an account of immanent time cannot be 
developed without going beyond primary meaning, retention, to consider 
the positive role7of reproductive, secondary memory. This is an 
enormously rich and valuable part of Husserl's work, for he is showing 
that even if retention is essential for the constitution of time, it 
is not sufficient. 
Retention and Reproductive Consciousness 
In discussing the relationship between retentional and reproduc- 
tive consciousness, reflection on the expression Iretentional conscious- 
ness' itself will serve us well. The intimacythat holds between 
primal impression and retentional consciousness is founded on two 
conditions-(1) that between the contents of each there is a continual 
passing over from impression to retention, (2) that both impression 
and retention are modes of consciousness. Impressional conscious- 
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ness is (now) directed towards what is sensed, retentional conscious- 
ness is (now)directed towards what has just been sensed. Both are 
immediate, non-reproductive modes of consciousness. 
The language of 'peeling off', 'passing over', 'running off', 
'sinking down' is all carefully designed to suggest a mere change in 
'temporal place' of the same content, with only a new angle being 
required for the intentional ray directed towards it. We need further 
to bear in mind two things: first, what we have called the succession 
of inclusion involved in retention, and second, that all these accounts 
in which reference is made to this or that particular retention must 
be understood in the light of the fact that individual retentions 
are only abstract moments of a continuous flux. Husserl's reference 
is to a 'continuous modification' (011, p. 50) and, later, to retentions 
as mere phases of a flux (p. 54). The relation between a phase and 
that of which it is a phase is vital to Husserl's characterization 
of retentional consciousness. Phases are not independent parts of 
wholes. They are, as Husserl wants to claim for retention, logically 
connected to their fluxes, to the structure of any such flux - namely 
that it always begins with an impression, a now 
12 
source. A retention 
is always a retention of. But the uniqueness of this relationship is 
that it is not a reproductive relationship, it does not involve images, 
or signs. Husserl's position stands or falls with the claim that it 
is an originary mode of consciousness. It is no more an imagistic, 
reproductive consciousness than it is a mere quasi-physical echo or 
reverberation. 
The Dependence of Recollection on Retention 
Here Husserl is not just making analytical distinctions, nor 
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'merely' describing phenomena as they present themselves to us; he 
is doing phenomenological epistemology. He has, in effect, an 
argument to the effect that symbolic, imagistic, representational 
.... relationships to the past must at some point as a matter of 
principle depend on our having an 'intuition of the past' (011, p. 53), 
which, as we have said, he calls an loriginary consciousness'. It is 
only because we have a retentional grasp of the past that other 
(secondary) forms of memory can be understood to be 'of the past'. 
The supposition is that only what we can be acquainted with'directly 
can we give sense to. Without retention, we would, I take it, be 
unable to distinguish - even in principle - memory from imagination. 
Of course we cannot in practice always do this, but the access to 
the past that retention, (in a limited way) provides 
13 
gives sense 
to the distinction that we may or may not on any particular occasion 
be able to make accurately. 
Husserl here seems to be discounting the possibility that we 
might be able to make sense out of the various ways in which 
acquaintance, direct grasping, confronts its limits, which it cannot 
penetrate. To be specific, he presupposes that our grasp of the 
past has to be a positive rather than a negative one. - But he would 
respond, I take it that to talk of 'the various ways in which 
acquaintance, direct grasping, confronts its limits, ' begs the questiont 
for it does not explain how these 'ways' are in fact distinct. Both 
memory and imagination deal with what is 'not actual'; the'difference 
between them is that the former deals with what 'has been' the case, 
and the latter with what 'might be/have been' the case. The 'beyond' 
that memory deals with is distinguished from the 'beyond' of imagination 
(say) by the meaning of 'has been'. And our only source for-that is 
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primary (retentional) memory. 
Of course this reply we have provided for Husserl could itself 
be challenged. Surely we do have other ways of distinguishing memory 
from imagination, 'ways that rest on the fact that memory of states of 
affairs that still persist will give us knowledge we can check. I 
may 'imagine' that I have a tail, and Iremember"that I do not (and 
perhaps, qua human being, could not). The difference between these 
instances of memory and imagination, determining which is which, will 
be established by feeling for my tail. Of course such tests are not 
in themselves conclusive'. Not all that one remembers is still the 
case, and some of what one imagines is actually true. That one can 
easilyconstruct scenarios in which such tests would mislead is not 
the point. The very fact that one could broadly distinguish a class 
of experiences that mislead and another class that, making due* 
allowances for the ways things can change, does not is what is 
significant., However, unless one at some-point begs the question it 
is hard to see how such a distinction could do more than provide a way 
of guessing more or less accurately, assuming one had no other way of 
telling, which experiences were memories and which phantasy. But it 
would not quite so obviously provide us with the sense of these terms. 
They might be thought synonymous with more predictive/less predictive! 
Perhaps Husserl has a point. But what would he say to the further . 
suggestion that precisely because retention is a mode of self-evidence, 
or direct awareness, that it cannot convey pastness to us, for the past 
is essentially what is no longer in any sense present? This question 
will be touched on again in a later section on Perception (see below 
The beginning of an'answer might go like thist that the 
force of this objection is such-as to focus one's attention on the 
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importance of supplementing retention by a consideration of reproductive 
memory. 'It might be, in oth'er wordst that while reprodulcýtive memory 
was dependent on'retention, that the possibility of forming the basis 
for a reproduction was just as essential for retention to be the 
primitive form of our access to theý'past. 
While we are considering alternatives to Husserl's use of 
I 
retention to provide us with a grasp of the pastp we might reflect 
that from the human point of view, the most striking feature of the 
past is not at all that it 'has been' but that it now must be, that 
it cannot now be changed. What is done, is done. There is no use 
cryin .g over spilt milk.... It could be said however, that this 
could not serve as a defining feature of the past because the present 
cannot be changed either, and perhaps some aspects of the future are 
similarly immutable. As regards'the future, however, it would only 
be a kind of folly (it would not be absurd) to try to prevent the sun 
rising tomorrow. Our'inability to cut a cake into three halves is 
another form of determination quite different from the fixedness of 
the past. One can of course often restore affairs to their original 
state - retying a shoe-lace', rebuilding a wall, washing the dishes - 
but that does not repeal the past. One does not thereby wipe out 
the fact that the laces came undone, that the wall fell down, that 
the dishes were used, even if one wipes out all'evidence of 'this fact. 
Again, it could be argued that the past, or at least the future past 
can indeed be changed by my current and future actions. I can, today 
or tomorrow, bring it about that I am (at some future date) remembered 
as a generous benefactor. Nonetheless I cannot bring it about that 
I did do something yesterday if I did not. It is the indeterminacy 
of the future that prevents symmetrical remarks being made about what 
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I will do from having the same force. 
. 
How about the claim that the present, at least, can no more 
be changed than the past, and so, again, immutability cannot1serve 
as a distinguishing characteristic of the past? It is difficult to 
respond neatly to this. If we understand the present as the instant 
of sensate consciousness, then it is true that if I am sensing x at t 
there is no changing that fact, except by moving on to t2, to another 
present. With such a view of the present, one would have to add 
land not at this instant being sensed' as a rider to the unchangeability 
of the past. But if one thinks of 'the present' as having some duration 
(or indeed as being conscious duration) as we do in a loose colloquial 
way, then it is clearly a locus for a change, indeed perhaps the only 
one. If I look round to see what is making a purring sound at my 
ear, I change the focus of my attention. I can only act in the 
present, and in doing so, of course I take time, and so change the 
present! It would seem clear that the present as commonly understood 
cannot be thought of as unchangeable, for it is precisely the locus 
of change. 
This however suggests a further objection -that the future cannot 
be changed not because it is fixed, but because it is not fixed. If it 
is not fixed, it cannot be changed, for there is nothing for it to be 
changed from. Perhaps we should say this - that the distinctiveness 
of a past consists in the fact that our current actions can have no 
effect on it, while they can affect what will be the case. 
If this. general contention can be sustained, does it not provide 
an alternative candidate for 'the meaning of the past' to that provided 
by retention? Clearly there are fundamental issues involved here, 
for we would be introducing a pragmatic, active, existential dimension 
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into a contemplativeg epistemological framework, and somewhat vulgarly 
at that. But the possibility that it might be in just such a 
dimension that the past derives its 'meaning' cannot be ruled out. 
There is, however, one final qualification I would like to 
make to the suggestion that the unchangeability of the past might 
be its defining feature. It would seem to confine our understanding 
of the past to a collection of events, the 'limits' of which are 
fixed at the time at which they occur. But there are two ways at 
least in which, if we abandon that presupposition, it would be possible 
to change the past. We can act in such a way as to change the meaning 
of a feature of the past. If I make many sacrifices towards the 
attaining of a supreme goal, and I 
to achieve it, I can act in such a 
sacrifices, or to make them in retý 
example can be found in the act of 
The act forgiven cannot be undone, 
moral wiping out of the past. We 
below. 
am now at the point of being able 
way as to make sense of those 
rospect, futile. A more interesting 
forgiveness, as Levinas discusses it. 
but forgiveness can effect a kind of 
shall return to these sort of questions 
The Difference between Retention and Reproduction 
$we characterised primary remembrance or retention as a 
comet's tail which is joined to actual perception. 
Secondary remembrance or recollection is completely 
different'. (014, p. 57. ) 
How is this difference described? 
As usual Husserl offers us first a simple story, which he 
attributes to Brentano, one that seems plausible, but which does not 
survive critical scrutiny. 
The simple story and its defects 
I actual perception is constituted on the basis of 
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14 phantasies as representation, as presentification 
just as immediate presentifications appear without being 
joined to perception. Such are secondary remembrances' (014t p. 57) 
In other words, on this account both retention and recollection are 
representational phantasies, the difference being that the former 
are not 'Joined to perceptions'. 
The flaw in this story, put very simply, is that it assimilates 
memory to phantasy, 
15 but more importantly, even if (as 019 suggests) 
we allow that assimilation, to treat retention, primary memory as 
rooted in phantasy, is to make it impossible to understand how secondary 
remembrance can reproduce what was once 'experienced', i. e. perceived. 
Reproductive memory must refer back to an original self-givent non- 
reproductive, grasp of an immanent object, and that cannot be provided 
by an essentially reproductive 'phantasy'. 
It would be a misleading portrayal of Husserl Is position, 
however, to focus too singularly on the non-representational nature 
of primary, retentive consciousness. This is a vital component of 
his account of time, but it might suggest that reproductive modes of 
consciousness are merely reproductive, with no special contribution 
to make to our understanding of time. And it is surely one of the 
great strengths and indeed virtues of his position that he recognizes 
the vital positive constitutive role(s) played by reproductive 
consciousness (see esp. 018,032). The argument has the structure of 
what Derrida will call Isupplementarity' (see below, ch. 4). This 
we will pursue after a fuller discussion of the difference between 
retention and reproduction, primary and secondary memory. 
Reproduction is not all of the same kind. Husserl makes a 
distinction between at least two different forms of reproductive 
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memory which we could call (a) simple recalling, (b) recapitulative 
memory. The first affords us largely unanalysed glimpses of the 
past, the secona, ' a systematic reconstitution of 2 the past experience. 
Husserl seems typically to focus on the latter. 
He also mentions a spontaneous form of reflection on (say) 
some just completed phases of a melody, which is neither simply itself 
retention, nor a reproduction of the sequence. We simply have the 
ability to glance back at what we have just experienced. What is puzz- 
ling about this is the status it is meant to have* While Husserl 
does not say so, it could be argued that this capacity for spontaneous 
retro-glancing is quite vital for understanding our ability either to 
experience immanent temporal objects of any significant durationg or 
to recall them in their extended unity of duration. For even if we 
do not (as 'psychologists' have variously given for short-term memory) 
give any precise quantified limits to retention, it is hard to see how 
one could actually hold even a short story in one's retentive grasp, 
let alone a symphony, without some intermediary form of partial and 
successive retro-glancing, which would allow the process of constitution 
16 
of an immanent temporal object to work at different levels. I read 
these brief remarks as Husserl's attempt to solve the problem of the 
limitation of the range of. retention. But it is nonetheless theore- 
tically problematic. It is not a 'mode of accomplishment of repro-, 
duction' because it is not reproductive. Nor is it simple retention. 
Husserl's words surely belie a certain unease ('Es scheint also, das 
wir sagen konnen: ... 015) -, as if, we seem to be able to say it, but 
he does not quite know how. His justification is of course that of 
one who is faithfully describing what he sees, whether or not it is 
theoretically convenient. Its place in this section on the varieties 
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of reproduction rests on what it shares with reproductive modes of 
consciousness - that 'this givenness certainly refers back to another 
"primordial" ("ursprUngliche") one. 1 (015, p. 60) But instead of 
immediately pursuing the consequences of trying to assimilate this 
rearward glancing in some theoretical way, I want to draw attention 
to a phrase Husserl employs at the end of the first paragraph of 015, 
for it opens up a more general question about how we should understand 
the phenomenological status of Husserl's claim in particular about 
reproduction. After briefly describing recapitulative memory (dis- 
tinguishing it from what we have called simple recalling) he remarks 
'However, everything (here) has the index of reproductive modification'. 
And we ask - what is it to have the index of reproductive modification? 
In particular, does this mean that reproduction bears (or bares) its 
status as reproduction on its phenomenological sleeve? Can one always 
or usually tell 'at the time' just by spontaneous reflection on the 
experience itself whether it is, say, primary or secondary memory or 
phantasy or 'living experience'? Or is he in fact saying that it is 
the analysis or description of reproductive memory that 'has the index 
of reproductive modification'? 
Immanent description and analytical reflection: Husserlian ambiguities 
The motivation of our question must be clear. A similar question 
could be asked by sceptics of various hues. But it is not our purpose 
here to cast doubt on the concept of recollection. We are interested, 
however, in marking the point at which Husserl moves from immanent 
description to what we could call reflective (analytical) description, 
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and for two reasons. Firstly, Husserl himself does'not always pay 
. attention to this shift, although 
from his own (phenomenological) 
point of view, it is'quite crucial. And secondly, one would, suspect 
that it is at'the reflective, analytical level that we would find not 
only an intensification of theoretical insight, but also the quiet, 
accumulation of dogma. 
To appreciate the importance of this distinction between 
descriptive and analytical phenomenology, consider the following' 
possibility: much of what Husserl wants to say about the distinctive 
features of 'recollection' cannot be-said to fall under the heading 
of 'immanent description'. Indeed Husserl himself, having already 
devoted a number of sections to the distinctive features of re- 
collection, goes so far as to point out (0199 p. 68), as if for the 
first time, that between Irepresentifying memory and primary 
remembrance' there exists 'a great phenomenological difference, which 
'is revealed by a careful comparison of the lived-experiences involved 
in both'. And what he means-by a 'great phenomenological-difference' 
is, it seems 'radical differences-in. content' (p. 69).. The possibility 
we referred to above is this: that however much it may be crucial 
for Husserl's general programme, and indeed-his particular analysis of 
time-consciousness, that he go beyond Brentano's interest (however 
shortlived) in the contents of consciousness,. it is to just such 
differences in content that Husserl returns to bring out the 'great 
phenomenological difference' between retention and recollection. 
Even if it would be-to unfairly exaggerate'this remark to suppose'that 
he was claiming the only difference was one of content, why does he 
use the word 'phenomenological' just at the point at which he wants 
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to talk about the contents of lived experience? (With one trivial 
exception, it is the first time he has used the word 'phenomenological' 
for 25 pages. ) Might it be that differencesat the level of acts are 
not phenomenologically accessible if one understands by phenomenology 
the immanent description of lived experience? Certainly many of the 
claims Husserl makes are simple deductions from certain basic 
principles he has established about experience (eg. the necessity for 
all experiences to be either self-given or related to one which is (or 
was) self-given). Whatever we ought to conclude here, we hope now to 
at least show that many of the differences between retention and 
reproduction owe more to reflection, to what must be the case, than to 
immanent description. And it makes the relationship between the two 
levels of description problematic in principle, as it certainly was 
in practice for Husserl himself. 
Consider 0 14 "Reproduction of Temporal Objects - Secondary 
Remembrance". Clearly taking reproductive memory as his model, one 
of his main points is that from the point of view of the experiencer 
'the entire phenomenon of memory has, mutatis mutandisq exactly the 
same constitution as the perception of the melody' (014, p. 57) (we 
pass over the details here). 'Everything thus resembles perception 
and primary remembrance and yet is not itself perception and primary 
resemblance'. What separates the two cases are facts about them 
(that we are not, in memory, actually hearing) and all that flows from 
these facts about the epistemological status of recollection 
("presentified but not perceived"). Husserl will later (019) attempt 
to distinguish phenomenologically (ie. in terms of content, as we 
have noted) these two, but his preparedness to follow through a very 
simple model of reproduction without much thought already calls for 
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comment. 
By his 'very simple model' I mean the idea that reproduction 
is indeed just that - the re-living of the original experience just 
as one originally experienced it. It is important to remember that 
Husserl takes this to be the standard case, not an ideal, realised 
perhaps under special conditions. The implausibility of this model" 
of perfect reproduction can be seen by reflecting on the following 
sentence, in which he is describing how in reproduction the operation 
of primary remembrance remains intact, the seal unbroken: 
'with the apprehension of the sound appearing nowq heard 
as if now, primary remembrance blends in the sounds heard 
as if just previously and the expectation (protention) 
of the sound to come' (014, p. 58. ) 
It is extraordinary that we should have had to wait so long for a 
reference to protention, but here surely, it is fatal for his account. 
For a recollection that ignored the question of whether or not the 
protentions in the original experience had or had not been fulfilled, 
a recollection that abjured the benefits of hindsight would surely 
bea very odd and unusual thing. If the memory is of our first 
listening to a piece of music, our knowledge of how it goes will 
interfere with the protentional structure of the original experience 
on recall. Where once we did not know what to expect, we now do 
. 0.. To be fair, Husserl discusses some of these points in 024, 
but 014 exhibits no anticipatory awareness of the coming destruction 
of its model of recollection. 
If Husserl has wanted a critical difference between primary 
and secondary remembrance, one which spans the space between what 
I have called analytical and immanent description, a discussion of 
the interference patterns produced by the shape of subsequent pro- 
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tentional fulfillment would surely have filled the bill. What does 
Husserl offer us in the way of a 'phenomenological difference'? His 
analysis of the 'hearing of two or three sounds' (019) is intended to 
provide the answer. Unfortunately, his discussion (0199 pp. 68-70) 
is at best confusing and at worst itself confused. His attempt to 
demonstrate a phenomenological difference between the two (ie. between 
primary and secondary remembrance) seems to involve both the iden- 
tification of phantasy and presentification and yet importantly 
distinguish between the two, and it is altogether unclear what the 
final upshot is. When a clearer claim does emerget it seems, as 
often happens, to be an analytical distinction posing as an immanent 
descriptive one. Husserl claims that there is a difference between 
the modification of consciousness involved in the transition from 
'an originary now into one that, is reproduced', on the one hand, and 
'the modification which changes the now ... into the past'. But 
after having first suggested that the difference lies in the way the 
latter involves a 'continuous shading-off', he then states that 
(reproduction requires exactly the same gradations although only 
reproductively modified'. And unless what is meant by 'reproductively 
modified' can be made phenomenologically clear (ie. clear in immanent 
description) we are dealing again with another analytical distinction 
that does not make itself experientially apparent. 
17 
The Freedom of Reproduction 
In his discussion of the "freedom" of reproduction we do however 
find a plausible candidate for an experientially distinguishing feature, 
even though there is a certain exaggeration involved. Husserl claims 
that there is a basic difference between the passive way in which we 
84 
can merely observe the sinking-down of original impressions into their 
retentional phases, and the free activity involved in reproducingý 
(presentifying) the successive phases of a temporal interval. 
'We can carry out the presentification "more quickly", 
or "more slowly", clearly and explicitly or in a confused 
manner, quick as lightning at a stroke, or in articulated 
steps, and so on. ' (020, p. 71). 
This is surely an important claim. And it raises the most interesting 
questions in its own right. I shall consider three. The first two 
concern the status of the term 'can'. 
In the section title, the word "freedom" is in scare quotest 
as if Husserl was not sure it was quite appropriate. In fact Husserl 
is deeply committed to the idea of freedom, even if it does not play 
for him (as it does for, say, Sartre) a central role. For example, 
when endorsing (while modifying) Descartes' universal doubt (in Ideas 
031) he writes 'the attempt to doubt everything has its place in the 
realm of our perfect freedom'. There too, the power of the 'can' 
devolves from our capacity as conscious beings to modify our mode of 
consciousness, to 'transform' our cognitive attitudes. There is an 
essential element of voluntarism operating here; the 'can' does not 
just refer to possibilities (as in, say, 'beetles can come in many 
shapes and sizes'). But it is a little difficult to know how eg. 
it is within our freedom to modify the level of clarity or confusion 
in our reproductions. It would seem to presuppose that the 'base' 
for this freedom in reproduction is perfectly clear access to the 
past, which we then deliberately may allow to become confused. it 
is hard to see how one could reconstitute clarity from confusion. 
But it is in fact just as difficult to see how we can introduce 
confusion into clarity, while at the same time (in some sense) having 
access to the (clear) version being confused. In fact the assumption 
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of perfectly clear access to the past is itself problematic for-two 
reasons: (1) it would itself have to involve reproductive memory, 
and hence pose the same difficulty again, or be a kind of access 
not yet discovered, (2) while we may have such clarity on odd occasionst 
it is hardly something we can take for granted, and when we lack it, 
it does not seem to be remediable by an exercise of our freedom. The 
second point to be made about this 'can' is not a criticism, rather 
an observation: it itself involves a temporality that requires a 
complex use of Husserl's categories to be explained. 'One stab at an 
analysis of its specific temporality would be this: it is the 
reflective assertion (which transcends but'includes 'expectation') 
of a generalised protentional possibility. If anything like this 
is true, it would at least call for a reassessment of any suggestion 
that the difference between retentional passivity and reproductive 
activity is one open to simple immanent observation, for the sense 
of '(I) can' must surely be seen either as a reflective addition to the 
bare activity of reproduction, or as introducing reflection into the 
very experience of reproduction. 
The Preservation of Order 
Finally, it is interesting to note the privilege accorded to 
the order of events or phases being reproduced, even though we are 
allowed to break the continuity into 'articulated steps' which would 
seem to set the scene for transformations of order too. But why not 
extend the exercise of our freedom to the order as well? The simple 
answer is that it couldn't be a reproduction of the original experience 
if the order of its parts was tampered with. Variations of speed or 
clarity, and a kind of phase-parsing seem to be acceptable but not 
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changes of order. The intuition behind this would seem to be that a 
change of order could only take the form of error, an intrinsic failure 
of reproduction, like adding an element that had never occurred. 
Clearly one can make mistakes about order. (Indeed this possibility 
is discussed in 022. ) But not all transformations of order need be 
mistakes. If reproduction cannot avoid the destruction of the innocence 
of the protentional unfulfillments of its original experience, it might 
well be that the reproduction of an original experience could begin 
with a glimpse at the outcome or the end. (Think of trying to run 
over the construction of a plot in a novel one has just read, or the 
course-of an important conversation, or a trial, or a joke. ) There 
might be resistance to calling this reproduction, but (a) it is clearly 
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not the same thing as error, for there need be no deception involved, 
no supposition that the end phase actually did come first, (b) nor is 
it, a case of phantasy, because there is genuine reference to a past 
that actually occurred, (c) in the light of the effects wrought by 
knowledge of protentional fulfillments, one might conclude that there 
is nothing radically different in reproductive representations involving 
at some level, complex splicings of past and future, rather than the 
simple maintenance of the original 'order'. 
Husserl would resist allowing transformations of order to be 
included in the freedom of reproduction. He could nonetheless allow 
that they exhibit a wider freedom. But the reason, I suspect, is 
paradoxically, that he readily acknowledges the complex temporal over- 
lappings and interweavings on which we have predicated such transformations. 
But he wants to preserve a distinction between the order of what is 
experienced, and that of the intentional nexus that accompanies it in 
(eg. ) reproduction. It is in the way he begins to explore this that 
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024, "Protentions in Recollection", is so promising. What we have to 
take account of is that 'every act of memory contains intentions of 
expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present' (p. 76). 
The Productive Role of Reproductive Memory 
This gives us a hint of the productive role of reproductive 
memory. In reviewing the past in the light of outcomes one can learn 
from it and give it meaning. There is an interesting illusion possible 
here, however, which it is worth pointing out, just so that it becomes 
clear that it does not follow from a phenomenological analysis. I. t 
is that the only real meaning of past events is to be determined on the 
basis of the fulfillment or otherwise of their protentional horizons - 
how things worked out. Firstly, Husserl's concern'at this point is 
with memory, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this frame of 
reference is definitive. Possibilities that were not realised, hopes 
that were dashed, dangers that did not materialise are in their own way 
every bit as 'real' as those that were 'fulfilled'. Indeed, retro- 
spection need not merely serve to consolidate, or to draw the lessons 
of experience. It can just as well discover forgotten possibilities, 
find honour or courage in actions that resulted in failure, etc* 
And although such judgements may often only arise retrospectively, the 
horizon they celebrate is not the past but the future. Courage attaches 
to an act whether successful or not because of the horizons of danger 
and uncertainty in which it is carried out. It is only an accident 
that the recognition of courage (with medals, 'for example) is so often 
a consolation for practical failure. 
Husserl's discussion of protentions in memory makes it'clear 
that one of the great virtues of a phenomenological analysis of time 
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is its ability to register and delicately disentangle the multiple 
strands of temporal intentionality. It does not necessarily mean 
that these strands are wholly susceptible to phenomenological separation; 
that remains to be seen. But it does mean that phenomenology offers 
a powerful way of broaching the question of the depth structure of 
time. 
The Place of Protention 
We have already mentioned the paucity of references to proten- 
tion. Husserl's discussion in 024 is certainly some compensation. 
But is it not significant that it should first receive thematic treat- 
ment in the context of memory? What this seems to suggest - though 
we may be being unfair here - is that the fundamental importance of 
protention for Husserl is the way it anticipates possibilities of 
objectifying reflection. Protention is the name for the way the 
adventure of the future - its fundamental openness - is closed off 
by anticipation. The future is seen as a reservoir for generating 
an ever tidier past, insofar as it is (subjectively) filled with 
anticipations of completions of as yet only partial objectivities. 
The interesting question this raises is whether any truth there is in 
these remarks should be traced to the. epistemological context of 
Husserl's writing, or whether it does not perhaps offer us a way of 
coming to understand the fundamental temporal project of epistemology 
itself. 
Husserl, of course, also concerns himself with expectation as 
well as with protention (though some of his remarks would seem to 
refer to either, particularly 026, where he compares 'memory and 
expectation'. The possibility of clear sight of the future and 
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imperfect memory makes Ideterminateness' an inadequate distinguishing 
feature. But there is an essential asymmetry, which is particularly 
interesting from our point of view, for itis of immediate phenomeno- 
logical interest. Our expectations are fulfilled, or otherwise, 
perceptually, : Le. by a future experience, the occurrence of which will 
end the expectation. Whereas the only subjective basis for confirmation 
of memories is internal coherence, or, as Husserl puts it (p. 80) 'the 
establishment of nexuses of intuitive reproductions'. 
I would like to make two comments on thisq one that would add 
further complexity to the analysis, and the other, more importantj 
which will draw us into a dimension that we will take up only much 
later. 
The first is this: there is a strange inverse mirror relation 
between memory and expectation. In terms of fulfillmentt as we have 
seen, expectation alone can appeal to perception. And yet in terms 
of intention,, of course it is memory which has a special relationship 
to perception. We remember only what we have experienced and so what 
has actually happened. And memory posits such an occurrence. 
Expectation can posit what it likes but it may not happen. Memory has 
a special relationship to actual perception; expectation relates to 
possible perception. Husserl's asymmetry rests on the function of 
coherence in allowing us to test meanings, and perception those of 
expectation. But it ought to be pointed out that expectations too 
can be tested by considerations of coherence ('All this must ... dove-- 
tail into a context of similar intuitions up to the now'). -But such 
considerations are, surely equally applicable to the expectations. 
Some expectations - for instance those inconsistent singly or severally 
- can be discounted in advance. That the moon will be found to be 
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made of green cheese, that my dead grandparents will turn up for dinner, 
that my book will write itself, and so on. In this respect, the contrast 
with memory is less marked than one might think. 
Expectation as an Inadequate Paradigm for Consciousness of the Future: 
an Alternative 
Our second comment may perhaps seem more tangential. Husserl 
is taking expectation as something of a paradigm for our relationship 
with the future. And yet does it not exhibit a strange unconcerned 
neutrality? Expectations treat the future as a matter of detached 
curiosity, unless we treat 'Expectation' as a mere analytical moment 
in some more interested or involved relation. It is surely somewhat 
rarely that we-can relate to the future in a purely cognitive manner, 
and for two reasons. Firstly, insofar as we are active beings (and 
not simply observers) the future is not something independent of our 
own actions. Secondly, even when we are not in a position to affect 
the future, we may be no less concerned about it. In the case of 
active involvement it may be said that it both presupposes an expecta- 
tional nexus, involving all sorts of hypothetical assumptions about 
'what would happen and it results in certain expectations 
about what after one's intervention will happen. This is all quite 
true, but in each case, expectation has become (if-ever it was any- 
thing different) an analytical component of a more complex relation- 
ship to the future. We shall suppose for the moment that a plausible 
name for a better paradigm of our relationship to the future is. 
-'desire,, 
and briefly suggest ways in which the analysis of desire would have to 
depart considerably-from that of a mere analytical component - expecta- 
tion. 
Whether one adopts a Platonic or a neo-Nietzschean conception 
of desire - whether, that is, one thinks of desire as the expression 
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of ontological lack (Plato, Hegel, Lacan, Sartre), or whether one 
thinks of it as an expression of the way we each exceed and overflow 
ourselves into the future (Nietzsche, Deleuze), there is a sense in 
which'desires may not be fulfilled as expectations ideally are. An 
expectation is a cognitive distance from a perception, and the 
perception (ideally) totally fulfills the expectation. ' The satiation 
of a desire, however, is different. For the satisfaction of desire 
only sustains more desiring. Indeed, it is the occasion for the 
discovery - certainly on the Platonic view - of the impossibility of 
satisfying what desire truly seeks - possession, completions unity 
with the Other (or the other object), the end of striving, etc. In 
other words, desire has a metaphysical dimension to it that expectation 
per se lacks. If, however, expectation is always conjoined with some 
conative element, then we cannot exclude that, albeit by association, 
the same would be true of expectation. But only because there is'no 
mere expectation. Expectation, pure as it may always be, is an index 
of our status as temporal beings. Particular expectations themselves 
occur, as we have said in a different context, within nexuses of other 
expectations, all drawing on previous experience, and as these new 
expectations are (or are not) fulfilled this body of experience will 
be itself enlarged, generating a new range of expectations.... But 
although the fulfillment of expectations could in this limited sense be 
said to generate new expectations, it would be more accurate to say 
that it modifies the framework of understanding within which new 
expectations are generated. The generation is indirect. But are 
matters so different with desire? A proper account of this question 
will have to await a fuller analysis of desire. Perhaps the clue 
to the fundamental difference is precisely in the apparent disin- 
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terestedness of expectation, and the overwhelming interest involved 
in desire. The possibility of metaphysical illusion is not confined 
to the idea of disinterestedness (as the hollowness of at least some 
desires has suggested eg. to Epicurus, and to Buddhism. ) 
Husserl's Epistemological Focus: a Limitation? 
Where does this take us in our discussion of Husserl? We do 
not claim yet to have proved anything by comparing expectation to 
desire, about the intrinsic limitations of phenomenology. But we 
do hope to have at least suggested that the move from thinking about 
expectation to thinking about desire is a move that brings the scope 
of Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness into a new perspective. 
That is - it shows again the limited epistemological concerns 
on which Husserl's treatment is predicated. If this is a fair claim, 
we are confronted with a number of possibilities - 
(i) that there may be a good reason for this limitation - that time 
is either itself an epistemological concept, or that epistemological 
and temporal concepts have some common root, or common field of 
operation. 
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(ii) that if this is not true of time, it is nonetheless true of time- 
consciousness, and this latter is fundamental. 
(iii) that we need to expand our frames of reference to accommodate 
other concepts of time, leaving Husserl's intact, but as having finite 
scope, limited application. 
(iv) that we need, in addition to (iii), to place epistemology. itself 
within a wider context, within which Husserl's concept of time may or may 
not have its place. 
These alternatives are not all incompatible. We can read (ii) 
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as a refinement of (i), and (iv) of (iii), drawing the main division 
between (i) and (ii) on the one hand and (iii) and (iv) on the other. 
The relationship between these two pairs is complex, indeed one of'the 
key issues of this thesis will be whether moving the-consciousness of 
time out of the framework offered by Husserl would mean its expansion, 
or its transcendence/displacement/destruction/deconstruction... 
The Scope of Perception 
The distinctiveness of Husserl's account of internal time- 
consciousness rests on the particular way he treats retention., Not 
only is it not understood as a change in the contents of consciousness 
(eg. by their acquiring a new quality - that of pastness) it is, 
positively speaking, treated as a non-dependent or loriginary, mode 
of consciousness. Retention in particular is not a reproductive, or 
representational mode of consciousness. He calls it a kind of 
'perception', and allows that we perceive the past. And yet there 
seems to be a difference between our awareness of what we are immediately 
sensing now, and our retentive grasp of the 'immediate' past. Can. we 
really call both 'perception' in the same sense? And if we talk about 
perceiving what is in one way or another immediately available to us, 
can we really talk of perceiving a melody which endures through time? 
Husserl does so because he wants to stress that the unity of the melody 
is constituted by intuitive acts, and not the result of mere associations. 
How can he reconcile these three senses (or types) of 'perception' 
especially considering the kind of epistemological privilege that such 
a term conveys? 
Two Levels of Perception 
What, in fact, we get from Husserl is an explanation of the 
different motives for the double application of 'perception'. We have 
said before that the idea of the present and of presence involves a 
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fusion of a temporal and an evidential sensel and this ambivalence plays 
an important part of Husserl's discussion of perception. 
If we consider what it is to listen to a melody, the problem 
becomes apparent. On the one hand we want to distinguish between 
individual tones actually being perceived, and those that have gone 
by, which are no longer perceived. And on the other hand we want 
to say that we perceive the whole melody. 
Husserl offers two ways of explaining the second usage. First 
we can say that the whole melody is perceived because each part of it 
is, one after the other, perceived. But this seems insufficientg 
because the unity, of the, 
'whole 
melody as an immanent temporal object 
is not accounted for. A randomly organised sequence of the same tones 
would do quite as well. Husserl seems to admit this when he writes 
'The whole melody ... appears as present so long as it 
still sounds, so long as the notes belonging to it, 
intended in the one nexus of apprehension, still sound' 
(016, ? -GI) (author's emphasis) 
This reference to 'belonging', to loneness', to the 'nexus of apprehension' 
bringsout the second condition, that the individual tones be perceived as 
part I of a whole. What he calls 'adequate perception of the temporal 
object' requires that 
'the unity of retentional consciousness still 'holds' the 
expired tones themselves in consciousness and continuously 
establishes the unity of consciousness with regard to the 
homogeneous temporal obj ect, ie. the melody I. (01r., p. ( o) 
Husserl seems to say that the elasticity of the scope of 
'perception' results from the variability of the intentional focus. 
We legitimately say we 'perceive' whatever is intended in experience 
and is therein constituted as such through time, as 'one', as a unity. 
After this, Husserl follows up two seemingly inconsistent lines 
of thought, which can be explained in the following way: what counts 
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as perceived depends on whether we are making a distinction within the 
domain of what is 'originally self-given', or whether we are distinguishing 
that field itself from what is not self-given at all (but is only 
presentified). The internal distinction gives rise to a distinction, 
one that emphasises the temporal sense of 'presence', between perception 
(ofthe now) and retention (of the just gone), while, the external distinc- 
tion emphasises the evidential sense of presence, and calls perception 
whatever is self-given, whether or not it is so given in the immediate 
temporal present. In brief he distinguishes perception v. retention 
from perception v. presentification (eg. recollection). 
His successive consideration of what we have called the. internal 
and external distinctions leads him to interestingly different 
conclusions. 
If we make the distinction internally, we would say that our 
apprehension of an immanent temporal object was a product of mixing 
perception and non-perception.. At any time, we will have impressions 
(perceived) and retentions (not-perceived). And yet when we remember 
that we are only dealing with the phases of alcontinuum which is 
constantly being modified', we have to realize that the restriction of 
'perception' to the now is only an ideal limit, never actually realized. 
He goes on to say that 'even this ideal now is not something toto caelo 
different from the not-now, but continually accommodates itself thereto'. 
This is a momentous remark. Husserl is first of all saying that once 
we admit that the now is only a phase in a continuum, it only has an 
ideal existencel and then he sees that it would be wrong to restrict 
ideality to the function of making static abstractions from a continuum. 
The true ideality of the now is itself a dynamic ideality, a continous 
accommodation of the now to the not now. 
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What this surely implies is that the internal distinction between 
perception and non-perception breaks down, when we see that the distinction 
between the now and the, no-longer-now itself breaks down, and not only 
'in practice', but ideally too. What is actually perceived is not the 
now, but the now as it passes away into retention. And the now has 
no existence independent of its own becoming not-now. 
The 'external' distinction - between perception and recollection 
involves treating the 'now-ness' of narrowly conceived perception as 
merely an instance of originary self-givenness. If we allow-this latter 
to be the criterionfor perception, then we can allow that retention is 
a mode of perception and as such is quite distinct from recollectionj which 
is only presentification. The extraction of loriginary-self-givenness' 
from the apprehension of the 'now' is. in effect the extraction of 
evidential presence from a blend of temporal and evidential senses of 
presence, claiming that the evidential sense extends beyond the temporal, 
and is sufficient for 'perception' to occur. If we make this move we 
are saying that it is possible to 'perceive' the past. 
'There has never been any 'perception't (Derrida) 
What Husserl has to say about perception in 016 and 17 leads in a 
strange direction. The structure of his epistemological thinking is 
such as to treat our immediate awareness of the 'now' as the model of 
originary givenness, with which retention and recollection will later 
be compared. While retention does not give us the present, it is a 
mode of direct access to what is self-given, and if we consider this 
feature to be what is epistemologically central to our awareness of the 
now, then retention is thought of as a form of perception. But Husserl 
is quite aware that the distinction between impressional and retentional 
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consciousness is hewn from what is actually a continuum, and a dynamic 
continuum at that. , And as a continuum, it is characterized by infinite 
divisibility, so that at any level one chooses, the sinking-down into 
retentional consciousness will already be apparent. And if, as he 
claims, the now is only an ideal limit, it is tempting to treat retention 
as the primal phenomenon, with impressional consciousness as extrapolated 
or derived from it, or perhaps as only one of its abstract phases. 
Husserl has, of course, earlier vigorously resisted anything like this. 
'We teach the a priori necessity of the precedence of a 
perception or primal impression over the corresponding 
retention' (013, p. 55) 
And such a conclusion as we have suggested would make it somewhat 
difficult to credit retention with the epistemological status of 'now, - 
perception in the way that was done before, because, at the'very least, 
they are inseparable. Put more strongly, however, there is fio now- 
perception as such, and so nothing with which retention could be com-- 
pared. 
Is there not a parallel here with Hegel's discovery at the 
beginning of the Phenomenology of Mind of the difficulties involved 
in the idea of simple sense-certainty? I am not in fact convinced 
that the indexical terms 'this'. 'that', 'now', or 'here' can be thought 
to bear the seeds of that universality that threatens the very poss- 
ibility of simple sense-certainty. Nonetheless, it is arguable that 
'this'. 'here', 'now' not only have no meaning, they have no referential 
value either until they are filled out, or qualified in some way 
('this phraselp 'here in Warwick', 'as I speak to you now' etc. ). 
The argument then is that any attempt to specify the particularity or 
individuality of an item (eg. a sensation) automatically makes use of 
some sort of conceptuality, simply to delimit the item being indicated. 
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Husserl's willingness to extend the scope of 'perception' to 
immanent and enduring temporal objects could be seen to compromise 
the basis in an extended now-perception from which he proceeded. 
For it begins to seem that any now one might choose has its own 
inner retentionality. (The parallel with Hegel would only be complete 
if one were able to relate the role of concepts in Hegel to the primitive 
origins of constitution in Husserl - the structure of retention. We 
might suppose that this could be accomplished by seeing Kant's schemata 
as supplying the temporal underpinnings of Hegel's concepts, and 
Husserl's retentionality as supplying the basic unit from which 
schemata could be constructed. ) 
Husserl's repeated example of the melody (or a tone) may seem 
to simplify the question of temporal constitutiong but at the same 
time it leaves open the way in which concepts actually do supply the 
unifying grounds for other immanent objects. Husserl's answer, of 
course, is his theory of constitution. But it is far from clear that 
the operations involved in constitution can all be derived from 
retention. And if the claimed epistemological'privileges of 'perception' 
can be extended to retentional consciousness, and indeed to the exper- 
iencing of temporally extended objects, it is hard to see how-it can 
extend to the products of extended constitution. 
Can 'Perception' be extended to any retentional continuum? 
Husserl has offered us, as we have mentioned before, a model of 
how this can happen, by progressive retentional inclusion: 
I ... in each of these retentions is included a continuity 
of retentional modifications ... each retention is in itself a continuous modification which ... bears in itself 
the heritage of the past in the form of a series of 
shadings' (011) 
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This is both a simple and a generatively powerful model and does indeed 
offer a superficially plausible way in which we might have some sort of 
direct access to the past via a kind of retentional backlog. But 
there are certain difficulties with it. 
(i) Precisely because the principle of retentional inclusion can be 
recursively applied without limit, there should be no limit to what 
can be perceived. But it is perfectly clear that even if we accept 
this terminology, that such extended-retentions shade into recollection 
(and indeed into forgetfulness, of which more later) without warning. 
And yet this whole analysis rests on there not being shades of self- 
givenness. Retentional inclusion is a neat but a priori solutiong 
but it cannot explain why it ever comes to an end, or falters. 
(ii) More important still, there seems to be no scope, on this model, 
for understanding the role of other schematic devices for organizing 
time. A very simple example will suffice. If I listen to four bars 
of a song, retentional inclusion has either to ignore the intentional 
structure of the song (Le., minimally, that it is divided into four 
parts), or to take this into account. If it ignores it, it is blind; 
if it accommodates itself to it, it transcends the simplicity of its 
structure of progressive inclusion towards a recognition of, the temporal 
structure of objects themselves, or of ways of representing their 
temporal structure that are inseparable from the ordinary ways of 
experiencing them, ways that could not be eliminated for being Irepre- 
sentationall (and hence secondary etc. ) without eliminating the object 
itself. 
Consider$ for example, listening to a (regularly) repeated 
sensation, such as a heartbeat, a ticking clock, throbbing pain. In 
this experience the regularity, the equality of the intervals between 
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the 'beats' , which is a fact about the series of sensations, is 
equally part of the experience itself. It could be replied that, 
of course, retention does not deal with representational elements in 
a temporal sequence. Our claim is that the kind of extended reten- 
tional constitutions to which Husserl alludes always require the 
scaffolding of types of temporal structuring that transcend reten- 
tional inclusion. 
We are facing Husserl with an unpalatable choice: 
a. either face the prospect of 'perception' being narrowed down to 
a very restricted band of experiences, or possibly even becoming an 
unrealizable ideal, 
b. or abandon the epistemological status of 'perception' as, for 
example, offering certainty ("What I am retentionally aware of, we 
say, is absolutely certain "). (022) 
* 
If we have doubts about how much we could be said to 'perceive' 
by retentional inclusion, it should not be thought that Husserl restricts 
our experience to this perceptual paradigm. Not at all. Recollection, 
even though it is not itself an original, self-given kind of experience 
makes a particular positive contribution to the constitution of time. 
This we must now explore. ' 
The Positive Contribution of Recollection 
Reproductive consciousness, secondary remembrance, representa- 
tional memory... in each case the question is simple: whai account can 
we give of the relationship to primary, original consciousness of the 
past (in retention) such that recollection can play a role in the 
constitution of 'time'? Why is this relationship problematic at all? 
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Unlike retention, reproduction can offer no guarantees of accuracy. 
The order of succession may be misrepresented. Elements may be added 
or lost. In fact Husserl allows the possibility of transmitting the 
certainty of retention through to reproduction only under very 
restrictive conditions, namely when we inwardly repeat what is till 
'fresh' or 'vivid' in our memory (022). In this way, the Ireproduc- 
tive flow' can coincide with 'a retentional one'. This would seem 
to apply to a rather narrow range of cases. It might properly describe 
the strategies by which one tries to keep in mind a telephone number 
until pen and paper are to hand, but does it really apply any more 
widely? According to Husserl it does. In section 14, it provides 
the basis for his account of the role of recollection in constituting 
the consciou'Sness of 'duration and succession. We can summarize his 
argument as follows, focussing on his account of the constitution of 
succession. 
Take the simple succession of two tones A and B. 
M In addition to the experience of A and the experience of B (and 
their respective retentional trains) there is the experience of the 
succession A, B, which succession we perceive in an originary way 
(via Retention). 
(ii) It is always possible ("I can") to repeat my consciousness'of 
this succession, 'presentify' it; that is an a priori fact about my 
freedom. 
(iii) I can do this indefinitely, generating a succession of con- 
sciousnesses of succession and I can even make any such sequence into 
one of the units of a similar sequence. 
(iv) In this way (a) succession is constituted. 
Husserl's presentation contains many subtle-ties not here 
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reproduced. But let us see if we can further clarify the central 
line of the argument, remembering that it is the role of recollection 
in the constitution of succession that is in question. 
Husserl begins, as we have seen, by claiming that consciousness 
of the succession of two tones (A & B) is 'an original dator conscious- 
ness$, I take it that is achieved in retention, or is a kind of 
Iretentional consciousness'. His question, then, if I understand him, 
is how is 'succession as such' (and not this particular succession) 
constituted from this particular example, and his answer is that we 
have the capacity to reproduce the first constituted succession at 
will. I think his claim is that the series of memories of this 
particular succession (and memories of memories of succession) that 
this capacity generates gives us succession freed from its particular 
original content (A & B). Again interpreting his remarks, he seems 
to be claiming that reproductive consciousness, by generating a 
succession of successions allows us to focus on the form of succession 
itself, presented in the most appropriate way - successively. 
Husserl's conclusion (pp. 67-8) is most important for under 
standing the fundamental status of succession in the constitution of 
an enduring object. 
'In the succession of like objects (identical as to content) 
which we are given only in succession, and never as co- 
existing, we have a peculiar coincidence in the unity of 
one consciousness' (P. 67) 
'we have an interrelatedness which is not constituted in 
i relational mode of observation, and which is prior to 
all "comparison" and all "thinking" as the necessary 
condition for all intuition of likeness and difference' 
(pp. 67-8) 
Could we read this as saying that repetition precedes any 
consideration of identity or similarity? 
Recollection and the Past 
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As far as the 'Just past' is concerned, we have originary access 
to it by virtue of retention. But this does not suffice to account for 
the more remote past or the past in general. And it is here that 
recollection plays a vital constitutive role. The fact that recollec- 
tion posits (as 'having been'-in this way or that) the now it reproduces, 
serves to distinguish it from phantasy. Recollection also 'gives it 
a position with regard to the actual now and the sphere of the originary 
temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs' (023, p. 74). 
Recollection can play a constitutive role in this regard because 
it itself takes the form of a flux of presentificationsl which is 'a 
flux of phases of lived experiences constructed exactly like every 
other temporally constitutive flux'. In other words, the phases of 
primal retention and experience of the now occur just as freely with 
presentifications as their content. So this flux constitutes itself 
as a unity, but it also constitutes as its Object - its interitional 
object - 'the unity of the remembered', the sphere of memory itself. 
We have already discussed one of the most powerful ways in 
which this sphere of memory is constituted, via the reworking of the 
protentional horizons latent in what is recollected, in the light of 
what happened. This of course establishes nexuses within which 
particular past durations can be placed. And as these nexuses have 
as their ultimate context the whole of my conscious life, both past 
and still in flux, that sphere of memory is-itself subject to 
modification. 'Everything new reacts on, the old... 1-, (0259 p. 77). 
This account is of the utmost importance. We should, note in 
particular (1) that it is in the multi-phased flux of lived experience 
that constitution occurs; (2) that this can as easily take reproduc- 
tive modifications as its 'content' as anything else; (3) this permits 
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all manner of non-originary modes of consciousness to play constitutive 
roles, and is the vital way in which the limitations of retentional 
consciousness superceded; (4) it is precisely the interaction between 
originary protentions as recollected, and the continual process of 
recollection that brings about the progressive knitting together of 
the unity of time-consciousness; (5) there is a fifth claim which 
while clearly important, is open to two somewhat different interpre- 
tations. Husserl's way of stressing the fact that the chain of 
reproduced objects is not a mere succession of associated intentions, 
is to talk of 'the past as reproduced bear(ing) ... an indeterminate 
intention toward a certain state of affairs in regard to the now ... 
an intention which in itself is an intention toward the series of 
possible fulfillments' 
Husserl is saying, I take it, that the past as actually 
reproduced at any one time is to be understood against a background 
of greater fulfillment, which is steadily realized. On this-account 
his large scale intention would be the ideal fulfillment (or'other- 
wise) of all the protentional gaps in our memory, and hence the 
maximizing of the internal intentional integration of our past. 
But his subsequent remarks leave us less sure. He writes 
I ... this intention is a non-intuitivep an "empty" intention 
and its objectivity is the objective temporal series of 
events, this series being the dim surroundings of what is 
actually recollected' (025, p. 78) 
and shortly thereafter 
'The component "unauthentic perception""which belongs to 
every transcendent perception as an essential element is 
a "complex" intention which can be fulfilled in nexuses 
of a definite kind, in nexuses of data (025, p. 78). 
We seem to have a rather different claim here - namely that what 
recollection actually intends is not just what I experienced, 'but 
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what happened. That serves as the background against which what I 
can actually recall stands out. We posit 'the past', which always 
in fact transcends what I will ever be able to recall or understand 
about it, but which could ideally be presented as 'data'. 
If this is what Husserl is claiming here, we have an important 
instance of one of the transcendencies excluded in 01 reappearing as 
the object of an overarching intention. 
Recollection and the Constitution of Temporal Objects 
Our discussion of the positive constitutive contributions of 
recollection will be completed if we can explain how Husserl treats 
its involvement in the constitution of temporal objects and objective 
time. This is dealt with in 030-32, - but with enormously greater 
precision and clarity in Appendix IV. We shall look first at the 
constitution of temporal objects. 
Husserl's claim is lucidity itself: 
'the identity of temporal objects is a constitutive 
product of unity of certain possible coincidences of 
identifications of recollection' (p. 144). 
Recollection has a feature that merely perceiving-again lacks - the 
temporal object is quite identical on each occasion of recollection. 
Temporal objectivity can be established in subjective time-conscious- 
ness by virtue of the re-identification that recollection makes'possible. 
Recollection also has a feature that perception lacks - that 
while present time exhibits flux, and an always new now point, for 
recollection 
'every point exhibits an Objective temporal point which 
can be objectified again and again, and the interval of 
time is formed from purely Objective points and is 
itself identifiable again and again' (p. 144). 
Husserl seems to claim that while the unity of a temporal object rests 
on 'the series of primal impressions and continuous modifications' 
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through which it is generated - either as something unchanging, or as 
a unity involving change, its identity rests on the possibility of 
re-identificationt in which the same 'enduring unity' simply changes 
in its 'mode of (temporal) givenness'. 
Recollection and the Constitution of Time 
But what is the relationship between the constitution of 
Objectivity in, time, and the. constitution of time itself? Husserl 
says they are not the same (p. 145) but that 'the possibility of 
identification belongs to the constitution of time' (p. 145),. but 
what further contribution does recollection make to this constitution? 
Husserl is clearest on this point in Appendix IV'. There he argues 
(roughly) this: that the possibility of freely returning, via 
recollection, to an identical portion of time, over and over again, 
whir-1 applies in principle to everypart of my past experience, 
constitutes that experience as occuring within an objective temporal 
field. The analogy is drawn with the parallel feature of an objective 
spatial field - one can return to parts one has been to before. 
Recollection functions as the condition of accessibility of the temporal 
field, and hence constitutes it as a field. 
For a grasp of how Objective time is constituted as such, how, 
that is, we come io be able to think and have experiences for which 
we know a place on a single temporal continuum will always be assured 
- recollection is not enough. The idea of Objective time is insepar- 
able from this a priori assurance of the locatability of any particu- 
lar temporal object or duration. And in this concluding section 33 
of the second part of the book, Husserl spells out some of the further 
intuitive certainties that are involved, each of which is immediately 
comprehensible to us when we think about temporal position. This 
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section fulfills the promise of 02. He discusses, eg. simultaneity, 
transitivity, the homogeneity of absolute time etc. 
But how should we assess this account of the constitution of 
Objective time? I would like to make two related observations. 
Time and Identity 
Subtly, and somewhat without announcement, Husserl has moved 
from discussing internal time-consciousness to explaining the constitu- 
tion of what we think of, or experience as, objective time. The key 
role in this shift has been played by the apparently idealizing 
capacities of recollection, and the transitional, if lengthy emphasis 
on the constitution of temporal objects. These each sharpen a 
certain orientation towards the interpretation of time in the light 
of objects in time, (including essentially temporally extended objects), 
that is, discrete unities in time, subject to identity - establishing 
recollection. His discussion of time is in effect the discussion of 
the establishing cLn4 preservation of identity in and by time, by which 
the phenomenology of time contributes to the project (the term is 
Heidegger's) of 'fundamental ontology'. Recollection deals with 
completed durations; immanent temporal objects endure within distinct 
temporal limits, are nameable, reidentifiable, the bearers of predicates 
etc. 
19 Husserl does of course mention both protention and expectation 
but, as we have already suggested, his most important discussion of 
protention is in the context of recollection, 
But is it really fair to suggest that Husserl's account is 
limited by its concern with identity? Surely it is simply a result 
of trying to deal with the most obvious and difficult question time 
poses - how can there be stable identities given the flux of time? 
It is not a theory which ignores the fact of flux, it is precisely 
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built on that fact. What we can say, however, is that there is little 
sense here of what we might call the negative side of timeg the threat 
it poses to all constitution of identity, even as it sustains it. The 
concentration on the past is for its positive epistemological value. 
'Wesen ist was gewesen ist' as Hegel put it. This seems to leave for 
another occasion a serious discussion of the future, and those 
attitudes, emotions, orientations and practices that require its 
openness. 
The Idealization of Time 
What are we to say about the idealization involved in Husserl's 
descriptions? ýAt a certain point (041) Husserl admits this. For 
the rest, he writes, 
'... we operate with descriptions which already are in 
some respects idealizing fictions. It is a fiction, 
for example that a sound endures completely unaltered... ' 
(p. 113) 
There is of course a general justification for idealisation in any 
theoretical discipline, namely that it brings out what is essential. 
Where would Euclidean geometry be without the fiction of straight, 
infinitely thin lines? But this analogy, so helpful in some ways, 
also allows us to clarify our doubts. The dropping of the assumption 
that all lines are straight, for instance, allows the development of 
the geometry of curved surfaces, for example. What if the same sorts 
of restrictions are still operating with time? Husserl, for example, 
seems to treat as legitimate idealisation that everything we have 
perceived can be recalled at will, indefinitely, and without alteration. 
But this is not a description of experience, but the elucidation of 
a model of experience to which our actual expeience ideally corresponds. 
It should be possible to formulate a general rule to capture 
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those cases in which this difference matters and those in which it 
does not. It would go something like this: idealisation is 
permissable when those factors which are being excluded are of no 
significance to the matter at hand. So a map of the British Isles 
could, for most demographic purposes, square off the coast line quite 
a bit without affecting its capacity to communicate accurate informa- 
tion. But for an inshore yachting map it would be useless. 
Idealization as distortion: a special principle 
A very general description can be given of a type of case in 
which idealization may be dangerous: whenever the phenomenon being 
dealt with is itself the product of a certain (variable) failure or 
success at idealization. An idealization which ignored this struggle, 
compromise etc. would be critically misleading. Suppose I draw 
this - 
C) 
I can say 
1. "1 have drawn a circle". This is an idealization of my achieve- 
ment. In many circqm-btances it would not be misleading. But suppose 
I had been trying to draw a more or less perfect circle. Then it would 
be more accurate to say 
2. "1 have tried to draw a circle". An idealizing act must ensure 
that it does not take as its subject-matter something which has an 
intrinsic relationship to its own ideality, for it then risks covering 
up the importance of the gap between actuality and ideality. Idealiza- 
tion would make every attempt into a success. 
How does this apply to time? 
Husserl gives recollection a vital role to play in the constitution 
of objective time. But it is an. idealized recollection, one that does 
not know the meaning of failure. Can it do more than constitute an ideal 
110 
time? It is particularly curious that the form this idealization 
takes ("I can" (always return)) actually presupposes the very ideal 
objective temporality it constitutes. Does not the "I can" protend 
indefinite participation in the same future, connected to the past? 
Interestingly enough, though not noted by Husserl, this would make 
the past and indeed Objective time dependent on an idealization of 
the future -To be explicit, recollection presupposes a certain model 
of the temporal dimension which we could call transparency, accessi- 
bility, mobility and preservation. Nothing is lost, everything is 
still available. But if that were not so? If forgetting was quite 
as common, and identical recollections always involved some element 
of phantasy? Would we not at the very least have to consider the 
status of "objective time", or at least Husserl's account of its 
constitution? Might it not (just) be a projective idealization?. 
The power of Husserl's account is that it is in many ways 
intuitively persuasive. No doubt the objectivity of "Time" has 
something to do with our power to free ly order, revert tog and reproduce 
past temporal points. But is it any more than an imaginary infinitizing 
of that power? 
We have noted Husserl's orientation towards the 'completed', 
the way his road to "objective Time" takes him through temporal objects. 
But it would be misleading to leave it there. For Husserl is led 
to posit not just 'objective time' but an Absolute Flux, in which time, 
as a pre-objective, pre-constituted ground of any constitutiong is 
discovered. We must briefly consider this idea, and where it leads 
Husserl to later on. It is the main concern of the third and last 
part of the book and of a number of Appendices (eg. VI, xiii). 
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The Path to Absolute Flux 
The idea of the absolute flux of consciousness was not obvious 
to Husserl at the beginning of his lectures on time-consciousness. 
John Brough pinpoints its emergence in late 1906 or early 1907.20 
Husserl's position is presented by means of a contrast that had not 
previously been put to much work, that between the constituted and the 
constituting. And although he proceeds in a descriptive manner it 
is clear that an argument does underlie the move. It is that the 
time-consciousness and 'Objective time' we have previously been 
discussing have been the constituted products of a more basic consti- 
tutive level, which we have not yet unearthed. , He will call it 
'the absolute, temporally constitutive flux of consciousness, (032). 
What is so interesting about it is that it differs so much from what 
we described as his previous orientation towards 'completeness', 
-'unity' and 'identity', for it is understood as the constitutive 
ground of all such 'products', and is not to be confused with them. 
I ... any object which is altered is lacking herep and 
inasmuch as in every process "something" proceedst it 
is not a question here of a process. There is nothing 
here which is altered, and therefore it makes no sense 
to speak here of something that endures. ' (035, p. 99) 
So, neither the categories of object or process apply. As it is a 
flux, we want to talk about change, in some sense, but how? 
I ... we find necessarily and essentially a flux of 
continuous "alteration", and this alteration has 
the absurd property that it flows exactly as it 
flows and can flow neither "more swiftly" nor "more 
slowly". ' (our emphasis) 
What is absurd is that one wants both to talk of time as a flux or 
flow (Fluý ) and yet not talk about the rate of flow. But it would 
of course be even more absurd (if that is possible) if one were to 
talk of it flowing quickly or slowly. 
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'For all this, names are lacking' 
036t "The Temporally Constitutive Flux as Absolute Subjectivity", 
ends with the sentence 'For all this, names are lacking'. Husserl 
has drawn the ultimate (and obvious) consequence from the priority of 
this flux to any constituted objectivity (coupled with the thesis that 
language and meaning are also products of such constitutive acts) - 
that the description of this flux puts a fundamental strain on language 
itself. The word 'flux' itself must be treated as a metaphor. What 
we are dealing with is absolute subjectivity. He wants still to speak 
of 'the lived experience of actuality', 'primal source-point', a 
'continuity of moments of reverberation', but language is clearly a 
struggle here. 
I ... temporally constitutive phenomena.... are not 
individual objects ... not individual processes, and 
terms which can be predicated of such processes cannot 
be meaningfully ascribed to them. Therefore, it can 
also make no sense to say of them (and with the same 
conceptual meaning) that they are in the now and have 
been previously, that they succeed one another tempor- 
ally, or are simultaneous with respect to one another 
etc. (036, p. 100) 
In other words the language of temporal predicates belongs to the 
realm of the constituted, and cannot properly apply at all to the 
constitutive ground itself. He writes that 'we can only say that this 
flux is something which we name in conformity with what is constituted, 
but it is nothing temporally objective'. I take this as saying 
that we can attribute to this flux such 'properties' as are proper 
to it by virtue of its relation to what it constitutesl whatever 
they may turn out to be. 
It is worth at this point explaining why he calls this flux 
'absolute'. What he means (see eg. Appendix VI p. 153) is that the 
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shape of the flux - the constant sinking-down-from impression to 
retention - is not something that any change in circumstances could 
affect; it is not contingent. It could not suddenlý be the case 
that the flux got stuck in an impressional phase, for example. 'The 
variety of its phases can never cease and pass over into a self- 
continuing of ever-like phases' (p. 153). 
But we have to ask what the relationship is between this absolute 
flux and the original discussion that centred on the diagram of time, 
of the various modes of temporal awareness. Have we here discovered 
something quite new, a new temporal depth hitherto obscured by the 
discussion of objective time? In fact Husserl's thematization of 
absolute flux is a taking up again of the discussion of primal 
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impression and retention, the fundamental modes of temporal awareness, 
this time in the light of his attempt to delineate the constituted 
states of 'immanent' Le. objective (see 039) time. With that behind 
him, the question of the temporality of the consciousness responsible 
for that constituting activity is posed again. To merely talk about 
different temporal phases is not enough. Two problems in particular 
arise: 
(i) if temporal predicates properly apply to constituted (immanent, 
objective) time, what can we say about the temporality of the 
f lux? 
(ii) surely every flux must be constituted a unity - but how? 
What Husserl tries to do is to derive features of the flux from 
a discussion of its relation to and difference from immanent time. 
This most explicitly begins in 0 37 and 038. 
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Absolute Flux and Immanent Time 
We know (or at least we suppose we know! ) for instance that all 
objects and processes and events can be located within the framework of 
one immanent time. We know that within that time, we can give sense 
to 'simultaneity' for example. Does this concept, just to take an 
example, apply to the absolute flux? 
Impressional consciousness is at any moment surely a plural affair. 
WE are aware of many different sensory contents and this awareness is 
equally 'plural'. Husserl refuses to talk here of simultaneity but 
instead of Zusammen, Zugleich (all-together; all-at-once). 
'the primal sensations themselves are not simultaneous, 
and we cannot call the phases of the fluxional before- 
all-at-once (Vorzugleich) simultaneous phases of con- 
sciousness any more than we can callýthe succession of 
consciousness a temporal succession'. (0389 p. 104) 
Husserl is making a distinction between different levels of 
predication. Standard temporal predicates, to repeat, are being 
restricted to constituted time. And yet we do want to talk about 
the/this/any flux as possessing unity of some sort. How could such 
unity arise? 
The illusion that would treat this flux as a temporal series like 
any other is an illusion born of adopting a retrospective viewpoint on 
it. It then appears constituted like any other object of reflection. 
But if that were the case, one would still be left with the problem 
of the temporality of the other level at which it was constituted, and 
so on ... unless, of course, some way could be found of avoiding this 
infinite regress. Husserl makes a formally traditional move, and 
claims, to Sartre's subsequent satisfaction, that the Absolute Flux 
is self-constituting. 
22 
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In 0249 he had invoked the idea of double intentionality (some- 
what by analogy with the axes of two-dimensional space) of recollection. 
Here he uses the same term in relation to retention. The retentional 
phase both serves to constitute immanent temporal objects (eg. melodies) 
and thence objective time, via the"Ican"; it is also self-constitu- 
tive in that these very retentive phases that make it up each refer 
'back' to a previous mode of consciousness (ultimately impressional) 
and 'forward' to the next retentional one. 
How should we describe this flux? He talks of 
'the quasi-temporal disposition of the phases of the flux, 
which ever and necessarily has the folowing now-pointp the 
phase of actuality and the series of pre-actual and post- 
actual (of the not yet actual) phases. This--pre-phenomenalt 
pre-immanent temporality is constituted intentionally as the 
form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the 
latter itselfl(p. 109). 
As far as one can tell, through the intricate forest of Husserl's 
descriptive subtleties, he is arguing that the modes of conscious- 
ness (impressional, retentional, retentions of retentions etc. ) 
in themselves and without considering the 'objects' they intendt 
possess a kind of longitudinal or inner transverse intentionality, 
by which they constitute themselves as a flux, indeed as an absolute 
flux, as they are not the work of any more fundamental agency. At-- 
a later point (Appendix VIII) Husserl writes of this unity as ozýe of 
'lived experience' given to us by a shaft or ray (Strahl) of attention. 
He adds 
'that this identifying is possible, that here an object 
is constituted, lies in the structure of lived experience, 
namely that every phase of the stream changes into ret- 
ention "of", this again, and so on' (p. 158) 
and 
'the flowing consists in the transition of every phase of 
the primordial field (therefore, of a linear continuum) 
through a retentional modification of the same, only just 
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past' (p. 158)23 
The remark I would like to focus on in these sections is one 
I have not yet quoted. In 038 (p. 104) he writes: 'we can no longer 
speak of a time of the final constitutive consciousness' and in 
Appendix VI (p. 150) he writes: 'Subjective time is constituted in 
an absolute timelessness' 
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He does talk of quasi-time in one of his Appendices. He calls 
it 039 'a one-dimensional quasi-temporal order', and a. lpre-phenomenall 
pre-immanent temporality'. Standard temporal predicates apply only 
at the risk of confusion of levels. The word Fluý itself is an 
I 
acknowledged metaphor. 
I 
There is something very obvious and also very strange about 
this discussion of Absolute flux. That consciousness is a flux is 
both important and undeniable. What is special about Husserl's 
position is that he does not think of it, as many will, as a flux of 
contents (ideas and impressions running through one's head) but as a 
flux of modes of consciousness. 
intentionality: 
He has drawn on the basic structure of 
consciousness of object I am / 
conscious of 
and to the level of the, temporal object there corresponds an immanent 
time, while to that of consciousness itself corresponds the absolute 
f lux. So. we are not just dealing with a flux theory of consciousness, 
but one. that reflects a particular model of conscious life (and of 
human life itself). It is not easy to know how to deal with this 
claim. but I shall venture'the following comments: 
Husserl claims, with respect of 'unconscious contents', that the 
idea is an absurdity - and yet is the idea of logic that such a notion 
of absurdity implies not itself one that operates at the level of the 
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constituted? Does not the operation of its standards here perhaps 
involve a confusion of levels? (Did he not himself endorse the 
'absurdity' of 'the flux flowing as it flows'? ) If concepts like 
'succession' and 'simultaneity' are inapplicable, is it not mis- 
leading even to talk of its unity? Is the claim that is is self- 
constituted simply a logical solution, or does it rest on phenomeno- 
logical evidence? 
Husserl's use of attentional rays as ways of revealing the 
longitudinal intentionality seem misguided. Surely what is essential 
to flux is its pre-logical (pre-unified) status, one that does not 
require a 'device' like self-constitution. (Is there any real 
difference between self-constituted and not constituted? ) 
The point of all this is that what the idea of Absolute Flux 
opens up is the possibility that the logical, the rational, that 
which conforms to the categories of what is objectively constituted 
(taking these to occupy a common field) might rest on something that 
exceeds these categories even more radically than Husserl allows. 
We may wonder whether Husserl has not peered over the edge of. the 
brink aqd drawn back. 
Husserl's discussion of Absolute Flux would suggest that if we 
pursue the concept of time to its 'origin', it ceases, in important 
ways to exhibit temporal properties. This conclusion is interesting 
enough in itself; what makes it all the more -fascinating here is 
that we can find the same movement of thought, over a longer bio- 
graphical period in Heidegger's work too, in the transition from his 
%S 
account of existential time (1927) to what he calls time-space (1962). 
Even more tantalizing is the way in which we can align Husserl's 
position. here with that of Derrida, who in denying 'perception' is 
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claiming, as we said at the beginning, that time is an essentially 
metaphysical conceptt and seems to distance himself so much from 
Husserl. We may wonder whether the distance between Husserl and 
Derrida is not in part mirage. 
I. Husserl's Phenomenology'of'Time 
CHAPTER THREE 
Derrida's Reading of Husserl 
In 1967, under the title La Voix et le Phenomenel, Derrida 
published a book that some years later, and after various more 
ambitious and eccentric writings, he could still refer to as the work 
of which he was, from a philosophical point of view, mostý proud. 
Husserl scholars have not reacted too favourably, but it ha's had an 
enormous impact on the wider perception of the limits and indeed very 
possibility of phenomenology. It was sub-titled 'Introduction to 
the Problem of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenologyl, 'and the 'problem of 
signs' is the other face of what we have discussed above as the problem 
of intuition in Husserl. The direction of Derrida's reading has 
already been anticipated by our own discussion in chapter II and we 
have alluded to it on a number of occasions in the previous chapter. 
It has a direct impact on our understanding both of the status of 
Husserl's theory of time, and on Derrida's later insistence on time's 
inherently metaphysical constitution, which we dispute. Nk shall 
spell out in greater detail Derrida's argument in this book and its 
implications for our inquiry as a whole. 
There is a simple schematic way in which we can understand what 
is going on in the book. Derrida is claiming that the entire project 
of Husserlian phenomenology rests on the possibility of a realm of 
meaning which precedes public language and hence can provide it with a 
ground.. It rests on the possibility, of an evidential purity from 
which all, exteriorityo all inductive, indicative'relations have been 
excluded. For Derrida such moves are illustrative of a much more 
general philosophical privileging of the value of 'presence', which 
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at times he suggests is a value inherent in philosophy itself. He 
shows, in detail, how Husserl attempts, and fails, to bring about 
this exclusion in two crucial ways. He is unable to complete the 
separation of expressive from indicative signs; if the former are 
always 'contaminated' with relations of indication, then it is the 
very possibility of a foundation of meaning that is excluded. 
Secondly, Derrida argues that Husserl's own theory of time-conscious- 
ness undermines the possibility of a 'present' as an intentional 
unity free from all temporal alterity. And without such a temporal 
present,, the evidential sense of 'presence' collapses too. In each 
case, Derrida's strategy is to treat Husserl's texts as struggles 
(to exclude, to purify) which can be only temporarily suspended$ and 
which the texts themselves allow one to ressuscitate. Every such 
text contains the seeds of its own deconstruction. 
The guiding question of this whole thesis is whether Derrida's 
claim that the concept of time is inherently metaphysical can be 
sustained. Towards that end we are considering in detail the most 
obviously relevant writings of Husserl and Heidegger, and Derrida's 
readings of these texts, to trace the course of his thinking. We 
have already suggested (at the end of our reading of Husserl) that 
we find in Husserl's own text something of a recognition that when 
pressed far enough the concept of Time (and even time-consciousness) 
dissolves. Derrida does not follow Husserl on this route, for it 
takes us to something yet more fundamental (Absolute Flux) which, 
whether or not it could actually perform any useful philosophical 
function, wouldperhaps have succeeded in detaching itself from the 
value of presence. We find instead, in La Voix et le Phenomene, 
Derrida substituting one temporal complicity for another. The 
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fractured bond between temporal and epistemological presence, between 
the intentional unity of the temporal present and the subject's. own 
immediacy to itself, are replaced by another intimacy, one in which it 
is the values of absence, difference and delay that inform.,, It is 
entirely appropriate that the English translation - Speech and Phenomena 
- should include in the same volume, the essay Differance, for Derrida's 
explication of that term shows clearly how, in its dual aspect (of 
deferring and differing) it unites a temporal and a diacritical sense. 
To those who find this fusing confusing, the reply must surely be that 
it has to be seen as a response to the condensation-effect to be found 
in presence itself. Derrida's subsequent denial of the possibility of 
a non-metaphysical concept of time can then be seen to be a direct 
consequence of the strate ic significance of the term 
3 Idifferance'. 
It is not introduced as a concept, but as more of a device. To try to 
deduce from it a new concept of time would be to attempt to reappro- 
priate a transgressive discourse, which is to misunderstand it 
However, not all of Derrida is transgressions and he can not 
himself finally rule out the possibility of a new discourse of tempor- 
ality, as we shall see. And even here, in his discussion of Husserl, 
there is some sense in which he is making straight-forwardly different 
claims about language, and about the pervasiveness of certain of its 
salient features (repetition, play, the trace, differentiation, delayed 
effect etc. ) which, at one level at least supplant Husserl's. - Derrida 
goes further than Heidegger, for example, when the latter claims that 
he is not offering a new theory of language, only a new way of relating 
to it, even if Derrida clearly inherits something of that evangelical 
aim. 
4 It is open to question whether it is possible to successfully 
displace any incumbent philosophical position without at least 
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implying certain positive propositions of one's own. 
5 
A final attempt to formulate the problem posed by this reading 
for our understanding of temporality might be this: on the one hand 
it could be said that Derrida accepts the dependence of signification 
on temporality, but disagrees with Husserl on the nature of that 
temporality, substituting a temporality of difference, of non-presence 
etc. Or it could be said that he sees the very idea of'a distinct 
account of time or temporality as in itself a sympton of a metaphysical 
valuation of 'presence' which can be formulated atemporally - eg. the 
positing of what he calls a 'transcendental signified' -a source of 
meaning that lies outside of and escapes the 'play' of language. 
There is no doubt that there is a strong topological dimension to what 
one might playfully call Derrida's guiding intuitions and interpretive 
schemas. But the belief that a post-metaphysical account of temporality 
can rise again after Derridamust surely be encouraged by his inability 
to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis. 
Let us now discuss in more detail the argument of La Voix et le 
Phenomene, where the topology of inside/outside, of separation and 
exclusiont or more revealingly, perhaps, that of purity, immediately 
plays such an important part. 
6 
In his Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations) 019 
Husserl distinguishes two different sign relations or functions - 
Ausdruck (expression), and Anzeichen (indication). Ana by virtue 
of its relation to an ideal meaning, Husserl sought to privilege 
expression-as the essence of language. However in all actual communi- 
cative use of signs expression and indication are entangled together, 
so Husserl turns to the case of pure expression to be found in 'solitary 
mental life', from which both the world and the other person are in 
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principle excluded. 
For Derridaq the direction of this argument reveals Husserl's 
silent presuppositions and commitments in certain crucial ways. The 
privilege of expression is tied up both with the, idea that what is 
expressed is an ideal meaning, and with the assumption that the 
natural medium for such expression is the voice. Husserl's acceptance 
that while expression and indication are always entangled they are 
still. essentially distinct, presupposes, says Derridal a distinction 
between de facto and de jure that is itself ultimately dependent on 
a certain understanding of language. In fact however, Derrida, 
immediately shows precisely how Husserl escapes-such a charge of 
circularity by the reference to solitary mental life., For if 'there 
is' such a thing as solitary mental life, then the 'ideal' separation 
of indication and expression will actually be- achieved. The 
precise status of this dimension must therefore be investigated. 
Knowing, as we do, Derrida's overall verdict on Husserl - that 
is phenomenology is the most vigilant example of metaphysics - it is 
something of a proof both of his candour and of his subtlety that he 
offers us not simply a 'critical' reading of the moves we have just 
outlined, but also a sympathetic one. Critically one might say that 
for all his insistence on presuppositionlessness, Husserl never raises 
the question of the sign to an ontological, level. And it is by 
neglecting this that he can privilege that indicative, function 
(Hinzeigen) that supports his primarily logical conception of language 
(of language as the bearer of ideal meanings). But equally, and 
against this, it could be said that by beginning not with the signo 
but with an original fracturing of the unity of the sign (expression/ 
indication) Husserl is showing exemplary vigilance. - And are there 
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not very good reasons for avoiding the question 'What is a sign? ' 
for the premature attempt to subject the 'sign' to the regime of 
truth might well occlude the possibility that signification, without 
itself 'being true' might 'condition the movement and concept of 
truth' (f. 26,, ET p. 25). Derrida rightly sees that the inter weaving 
of these two motifs makes the final judgement of phenomenology very 
difficult. Are these accounts of the production, the constitution 
of truth, on the one hand, and of phenomenology as a philosophy of 
presence reconcilable? - 
Derrida's comments here are enormously important. The very 
same ambiguity will be discerned again in his discussions of 
Heidegger 7 when he identifies both a renewal of the value of presence 
in Heidegger's concept of Being and yet, insofar as Heidegger poses 
the question of ý Being (and, one might add, to bring out the parallel 
with Husserl more sharply, replaces 'presence' with 'presencing' in, 
for example, The Anaximander Fragment 
8) it also points in the other 
direction. 'And the formulation that 'the activity of signification 
although it has no truth in itself (might) condition 4-he- 
movement and concept of truth' will have an important bearing -on our 
understanding of terms like Idifferancel, 'trace' etc. of which-it can 
be said that they make meaning possible without themselveshaving 
meaning. And most importantly, Derrida's denial of a primordial time 
will be based on the same kind of consideration - that when we unearth 
what makes truth (meaning, time) possible we must leave behind the 
language applicable to the constituted. We discuss below (see Partil 
chapter 2- ) whether Derrida can avoid the accusation that he renews 
transcendental thinking. 
Strangely the generosity of Derrida's double reading is then- 
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suspended as he shows how Husserl attempts the reduction of '- 
'indication'. This is achieved by linking the indication/expression 
relation to that between facts and essences, empirical/logical etc. 
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion Derrida makes is that in the 
distinction between indication and expression is rooted the whole 
problematic of the reduction. 
In his chapter 'Meaning and Soliloquy', Derrida takes us through 
Husserl's argument for the claim that the'possibility of expression 
without indication is demonstrated by solitary mental life. But if 
expression is to be thought of as an exteriorization (ex-pression), 
how can it survive the excision of the external world, of the world 
of communication? Derrida argues that Husserl's account of solitary 
mental life anticipates his later account of consciousness as a noetic/ 
noematic structure, and that the inside/outside relation still preserved 
within solitary mental life is that between'the act of expression and 
the ideal object it intends. The significance of the term 'expression' 
for Husserl lies in its association with the voice (which has to be a 
silent 'phenomenological' voice in solitary mental life) and with the 
idea of voluntary intention -a connection made much clearer in the 
French (in which Bedeutung becomes, vouloir-direg literally, "wanting- 
to-say"). 
But the imýortance of this account of solitary mental life lies 
in the way it embodies the value of self-presence, an achievement the 
ideality of which is the product of all the exclusions (of the other, 
of the bodyq of the 'sensible', of the context of communication... 
In ordinary communication, the other has no immediate grasp of the 
meaning lying behind my words, and can at best perform acts of 
'analogical appresentation'. My expressive acts must all be under- 
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stood as 'indications' ofintentional states not directly available to 
the other. In solitary mental life, however, these problems are 
overcome. 'The meaning is therefore present to the self in the life 
of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world'. 
In solitary mental life, mediation is replaced by immediacy. 
Husserl quickly comes to see that what this requires is in 
fact theelimination of signs as such, and he comes to identify signs 
with indications as the nature of expression in solitary mental life 
becomes clearer. What role is there for words, then, in inner 
experience? The inner monologue that takes place in a living self- 
presence, makes no use of real words, to which indicative traces would 
attachq but instead of functions with imagined words, which are free 
from such implications. 
The claimed necessary connection between communication and 
indication has the consequence that expression and meaning do not 
function in a communicative way at all in 'solitary discourse'. it 
is in his account of how Husserl explains the fact that we c ertainly 
seem to communicate to ourselves that Derrida inaugurates his first 
really subversive strategy. 
The argument in this short chapter ('Meaning and Representation') 
has momentous consequencesl but it is in our view defective, even if 
something of the same conclusion can be reached by other arguments 
(which we provide). We shall first offer a summary of what is already 
a very dense section, and then offer some extended critical comments. 
Derrida's response to Husserl's distinction between actually 
communicating to ourselves (which, in pure expression, we do not do, 
in his view)and representing to ourselves that we do so, is to argue 
that the structure of repetition is constitutive for signs in general, 
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and hence for communication, and as it can be shown that 'presence' 
is inwardly and already constituted by representation, the distinction 
between actually and apparently communicating to ourselves breaks 
down. The corruption of presence by representation will have 'a 
whole chain of formidable consequences for phenomenology'. ( F. 65) 
ET pp. 56-7) Moreover, he claims that the basis for these moves is 
to be found in Husserl's own writing. 
For Husserl recognizes that signs in general operate within a 
structure of repetition (a unique sign is no sign). And so this must 
hold of expressive signs just as well. (At this pointp Derrida seems 
to ignore his earlier recognition that Husserl in a sense sees the 
trap and begins to suggest that expressive signs might not be signs at 
all, in his phrase 'signs, ie. indications'. ) And yet repetition 
surely involves or implies or has as its basic element representation. 
The argument, in essence is contained in the following lines: 
'(Something) ... can function as a sign, and in general 
as language, only if a formal identity enables it to be 
issued again and to be recognised. This identity is 
necessarily ideal. It thus necessarily implies 
representation: as Vorstellung, the locus of identity 
in general, as Vergegenwartigung, the possibility of 
reproductive repetition in general, and as Representation, 
insofar as each signifying event is a substitute (for the 
signified as well as for the ideal form of the signifier). 1 
ET p. 50). 
Surely, then, representation is. essential to language, and no accidental 
addition or intrusion. 
'Since this representative structure is signification 
itself, I cannot enter into an "effective discourse" 
without being involved in unlimited representation' 
(ibid. ) 
And yet, when Husserl says that we only take ourselves to be or 
represent ourselves to be communicating to ourselves in solitary 
mental lifet he is supposing that actually representation is excluded. 
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He interprevsý Husserl here as, in a very traditional way, 
trying to save presence and to reduce or derive (ie. make derivative) 
the sign. (He is trying to ward off the consequence that the 
general repetitive structure of signification should apply to 
'expression'. ) For Derrida the position of the sign is paradoxical 
here. While the classical way of eliminating the sign (or reducing 
it, taming its dispersive power) is to make it derivative from a 
presence, if the sign then has that derived sense, we eliminate the 
sign if we make it primary. This latter move, I take it, is his 
own, and its consequences can be seen in such a term as 'trace' (whicht 
he claims is not a trace of anything... 
Derrida is engaged here in a very general strategy of decon- 
struction, the first stage of which - that of reversal (making 
representation non-derivative) - we have already seen. The conclu- 
sion of this will be that 'The presence-of-the-present is derived 
from repetition and not vice-versa'. If Husserl never says this$ 
Derrida claims it: is consistent with both the Phenomenology of Time- 
Consciousness and the Fifth of his Cartesian Meditations. (of course 
part of the -. point of such a claim by Derrida is that while it may be 
consistent, it would take Husserl (or our understanding of Husserl) 
in an entirely different direction from the one intended. ) 
Husserl does link ideality with the possibility of infinite 
repetition, and this is one of the points on which Derrida fastens. 
It is critical because of the three-fold ideality of the sign on 
Husserl's account (- that of the sensible word, the meaning, and 
(sometimes) the object referred to). The question we must discuss 
shortly is whether that 'linkage' can plausibly, let alone compellingly, 
be regarded as one in which repetition (or the possibility of repetition) 
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constitutes ideality. But the version of the reversal we have just 
quoted mentioned the presence-of-the present. How does the relation 
between ideality and repetition bear on the question of presence? 
Ideality appears in presence in two forms, (1) the ideal object 
which stands before us, and (2) the ideal possibility of repetition 
afforded by a pure presence. Presence has the value and privilege 
it does because of the way it supplies the form for all experience, 
and because it too, as an ideal form is infinitely repeatable. Not 
only does this apply to my present, it applies to the present as such. 
In valuing presence I value an ideal ground of evidence, of trans- 
cendental life, in which not only is the existence of the world 
accidental, but in which my own death is no longer an issue. if, 
with Derridal we see the value of presence to be tied up with the 
reduction of the sign, then we can see that the reduction of the 
sign involves a tacit recognition'of the possibility of I my death. 
Derrida expands this, in a Heideggerean vein, to a general 
claim about the relationship between a subject and his/her own death. 
While for Heidegger, Dasein is essentially a Being-towards-deatht 
Derrida's version is that if we understand my being as a subject to 
rest on this general relation to presence, and if this presence has 
a general sense, one which rises above the possibility of my personal 
disappearance or non-existence, then we can say 'I am =I am mortal'. 
We cannot go into the subtle way in which Derrida makes much the 
same moves with respect to both imagination and fiction, as he has for 
representation, moves that again make use of Husserl'*s own phenomeno- 
logical subtlety in dealing with these matters (see above, Ch. 2. ) 
the general distinction between the fictitious and effective uses 
of the sign is threatened. The sign is originally weighted by 
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fiction. '). The consequence. of such further moves is to allow 
Derrida to extend, or perhaps just to put in other words, his 
undermining of the opposition Husserl needs to draw between mediated 
and unmediated self-knowledge, one's true experience of oneself from 
ways of imagining or fictionalizing oneself etc. 
However, the immediately relevant conclusion of the chapter 
is that if representation lies at the heart of signst then the idea 
of distinguishing true from merely represented (or imagined, or 
supposed) communication is suspect. 
There are two obvious objections to this conclusion. 
that the foundational role he gives to repetition is arbitrary. 
2. that the relationship this has to Husserl's question - about 
communication - is misconceived. 
The arbitrariness objection would go something like this: 
Derrida correctly gleans from Husserl a relation between the ideality 
of a sign and its repetition. But his attempt to go further than 
Husserl involves a certain casualness in his understanding of the 
modality of repetition. And it involves an unjustified weighting of 
the relationship of interdependence of ideality and repetition. To 
expand on these points: Derrida's position on the modality of 
repetition seems implausible when we compare it to the argument 
Wittgenstein used (in his Philosophical Investigations) against the 
possibility of a logically private language. For Wittgenstein, 
10 
to 
use a sign intelligibly, it must be possible for that sign to be 
repeated at other times and by other people. That is a test for 
whether there is a rule governing its use, and with no rule, no 
meaning. For Derrida, the question of whether we are dealing with 
actual repetition or possible repetition is often unclear. He 
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certainly usually refers to 'repetition' without further qualification. 
But a relationship between ideality and this plain repetition is much 
harder to see. The reason for Derrida's vacillation here is surely 
obvious. The relationship between ideality and the possibility of 
repetition is hard to construe as constitutionally unidirectional. 
It is as easy to suppose that the possibility of repetition depends 
on ideality as vice versa. And yet clearly the interrelationship 
is very close. In the case of plain (ie. actual) repetitiont the 
relationship to ideality is harder to grasp, while it is easier to 
see how that reversal would make a difference to whatever the relation- 
ship is. , 
There is a historical parallel to Derrida's position here, that 
of Saussure's principle of (semiological) difference (to which, inter 
alia, Derrida refers in his essay "Differance"). Saussure's 
revolutionary gesture was to have insisted that the identity of signs 
be understood as derivative from the differences between signs (phonic, 
graphic etc. ); identity comes through difference. Language is a 
system of relations 'with no posi tive terms'. 
11 Clearly there are 
difficulties in conceptualizing this, because no'point can be thought 
of as fixed independently of the others (of which, in each case, 
the same is true). And one of the critical features of this notion 
is, of course, that although thoug1tof as synchronic, these differences 
need never be co-present. This in itself would facilitate the 
transition to spatio-temporality of Derrida's Idifferance', but more 
modestly it gives one some insight into the virtuality underlying the 
idea of repetition. Repetition supplies the numerical difference 
on the basis of which ideal identity (= ideality) can be made to 
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appear, Derrida's reversal of the relationship between ideality, and 
repetition might be said to have completed in a temporal dimension 
what Saussure had begun from a synchronic perspective. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that our worries 
about the modality of 'repetition' can be overcome. The question 
remains as to whether we do actually communicate to ourselves, and 
what bearing Derrida's argument, were it successful, would have on 
that question. Husserl says we only think we communicate to our- 
selves. For Derrida, the distinction is inapplicable to language 
because it is confused in language., The distinction between actually 
speaking to ourselves ("effective" communication) and imagin! N` or 
representing to ourselves that we are so doing could only apply if 
actual speaking were free from the structure of representation. 
But does-the argument work? Can there not still be a difference 
between two things even if each presupposes the other? Would we not 
conclude on Derrida's argument that a husband and wife could not in 
fact act independently because the concept of husband already presupposes 
a constitutive-relationship with that of 'wife'? Is not Derrida 
saying (wrongly) that we cannot distinguish between things*that are 
constitutionally related? Suppose we agree that repeatability-is 
essential to all signs, and that signs are the basis of communication. * 
What that means is that other examples (tokens) of the same signs must 
equally be able to make sense. 'What it does not mean is that there 
is no difference between doing x and my supposing that I am doing x. 
The latter is compatible with my'not doing x, the former is not. 
Surely Derrida confuses repetition and representation. 
Is there perhaps a better explanation of Husserl's, claim that 
we only think of ourselves as communicating? How about this: Husserl 
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claims that there is no point in communicating to myself because it 
would involve'telling myself what I was thinking and to be able to 
do that I would'already have to know what I was thinking, and so 
would not needýtelling. So I can only suppose that this is, what I 
do. As I understand it, Husserl can only mean that we mis-describe 
inner speech-if we think of it as communication. But he cannot mean 
that we perform an act of - (false-) representation, because his very own 
argument would tell against such an act. It would be immediately 
obvious that we were doing no such thing if, as he believes, the 
evidence of non-communication were right there in front of us. I 
take it that Husserl means that we unthinkingly describe inner speech 
as communication just because we think it must be communicative as it 
involves words. If this is so Derrida has got 08 largely wrong. 
Does he not perhaps, for his own reasons, put too much weight on the 
literal sense of Istellt ... vor'? 
We have said*that Derrida would on this account be confusing 
repetition and representation. The fact that we think of ourselves/ 
suppose ourselves/'represent ourselves' as communicating is not 
inconsistent with an inherent repetition involved in any sign (assuming 
we concede this in some sense). Representation etc. is an intentional 
act, repetition need not be. But there is an obvious Derridean 
response to this. Such a reference to'an intentional act takes the 
very point in dispute for granted. We would be one of those Derrida 
describes as 
living in the effect - the assured consolidated, constituted 
effect of repetition and representation, of the difference 
which removes presence'. ( V. 57ý ET p. 51) 
Derrida's point is that the idea of intention rests on what in itself 
lacks meaning, namely (the possibility of) repetition., 
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But could one not still respond: yesq repeatibility is indeed 
a condition of my intention being a discrete one (being this intention 
rather than that) and so it is a condition of my being able to suppose 
that I am communicating to myself that I am able to suppose so at 
other times too. But surely this does not invalidate the difference 
between communicating and merely thinking that one is communicating? 
For the second relationship of representation or supposing is 
a 'that' relation, which is not the case for repetition. Firstly, 
the relationship involved in repetition is neutral with respect to 
whether the repetition actually occurs (the possibility will do), 
secondly there is consequently no constitutive, internal relationship 
between actual signs so repeated. Other actual signs would just be 
proof of repeatability and not in themselves required. ý Thirdly, even if 
we acknowledge the dependence of representation on. repetitiong, that is 
not a relation of equivalence. 
The proper thing to do with intentional acts is to apply the 
principle of identity through difference to them, to demonstrate their 
diacritical interdifferentiation. This surely does not mean that 
identity is undermined, but rather explicated. 
What then are we to conclude about Derrida's position in this 
chapter? The relationship between repetition and the sign's identity 
or between representation and presence is not convincingly a 
constitutive one. 
12 The interposing of 'possibility of ... ' makes 
that clear, allowing-the relationship to be understood in quite the 
reverse way. It may be of course that there are other arguments for 
Derrida's conclusion about the presence/representation relation etc. 
that would dispell the thought that the meaning of any sign rests on 
its relation to self-presence. Derrida again claims that Husserl - 
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himself provides them when one considers the question of self-presence 
irom a temporal perspective, as we shall shortly see. 
In the language of sameness and otherness, we have discussed 
Derrida's attempt to show that representation lies at the heart of 
the sign"s- presence. We have found the argument suggestive but not 
yet convincing. But Derrida offers another argument, to which we have 
already alluded in our initial summary, for an intrinsic relation to 
otherness in the sameness of the present. Derrida arguest as I under- 
stand him, that even if Husserl does not make much of the connection 
between ideality and repetition, his constant invocation of the value 
of presence itself rests on its infinite ideal repetition - ideal because 
the present as such 'concerns no determined being1p is content-neutral. 
The present is, if you like, the ideal form of repetition. But again, 
we can ask, is such ideal repeatability built in to the meaning of the 
present, or is it just a consequence of its content-independence? 
Derrida seems clearly enough to treat this ideal repeatability 
of the present as an idealization betraying a particular function it 
serves. He suggests that this ideal possibility of repetition is 
ultimately a 'dissimulation of one's relationship with death,, a 
dissimulation in that it hides the fact that this ideality is bought 
at the price of denying my mortality, which will bring the series of 
such 'Presences' to a close. 
If so, then the ideality of 'presence' itself would betray a 
concern that transcended it, oneýs awareness of oneýs mortality, 
" 
of a possibility other than the actuality of the living present. The 
remark is surely suggestive, but hard to judge the truth of. We 
might rather consider abandoning this ideal content-independent present, 
and moving to one which takes its structure and dimensions from its 
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content. Think of the difference in the 'present' when listening 
to a complex chord sequence and a single tapping rhythm. It it were 
admitted that some 'content', with contributions of its own to make to 
the shape and scope of the 'present' were always to be taken account oft 
then we would have an argument for the radical impurity of the present 
- whether one called this radical impurity 'representation' might 
depend on one's critical motives, but clearly for some 'content' to 
lend shape to the present, that content has to be grasped as such. 
And we might call that grasping 'representation'. For a tune to 
shape time it must be experienced as a tuneful sequence. This 'as' 
is surely the key to it being a case of representation. Would the 
same be true of the simplest beat, such as a heart-beat? Husserl 
as we saw in the last chapter, is not sure about this, but the answer 
is pretty clearly yes. While one can clearly retain one beat while 
listening to another, the protending of a third, while itself not an 
act of induction, surely rests on some recognition that one is con- 
fronted with a series of. -beats such that such protention is motivated. 
Representation then, in Derrida's language, would not precede presence, 
but be part of it. We repeat, and extend, here, the claim we made 
in Ch. 111,026. 
To sum up our conclusions at this point: 
(1) We are not convinced that Derrida can treat repetition and the 
possibility of repetition as interchangeable. 
(2) We claim an 'opacity of implication'. Just because representa- 
tion or repetition infects presence in itself, it does not mean that at 
another level one cannot distinguish between Oing and thinking one is 
0 ing. The putative constitutional indebtedness of all intentional 
acts to pre-intentional conditions of repetition does not preclude a 
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further relationship between such acts, or between acts and states of 
affairs etc. Derrida wrongly treats repetitive constitution as a 
levelling procedure. 
(3) But in the crucial question of the possibility of the evidential 
(and temporal) present, we can accept, via a somewhat different 
argument, Derrida's central conclusion, that the present is permeated 
by representation. 
We shall argue (see below, M. 1)4 ) that the consequences of 
this permeation by representation is not, as Derrida would have it, 
the collapse of any concept of time other than a metaphysical one, 
but rather the collapse of time (as presence) as a pure intuitional 
foundation. What is opened up is a concept off-time which theoreticallY 
embraces the necessary intrusion of representation. 
In the chapter Signs and the Blink of an Eye, we find Derrida's 
more specific discussion of the temporal presuppositions of Husserl's 
theory of signification. Given the declared focus of the thesis it 
might be thought none too soon in coming, but it will have been clear 
we hope, how (it is vital to understand) the setting of the theory of 
signs in evaluating Derrida's discussion of Husserl on time. 
At the end of the previous chapter, Derrida had written 
'The self-presence of experience must be produced in the 
present taken as a now. And this is just what Husserl 
says: if "mental acts" are not announced to themselves 
through the intermediacy of a "Kundgabe", if they do not 
have to be informed about themselves through the inter- 
mediacy of indications, it is because they are "lived by 
us in the same instant" (im selben Augenblick). The 
present of self-presence would be as indivisible as the 
blink of an eye. ' ( f-66) ET. p. 59) 
Derrida will argue that Husserl's argument is fundamentally 
threatened by an attack on the 'punctuality of the instant', and it 
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is this that he engages in, apparently with Husserl's own help! 
Derrida himself divides this chapter into three parts, preceded 
by this warning of danger: 
'If the punctuality of the instant is a mytho a spatial 
or mechanical metaphorp an inherited metaphysical metaphorl 
an inherited metaphysical concept, or all that at once, 
and if the present of self-presence is not simple, if it 
is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, 
then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is threatened 
in its very principle' ( f-6t) ET. p. 61) 
The three parts concern, themselves respectively with 
1. the importance to Husserl of the now point (and to philosophical 
thought in general). 
2. (contrary to (1)). The important, way in which Husserl's 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness offers a more complex 
account of the present in which retention and protention are included. 
3. The claim that however much weight Husserl gives to the distinc- 
tion between primary retention and-secondary recollection, ie. repre- 
sentation, both of these, and indeed the ideality of presence itself) 
have as their common root 'the possibility of repetition in generallp 
or what. he calls the structure of the trace. This would undermine 
the pure self-identity of presence. 
Let us now pursue the argument in more detail. 
1. The fundamental point, at the risk of repeating ourselves, is 
of course that 'self-presence must be produced in the undivided'unity 
of a temporal present so as to have nothing to reveal to. itself by the 
agency of signs'. ( p. Op ET p. 60) Temporality constitutes a 
threat to this unity if its movement cannot be excluded from presence. 
Once we get temporal differences, we lose the condition of immediacy 
and unity that would make signs unnecessaryt and the possibility of 
a pre-linguistic immediacy seems to vanish. 
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But is Husserl committed to the idea of the present as a now? 
gurely the issues that Derrida is raising are precisely the ones . - 
which, as we have already shown at length, Husserl himself raises, and 
in the most sophisticated way. For Heidegger, too, hardly an easy 
thinker to please, Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Conscious- 
ness was a radical-break with the traditional Aristotelian view of 
time, determined in accordance with such ideas as 'now', 'point', 
'limit', 'circle'. And does not Husserl enter into our study precisely 
as one who has attempted to distance himself from any, such metaphysical 
conception of time? 
2. Derrida's blend of appreciation and critique amounts to what can 
best be called a double reading, one which untangles two conflicting 
motifs and tendencies in Husserl's work. The focus of Derrida's 
interest is what he insists is the ambiguity of Husserl's expansion 
of the now by reference to the concepts of retention and protentiong 
with which we have already concerned ourselves. The point instant 
may seem to have been breached, and yet each case of retention-and 
protention is seen to share the evidential value of the original now 
pointv and moreover, is fundamentally attached to it. Derrida can 
be seen to be arguing (a) that the point instant is still the reference 
point from which retention and protention are subtended, and (b) that 
the evidential value associated with it is retained, if we can use that 
word. Proof that Husserl is still committed to a view that lies 
comfortably within the tradition can be seen in the impossibility of 
Husserl. accommodating say, Freud's concept of the delayed effect, 
becoming conscious of a content that was never conscious. - 
Not for the first time, we have a certain sympathy with Derrida's 
attitude here, and indeed his conclusions, but his argument is surely 
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wanting. Let us turn up the magnification and examine it more closely. 
Derrida makes the critical point about Husserl's use of protention 
and retention in this way: 
'the presence of the perceived present can appear as such 
only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a 
non-presence and non-perception, with ... retention and 
protention' ( t. 72. ) ET p. 64) 
He admits, however, that Husserl says that actually retention is 
perceptiong 'if we call perception the act in which all "origination" 
lies I. In retention 'we see what is past'. Here 'perception' gives 
t 
us a non-present. Derrida surmises that Husserl is at this point 
allowing himself to call retention 'perception' because for him 
(Husserl) the important distinction is between retention and repro- 
duction. Derrida seems to try to discredit this assimilation by 
quoting Husserl's claim that there is 'no mention here of a continuous 
accommodation of perception to its opposite'. Now it is quite true 
that Husserl does (PITC ET p. 62) talk earlier of the continual 
passing over from perception to non-perception but the claim just 
quoted is taken by Derrida completely out of context. Husserl 
(PITC ET p. 64) is talking about recollection. It is in recollec- 
tion that 'there is no mention of a continuous accommodation of per- 
ception to its opposite'. Husserl has not made some sort of slip 
in calling retention 'perception'. 
The poin*t is that Husserl is working with two different senses 
of perception, (1) as impression, (2) as an act of 'origination', which 
latter covers both retention and protention. Husserl usually uses 
'perception' in the first sense - as in the phrase about 'passing over,. 
As it happenss Derrida's conclusion still goes through, for however we 
characterise retention, it will be continuous with the impressional 
now, and that, for Derridalimplies that no rigid distinction between 
'now' and 'not-now' can be made. This takes us to the third point. 
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3. Assuming that Husserl is committed both to retention being 
continuous with the now, and also accessible only in a non-per- 
ceptual sense, Derrida then concludes that whatever their relative 
difference ('without reducing the abyss which may indeed. separate 
retention from representation.. ') retention and representation have 
more in common than might first seem apparent. The distinctiong he 
says 'is rather a difference betweentwo modifications of non-per- 
ception'. There may be phenomenological differences between the two, 
but this 'only serves to separate two ways of relating to the 
irreducible nonpresence of another now'. If the relation between 
the impressional now and the retentional consciousness into which 
it passes over, is treated as a difference within presence, a relation 
to the Other within self-presence, we cannot just say that the sign 
has entered into the structure of presence, for the classical under- 
standing of the sign involves a relation to a pure presence, which 
latter has now been discredited. It is here that he suggests the 
term 'trace' to capture that which cannot be called a sign, which 
lies at the heart of presence. If we can also see this relation to 
what is other in the very ideal repeatability of the present, we can 
come to see how the present has a primordial nonself-identity. 
Derrida clearly thinks, in one sense, that he is only redescribing 
what Husserl himself could admit. But where Husserl sees the impress- 
ional now and retention as primitively unified, Derrida sees in this 
relation a primitive difference. And this, it is claimed, equally 
affects how we think of time. For we cannot continue to give the 
name time to this primitive movement to otherness, for that concept 
has always 'designated a movement conceived in terms of the present 
and can mean nothing else'. 
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We have here, then, one of the places in which Derrida is 
arguing for the conclusion that we took as the starting point for 
this entire work. , How plausible is it in this version? Surely 
.. not at all, 
for the argument is tendentious in the extreme. it 
supposes that the same/other opposition has some sort of automatic 
ascendancy over. any other it happens to come across. Clearly, 
Husserl notes a difference between the now and retention, but,, Derrida 
simply refuses to allow him his own account of the meaning of that 
difference. And while acknowledging the radical difference between 
retention and representation, treats it as secondary to the, samehother 
opposition. What Derrida should have discussed are the ways in which 
Husserl too describes the positive contribution of recollection 
(=representation) to consciousness (see above, ch. 111, especially, 
0149 030). Furthermore, Derrida's assertion that 'time' 'has 
always designated a movement conceived ih terms of the present' is 
surely importantly imprecise. There is a considerable difference 
between, say, thinking of time as essentially recuperative of the 
present, or of some value associated with the present, and time seen as 
the inevitable loss of such a present or such a value. And yet both 
are covered by the phrase 'in terms of the present' ('a partir du 
present'). And the latter is surely represented not only in popular 
thinking (think of the picture of Father Time with his scythe) but 
also in the history of philosophy (think of Hume, for whom one-can at 
least say the future offers no guarantees of continuing identity, be 
it for things or selves). Finally, we ought to repeat that one of 
the most puzzling things about Derrida's position here is knowing 
, 
whether he is actually disagreeing with Husserl or just redescribing 
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that on which they would both agree. Husserl is clear that it is 
only because of the running-off of the now to retention that there, 
is any consciousness at all. Presence is then for'Husserl a 
primitive flux. Is not Derrida being obtuse in at. tributing to'' 
Husserl allegiance to the present as now-point? It is even more 
puzzling that Derrida should want to reuse the same sort of argu- 
ments (giving 'primordialityl a value, while applying it to 'difference') 
as Husserl had used. There may be a rescuable strategic value for 
(quasi-? ) transcendental arguments, but there is a real danger that 
in supposing one has achieved a reversal at some (fictional) trans- 
cendental level, one neglects to notice the consequence one's position 
has at other levels. As we have suggested before, the real question 
may well not be whether we call presence difference, but whether we 
can adequately articulate the actual overlaying of structures of 
representation onto any such primitive description of conscious life. 
Derrida still leaves himself the problem of coming down the ladder, 
negotiating the passage this time from the quasi-transcendental to the 
everyday. It may be that these remarks of ours will one day find 
their proper place in a positive revaluation of Derrida's relation to 
phenomenology. Further material for such a study is to be found in 
his account of the privilege of the voice for Husserl, where it seems 
Derrida is offering us a phenomenology of the voice.. 
We know that for Derrida the voice has'a privilege in phenomeno- 
logy, a privilege which, he claims leads Husserl to value the spoken 
word over the written word, a privilege which is said to have its-roots 
in the special relationship between speech, the voice and presence. 
In the chapter "The Voice That Keeps Silence" Der'rida does not 
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offer us further evidence of Husserl's phonocentrism, but we are 
offered a description of speech which would make it plausible that 
a phenomenologist would privilege speech. The immediacy with which 
we hear what we say, and the way speech fades into immateriality as 
soon as spoken could easily lead one to consider speech as privileged. 
And if Husserl did not say it explicitly, there are many classical 
references to the privileged connection of the voice and the soul 
(eg. in Plato's Phaedrus). A lot more is at stake, however: the 
relation between the voice and consciousness, the idea of auto- 
affection, and the temporality of speech. We shall draw out only 
those relevant to our purposes. 
Derrida has argued that for Husserl, absolute self-presence, 
phenomenological 'silence' requires not only the exclusion of 
indirection but even that of expression in so far as that is outside 
that of 'sense'. It also involves the exclusion of the relation to the 
other. What we are left with is an auto-affection, for which the key 
phenomenon is the Islentendre parler', hearing oneself speak. It is 
through this experience that we come to associate ideality with sound. 
'The signifier, animated by my breath and by the meaning- 
intention ... is in absolute proximity to me. The living 
act, the lif&-giving act, the Lebendigkeit, which animates 
the body of the signifier and transforms it into 
,a 
meaning- 
ful expression. The soul of language seems not to separate 
itself from itself, from its own self-presence. It does not 
risk death in the body of a signifier that is given over to 
the world.... It can show the ideal object or ideal 
Bedeutung connected to it without venturing outside ideality, 
outside the interiority of self-present life. ' 
ET p. 78) 
The auto-affection of hearing oneself speak is credited by Derrida 
with'being the basis of a number of the metaphysical illusions of 
experience - especially those associated with its apparent ideality. 
And he says of it much the same as he said of the relation between 
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retention and the now point in the present, that it constitutes a 
Vure difference dividing self-presence. And the difficulty we 
have noted before appears again with full vigour. This pure self- 
affection, with which he associates differance (with an a), is 
credited with a whole range of constitutive capacitiesl in particular 
it makes possible all those 'things' we thought it possible (and 
Husserl thought it necessary) to exclude from auto-affection - 
including space, the outside, the world, the body etc. '. The onto- 
logical significance of this notion is to be found in its primacy in 
relation to all constituted identities, which has the double consequence 
that it itself cannot be grasped 'in its purity', and means that it 
does not belong to the subject of which it is true; rather it produces 
the subject. Support for the primitiveness of this temporal event, if 
we can call it that, is to be found, as Derrida notesl 
13 in Husserl's 
admission that properly speaking, 'names are lacking' for this primordial 
flux. 14 The justification of his injection of the idea of 'trace' into 
the living present, with its peculiar 'logic' is that, we are dealing 
with a 'movement' that precedes and conditions presence, and hence 
identity, the possibility of identifying. and hence naming, and even the 
intelligibility that would go with this. 
'The living present springs forth out of its non-identity 
with itself and from the possibility of a retentional 
trace. -It is always already a trace. This trace cannot 
be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life 
would be within itself; the self of the living present is 
primordially a trace.... Being-primordial must be thought 
on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse. ' qS, 
ET p. 85) 
All this corresponds to a very traditional problematic. How 
can we attribute to those conditions which are supposed to be 
conditLons of possibility for identity, sense, etc. those properties 
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themselves? And in the case of time, the 'movement' that would seem 
es. sential to any account of its primordial form undermines the 
possibility of primordiality and either identity or chronological 
priority being compatible. One either speaks metaphoricallys and 
thus risks misunderstanding, or one invents terms which are logically 
'indecidablel. Derrida sees the very word 'time' as what he calls 
lontic metaphor'. 
The word 'time' itself, as it has always been understood 
in the history of metaphysics, is a metaphor which at the 
same time both indicates and dissimulates the 'movement' of 
this auto-affection. ( P. 151 ET p. 85) 
What is the difficulty with all this? Surely if we have discredited 
transcendental mode of thought we have to abandon its language of 
constitutiont production, primordiality etc. We shall argue later 
against the adequacy of the Isous raturel strategy. 
This idea of auto-affection has important consequences for 
time, and it is these that have guided us somewhat swif tly through the 
intricacies of this chapter. Now however Derrida will reassert his 
claims about the fundamentally metaphysical nature of time, and we shall 
have to consider these again. 
In the last-few pages of this chapter, Derrida brings to a focus 
the implications that his understanding of time as differance have for 
identity, ideality, presence.. the subject etc. - in short for the 
language of ontology. What Derrida does is to draw out of Husserl, 
with renewed force and determination, the recognition that temporality 
fundamentally undermines and does not sustain the idea of presence, 
and the very possibility of the interiority by which subjectivity has 
been traditionally thought possible. For Derrida, this will not only 
open up the present primordially to what is not, present, but also 
open up the 'inside' of subjectivity to the 'outside' of the world. 
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We have previously suggested that it is in the primitive movement 
from impressional to retentional consciousness that the idea of difference 
inserts itself in the heart of self-presence. Derrida here argues that 
auto-affection (which he links to, without identifying with. difference) 
is to be found in impressional consciousness itself. And the evidence 
for this is to be found in Husserl's description of the primal impression 
as a 'pure spontaneity', a pure production. The idea is that as such, 
it cannot be any sort of being, where 'beings' are thought of as consti- 
tuted. And it is in this light that the strange logic of Idifferancel 
and 'trace' must be understood. 
We evaluate this move in more detail in JIL-2- below. For 
now it will suffice to put down a couple of markers. We shall want 
to know (a) Does not Derrida's problem arise from being initially 
seduced by the transcendental project? Might we not resist that move 
from the very beginning? Is there a way of avoiding it that equally 
avoids the naiveties of empiricism? Is there not another way back, 
, ýhould 
it prove inevitable? (b) Is not Derrida converting a tendency 
(that may well exist in our understanding of language) into a limit of 
language itself? Is he not, in effect working with a very restricted 
understanding of the capacity of language to convey ontological subtleties? 
To be specific, why could we not say 'time' and recognise quite clearly 
that it was not sort of thing_? Does not the word 'temporality' 
already point in that direction? 
15 
We said that the other consequence of time seen as differance 
is that it opens up the interiority of subjectivity to the 'outside'. 
This claim, if it can be plausibly maintained, would be an important 
response to those who accuse Derrida of a textual idealism (eg. for his 
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claim that there is no 'hors textel). It is not clear whether Derrida 
offers a number of arguments for this, or just one in a number of 
different guises, but the suggestion that difference opens up subjectivity 
to the outside is not one that he convincingly sustains. He succeeds 
at most in showing that a certain spatiality can in a rather abstruse 
sense be located within subjectivity. And even then the language has 
a disturbingly Hegelian ring to it. Derrida writes 
'Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living 
present with its outside, the openness upon exteriority 
in general, upon the sphere of what is not "one's own", 
etc. the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, 
a "spacing". ' 
He continues 
'As soon as we admit spacing both as "interval" or as 
difference and as openness upon the outside, there can 
no longer be any absolute inside, for the "outside" has 
insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside 
of the nonspatial, which is called "time", appearsl is 
constituted, is "presented". ' ( t-96 ET p. 86) 
At one level, Derrida is saying no more than he has already said, about 
the structure or movement of difference lying at the heart of presence. 
At another, it seems to us that he is trying to repeat the criticisms 
of the transcendental reduction previously offered by existentialists. 
But all his references to the exterior or to exteriority, are in fact 
references to an exteriority within subjectivity. We need not 
conclude that there is an opening from subjectivity to the world, only 
within subjectivity itself. 
It might perhaps be said that we are adopting a philosophically 
naive sense of 'space'. But Derrida's own notion of space, exteriority, 
externality seems itself to depend on it having undergone some sort of 
reduction. Suitably interiorized, it can then be wedded to temporality 
in a kind of primoridal spatiotemporality. Derrida's indebtedness to 
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phenomenological themes returns to haunt his solutions. It is hard 
io say whether he has undermined or simply refurbish, ed transcendental 
thinking at this point. When he-writes 
'As a relation between an inside and an outside in general, 
an existent and a nonexistent in general, .* temporalization is at once the very power and limit of phenomenological 
reduction.... ' p. % 2 ET p. 
86) 
one is tempted to respond that he is confusing structural analogy with 
some sort of constitutional dependence. Temporalization does indeed 
in some sense involve a relation between an existent and a nonexistentp 
an inside and an outside but it can at best be said to symbolize the 
inside/outside relation involved in phenomenological reduction. 
Derrida, it is true, refers, perhaps in elaboration of the 
above remarks, to hearing oneself speak, in a way that might be thought 
to echo Merleau-Ponty: 
'Hearing oneself speak is not the inwardness of an inside 
that is closed in upon itself; it is the irreducible - 
openness in the inside; it is the eye and the world within 
speech. Phenomenological reduction is a scene, a theatre 
stage. ' p. q6p ET p. 86) 
But the way out of interiority offered by such an experience is 
surely not most obviously via 'the spacing in all temporalization' but 
16 
rather via the embodiment of the speaking voice, and the manifold 
ways in which the purity of that listening to oneself might get 
interrupted, distorted (from a sore throat, coughing, coping with 
eating at the same time, to various parapraxes of speech, in which the 
spoken word seems to have run forward, ahead of thought, or in which 
the monitoring has broken down, or in which alien words, or associations, 
have clearly crept in... 
For the sake of formal completeness and because Derrida's focus 
here is still explicitly Husserl, and even though the issues will have 
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to be discussed again below, we conclude by a discussion of his logic 
of supplementarity, in his chapter seven. Howevert despite, or 
perhaps because of the wealth of its analyses, we shall select ruth- 
lessly only those parts that directly contribute to Derrida's treat- 
ment of temporality. We shall put to one side Derrida's further 
discussion of Husserl's theory of language and concentrate on (1) the 
logic of supplementarity and its radically disruptive consequences 
for any understanding of time as 'succession'. (2) The relation 
between time, presence and the end of metaphysics. 
What, then, is Isupplementarity'? The concept does not merely 
appear in this chapter. It plays an important analytical role in 
two chapters of Of Grammatology 
J7 It is both a complex and a power- 
ful concept. It is powerful in that it captures a structure of 
dependence that relates a number of Derrida's key concerns - speech 
and writing, expression and indication - to name but two. And it 
serves to summarize and stabilize the relationship in each case. it 
is complex in that we have to jump the rails of our ordinary thinking 
to understand it. In particular, the kind of thinking we have to 
transcend is that which thinks of explanation as having the form of 
tracing back to a first point which unlike all the subsequent stages$ 
will not be derivative, but will have some sort of fulness of presence. 
When Derrida talks of 'original supplementarityl or 'primordial 
supplementarityl what he is saying is that there is no such privileged 
first point. But there is something like a first operation of 
significationg a first movement - and that is supplementation. 
As I understand it, Derrida derives the term frorn an innocent, 
use made of it by Pousseau-. 'Languages are made to be spoken, writing 
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serves only'as a supplement to speech, 
18 In this remark we have of 
course, on the Derridean thesis, the traditional appreciation of 
writing as an unproductive replication of speech. 
19 We know that 
for Derrida the problematic of speech and writing is subservient to 
the question of the sign. And indeed, at the beginning of this 
chapter he explains supplemenUlion, again, with the same duality as 
before, as the primitive structure of signification, both completing 
and displacing presence. 
If we stick for the moment with the traditional concept of the 
sign, what Derrida believes is that signs do not merely reflect pre- 
existing objectivities or meanings, Re-presentation is not a simple 
standing-for a pre-existing presence. ' Signs give to whatever they 
signify whatever sense of presence they possess. Derrida even 
extends this idea of an addition that fulfils to the idea of 'the 
for-itself or self-presence' (or self-consciousness), and concludes 
'by delayedrrcLc-tion, a possibility produces that to which it is 
20 
said to be added on'. In this respect we find an echo of earlier 
discussions of the 'I' and its relation to death, and the rejection 
of 'innocence'. Death does not befall a pre-existing III, rather a 
relation to death constitutes the III. But if this completion aspect 
of supplementation is important, we must not forget substitution. 
The written word replaced, substitutes for the spoken word, 
in Rousseau. In Husserl, indication substitutes for expression in 
communicative discourse. 
Derrida describes supplementation as an original structure of 
signification. What does that mean? I take it he means that it'is 
from this structure that the metaphysical picture is derived, by a 
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certain distorting transformation. We cannot, he claims, grasp the 
6tructure of supplementation 'on the basis of consciousness', or 
within a traditional temporal framework. I assume he means that when 
he talks of 'movements' he is not, talking of conscious acts, and that 
this structure cannot be laid out as a succession of moves. 
The link between supplementarity and, differance is not hard to 
grasp. By differance, Derrida picks out the positive sense in which 
signs do not have their meaning by a relation to a-presencep orl 
alternatively, that-such a, relation is aniinfinite deferral. And if 
supplementarity is seen to, displace presencet it equally introduces 
into presence, a play of differences. 
How does this account of supplementarity threaten time? The 
claim must be, both that it involves a contortion of the order of 
succession that no amount of fiddling round. with will straighten. out 
into something resembling a simple sequence, and that this is important 
somehow. For the interrelations of a static,. structure might equally 
be said to resist a temporal interpretation, but, unless it mattered to 
time we would think no more of it. , The point here is surely that the 
logic of supplementation is such as to undermine any reference back to 
a primordial 'presence' that would be seen as the origin of a meaning, 
or indeed of time itself. Supplementary logic says that the Ifirst' 
is merely-a shadow cast back by the second, so to speak, or that what 
'comes first' is the movement from first to second, that the fulness 
was not there from the start, but is created by what seems to point 
elsewhere. The idea of the supplement could be said to capture-the 
thought that the value of origin may be an effect of desire, generated 
perhaps from the sense that temporal representations cannot be all 
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there are, that time itself must have some underlying layer. 
knother name for this desire would be metaphysics. 
At the end of this work, we can distinguish six motifs that 
have concerned him, (1) presence as the matrix of all the inter- 
dependent conceptions of phenomenology, (2) the interpretation of 
this system as a teleological structure, (3) the interpretation of 
the philosophy of presence as the attempt to eliminate differancep 
(4) the announcing of the closure of the history of being as presencet 
(5) the problem of how to carry on 'beyond' absolute knowledge, (6) 
the metaphor of the labyrinth, lwhich includes in itself its own exits'. 
The scope of this set of topics makesýour attempt to clarify the 
particular status of time and temporality somewhat difficult., The 
most obvious remark to make is that Derrida makes it unnecessary, to 
demonstrate that the question of time is more than one question among 
the catalogue of philosophy's questions. Derrida's discussion of 
Husserl's theory of signification has traced that theory, and with it 
traced philosophy itself, to a primitive assertion of-the temporal and 
evidential primacy of presence. Equally convinced that theories of 
time have all traditionally privileged presence, the undermining of 
that-: value undermines time. When we talk about traditional theories-- 
of time, we mean, in fact, theories that, with the aid of 'presence', 
dissimulate differance, repetition, the fact that there is no origin, 
there are no absolute point-sources, etc. The very concept of 'time' 
like all other concepts, is associated with moves that are essentially 
metaphysical. To. try to change this involves changing all the rules 
of the game. The introduction of lindecidables', the logic of 
supplementarity, perhaps also the strategy of 'sous rature, can all 
be seen as contributing to such a change in the rules. 
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But what we have to ask, repeatedly, is whether Derrida is not 
overreacting to the specific claims of Husserl here. For Husserl, 
the bond between the temporal and the evidential present is indeed 
tight. Husserl's goals were foundational, his method intuitive. 
But it would need more argument to show that philosophy in general 
had embraced these goals. Is there not a great danger that we come 
to see Derrida as having invented a new positive vocabulary when in 
kt: 
fact he hasýbest undermined another? Do we not need to leave behind 
all the talk of 'fundamental differancel at the very same time as we 
leave behind belief in 'presence'? Is not the way he explains his 
goal in Of Grammatology - to shake our complacency about presence - 
about right? Positive theory to re place it would be an error, at 
least at that level. Equally, it should not preclude, as it can 
seem to have done, the exploration of those overlayed temporal structures 
in which representation and the shadows of presencing it casts back- 
wards co-habit, in which succession is one of many 'orders' of tempor- 
ality, one interwoven with delayed effects, anticipations, teleologies 
etc, One enormous danger of trying to transcend naivety is that one 
transcends its wealth too. 
Apart from the questions of strategy and method which we resume 
later, a final word ought to be offered about Derrida's arguments, and 
the fact that we have often argued in this chapter that they are 
inconclusive. In particular, his reversals have seemed, to us at least 
twice to be arbitrary. Would it be sufficient to gloss their effect- 
iveness as inconclusive in the following way: that in the face of a 
relationship taken naturally to operate in one direction, the plausible 
suggestion that it even might operate in the opposite directiont has 
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the effect of. actually unsettling the naturalness of the original 
position? The suggestion that repetition might constitute presence, 
even if inconclusivel weakens the force of the originally assumed 
constitutive relation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Intentionality" ... a central problem 
We begin our consideration of Heidegger's thoughts about time 
with a small bibliographical note. It was Heidegger who (somewhat 
perfunctorily, Husserl is said to have thought) edited the lectures of 
Husserl we discussed above. His editor's foreword tells us very little. 
It is idle but fascinating to imagine what he would have written had he 
offered a substantial introduction to the lectures. There is, however 
one remark that merits our attention. After pointing out the central 
role of the concept of intentionality, and the intentionality of time- 
consciousness in the lectures, Heidegger goes on, in words that Husserl 
could formally assent to 
'Even today, this term "intentionality" is no all-explan- 
atory word but one which designates a central problem. ' 
Husserl could agree to this. He called himself a perpetual beginner in 
philosophy. Nothing was to cease to be problematic. And in many of 
his references to intentionality, Husserl identifies it with 'a number 
of pervasive phenomenological structures' (to which a set of problems 
belong) (Ideas 084) 'the problem which in its scope covers phenomenology 
in its entirety' (0146). Its formula may be simple ('all consciousness 
is consciousness of something') but nothing could be less simple than 
working out its, meaning and implications. 
But the historian of phenomenology cannot fail to read into 
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Heidegger's words another suggestion - that 'intentionality' is not 
just the name for a legitimate and central problem, but is itself, as 
they say, part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. 
Heidegger dates his editor's foreword April 1928, two years to the 
month after concluding the writing of Being and Time if the date of 
its dedication to Husserl is anything to go-by. But in that book 
there are only two mentions of the word 'intentional'. The first 
appears when he is paraphrasing Scheler, the second is a little more 
interesting - another case of marginalising in a footnote. This foot- 
note is worth quoting 
'The thesis that all cognition has intuition as its goal, 
has the temporal meaning that all cognising is making 
present. Whether every science, or even philosophical 
cognition, aims at a making-present need not be decided 
here. 
Husserl uses the expression 'make present' (Gegenwartigen) 
in characterising sense-perception .... This temporal 
-way of describing this phenomenon must have been suggested 
by the analysis of perception and intuition in general in 
terms of the idea of intention. That the intentionality 
of 'consciousness' (sic) is ro'unded in the ecstatical 
temporality, of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be 
shown in the following Division (in fact unpublished). ' 
(Being and Time p. 498 (H363) n. xxiii) 
Here buried in a footnote Heidegger states the problem with intention- 
ality. It is the pivot of epistemology, and the very project of 
epistemology is both grounded in, and, with all this tunneling, 
subverted, by Dasein's intrinsic ecstatic temporality, a temporality 
which cannot just be thought of as 'making present'. Heidegger's task 
in Being and Time is to spell out the nature and role of this ecstatic 
temporality, by providing, via an analytic of Dasein, an ontological 
dimension that will undercut the concern shared by phenomenology and 
neo-Kantian philosophy with questions of knowledge. 
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In its simplest terms, Heidegger has to rescue time from merely 
being the servant of epistemology. In doing so, he takes a fateful 
step out of the framework he had already begun to trouble in his early 
essay "The Concept of Time in the Science of History" (see our dis- 
cussion below). 
The-relation to Husserl is important. Heidegger adoptsp and 
I think is sincere in modifying the meaning of the term 'phenomenology', 
and his account of it occupies the longest section in his Introduction 
(07). of course he has his sights not just on epistemology,. but equally 
on that whole tradition of philosophy (including its so-called onto- 
logical versions) which suffers in different ways from the same 
deficiency. This failure is more than a problem of method though it 
is reflected at that level. -It is the failure to ask (and keep asking) 
the question of Being. That is a failure to pose one's questions in - 
the light of the thought of Being. It is in this context that Heidegger's 
interest in time arises. Time, he believes, will provide him with a 
horizon (the horizon, he claims) within which we can both diagnose the 
various ways in which philosophers by privileging the present, 'or indeed 
presence, without grasping its deeper grounding in Daseinýsecstatic 
temporality, have fallen short, and at the same time will open up the 
possibility of thinking-of Being itself. In principle the question 
of Time seems subservient to the question of Being. If there were 
another way of reawakening the question of Being, one might avoid a 
consideration of time. But it soon becomes clear that the two questions 
are inseparable. 
Introductory gurvey of Heidegger's writing on Time 
'Time' figures in the titles of many of Heidegger's writings 
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and as one of the key foci of certain others. While a full treatment 
oi the question of Time in Heidegger would ultimately coincide with an 
exhaustive treatment of Heidegger himself, we shall be content with 
something less comprehensive. Nonetheless, it would be useful to 
take a brief look at some of the major places at which Heidegger has 
discussed time, or key aspects of time, following which we shall try to 
discern a relationship between the shifts in Heidegger'streatment of 
time, and his more general philosophical outlook., 
(a) The Early Essay 
In 1916 Heidegger published a short essay, one conforming in 
both its vocabulary and its focus of concern to a neo-Kantian frame- 
work, but which points forward to the problematic of time in Being 
and Time. It was entitled "The Concept of Time'in The Science of 
2 History" . The basic position Heidegger argues for in this essay, is 
that the concept of time required for the study of history is quite 
different from the one required for natural science , in particular 
physics. Physics has theoretical goals ('to trace all phenomena back 
to the laws of motion of a general dynamics') for which a concept of 
time that will make measurement possible is required. That concept 
of time is of time as 'a homogeneous ordered series of points, a scale, 
a parameter'. History, understood as a scientific, that is, methodical 
study, -while not denying succession, has quite different goals 
'to represent the context of effect and development of object- 
ifications of human life in its understandable peculiarity 
and uniqueness in so far as its relation to cultural values 
is concerned'. Co?. cL-. P-9) 
And consequently, its concept of time is quite different. 'Historical 
time periods differ qualitatively' he writes, and time in history does 
not have the homogeneous character found in science. 
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Now, at one level, one could say that this essay remains at the 
epistemological level, concerned only with the conceptual requirements 
of different sciencesq and different types of science. Is he doing 
more than repeat the distinction made by neo-Kantians, such as Rickert 
between nomothetic and ideographic sciences? There are however one 
or two clues to a breakdown of any simple epistemological framework. 
He begins with a quotation from Eckhart ("Time is what changes and 
evolves; eternity remains simple") - hardly suggesting epistemological 
confinement, unless the confinement we are considering should-be that 
preceding birth. He goes on to discuss the limitations of the theory 
of knowledge in appreciating 'the full meaning of the ultimate question 
of philosophy' (without saying what that might be). Further, when 
discussing - in a very Nietzschean way - the importance of the interests 
of the present in interpreting the past, he makes a number of ontological 
moves. The past does not exist, he reminds us. It affects us in its 
'qualitative otherness'. And it forces the historian into an overcoming 
I 
of the gap between past and present. "Time must be overcome and one 
must live one's way through the temporal gap from the present to the 
past". The advocacy of a living-through that overcomes time suggests 
a clearly existential dimension to what might have seemed simply a 
question of scientific conceptuality. And he makes two important 
foundationalist moves. He argues that (though I am here construing a 
claim that is less clear in print) the possibility of understanding the 
past rests on the fact that its 'otherness' is such only in relation to 
the lobjectifications of human life'. As living, creating beings, we 
have access to a pre-objectified realm, from which alternative object- 
ifications can be grasped. And finally, he makes a move that presages 
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a move he will make in Being and Time in suggesting that there is a 
dependency of computational time on historical time, one to be'found 
at the beginning of any time series. Such series-beginnings are 
always invested with meaning and value. Calendars are obvious 
examples. We begin with the founding of Rome, the birth of Christ etc. 
Fundamentally, in this essay, Heidegger'injects a little 
Nietzsche into a neo-Kantian approach to the logical structure of the 
different sciences, and in doing so, the qualitative time of the study 
of history, and indeed the very business of reckoning time are 
suggested, albeit en passant, to require an existential groundingt and are 
certainly not reducible to any other sciences. 
The general question of History will at this point be deferred. 
It would be more fruitful to discuss the question in the light of 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry (1939), Heidegger's later discussion in 
Being and Time, Derridaýls reading, of Husserl, and Nietzsche's early essay 
on the Uses and Disadvantages of History For Life (1874). But it is 
worth pointing out, following a schema of bifurcation that could be 
allowed to recur endlessly, that the question of history is not merely 
one among many for Heidegger, it is not just a topic of special interest. 
Many of the claims he has made in this short essay will find a place in 
his general understanding of the History of Being, which is the setting 
for much of the thought of Being and Time. Being and Time itself both 
discusses and enacts this overcoming of the past. It calls it 'destruc- 
tion' at one point, and 'repetition' at another.... But in this pre- 
liminary sketch we cannot extend these considerations further. 
(b) Being and Time: The Original Plan 
Naturally, it 'is on Being and Time (1927) that our attention must 
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focus, but not only for the analyses of time that it, contains, but also 
for the perspective it provides for the various other of Heidegger's 
writings on time that we shall consider. For these other writings can 
be seen, in various ways to be the working out of the complete structure 
of the two part treatise, never in fact officially completed. By 'these 
other writings' I refer-to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. (1929), 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1975, but given as a lecture course 
in 1927) and Time and Being (1962). - In the first part of the whole 
treatise the two published sections of which were titled Being and Time 
Heidegger offers us, in his own words, 
'The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and 
the explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for 
the Question of Being' 
(see the first page of the Table of Contents), 
In fact we do not get in 1927 this explication of time as transcendental 
horizon for the question of Being. Indeed the subject is only broached 
in that work in the last paragraphs, and the last sentence of the book 
is a question 'Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? ' 
In the schematic outline of the whole treatise (08, H39-40), this missing 
third section had a shorter title - simply 'time and Being'. We can 
suppose in a preliminary way some sort of fulfillment of this section's 
promise in the lecture Time and Being given in 1962. 
Part 11 of the treatise was to have looked like this: 
'Part 11 
1. Kant's problem of schematism and time, as a preliminary 
stage in a problematic of temporality 
2. the ontological foundation of DescarteV "cogito sum" , 
and how the mediaeval ontology has been taken over into the 
problematic of the "res cogitans". 
3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a. way of 
discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of 
ancient ontology. ' 
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Kant and the Problem of Metaphysicsq conceived 
3 if not written 
1925-6, before Being and Time, if only published in 1929, could be 
thought ofas the working out of the first section. One could treat 
part 1 of The Basic Problem of Phenomenology 
4 
as a way of working out 
the second section, substituting Kant for Descartes, and part 11 as the 
working out of his relation to Aristotle's view of time, a question to which 
Heidegger could devote only a footnote (his longest) in Being and Time. 
5 
(We discuss below Derrida's long treatment of this footnote in 'Ousia 
6 
and Gramme' ,) 
There are other works by Heidegger in which Time is either discussed 
or plays an important role either as a subject in its own right or as 
presupposed by the questions being considered. 
7. The only other writings 
we shall consider in any detail will be Heidegger's Nietzsche volumes 
8 
and What is called Thinking? 
9 for its further thoughts about Nietzschet 
and in particular Nietzsche's understanding of time. 
This merely schematic assimilation of various other of Heidegger's 
writings to the plan laid down in Being and Time has value only to the 
extent that it serves to focus our attention on the ways in which the 
project of Being and Time was not completed at the time of publication$ 
and the various ways in which the problems encountered at that time are 
solved, or at least approached, in these other works. To say that they 
fulfill the promise of the original design is really mistaken, for in 
the end (eg. in Time and Being) they put that plan in question. 
Guiding Questions i 
Our reading of Heidegger will be guided by the following kinds of 
questions: 
1. How successfully does Being and Time overcome our , 
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traditional metaphysical understanding of time? 
2. In what ways do the various other writings on time successfully 
resolve deficiencies in that original account? 
3. How does the shift in Heidegger's understanding of time correspond 
to his (and our) understandings of his more general 'reversal', 'change 
of emphasis', 'turn', etc. from Being and Time (1927) to Time and Being 
(1962)? 
4. Is there any sense in which (a) there are other ways of proceeding 
beyond Being and Time (or even avoiding it) while endorsing the same 
goal (of rethinking metaphysics)? (b) there remains what is still a 
metaphysical motif in the very movement that Heidegger makes? (The 
work of Derrida is obviously what we have in mind here). 
5. Suppose that the history of our understanding of time is the history 
of our inadequate ontological grasping of it (because ontology has always 
itself privileged the present), might it not yet be that time needs 
releasing from its rescuer, from its continuedly ontologico-transcen- 
dental framework of understanding? (Not only Derrida, but also Levinas 
and Nietzsche are relevant here. ) 
6. How unproblematic is the association of metaphysics with 'philosophy 
of presence'? 
We cannot claim to have resolved all these issues, only to have considered 
some of them seriously. 
Time and Presence in the History of Philosophy: Heidegger's General View 
The question of time as we have seen is rarely absent from Heidegger's 
writing in some form of other. The term itself figures in one of the 
handiest symmetrical frames by which the bulk of his work can be organised- 
the path from. Being and Time (1927) to Time and Being (1962). Heidegger 
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is one of a long line of philosophers for whom the question of time is 
not merely one of great philosophical interest as a topic for philosophi- 
cal inquiry, but one which bears on the nature of that inquiry itself. 
This was in fact true for philosophers. before Kant, but with Kant, and 
then Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl - to mention only the most obvious - 
this reflexive status of the question of time became thematic. 
No philosopher who attempted to deal with the question of Time 
without confronting the way in which temporal valuationsp ways of 
thinking of, and relating to time are woven into the very practice-of 
philosophy, could any longer deserve to be taken seriously. If such 
a demand were posed as a test of philosophical seriousness, Heidegger 
would pass with flying colours. But an important question remains. 
Can we allow that the fate of our understanding of time should be linked 
so closely with its place in our understanding of philosophy? is it 
not possible that the power of this insight might swamp and occlude 
certain possibilities of understanding time itself, even as it opens 
them up? But what about this 'time itself'? Does such a notion still 
make sense? Although it is somewhat difficult to recognise, Heidegger 
does not lose sight of the aim of restoring to time a sense free from 
metaphysical determination, and such accounts appear at each stage of 
his penetration into the question of Being. For with Heidegger, the 
engagement of time with philosophy itself appears in the form of the 
relation between time and Being, and in particular the question of 
Being. 
For Heidegger, the importance of an investigation of time is 
derived from its role in our understanding of Being. The importance 
of the question of Being ("What is the meaning of Being? " is the shortest 
form of the question) is twofold. It plays a vital role in Heidegger's 
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reading of the history of philosophy, and it also serves as the basis 
for awakening awareness of certain existential possibilities. For 
Heidegger, the importance of the question is that while philosophers 
have always philosophised in its shadow, they have not posed this question 
to themselves adequately, if at all. The reason for this is that a way 
of answering the question has become historically so canonized as to 
obscure the fact that the question ever existed. Heidegger attempts to 
reopen it in essentially three ways: first by an existential analysis 
of that being forýwhom the question of Being, at least in a certain 
form, is still a live issue, second by a reading (a 'destruction', best 
read Ide-struction') of the history of philosophy, drawing out the points 
at which Being is silently interpreted without that fact being acknowledged, 
and thirdly, by meditation on the work of art, on the language of poetry, 
and on language itself. The consequence is not, in fact, a renewal of 
philosophy, not its revitalisation, but the marking out of its limits, 
the recognition that philosophy is not so much limited by its interpreta- 
tion of Being, as constituted by that interpretation, and once one begins 
to think beyond or beneath that interpretation, one begins to leave 
philosophy (that is, metaphysics) behind, to its own devices. 
How is it that Being has always already been interpreted? In 
broad outlinel Heidegger's answer never varies. The history of 
philosophy is the history of the interpretation of Being as presence 
(Anwesenheit), that is in a particular limited and limiting temporal 
determination. Heidegger writes of 
*the treatment of the meaning of Being as parousia or 
ousia, which signifies n presenceft (Anwesenheit) in 
ontologico-temporal terms. A being is grasped in its 
being as "presence" (Anwesenheit) - this means that it- 
is understood by reference to a determinate mode of 
time, the "present", (Gegenwart). Being and Time, H25 
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But what of time itself? What Heidegger says of Augustine applies to 
the interpretation of time in general. 
'The essential nature of time is here conceived in the 
light of Being and, let us note it well, of a totally 
specific interpretation of "Being" - Being as being 
present. This interpretation of Being has been current 
so long that we regard it as self-evident. ' 
And he goes on 
'Since in all metaphysics from the beginning of Western 
thought, Being means being present, Being, if it is to 
be thought in the highest instance, must be thought as 
pure presence, that is, as the presence that persistsp 
the abiding present, the steadily standing "now". ' 
What is Called Thinking? p. 102 
These words, which date from the years 1951/2 complete the circle. 
Being is understood in terms of 'presence' guided by a valuation of 
the temporal 'present'. When time itself comes to be reflected on 
explicitly, it is understood in relation tolBeing already determined 
as 'Presence'. These words bring out sharply a number of important 
themes. Heidegger does not and, cannot, as Husserl I was wont 
top treat 
self-evidence as evidence of truth. The reason he offers here is 
simply that self-evidence may just be the mask of habit. But there is 
another more important reason. The standard of self-evidence is itself 
the perfect embodiment of the value of presence, What is self-evident 
shows itself to me as it is now. To ask self-evidence to pass judge- 
ment on presence is to ask it to evaluate itself. The suggestion is 
not merely that this would be improper, but that this accounts for the 
self-sustaining nature of the interpretation of Being as presence. 
But there are other explanations for the self-evidence attached to the 
interpretation of Being as presence. In particular, when Heidegger 
writes of time "conceived" in the light of (a specific interpretation of) 
Being, and when he says that throughout Metaphysics 'Being means being 
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present', he is in neither case describing a conscious choice among a 
set of possibilities. The concept of time was not made the object of 
a fundamental interrogation until the very end of Greek philosophy, and 
by then its association with the idea of 'something present' (ousia 
tis) had already been established via Greek physics. 
Clearly if we want to talk of the question of Being as 'forgotten', 
no psychological sense of forgetting will do. Heidegger's proJect is 
a project of radical interpretation, uncovering not just what has been 
forgotten, but what has not been thought, or better, the unthought that 
lies in all thought. Collingwood's suggestion that we treat all 
philosophical propositions as answers to questions is helpful here. 
Heidegger's project is a revival of the question which unknown to it- 
self, metaphysics has consistently been trying to answer. 
Presence, and the present are each determinations of time. 
Heidegger's suggestion is that if we can gain access to the temporal 
horizon itself, within which such particular determinations of time, 
and thence of Being, occur, we will be able thereby to reopen the question 
of Being in a fresh way. In Being and Time, Heidegger projects two 
different, though because, Dasein is itself 'historical', related ways of 
going about this. First, as he puts it 
'the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and 
the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for 
the question of Being'. (08) 
This by and large, is what we are offered in Being and Time. The 
second way is what we have called the radical interpretation or des- 
truction of the history of metaphysics, with, as he puts it the , 
problematic of temporality as our clue'. With the exception of his 
brief treatments of Descartes and Hegel, this latter approach was not 
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in fact carried out in the published version of Being and Time, but, 
as we have seenp accomplished instead in later lectures and published 
works (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (Kant, Aristotle), Hegel's Concept of Experience, "Plato's 
Doctrine of Truth", his two volume work on Nietzsche etc. ). Heidegger 
also shows that the question of Being can be raised in relation to the 
understanding of a work of art ("The Origin of the Work of Art") 
10 
which, 
although unable to raise for itself the question of its own Being, as 
was true of Dasein, nonetheless works as a work of art, not by being a 
mere thing or being, but by 'opening up a world'. In his meditation 
on the language of poets and on poetic language, Heidegger tries yet a 
different way. In poetry, the referential confidence with which we 
ordinarily use language is broken. In poetryt language's openness to 
Being can be shown to be what is always at stake - certainly in the work 
of the great poets (H61derlint Trakl, Georg, Rilke). That poetry which 
is always on the verge of silence, is a witness to what Heidegger will 
later call the 'mystery'. All along, while he has moved away from the 
project of describing the temporal horizon through an existential analytic, 
Heidegger has nonetheless tried to find a way of talking about the relation 
between man and Being which avoids the trap of supposing that either can 
be adequately identified separately. For such a move, even without 
the use of such labels would lead back into the old opposition between 
subject and object, however subtly conceived. Being and Time had seemed 
to suggest that an authentic taking up of the temporality of human exis- 
tence might be a task for each individual -a view inherited perhaps from 
Kierkegaard. The 'later' Heidegger, however, influenced undoubtedly, as 
Vail suggests, 
11 by his reading of H61derlin, and by a continuing and 
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deepening confrontation with Nietzsche * now attempts to name 
this relation in a way that, firstj reverses the direction of activity 
(with the les, gibtl) and then moves away even from naming Being at all 
(with lereignis'), naming with this word, only the relationship between 
man and Being, seeing the terms as derivative from the relation itself. 
In the course of Heidegger's thought, he moves away as we have 
suggested from the existential analytic of Dasein. It is often said 
that his attention moves from man to Being. And yet the advent of 
the les gibtl 
12 
and lereignis 
13 
and the crossing-out of the word 
"Being" 14 (The Question of Being p. 81) (1955) all point equally to his 
drifting away from Being. 
15 Or rather,, perhaps we shall see that he 
drifts away from 'man' and 'Being' in the same way - that is, from the 
dangers of objectifying$ conceptual, representational thought with 
which the very use of these words is fraught. Heidegger talks of man? 
He is offering us a new (existential) anthropology or humanism. 
Heidegger talks of Being? He has become a mystic as we were warned he 
might. These responses are understandable, if mistaken. From the point 
of view of our getting a grip on Heidegger's treatment or treatments of 
Time, these shifts are important. We will shortly look both at what 
Heidegger at various times has said publicly about the 'Kehre' in his 
work, and make our own comments. It remains true that if the later 
writingst and especially Time and Being are to be seen as offering us 
samples of what can properly be said about Time once one has thought 
through its previous metaphysical determination, then doubts about the 
value of Heidegger's path of thinking for our understanding of time do 
not need much encouragement. It becomes imperative to look carefully 
and closely at what is going on in Being and Time and to ask ourselves 
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whether the interests of understanding Time are best served by the path 
Heidegger took after writing it, or whether that path was in fact 
followed in pursuit of a different problem. 
Beyond the transcendental: a speculation 
In our discussion of Being and Time we shall be concerned with 
a number of issues. We shall be asking what positive contributions 
it makes to the project of rescuing time from its metaphysical deter- 
mination, whether it supports the idea that the concept of time is 
intrinsically metaphysical, (which would mean that rescuing it-from 
metaphysics would be like rescuing a fish from water), whether or not 
Heidegger's treatment of time in this work exhausts the possibilities 
of understanding time available in the 'everyday conception of time' 
or whether it in fact covers them over. And, as we have suggested, 
we shall consider the possibility of questioning the way in which 
Heidegger develops his insights about time after Being and Time. 
Let us reflect again on the words with which Heidegger actually 
describes what for the most part he is engaged in in this book: 
'The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality, 
and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental 
Horizon for the Question of Being'. (Being and Time p. 7) 
In fact the second half of even this characterisation of the published 
part 1 properly corresponds to the division he did not include (3. time 
and Being). The last sentences of the book put the completion of the 
task of the third division in some doubt 
'The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's 
totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the 
ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible 
by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality 
temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing 
of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which 
leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? 
Does time manifest itself as the horizon of Leline. (H 437) 
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With these closing sentences a life's work is foreshadowed. If the 
book, the torso, has been successful, it will have offered a rather 
special account of man - namely of man as a being for whom his Being 
is in question - and will have shown that it is the temporality of 
his existencet in particular his way of taking up the fact of his 
finitude, that gives that Being its fundamental meaning. As we 
embark on an analysis of the book, we should pause to take note of 
the language Heidegger is using in those closing sentences He talks 
of 'grounding', of 'constituting', of the 'primordial', of 'horizon', of 
making possible' and of the 'transcendental'* Much of the interest of 
Heidegger's writing lies in the way in which he transforms the sense of 
these terms from their often Husserlian origin. And yet the question 
must remain - do they not still represent a strongly neo-Kantian/Husserlian 
way of posing problems? Even if the method of analysis is differentg 
is not Heidegger still wedded to a transcendental, foundational approach, 
one which ultimately derives its legitimacy from an idea lism which he 
cannot accept? This diffigulty will not escape him and much of the 
subsequent development of his thought after Being and Time will be an 
attempt to deal with it. We mention this fundamental matter now not in 
criticism, but simply to offer some focus to our reading. The question 
"Is there a more basic frame of reference or horizon or context within 
which something we think we already understand appears and derives its 
possibility of appearance and all its intelligibility" is an enormously 
productive one in the history of philosophy. But whether it. fully 
understands itself is another matter. It often presents itself as a 
vertical principle. A certain surface makes more sense in relation to 
a deeper, hidden, layer. And where the vertical dimension is missing 
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- one might say that the concept of horizon explicitly tries to avoid it 
- ihe power of the analysis still seems to rest on an exclusive and uni- 
directional ordering of the levels of description involved. An account 
of the temporal horizon uniquely illuminates Dasein's existence. The 
relation is assymetrical. 
But what if, to use its own terminologyo the possibility of such 
transcendental grounding itself rested on a certain doubling-up, or 
superimposition of language, in which something is thought in terms of 
something else? 
16 It is not simply a question of translation, but of 
transformation. The possibility of a transcendental grounding is 
discursively dependent on an operation of mapping of one discourse onto 
another, of the language of temporality onto that of existence. This 
may be true, but what is gained by such a formulation? The gain is this: 
there are no a-priori restrictions on what mappings are possible, and, no 
guarantees whatsoever that certain incestuous superimpositions and wild 
intermappings will not occur. This very intervention into the language 
of grounding which treats relations of possibility, of ground, of 
constitution, as special cases within a more general horizon of doubling 
up, superimposition, mapping, transformation etc. demonstrates graphically 
the disturbing power of such mappings. By offering a neutral way of 
describing what is going on when one gives a transcendental grounding for 
a phenomenon, it allows us to focus attention-on the ways in which claims 
about the privileged status of such atransformation are made. Here we 
would return to the terms with which we began; ground, constitution etc. 
We can treat them as attempts to order relations of mapping. 
And yet if we ask for the justification of such ordering ... 7 Will 
we not end up doing theology? ('We have not abolished God if we still 
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believe in grammar' wrote Nietzsche). It maybe suggested that the 
test of proper order is power to illuminate, the shedding of light. 
We ought to grasp this candle with both hands. For what is so 
interesting about illumination is that (a) it does not jealously 
proclaim its-own uniqueness (it certainly need not) (b) it does not 
require that one establish vertical series of deeper and deeper. levels 
of profundity. Sidelighting is often far more effective. Shadows 
often reveal quite as much as they obscure. The only objection to all 
this would come from someone who held there was only One source of light, 
whether or not that was to be found in the One proper discourse. 
Prelude to our later discussion of Heidegger 
We shall try to show, in our discussion of Being and Time the 
possibility of (and need for) a double reading, in which tendencies 
towards unity and dispersion are interwoven. The concept of authenticity 
will provide an examplary focus. In his later writing there is analogous 
tension. For on the one hand he reminds us frequently ofthe tentative 
nature of his writing, and yet what he consistently aims for is the- 
'proper word', the final story, to gather up the light into a single 
source. But if we treat accounts that offer transcendental groundings 
as essentially exercises in the transformation of one discourse into 
another, of the mapping of one onto another, then the 'vertical! flavour 
of a transcendental grounding would dissolve into a horizontal relation 
of transformability. What consequence would this have?. There are two 
sorts of possible consequence. one could adopt a deliberately counter- 
transcendental attitude to language, an openness (one which involves 
danger, risk, etc. ) to the phenomenon of superimposition, that is, of the 
undermining, or illumination of one or more of one's present discourses 
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by another one. Corresponding to Heidegger's talk of'where words 
break offj17 we would have the experience of using words (or not using 
them). which one knew to be vulnerable to engulfment by another discourse, 
and yet still.... Heidegger himself, after all, does not stop writing, 
but continues to take the risk of losing his previous insights (previous 
discourses) by developing ones which he can superimpose on them, and 
which threaten to conceal them. There is a second more direct consequence 
for reading the later Heidegger. We could try to interpret the apparent 
orientation to the unique word as the very principle which generates 
constant revision. For it is unachievable! one of the names of this 
principle would be(desir2. To that extent one could justify belief in 
truth as a regulative ideal, not because we thereby get closer to it, 
but because it generates a multiplicity of texts, and in the succession 
of such texts, and the light generated by their consýant displacement of 
one another is the only truth. 
All this, as must be clear, is somewhat speculative and programma- 
tic, but it does give a sense of how the mapping principle might function 
critically. And this principle has a more direct application to our 
present concern with Time. For at a certain point we shall want to 
explain how it might be possible to transcend 'ordinary temporality' 
without resorting to a more primordial level of primitive elements, and 
we anticipate that the mapping principle will play a significant role 
here. All this will of course have to be tied in with what Derrida calls 
deconstruction. Equally, we shall try to find room for the move from a 
valuation of 'grand recits' to what Lyotard 
18 
calls 'petits r6cits', 
and his corollary principle of productivity. Heidegger writes, for 
example I. 
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'If we penetrate to the "source" ontologically, we do not 
come tothings which are ontically obvious for the common 
understanding; but the questionable character of every- 
thing obvious opens up. ' (our emphasis) Being and Time 
(H 334) 
What if we came to think of the true significance of fundamental 
ontology in a purely consequential way? ' 
Heidegger's own Introduction to Being and Time 
One of the most extraordinary features of this book is its 
structure. After an introduction which justifies our renewing the 
question of Being, provides a methodological perspective on the whole 
treatise (including the parts never published) and offers a radically 
new interpretation of phenomenology, the book divides into two parts. 
The first half, which offers a 'preparatory fundamental analysis of 
Dasein', postpones at every turn the question of the temporal dimension 
of the phenomena it deals with, and yet interprets them in such a way 
that a temporal determination is what is most called for. This textual 
epoche' of the time question is all the more fascinating because of the 
radical displacement of traditional (epistemological) accounts of our 
relation to the world that occurs in the first division. To accomplish 
such a displacement without reference to time or temporality given the 
fundamental role that these will be seen to have in Heidegger's thought, 
is quite extraordinary. He is operating, as it were, with one hand 
tied behind his back. 
What does this 'preparatory fundamental analysis' achieve? -At 
the beginning of Division Two, Heidegger sums it up, essentially, in 
four points: 
(1) Dasein is (a) Being-in-the-world whose #essential structure centres 
in disclosedness'. 
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(2) Taken structurally as a whole, Being-in-the-world revealed 
I 
itself as care. 
(3) Dasein 'exists' in that it has 'an understanding potentiality- 
for-Being. ' 
(4) Care has been seen to be concretely connected with Dasein's 
facticity and its falling. 
Heidegger's account of care (Sorge), on which we shall focus our attention, 
is the structural hinge of the book. One and the same structure of 
involvement is revealed by Angst (in Division 1) and by the anticipation 
of death (in Division 2); that structure is care. 
In his preface to the seventh edition, Heidegger writes of Being 
and Time that 
I ... the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one 
if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being'. 
Immediately after the page on which this sentence occurs is another, 
which begins 
19 by interrupting Plato's Sophist at the point at which 
the Stranger is talking. Heidegger's point is that the meaning of 
Being is for us doubly concealed, and that double concealment requires 
a philosophical strategy adapted to it. For not only do we not have an 
answer. to the question of the meaning of Being, we do not even find the 
issue perplexing. We have to learn to ask the question before we can 
begin to answer it. 
In the first part of the Introduction ("The Necessity, Structure, 
and Priority of the Question of Being") Heidegger begins by sketching out 
the historical scenario by which we can understand how the question might 
be both forgotten and important. It is a version of the view that the 
history of philosophy is the history of footnotes in Plato. While 
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Plato and Aristotle were in some sense aware of the questions, their., 
successors are more interested in these philosophers' answers than in 
the space of questioning from which they arose. Heidegger dispels, or 
at least wards off the obvious objections to the question. But how 
are we to begin to ask it? It is by reflection on this question (How 
are we to ask the question of Being? ) that Heidegger formally at least 
justifies the whole endeavour of Being and Time. He begins by claiming 
that it befits what is claimed to be a fundamental question that it be 
made transparent in itself (and not merely asked causally). That 
means we must (minimally) ask what a question is. His account is a 
structural one. A question has a topic (that which is asked about)t 
an object (that which is interrogated) and a goal (that which is to be 
found out) and it is thebehaviour of a questioner, and thus characterizes 
the Being of that being,. in that questioning is not itself a 'thing, 
but the 'how' of a thing. So if we are to ask the question at all we 
must have some grasp of it. This he supposes we do have - albeit in 
the form of 'a vague average understanding of Being' - evinced by our 
apparently unproblematic use of the parts of the verb 'to be'. ('The 
water is rough'). This 'vague average-understanding' is very far indeed 
from being determinate; for Heidegger its very unclarity is a sign that 
it is Being that we are dealing with. What he claims is clear is that 
the Being of things is not itself a thing, but may nonetheless only be 
accessible through things. 
But how do we then choose which particular entities to interrogate? 
When we pose this question of choice, however, and begin to consider the 
problem of different kinds of access to Being etc., different modes of 
investigationt we are already discussing the Being of a particular entity 
183 
- namely we the questioners. So. Heidegger argues, if we are to make 
the question of Being structurally transparent, which looked like a 
mere methodological preliminary, we have 'first' to consider the Being 
of the questioner, of 'Dasein' (I ... this entity which each of us-is 
himself, and which includes inquiry as one of the possibilities of its 
Being... I H. 7). Is this not circular? His response is basically 
that phenomenological exhibition of fundamentals is not concerned with 
such formalistic objections. 
20 
In the third section of his Introduction ('The Ontological Priority 
of the Question of Being') Heidegger asks what the point of this question 
might be. Initially his answer is very like Husserl's account2l of 
regional ontologies. The discrete natural and human sciences in them- 
selves are ontic disciplines which each require an ontological foundation 
-a fundamental clarification of their categories and concepts. 
22- 
But this ontological enterprise itself (and here Heidegger is 
clearly and directly marking his distance from Husserl) rests on a priori 
conditions, which it is the more general task of the question of Being to 
consider. So talk of the 'ontological priority' of the question of 
Being is somewhat ambiguous, for at its deepest level, it has a priority 
in respect of being ontological. 
It is in the final section on 'the ontical priority of the question 
of Being' (04) that we find the fullest and most convincing explanation 
of the place of the analytic of Dasein in the question of Being, one 
which, if it does not attribute 'reflexivity' to Dasein in theold meta- 
physical sense, certainly does make all sorts of reflexive moves in the 
analysis itself. The key to Dasein's ontical priority, that is, its 
priority as an entity among other entities is that it is doubly inscribed 
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by Being. What is distinctive about Dasein is that its very Being 
involves a relation to Being, "its Being is an issue for it'. The 
passage is so critical we cannot avoid quoting it. 
its Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this 
is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies 
that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that 
Being -a relationship which is itself one of Being. And 
this means further that there is some way in which Dasein 
understands itself in its Being, and that-to some degree 
it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity 
that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to 
it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite character- 
istic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive 
in that it is ontological. ' (H12) 
The word 'disclosed' will turn out to be the important one. We are 
not dealing here with the kind of reflexive self-transparency in which 
a subject is aware of itself as a subject. Dasein is open to the 
possibilities of self-understanding which are existential rather than 
conceptual. 'Existence' is, as it was for Kierkegaard, the distinctive 
'determining character of Dasein', and in the brief remarks Heidegger 
makes here, the later theme of authenticity is adumbrated. 
'in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own" 
'Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence 
- in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or 
not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities 
itself, or got itself into them, or grown up-in them already'. 
'Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether 
it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. ' (H 12) 
What is clear from these remarks, which signal a significant intensi- 
fication of language on Heidegger's part, is that when he says that 
for Dasein, its Being is an issue, he is talking not about a matter of 
mere curiosity or fascination for each of us, nor is he talking of 
choosing between a variety of possible life-styles. The level Of 
possibility he indicates here concerns the stark alternatives between 
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grasping and not grasping the distinctiveness of having the relation to 
Veing that each Dasein has, the truth of (one's own) Being. The radical 
possibility he offers is to be (become) 'what' we are, which means to 
gather ourselves up into our distinctiveness as beings that 'exist'. 
Formally, we can say that the ontical priority-of Dasein lies 
in its being ontological. But this 'ontological' status affects not 
only its existence but also its relation to other entities. Heidegger's 
argument is that we are not metaphysical subjects, but Beings-in-the- 
world, and as such have some sort of grasp of the Being of entities we 
encounter in that world. This gives the existential analytic of Dasein 
the role of providing (in itself) that 'fundamental ontology from which 
all other ontologies can take their rise. ' This he calls Dasein's 
ontico-ontological priority. 
All this is to leave us in no doubt that if a choice has to be 
made about which entity to scrutinize in pursuing the question of Being, 
it will be Dasein. Heidegger, most interestingly concludes by a further 
linking of existence with philosophical inquiry itself. If for Dasein 
(its) Being is an issue, philosophical inquiry is only a radicalization 
of existence. And for philosophy to be successfully pursued it must 
be 'itself seized upon in an existentfell manner as a possibility of the 
Being of each existing Dasein'. Passive readers stop here! 
The immediate importance of this Introduction is threefold: 
(1) It offers a compelling route back into thinking about the 
forgotten question. 
(2) It makes clear the role that the analysis of Dasein is to play 
I 
in Being and Time - that is, one subsidiary to the general 
question of the meaning of Being. 
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It announces many of the major themes to be taken up in the 
first Division of. Being and Time - Being-in-the-world, 
authenticity, and disclosure. 
But reflection on its movement reveals more. When John Sallis asks 
'Where Does Being and Time Begin? ' 
24 he actually begins at the literal 
beginning - Heidegger's, quote from Plato - but ends by reflecting on 
the real place at which Heidegger beginst the place he begins from, and 
begins with, and returns to: 'the place of the disclosure of Being'. 
25 In a later essay Heidegger will write that his aim is not to 
'get anywhere, but for once to get to where we are already'. This is 
what I have called self-collection, or self-gathering, the thoughtful 
recovery of the ground of our Being. This thinking has of course its 
own temporality: it is the temporality of the circle, the circling 
back of the movement of recovery. With brief references to Parmenides, 
Aristotle and Aquinas, Heidegger gives this a historical dimension I 
too. But temporality makes no thematic appearance in this introduction. 
And this is proof, if proof were needed, that Heidegger's central focus 
in this book is not time but Being. The horizonal functions of time 
and temporality are part of the solution, not the problem. Fundamentally 
they supply a way of describing the dimensionality of the 'horizon' of 
what for Dasein is its 'disclosure of Being'. 
The two halves of Heidegger's Introduction anticipate, though-not 
in any organised way, the division of the book itself. While the 
first half does not concern itself with temporal considerations, the 
second half bristles with them, at least in its first two sections which 
we shall provisionally 
26 distinguish as existential and historical in 
their focus. In particular we can distinguish four different levels 
187 
or regions (in 05): 
(1) temporality as the dimension of Dasein's Being by which 
the move from the everyday to the 'authentically ontological' 
level of analysis is accomplished. 
(2) time as 'the horizon for all understanding of Being', and 
in terms of the temporality of (1). 
(3) the ordinary understanding of'time, which also stems from 
the temporality of (1). 
(4) the naive ontological function time traditionally plays - 
chiefly in distinguishing temporal and non-temporal or super- 
temporal entities. 
The very title of 06 ("The Task of Destroying the History of 
Ontology") embodies at the level of particular project what Heidegger 
argues is the general structure of historicality. Initially one could 
say that Dasein is its past rather than that it merely has a past. But 
this 'is' needs articulating. For Heidegger, as for Nietzsche27 the 
past supplies the ways in which we understand ourselves, and it is in 
the light of these 'possibilities of Being' that we project the future. 
It is this necessary historicality that makes possible the thematic study 
of history. 
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These remarks, moreover, have direct reflexive application to the 
very project we are engaged in here. For the possibility of thinking 
about the meaning of existence, or of Being in general, and indeed of 
the historicality of our Being, is itself characterised by historicality. 
And in order that 'by positively making the past own own, we may bring 
ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of such' 
inquiry'. We must concern ourselves explicitly (Historiologically) 
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with the history of the question of Being. 
But 'tradition', certainly when merely part of our taken-for- 
granted world, and even when recovered explicitly, all too easily 
conceals both the originating power of the past it delievers to us, 
and an understanding of the 'most elementary conditions which would 
alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make 
it productively its own. '. 
'If the question of Being is to have its own history made 
transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened 
up, and the concealments which it has brought about must 
be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by 
taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy 
the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive 
at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our 
first ways of determining the nature of Being - the ways 
which have guided us ever since. ' (H 22) 
But destruction is not negative 
$we must on the contrary stake out the positive possibilities 
of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within 
its limits ... to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose 
of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative 
function remains unexpressed and indirect'. (H22-23) 
This introduction was designed as an introduction to Being and 
Time as projected in its entirety in 08 (H39-40). Part Two was to 
consist of 'basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the 
history of ontology with the problematic of temporality as our clue', 
and was to deal with Kant's doctrine of schematism and time 
29 
, with the 
unthougbtontological foundations of Descartes' 'cogito sum' and with 
Aristotle's seminal essay on time. 
30 In this section (06) Heidegger 
sketches out something of the line he will be taking (would have taken). 
Descartes (019-20)9 and Aristotle, in his longest footnote3l are 
returned to later in the book we now havet'but further 
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discussion of Kant's schematism has to wait for Heidegger's 'thoughtful 
dialogue' with Kant in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. 
32 And Hegelq 
who is not discussed in this-section does figure prominently -, later on 
(082). 
Clearly his brief discussion of these three figures is meant as 
an example of the practice of destruction. ' But they are not randomly 
chosen. Heidegger will maintain on many occasions -'even where it verges 
on the implausible3l that all of Western thinking on time depends on 
Aristotle. And he makes this claim here too (H26). Moreover, the 
choice of Descartes is quite critical, and instructive. For despite 
the fact that Descartes clearly did reflect on the nature of the human 
subject, he did not, Heidegger claims, determine 'the meaning of the 
Being of the "sum"'. Heidegger's diagnosis is essentially that Descartes 
unquestioningly inherits a scholastic/theological notion of substance, 
which, when interpreted as 'needing no other being for its existence, 
obscures our Being-in-the-world. Descartes is the inheritor of the 
most ancient way of interpreting Being- as 'presence'. His valuation 
of certainty is the most obvious sign. Kant's impor I tance lies in the 
fact that he more than glimpsed the significance of temporality. But 
he finally failed to raise the question of the Being of the subject in 
such a way as to successfully link time and the cogito. His chapter 
on the Schematism in which he (Kant) writes of the 'obscurities deep in 
the human soul' is treated as a monument to this (brilliant) failure. 
These brief sketches of Heidegger's own (mere) indications are 
clearly of very limited value. They do, however, illustrate Heidegger's 
understanding of the history of philosophy. For Heidegger there are 
original and powerful formulations which as the congealed products of 
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thoughtinfluence every successive generation and prevent certain 
fundamental questions from being even considered let alone answered - 
particularly Aristotle's treatment of time. There are, correspondingly, 
blind receptions, failures to fully examine what one borrows from the 
tradition, and unconscious repetitions - Nietzsche- wr*Ae S of- fAn 
mv; s, ble spe. 11134 - Descartes being a case in pointv-and there are 
revolutions that finally do not fully exploit their own insights - as 
was the case with Kant. Elsewhere 
35 Heidegger insists that every new 
disclosure is accompanied by a further concealment, and necessarily. 
The midday sun that casts no shadow will always elude us. This suggests 
that philosophizing (and perhaps 'theoretical' writing in general) has 
a general structure of disclosure/concealment, so that the Ide-struction' 
of the history of ontology should indeed be thought of as exploring 
particular instances of this structure (or play) of disclosure/conceal- 
ment-in the light of the question of Being. This raises the question, 
to which we shall return later, of whether Heidegger's own enterprise 
should be thought to be included in, or to escape from this structure. 
At the end of this section (06) Heidegger makes some tantalizingly 
ambiguous remarks: 
'In any investigation in this field, where 'the thing itself 
is deeply veiled' one must take pains not to overestimate the 
results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled 
to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial 
and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer 
to the question, "What is "Being 17". We can discuss such 
possibilities seriously and with positive results only if, the 
question of Being has been reawakened and we have arrived 
at a field where we can come to terms with it in a way that 
can be controlled. ' (our emphasis) (H26-27) 
The ambiguity lies in the words we have underlined. Is it suggested 
that there is one or more primordial horizon that we are constantly on 
the verge of glimpsing, or that different, ever more primordial horizons 
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can keep opening up? On the first interpretation, the name of that 
6ne horizon is temporality (locally, -for Dasein) or time (more generally, 
for Being). On the second interpretationg the possibility arises that 
horizon-seeking thinking could even go beyond temporality and, find new 
horizons. The reference in the last sentence to 'coming to terms with 
the question of Being '... in a way that can be controlled' may perhaps 
serve as a clue, all the better for being unintended. The ideal - 
'coming to terms with a question in a controlled way' may itself 
constitute a limit of Heidegger's thought, beyond which ... 'Heidegger's 
later writing certainly suggests that the ideal of control might well 
have faded. But where Derrida can explicitly celebrate this loss of 
control 
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without handing over control to another responsible agent, 
Heidegger seems to be prepared to release control only because of a 
faith that the ends it sought will be more surely realised by letting 
language speak. A responsible language. These questions will all be 
taken up later, and with specific reference to the problem of speaking 
(and writing) of time. 
As we have said, these introductory sections (06-7) bristle with 
temporal considerations in a way absent from the earlier sections. Now 
that we have discussed the historicality of Dasein and the way it makes 
possible his destruction of the history of ontology, it is clear that 
no single separation of the concerns of 05 and 06 into 'existential' 
and 'historical', which we made provisionally, must now be discarded. 
Historicity is just the name for existential temporality in so far as 
that precedes and grounds historiology. The structure of a future- 
projective past that historicity consists in is a specification of 
general features of Dasein's temporal existence. 
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The term 'reflexivity' was used above in connection with the 
possibility that Heidegger's own writing might (and might necessarily) be 
characterised by its own lunthought'. And this section brilliantly 
demonstrates the way considerations of method are self-applicable. 
Heidegger is perhaps right to think of this as a circle. And in 
connection with historicality, something like the same structure emerges. 
(The inquiry into historicality is itself historical.... If histori- 
cality is just (a dimension of) existential temporality, and if it is 
possible (by Heidegger's 'destruction' or by some other means) to recover 
a sense of the horizonal significance of temporality then what we must 
contemplate (and indeed do more than contemplate) with amazement, is a 
kind of layering of superimposed temporalities. What Heidegger will 
call (anticipatory) resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) will exhibit just 
this intensity of overlaying. But what, in such a set of layers is 
basic? What is the position of everyday time in all this? Are 
representations of time, reflections on the course of time, to be 
excludedg integrated, or what? To answer these and other questions, 
we must now turn to the body of the text. Our plan will be to comment 
first on those features of the first half that will figure most impor- 
tantly in the temporalizing rerum of the second, developing in particular, 
the hinge of the book, the concept of care. 
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality: 
A Critical Analysis of Being and Time 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Existential Grounding 
At the beginning of Division 11 (045) Heidegger reviews the 
story so far and issues in broad outline a prospectus for the future 
course of the book. He has already provided us with a 'preparatory' 
account but 'our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay 
claim to primordiality. 1 (H233). In particular, he questions the 
primordiality of his earlier account of care. He had at one point 
called it 'the formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological 
structural whole' (H192), and more commonly Dasein's 'primordial 
structural totality'. But at the end of Division I he had asked 
... has the structural manifoldness which lies in this phenomenon 
presented us with the most primordial totality of factical Dasein's 
Being? ' (H230). Division II is based on the recognition that this 
'structural totality' of care itself rests on another horizon. 
I ... The primordial ontological basis for Dasein's 
existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality 
the articulated structural totality ofDasein's Being as 
care first becomes existentially intelligible. The 
Interpretation of the meaning of Dasein's Being cannot 
stop with this demonstration. The existential-temporal 
analysis of this entity needs to be confirmed concretely. 
We must go back and lay bare in their temporal meaning 
the ontological structures of Dasein which we have 
previously obtained. Everydayness reveals itself as a 
mode of temporality. ' (H234) 
And where Angst had disclosed the 'structural totality' of care, it 
will now be the anticipation of Death that provides care with a deeper, 
temporal dimension. 
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It is on his discussion in Division II that we must focus, but 
the enormous wealth of analysis in Division I (cf. H334), and the role 
that plays in the structure of the book, means that we must selectively 
bring forward some of this material, even where it may already be very 
familiar to the reader, and at the risk of being accused of omitting 
certain vital considerations. Our selections will be guided by our 
basic question - the possibility of a post-metaphysical understanding 
of time. 
The Deferment of the Question of Time 
The role of the existential, analytic (Division I) can be explained 
like this:,, 'there 'is' no Being independently of man's understanding of 
Being (even, if 'understanding' is never the whole story). But man's 
understanding of Being is shrouded both by the practical concerns of, 
everyday life, and by traditional philosophical interpretations of 
both man and the world. The pursuit of Being has to proceed via an 
account of man's 'existence' that discerns both his essential relatedness 
to Being, and the various levels at which that relatedness itself can be 
lived and understood. In talking about 'Dasein' rather than 'man', 
Heidegger already marks out the essentially ontological orientation of 
his analysis. He is concerned with man, but only. 2s Dasein, a particular 
kind of Being - Being-there - with a (problematic) relation to its own 
Being, with an openness to other Beings, and to the question of Being. 
Heidegger's method is hermeneutical, and phenomenological. It is 
phenomenological in the sense that it begins with what is most common 
and everyday - namely Dasein's everydayness. ' It tries first to show 
how this always has an existential dimension, and then how this 
existential dimension is to be interpreted as a relation to Being. 
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A number of tasks are being concurrently carried out in this first 
half. Heidegger is describing Dasein's everydayness via his various 
lexistentialial, he is transforming the framework of ordinary philosophical 
inquiry, and he is setting the scene-for a temporal reinterpretation of 
this same material in the second half. The bracketting out of time from 
consideration in the first half has a number of explanations.. Heidegger 
wants tobe able to single out the temporal as a distinct necessary further 
horizon for the interpretation of Being. This is most effectively done 
by going as far as he can without it. (One is reminded of the way Paul 
Klee refused to use colour until he had exhausted-the possibilities of 
black'and white. ) But it could also be said that Heidegger's first 
half already had quite enough to do without introducing the complications 
of temporality. Heidegger's first half is engaged in a transposition, 
a radical reworking of a whole tradition independent of the 'subject'. 
'the self', the world, knowledge, our relation with others, the poss- 
ibilities of self-realization, the nature of language, and of truth. 
That this can be achieved, even in a preparatory way, without discussing 
temporality, when that is a perfectly obvious surface characteristic of 
human existence, quite apart from being the ultimate horizon of our Being, 
is quite extraordinary. 
Our preliminary explanation of how this was possible is that in 
the first part, Heidegger is essentially manipulating the question of 
Dasein's Ilimit'p 'boundaries', 'spaces', inner and outer relations ... 
ways in which Dasein'sAdentity opens onto what might be thought to be 
other than it. 'Opening onto', is a radical undermining of self- 
subsistence. It is quite extraordinary how Heidegger manages to take 
positive account of the relational aspects of human being, while at 
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the same time enhancing, and not diminishing, the sense of individual 
human possibility. And this 'opening onto' is not just a fact about 
Dasein's Beingg but the most luminous dimension of it (prior to any 
discussion of temporality). Another way of putting this would be to 
say that Dasein is a being for whom there are horizons - of significance, 
of potentiality for Being, of understanding, of disclosedness. When 
Heidegger talks of Dasein's 'existence', it is surely an ex-sistence, 
a standing outside of itself, that 'opens onto' such horizons. The 
reference to horizons, a term adopted from Husserlp-converts the negative 
sense of opening onto 'what ... (is) other than it' into a positive 
feature. From the point of view of a Cartesian subject, for instance, 
the 'world' is other than it - and not even 'external' in any sense 
shared by the two relata - but ontologically alien. for Heidegger, 
man opens onto the world, Dasein is a Being-in-the-world. And a 
measure of the primordiality of this relatedness - that it does not 
leave its terms unmoved, can be found in his account of knowledge as 
a mode of Being-in-the-world, one founded on a more primitive involve- 
ment. 
An Anglo-Saxon approach to such an account would be to talk of 
knowing-how as more primitive than knowing-that. Heidegger is talking 
about knowing-that. Knowing-how would be part of a more general 
orientation to equipment, things ready-to-hand. At the same time, 
Heidegger's account of the derivativeness of 'knowing' is aimed very 
generally at the epistemological centredness of most modern and much 
traditional philosophy, more specifically at Descartes, and indirectly 
at Husserl. 
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From Husserl To Heidegger 
Whenever Heidegger discusses various possible ways of under- 
standing 'phenomenology' he makes the same move: phenomenology is 
fundamentally ontology. And it is no accident that Heidegger has 
first (010) reworked in his own terms the anti-psychologistic arguments 
Husserl offered both in his Logical Investigations, (1900), in Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science, (1911), and elsewhere. And while we axe dis- 
cussing Heidegger's implicit references to Husserl, we should note that 
the whole of his discussion of Being-in-the-world must be seen as a 
response to Husserl's insistence on the need for phenomenology to begin 
with a reduction that bracketted out the world. For Heidegger we of 
course stand back from our practical involvement in the world but only 
so as to articulate and interpret its significance, not to put it 'in 
brackets' or 'out of play'. 
We could also see Heidegger's whole discussion of Being-in-the- 
world (and of Being-ing Being-with, Being-there) as a radicalization of 
the principle of intentionality (that all consciousness is consciousness 
of something). The move from Husserl to Heidegger could be said to be 
the move from of to in (and as). With intentionality consciousness is 
opened onto its objects; with the analytic of existence consciousness 
itself is drawn back into its Being. This step back into a concern 
with Beingv with the clearest but silent reference to Husserl, can be 
seen in Oll (H52) 
'we shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences 
simply by the syncretistic activity of universal 
comparison and classification. Subjecting the 
manifold to tabulation does not ensure any actual 
understanding of what lies there before us as thus 
set in order. 
, 
If an ordering principle is genuine, 
it has its own content as a thing (Sachgehalt), 
which is never to"be found by meaýs of such an 
orderingp but is already presupposed in it. So 
if one is to put various pictures of the world in 
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order, one must have an explicit idea of 
the world as such. And if the 'world' 
itself is something constitutive for Dasein 
one must have an insight into Dasein's basic 
structures in order to treat the world-phenome- 
non conceptually. (H52) 
This is surely a critique of Ideas Chapter 1 (Fact and-Essence). 
The question of time is of course displaced. It could hardly 
be otherwise. And yet there is an interesting parallel in the place 
given to time in their respective thought. For Husserl, no less than 
for Heidegger, temporality is brought to bear on a scene that has already 
been described without reference to time (the realm of transcendental 
subjectivity, of epoche, of structures of intentionality). Husserl 
offers first a structural account of the space of intentionality, and 
then brings time in. And in each case-it then becomes clear how 
inadequate the pre-temporal account really was. One might also try 
to show that the way the scene was first set in each case determined 
the way time entered into it. For Husserl, time-consciousness is 
(initially at least) a form of intentionality, and for Heidegger, 
temporality-is a horizon, an 'opening-ontOl .... And if that, could be 
supported one might wonder whether we would not be paying a higher 
price than we realized for the methodological exclusion of the temporal 
from the first stage analysis, if it establishes the basic, framework 
within which time can make its appearance. 
Opening onto the World 
Let us look in more detail at some of the moves Heidegger makes 
in Division I. We have said that Heidegger reworks Husserl's anti- 
psychologism. The form it takes in Heidegger is an emphasis on the 
error of taking the Being of things in the world (which he calls 
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Verhandenheit (present-at-hand) as the model for understanding Dasein. 
Man is not a thing. And yet the usual ways of showing this end up 
treating man as nonetheless possessing the same sort of being. 
Heidegger brings out the status of Being-in-the-world with reference 
to two obvious truths about Dasein - that Dasein exists - that is, 
bears itself in relation to its Being, and that for Dasein, it is in 
each case (for itself) 'mine', and so grasped adequately or not 
(authentically or inauthentically). These-are both, he claims, ways 
inwhichDasein's being takes on a definite character, and as such, 
they must presuppose the domain in which such definite characters are 
possible - namely Being in the world. And the radical difference 
between this in-relation and that spatial inclusion relation found 
amidst ordinary things, 'present-at-hand', is brought out by a-list 
of ways in which we are in-the-world: 
'having to do with something, producing something, 
attending to something and looking after it, making 
use of. something, giving something up and letting 
it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, inter- 
rogating, considering, discussing, determining... I (H56). 
Heidegger says all these are characterized by concern (Besorgen). 
Perhaps the word in-volvement (literally, being rolled up in) would 
help to preserve the 'in'. Concern here is an existentiale - that 
is a fundamental dimension of Dasein's Being - one which does not come 
and go, but rather has positive and deficient modes. The chief point 
is that this. iiivolved relatedness to something other is an essential 
intrinsic feature (in-trinsic) of Dasein's Being. 'And it serves as 
an example of the way in which the metaphysical conceptualization of 
subjectivity and selfhood will be undermined. Being in the world is 
not something that an independently definable being does or has as an 
appendage, or an additional quality. Rather Dasein is exhausted by 
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such existentials, such ways in which it 'opens onto 1. 
But what, then, is 'the world'? Heidegger like Wittgenstein 
1 
draws a distinction between the world and any mere collection of things, 
including that collection by the name of nature. Again, it is 
Descartes' notion of Ires extensal that is the most obvious point of 
differentiation. For the worldhood of the world is a phenomenont 
albeit one it is easy enough to 'miss'. For we tend to focus on 
things in the world, and the world itself is not a thing in the world. 
(016). 
But this formal point does not itself reveal the phenomenon of 
worldhood, even if it encourages us to pursue it. Heidegger's key 
move is to distinguish between two modes of Being of things encountered 
in the world - presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and readiness-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit). It is through a consideration of the latter kind of 
Being that the worldhood of the world will emerge. The best examples 
of Zuhandenheit are tools, equipment, devices. And yet we do not 
group them in the fulness of their Being simply by an observational 
encounter. Our most direct contact with things ready-to-hand is to 
use them. And when we reflect on the use to which we put them, we 
realize that such uses, functions, instrumentalities are significant 
only within a whole network of such functions. This nexus of-'references 
and assignments't as he comes to call it, constitutes a background 
against which any particular function is set. When our tools break 
down - that referential context stands out. If I lock the keys inside 
the cart I cannot get into it, I cannot drive it, I cannot get to work 
on timep I cannot tell students what to read for next week etc. etc. 
'The context of equipment is lit up, not as some- 
thing never seen before, but as a totality constantly 
sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this 
totality, however, the world announces itself. ' (H75) 
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The 'world' - and we are all the time here talking of the world in its 
primary everyday sense - is theworld of our significant involvement, 
a world structured by such relations as 'towards-which', 'for the sake 
of which', 'in order to', and so on. It is in this sense of the world 
that Dasein is a Being-in-the-world. And it is such an understanding 
of the world that proceeds via the Being of things ready-to-hand, that 
allows our understanding of Dasein, at this everyday level, to escape 
reduction to the mere thinghood of the present-at-hand. 
In the sections in which Heidegger compares his own account of 
the world with that of Descartes, he brings out the way Descartes 
inherits a scholastic and theological notion of Being as substance, 
one to be understood as linked to the idea of God the lens perfectissimuml, 
which 'needs no other entity in order to be'. Such a notion of Being 
as autonomous substance is extended to characterize things in the world 
which, if not relative to God at least relative to one another, have 
this independence. It is just such an ontological autonomy and 
discreteness that Descartes relies on - but does not himself inquire 
into - in formulating the idea of a res extensa, And it is just such 
a notion that Heidegger characterizes as present-at-hand. Similarly, 
compared to Descartes' 'thinking substance', Heidegger's Dasein radiza--: - 
displaces the idea of subject as substance, as autonomous source tha---, 
leaving aside the vertical relation to God, Descartes held man to be. 
The worldliness of Dasein is the opening out of the Being of lsubstanca-, 
a radical articulation of Being as ec-sistence. 
The Topology of Selfhood 
We have suggested that the key to Division I is Heidegger's 
unfolding of the 'limits' of Dasein, the bestowal on man of horizons 
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of disclosedness (and self-disclosedness) that explode the traditional 
s pace of its topological representation, that transfer the location, 
and indeed, locatability of the limits of Dasein's Being. Confirmation 
of this insight is found in Chapter IV ('Being in the world as Being- 
with and Being-onels-self. The "they". ') A few short quotations will 
bring out something of the pattern of Heidegger's thought here. First - 
to connect up with our previous remarks: 
I ... others are encountered environmentally. This 
elemental worldly kind of encountering, which belongs 
to Dasein and is closest to it, goes so far that even 
one's own Dasein becomes something that it can itself 
proximally 'come across' only when it looks away from 
'experience' and the Icentre of its action. ' (H119) 
Dasein in its oneness, is declared decentred 
'Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, 
uses, expects, avoids - in those things environ- 
mentally. ready - to-hand with which it is proximally 
concerned. ' (119) 
'It could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just 
is not the 'I myself'. ' 
'Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which 
is closest to itself, it always says "I am this 
entity", and in the long run says this loudest when 
it is 'not' this entity. ' (H115) 
'By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me - 
those over against whom the III stands out. They 
are rather those from whom for the most part one 
does not 
, 
distinguish oneself - those among whom one 
is too., 0118) 
One of Heidegger's moves here is to undermine the privilege of 
the 'near', and to argue, as he has often done, against the truth of 
the obvioust the 'self-evident'. Self-appropriation must make the 
detour of the worldly articulation of Dasein. 
2 
The parallel with Hegel here should again not be missed. For 
Hegel, spirit has to make the 'detour' of historical articulation. And 
to the extent that the parallel holds, we can ask of Heidegger the 
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question that has often been put to Hegel: does not the need for the 
detour presuppose the validity of the destination? It is quite true 
that self-understanding, self-knowledge, and self-appropriation are not 
availabl6 to immediacy. But is there not a danger that the articula- 
tion of modes of mediation will only reinforce the value of the ideal, 
rather than put it in question. The scheme of Heidegger's thought 
is surely such as to warrant our questioning. It is because every- 
dayness is only the necessary mediation of our authenticity that the 
danger of losing oneself in it arises. But what if the very value 
of selfhood and hence authenticity itself were ultimately bound up 
with a philosophy of identity that after Heidegger we have come to call 
metaphysical? 
The other move is in a sense in the opposite direction. What 
we take to be other ('others') is in an important way not the other at 
all, but part of, or a level of my own existence. Again, the boundaries 
of Dasein are being transfigured. It is obvious that others are out 
there. What is less obvious is that at some level III am 'out there' 
too 
We are here being confined to a quasi-spatial articulation. 
It is however interesting that the same point can be, and is made in 
temporal language in this same chapter. 
"The others' already are there with us in Being-in 
-the-world. ' (H116). 
'Not only is Being towards others an autonomous$ 
irreducible relationship of Being: this relation- 
ship-0 as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's 
Beingq already is. ' (H125) 
What we have called Dasein's articulation is not something that happens 
at some point to a worldless Dasein: it is always already 
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Seeds of Doubt about Authenticity 
Heidegger's chapter on Being-with is the source of many important 
formulations. In particular, he develops the idea of the inauthentic 
'they'-self which identifies itself with that dimension of Dasein which 
we have called 'Being-with' and treats this not as the basis for 
developing either an authentic selfhood, or an authentic relationship 
to others (see authentic solicitude) but rather treats it as a limit. 
Inauthentically, Dasein does what 'one' does. And yet Being-with in 
principle sets no such limits. To speak a public language is merely 
a necessary condition for poetry, not an obstacle to it. But it is 
a necessary condition. And it is vital to remind ourselves that 
authenticity cannot be simply opposed to everydayness, but only to that 
mode of Being that takes everydayness to be the standard. Close to the 
end of the chapterp Heidegger puts it like this: 
'Authentic Being-one's-self does not rest upon an 
exceptional condition of the subject, a condition 
that has been detached from the 'they'; it is 
rather an existential modification of the 'they' 
- of the 'they' as an essential existentiale. 1 (H130) 
This general principle - that authenticity modifies everydayness, rather 
than breaking with it altogether - will be important for us later when 
we discuss what 'authentic temporality' could consist in. Clearly it 
will be a modification of everyday time, not a denial of it. We have 
already met the idea of authenticity in Heidegger's Introduction - where 
he says that Dasein can either choose itself or lose itself. It is 
fashionable among some sophisticated readers of Heidegger to pass over 
the concept of authenticity. Doesn't Heidegger himself largely drop 
the term after, Being and Time? * But this passing-over is a mistake. 
If there are difficulties with the term, they are difficulties that 
penetrate Heidegger's philosophy more generally. If Heidegger drops 
leigentlichheit' we should not miss the return of the leigen' in 
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lereignis'. To leave aside the concept of authenticity would be to 
fail to confront what can be seen as a central issue for a modern 
reading of Heidegger - whether his thought aims at a phenomenological 
restoration of such values as identity, totality, and 'presence', 
or, on the contrary, radically puts them in question. And there is 
a third position - which is that he makes this question in some way 
undecidable. We shall bear these questions in mind as we proceed, 
but the question of authenticity proper must await the temporal 
dimension of Division II. (See esp. our 016,29 below. ) At the same 
time, however, we should realize that the question of how we judge 
Heidegger's treatment of time and temporality may well depend on just 
such a question about the 'fundamental tendency' of Heidegger's thought. 
Is existential time just a way of taming 'the time that destroys' by 
finding secular meaning in death ... ? (See below 023). 
Care and Disclosedness: Intimations of Temporality 
'Care' - what we have called the hinge of the book -is the subject 
of Chapter VI. The question of Dasein's 'wholeness' -a question that 
guides his discussion from the outset - is one to which we shall be 
giving close scrutiny. But an essential final step in articulating 
Dasein's Being-in is to be found in Heidegger's discussion of moods and 
of understanding -two distinct modes of the existential constitution of 
Dasein's 'there', that is of Dasein's manner of Being as disclosure. 
We are not engaged in summary, and we shall focus on particular features 
of these two analyses: (1) the way 'moods' can reveal Dasein 'as a whole' 
in a special way; (2) the proto-temporality of understanding. 
'Moods' 0 understood as ways of being attuned, and so not just 
good or bad moods as we usually think of them, are revealing both for 
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Dasein and for the philosopher. They are said to disclose to each of 
us, at the time, ourselves as-a-whole in the way that no attempt at a 
comprehensive self-knowledge could do. ('The mood has already 
disclosed Being-in-the-world as a whole... I (H137). ) Through moods 
we do not learn facts about ourselves, rather Dasein learns 'that it is 
and has to be'. This is an existential disclosure of our thrownness. 
It achieves a kind of self-confrontation that knowledge cannot. More- 
over the philosopher reflects on the fact that Dasein turns away from 
its moods so that time is an essential concealment in this disclosure. 
Heidegger's analysis of Befindlichkeit is denser and at points 
-seems 
overdone, even acknowledging the genuine revolutionary insight on which 
it is based. If we can hold them apart, Heidegger adds to the dis- 
closing of thrownness that states of mind also provide a 'current dis- 
closing' of 'Being-in-the-world-as-a-wholel and opens up the possibility 
of circumspective concern, the awareness that things matter to us. As 
he will say about 'being in the truth', the possibility of going wrong 
here is not an objection to the analysis. _What 
is at stake is, if-you 
like, the possibility of a certain shape, modality, or character of 
disclosednessp not the accuracy or otherwise of its content. 
If Befindlichkeit is one, understanding is the other existential 
structure in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. We 
might say - we must postpone further discussion until we consider the 
disclosive relation between Angst and Sorge - that Heidegger's account 
of Befindlichkeit offers a perfect example of the problem of judging 
whether the elaboration of an existential sense of being-a-whole allows 
him to escape the charge of taking the integrity of Dasein for granted, 
as a telos. The concept of de-severance (Entfernung) (discussed eg. 
in his 023) is another place at which this question can be raised. A 
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decision on that question - should it prove possible - could give a 
firm direction to our interpretation of his general account of time. 
Although that question is strictly speaking excluded from this Division, 
in Heidegger's discussion of Understanding (and interpretation and 
discourse) temporal structures are already pressing forward. What 
is so interesting about this discussion of course is that the subject 
of understanding has direct reflexive application to the method of 
phenomenology itself and hence to the method being pursued in this 
book (including this very section on Understanding). Something like 
the model of understanding he will offer us was simply laid out for 
acceptance right at the outset in his analysis of the structure of the 
question (of Being). The ideas of disclosure, phenomenology as 'letting 
show itself19 and the hermeneutic circle benignly conspire to allow 
this. 
It has often been said that moral responsibility rests on one's 
ability to have acted otherwise than one did. Without freedom no praise 
or blame makes sense. We do not censure the hungry mosquito. Heidegger's 
account of authenticity, while not a moral concept, shares a structurally 
parallel relationship with the concepts of understanding and possibility, 
or being able to be (Seinkonnen). It is only because we are beings 
for whom both ordinary (ontic) possibilities and possibilities for Being 
are intrinsic features, that understanding and authenticity are possible. 
The notion of 'possibility' (being-able-to... ) used here is quite 
central to our grasp of the way Heidegger's account of Dasein transcends 
that of any being merely present-at-hand, and begins to make it clear 
how any idea of Dasein's other 'presence', or living in the present, 
would have to be radically distinct from the presentness of, say, a stone, 
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or a machine, or an ant. To be sure a difference in man's way of 
being-present has been clear to all philosophers who took memory, 
expectation, imagination and self-consciousness seriously. The thought 
that one's Being could be adequately tied down to a single-dimensional 
bodily/perceptual being present at an instant is not one that withstands 
a moment's scrutiny. But the difficulty remains that the attempts to 
expound the way these 'faculties' expand our 'presence' have typically 
taken for granted the categories devised for our understanding of 
things. Heidegger's sustained effort in Being and Time is devoted to 
the attempt to avoid this. His discussion of 'possibility is a case 
in point. Certain positive features of Heidegger's concept - that 
possibility is intrinsic to Dasein, and that-it precedes reflection 
on what its possibilities are - demand its clear separation from (a) 
empty logical possibilities, (b) mere factual possibility, and (c) 
Aristotelian potentiality. Understanding, in Heidegger's sense, has 
as its object 'Being-possible' - or a being for whom possibility is an 
intrinsic feature. But we know that for Heidegger there are at least 
two different ways of Being - authentic and inauthentic, as well as 
(ontically) various degrees of lucidity about our involvements with the 
world and relations with others. Understanding and possibility are 
really to be thought of here not as 'achievement' or 'success' - words, 
but as dimensions - existentials - that point to a manner in which 
Dasein is to be elucidated. Heidegger speaks later of their 
"transcendental $generality"' (H199). This point can be made over 
and over again in respect of Heidegger's existentials. The same must 
be said, for example, of both disclosure and truth - each is a dimension 
in which Dasein's Being is-worked outnot the name for an achievement 
in itself. Heidegger's account is ontological in that he determines 
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the dimensions within which subsequent ontic differentiations can be 
made. 
He explains the relation between understanding and possibility 
in terms of 'projection' (Entwurf). It is not clear whether anything 
essentially new is added by this concept. It has a range of 'meanings' 
which deepen our grasp of the inherent towardness of Dasein's Being. 
As 'thrown toward' it links up-with Ithrownness' in emphasizing that we 
are always already in this state, that-it precedes any explicit forward 
planning. (In this combination of an already and a forward the 
(ultimately temporal) structure of care begins to be articulated. ) 
Macquarrie and Robinson 
3 
suggest the geometrical sense (of which perhaps 
Mercator's projection of the surface of the globe is the most, celebrated). 
'Projection' in this sense means the way Dasein's Being is mapped onto 
its possibilities. 
Understanding in general is understood in terms of projection. 
And the notion of 'projective understanding' is used by Heidegger as a 
way of rethinking the idea of 'sight', which he links, at the same time, 
to 'disclosure', and 'clearedness'. The force of this is to provide 
a way of deepening our understanding of the conditions on which any kind 
of seeing must rest. And this allows him, almost en, passant, to mark- 
out as sharply as he possibly could, the-basic difference between 
existential and. Husserlian phenomenology. As we saw in the last 
chapter, Husserl's understanding of time is limited in principle (and 
so for him not limited at all) to what pure intuition reveals. For 
Heidegger both pure intuition (Anschauen) and the 'intuition of 
essences' (Wesensschau) are deprived of their methodological priority 
by being 'grounded in existential understanding' (H147). ' 
Understanding is not, however, itself devoid of possibilities, 
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which get developed in and by interpretation. What is tacit in 
understanding is made explicit in interpretation. But this is 
perhaps misleading. While Being and Time is itself a work of inter- 
pretation, it is not actually necessary for interpretation to take a 
linguistic form. For Heidegger the move from understanding to 
interpretation is one in which the 'as' structure appears. And while 
, 
this is clearly accomplished in linguistically explicit forms of 
interpretation, it can equally be accomplished by the move from an 
understanding engaged in the world to the level of 'seeing-as'.. 
'The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that 
is understood. ' (H149). 
It must be admitted, it is in the end difficult to precisely 
locate the point at which the 'as'-structure, for Heidegger, begins. 
He offers an account of the kind of presuppositionless seeing on which 
science is often supposed to depend, which argues (as he has argued 
earlier when discussing the 'present-at-hand') that such seeing is a 
very considerable achievement - being a privative derivation from seeing- 
as. And as such, of course, it does not have the primitive status 
it claims it needs. Many philosophers of science (eg. Popper, Hanson, 
Feyerabend) now agree that the foundationalism that inspires this appeal 
to a presuppositionless seeing is not only impossible, but undesirable 
and (for Feyerabend) positively dangerous. The fact that they do not 
howevert typically, call for an existential analytic to replace it, does 
not mean that this is not called for. 
The basis for this claim about the primacy of the 'as-structure, 
is of course Heidegger's claim about the primacy of our involvement in 
a world of things ready to hand. Even if not every item in the world 
is some-thing we use as a tool, everything is encountered in the light 
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of its significance to us - even in IdeficientmOckas?. Things that 
baffle us may be very important. Things we find very significant 
may be repressed etc.... 'An interpretation', Heidegger sums up, 
'is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something present to 
ust (H150). But Heidegger is prepared to go further, and articulate 
the fore-structure of the 'as' of interpretation. His three levels 
have been translated as fore-having (Vorhabe), fore-sight (Vorsicht) 
and fore-conception (Vorgriff), which seems to indicate that the various 
different levels of explicitness all cumulatively contribute to the 
fore-structure of interpretation. We are not just dealing here with 
'pre-supposition', but with an articulated array of levels of lalreadyness'. 
Heidegger goes on to defend the 'circularity' of interpretationt 
which seems to deliver only what it has already taken for granted. 
Understanding requires the circle. There can be no question of trying 
to avoid the circle, rather what matters is 'to come into it in the 
right way' (H153). For 'In the circle is hidden a positive possibility 
of the most primordial kind of knowing. ' (H153) 
It is in this same pursuit of primordial existential grounding that 
Heidegger offers us readings of 'assertion' (as derived from interpreta- 
tion and understanding) and of discourse - which latter, it turns out, 
is existentially on a par with state of mind and understanding. 
Discourse is understood as the significant articulation of the intelli- 
gibility of Being in the world. In the course of these accounts of 
assertion and discourses the possibility of thinking of language as 
having a fundamental logical structure is ruled out by understanding 
logositself as rooted in Dasein's existential analytic. What it 
suggests, and is meant to suggest, of course, is that all structures 
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and all' representations are to be so understoodt including the structures 
of time. 
Chapter 5 concludes with an account of our everyday being there - 
in such fornras idle talk (Gerede), curiosity and ambiguity. These 
together point to an important aspect of Dasein's everyday Being - 
that Dasein is for the most part alongside and absorbed in its world. 
He calls this, quite neutrally, 'falling' (Verfallen). - and'distinguishest 
very interestinglyt a, whole range of ways in which we hide from our- 
selves, and flirt with the possibility of authenticity that fallen 
everydayness conceals (temptation, tranquillizing, alienation, and 
entanglement). 
Wholeness and Method 
So far in this Division, Heidegger has been spelling out in a 
reasonably ordered way the most general lexistentials' of Dasein's 
Being-in-the-world, filling these in with more specific characteristics. 
But the moment of analysis is counterbalanced by one of synthesis, and 
Heidegger begins his chapter on Care with the section heading 035 The 
Question of the Primordial Totality of Dasein's Structural Whole. 
The first sentence says it all - "Being-in-the-world is a structure 
which is primordially and constantly whole. " Why does Heidegger put 
so much weight on this wholeness? It is, after all, an issue that 
repeatedly recurs in the book. A preliminary answer would be this: 
that Heidegger has ventured a radicalizing articulation of man, of the 
self (as Dasein) which does away with any basis for unity there might 
previously have been, such as the permanence of a substance, or some 
cluster of features (grasped as present-at-hand). In opening man onto 
the worlds Heidegger has risked loss of identity, because he has dissolved 
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the traditional limits (eg. simple self-presence). Moreover, in the 
account he has given, he has continually stressed that Dasein can exist 
in two different ways - inauthentically and authentically, and he has 
argued'for 'possibility' as an intrinsic feature of Dasein's being. 
At every turng we might say, identity in any traditional sense is harder 
and harder to credit. 
And yet as the wealth of his analyses piles up, it is easy to 
see how the demand for an understanding of Dasein as a whole can arise. 
Through his analysis of care, and then Being-towards-death, Heidegger 
will supply an answer to the question of 'the primordial totality of 
Dasein's structural whole'. What we have to ask ourselves, however, 
is on what ground this projection of wholeness is based. 
Heidegger is right to suppose that if Dasein is to exhibit a 
'structural wholeness' it must be of a somewhat original constitution. 
But that Dasein should have such wholeness, and what the source or 
point of that assumption might be is still unclear. Heidegger assumes 
that as a work of interpretation he is merely bringing out structures 
latent in Dasein's (understanding) existence. But might these not be 
exigencies of interpretation quite alien to the ground from which they 
arise? To put the question another way - might it not be that the demand 
for an account of Dasein in its wholeness, is the demand that a certain 
sort of account makes -a certain rather traditional account perhaps - 
rather than a demand that actually articulates the existence it inter- 
prets? Were that so, we would be at least as much interested in 
investigating the existential basis of this demand (inauthentic turning 
away fromilnitude? ) as trying to satisfy it. Much of course will rest 
on our assessment of his account of death, but before that we have out- 
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lined a series of questions through which we can read his chapter on 
Care, which, with his famous disquisition on Truth (044), brings 
Division I to its end. . 
A clue to the nature of this demand comes early on (039), 'If the 
existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to 
its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its 
provisional task of exhibiting Dasein's Being, it must seek for one of 
the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure 
- one that lies in Dasein itself. The way of disclosure in which Dasein 
brings itself, before itself must be such that, in it Dasein becomes 
accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With what is thus dis- 
closed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to 
light in an elemental way. ' 
So the requirement, that Dasein's Being be able to be 'simplified' 
is one that stems from the role Heidegger has given to the existential 
analytic in approaching 'the question of the meaning of Being in 
general'. There is no a priori guarantee that this can be accomplished. 
('Can we succeed in grasping this structural whole of Dasein's everyday- 
ness in its totality? ' (H181)). But given the premise that 'an under- 
standing of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure' it seems 
plausible to look for a privileged moment of such understanding. 
Heidegger's difficulty is that he has had to employ the scaffolding of 
the language of structure to organize the complex relationships between 
the various primordial features of Dasein's existence he has distinguished, 
and to prevent them from being a mere heap of insights.. And yet he 
denies that this structural approach actually yields a totality in its 
own right. Why? I ... the totality of the structural whole is not to 
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be reached by building it up out of elements. For this we would 
need an architect's plan. ' (H181) 
This is ambiguous. It could mean that as Dasein is not the 
product of design, its 'totality' will not be able to be found by 
drawing up such a ground-plan - this would be to confuse a representation 
of totality with the totality itself. Or it could mean that without 
such a plan we would never be -able to make sense of the complex. relations 
between the parts. It is pretty clear as he continues that Heidegger 
is opting for a version of the first alternative. A representation of 
Dasein as a structural whole is not an exhibition of his, Being. What 
is needed is 'a single, primordially unitary phenomenon which is already 
in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation 
for each structural item in its structural possibility. ' 
The Hinge of Care 
The simplification Heidegger seeks is found in care, which is 
revealed through Angst. Care, as will soon be apparent, has a triadic 
structure that waits only for the kiss of Division II for its temporal 
significance to be made explicit. The importance of this structural 
condensation of the existential analytic' into the structure of Care via 
a fundamentally disclosive experience (Angst) is that it makes it possible 
for Heidegger already within the covers of Being and Time explicitly to 
move away from 'the special task of an existentially a priori anthropology, 
(H183). The structural condensation of Care, achieved via the primordial 
disclosure of Angst, prepares the way for the absorption of that. structure 
into a dimension that precedes all structure and representation - namely 
temporality. - Care itself is the hinge on which the thoughtful progress 
of the book turns. 
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Put very simply, the experience of Angst does not (as does fear) 
have an object in any ordinary sense; rather it Idisclosesl primordially 
and directly, the world as world' (H187). The importance of Angst 
for Heidegger lies in his ontological interpretation of it. It puts 
in question our Being in the world, renders us lunheimlichl, forces us 
to face our potentiality-for-Being. If Angst reveals 'Nothing', it is 
as 'no-thing' - nothing in particular - that is, our Being in the world. 
And most important, Angst distinctively reveals to us our individual 
Being-in-the-world. - 
How does Angst play the role of revealing the structure of Care? 
Angst, we suppose, is a 'single' mood. But, in his account of it, 
Heidegger, not implausibly, had displayed its nature on three axes: 
'Angst as. a state of mind is a way of Being-in-the 
-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety 
is thrown Being-in-the-world, that which we have 
anxiety about is our potentiality'for Being-in-the 
-world. ' (H191) 
This can be abbreviated further: 
'The fundamental ontological characteristics of 
this entity are existentiality, factivity, and 
Being-fallen. ' (H191) 
Shortly afterwards, this gets re-expanded in a different formula 
'The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being 
-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (entities 
encountered within the world). This Being fills in 
the signification of the term 'Care' (Sorge)' (H192). 
Clearly any term which is to bear the weight carried by 'Care' 
will have difficulty in shaking off all the lontic' senses it brings to 
mind. In particular, despite the value he places on anxiety (Angst) he 
does not intend that 'Care' be understood in such a way. Care is 
understood, as he says 'in a purely ontologico-existential manner., 
This does allow him to distinguish between our 'care' for the different 
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kinds of entities in the world - our 'concern' for the ready-to-hand, 
and our 'solicitude' for others. But it is hard to find any ontic 
paraphrase of the concept of care in Heidegger's discussion. As a 
way of emphasizing its ontological sense, this is clearly understandable, 
but it raises the question of why the word 'care' should be used'in the 
first place. Is 'Care' just a convenient label for the structure 
(ahead/alongside/already... ) already mentioned, or is that structure an 
analysis of the ontological concept of care? 
It could be replied that the whole point of the discussion of 
Angst was to give us access to care itself as what Angst disclosively 
brings into focus. But Heidegger's interpretation of Angst is surely 
not conclusive. That it is possible to draw out the features he does 
draw out is clear. But whether they are the only features, or the 
ones that some other interest would have focussed upon - that remains 
far from clear. The move from the interpretation of Angst to the 
structure of Care seems somewhat preordained. And when it turns out 
that the structure of care can be given an all too easy temporal reading, 
we need not think of this as 'confirmation' of anything except Heidegger's 
own prescience. 
The second difficulty that arises, out of trying to understand the 
meaning of care while maintaining its ontological significance, and 
radically eschewing its ordinary ontic significance is that this is 
surely an impossible task. The word is chosen because, of its everyday 
meaning (with the etymological connection between Sorge/Besorge helping). 
Does not this suggest a radical inverse dependence of the ontological 
on the ontical, one which Heidegger would find disturbing? 
In Being and Time it seems that Heidegger is content to keep the 
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senses apart rather than to pursue the difficulties involved in 
articulating their inter-relationship. . Elsewhere however (eg. in Letter 
on Humanism and his essay Language) he explicitly refuses to describe his 
use of certain apparently ontic terms as metaphorical (language is the 
4 
house of Being, the flower of the mouth). The suggestion is that the 
relationship of one-way transference of meaning (from ontic to onto- 
logical) belies the fact that the ordinary ontic meaning of a word may 
well be open to a renewal, or revitalizing, one that an ontological 
transposition can provide. Heidegger suggests that understanding 
language as 'the house of Being' might deepen our sense of 'house', 
'dwelling', etc. Another way of putting this would be to say that 
language has an ontological dimension even when being used ontically, 
even if that may often be unapparent, concealed. The difficulty with 
this position is that the possibility of a retroactive illumination of 
a literal sense by a metaphorical one can be accommodated without 
giving the relationship an ontic/ontological status. And this 'ordinary' 
retroactive illumination might well be enough to explain the effect 
Heidegger describes. 'House' could still be a metaphor. 
What about the case of 'care'? Why does Heidegger choose such 
a word, rather than opt for some emptier, abstract term? It is no 
accidentt I think, that the terms with which he compares 'care, - 
unfavourably for that term - are 'willing' and 'living' - which could 
respectively be traced back to Nietzsche/Schopenhauer and to Dilthey. 
'Care' is a competitor in a field of other candidates for the title of 
'legitimate successor to the epistemological paradigm', that is to 
'knowing'. He has already argued for knowing as merely one mode of 
Being in the world, among others. Here (H194f) he argues that willing, 
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when we consider it ontologically, exhibits the structure of care. 
'In willing,. an entity which is understood - that is, 
one which has been projected upon its possibility - 
getsseized upon, either as something with which one 
may concern oneself, or as something which is to be 
brought into its Being through 'solicitude". 
He then articulates the structure of this a priori possibility in terms 
5 
that allow him to conclude that 'In the phenomenon of willing, -the 
underlying totality of care shows through. ' And this same form of 
dependence is claimed for ordinary lontic' care too. ("The existential 
condition for the possibility of 'the cares of life' and 'devotedness', 
must be conceivedýas care, in a sense which is primordial, that is onto- 
logical. ") (H199) 
We have alluded already to Heidegger's justifying references to 
the 'transcendental "generality" of care, and to the (apparent) 
'emptiness' and 'generality' of such descriptions. But even if one 
accepts as persuasivep illuminating, etc. his structural analysis here, 
there is a sense in which the abstractness is not just the price one has 
to pay for a priori virtue, but is a sign of incompleteness. There is 
a sense in which one needs a further story to be told about why there are 
just these three factors (existentiality, facticity, falling... ), a 
story yet to be told. 
In the face of this urgency, the discussions of reality and truth 
seem almost distractions. Heidegger's discussion of truth by its very 
brilliance, interrupts the course of the book, delays the moment of 
time. If it has a logical place here in the book, we can find it in 
the way the word Idisclosedness' keeps 'appearing' in the analysis of 
care.. If we apply the idea of trying to. 'preserve the force of the 
most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself' to the Greek word 
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X/ 
oyo; from which the traditional philosophical understanding of truth 
aerivest we can trace back a series of steps (through uncoveredness, 
and uncovering) to Dasein's disclosedness as 'the most primordial - 
phenomenon of truth'., (With this existential grounding of truth we 
can say that 'Dasein is in the truth'. ) -And Heidegger can then show 
(via disclosedness) the intimate relation between truth and care. 
We have said that there is, a certain delay here (in the last four 
sections of Division I). At the end of 041, Heidegger is already 
pointing forward, playing with the moment at which structure becomes 
time, a moment caught in the word 'articulated' (gegliedert) which 
deserves a special place in philosophy. 
I In def ining "care" as "Being-ahead-of -oneself -in-Being 
-already-in... - as Being-alongside ... ** we have made it 
plain that even this phenomenon is, in itself, still 
structurally articulated. But is this not a phenomenal 
symptom that we must pursue the ontological question even 
further until we can exhibit a still more primordial 
phenomenon which provides the ontological support for the 
unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of 
care? ' (H196) 
For all the artifice involved in withholding the temporal, Heidegger 
has succeeded in giving an-account of the fundamental structure of - 
Dasein's Being which is both plausible and yet deficient, hugely so. 
Clearly the art has-been to anticipate in structural form a triad, 
susceptible of temporal transformation. - But before we proceed to the 
gratification and fulfillment of Division'II there is one question that 
ought at least be adumbrated here, even if it must return when we discuss 
Heidegger's own assessment of Being and Time -a single question even, if 
it occupies a number of sentences. Do we really understand what is 
meant by an existential grounding? , By treating-Dasein's existence as 
capable of serving transcendental functions? Is it (and if not does it 
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matter? ) really possible in principle to pin down the logical inter- 
r elationship between the multiple claims to primordiality (even being 
Imore primordial')? How satisfactory is the logic of deficient modes - 
which has the consequence that phenomena which seem to have become 
detached from their proper ground are actually (though negatively) 
attached? (Might this not be an instance of an ill-advised conversion 
of a powerful interpretive schema into an a priori assumption? ) Is 
there not a bad circularity involved here in that by assuming the 
universal possibility of grounding one convinces oneself that apparent 
exceptions are deficient modes and thus misses the possibility that 
groundedness itself might be a limited phenomenon. We would recall 
the suggestions in our introduction to Heidegger, that it is the very 
impossibility of a primordial ground that incites a multiplicity of 
cross-mappings, translations, etc. Vertical impossibility generates 
horizontal diversity. 
our concern will be for our understanding of time. The question 
we will try to put to Heidegger is this: is it not possible for the 
existential grounding of our ordinary understanding of time to over- 
estimate its own significance - to suppose that there is one ordinary 
concept of time already seems contentious. And does it not run the 
risk that all such transformations take - of being silently determined 
by the shape of what it overcomes? Finally, and this is meant as a 
hint of where our doubts about transcendental grounding lie, is it 
really possible to exclude representation from, our fundamental account 
of existence? Heidegger is much more sensitive to the positive status 
of the everyday than some of his critics suggest, but it remains true 
that if an authentic modification of everydayness is possible, it would, 
as I understand it involve an exclusion of representation. In 
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particular it would exclude representations of time from any role in 
our understanding of authentic temporality. Is this in fact or in 
principle possible? 
II. Heidegger's Treatment of Time and Temporality: 
A Critical Analysis of Being and Time 
CHAPTER TWO 
Death, Resoluteness and Care 
The Temporal Reworking 
Heidegger never misses the opportunity to make methodological 
remarks. The ease with which his contemporary readers drew merely 
'anthropological' conclusions from his work fully justifies this practice. 
No less does the revolutionary nature of his project. At critical points 
he must remind us - the point of all this existential analytic is to 
answer the question of the meaning of Being. It is necessary to go 
through this existential stage, because 
'to lay bare the horizon within which something 
like Being in general becomes intelligible, is 
tantamount to clarifying the possibility of 
having any understanding of Being at all - an 
understanding which itself belongs to the constitu- 
tion of the entity called Dasein. 1 (H231). 
In each of these methodological discourses, Heidegger channels our 
questioning in the right direction - towards the ontological, towards, " 
the primordial, and towards a conception of the question that progressively 
incorporates the insights already obtained. This last feature is one 
of the most impressive of the book, one which gives it unusual unity 
and penetration. It happens that we find in 046 a prime example of 
this textual roll-on. 
We spoke of the over abstractness of the structure of Care, the 
felt need for another 'story' which would make sense of this structure 
(why three parts? ). Heidegger begins his second Division by a 
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clarification of the ultimate question (the question of Being) and by 
a demonstration that our account of Dasein is so far inadequate. And 
he does so (1) by reminding us that the ontological interpretation in 
which he is engaged is a species of interpretation and as such subject 
to its fore-structure (fore-having, for-sight, and fore-conception) and 
hence to the demand that this be clarified as far as possible (2) by 
insisting that more needs to be done on this score. 
Consider 'fore-sight'. In treating existence as potentiality-for 
-Being, we concentrated on its necessary but incomplete inauthentic form. 
And how can we claim 'fore-having' without an assurance that we have 
grasped Dasein in its wholeness? We may have supposed that 'Care' had 
provided us with an account, of Dasein's Being as a whole, but surely 
when we consider Dasein from the everyday temporal point of view, we 
must question this. Indeed as Dasein is never complete until it ceases 
to be Dasein, as it almost seems to be defined by an incompleteness 
(potentiality for Being), one might wonder 'whether "having" the whole 
entity is attainable at all' and hence whether a primordial interpreta- 
tion of Dasein is not rendered impossible by the very nature of its Being. 
Heidegger is using the standard of 'wholeness' as a vantage point from 
which to point to deficie=6 in the story so far. 
'If the Interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become 
primordial as a foundation for working out the basic 
question of ontology, then it must first have brought, 
to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its 
possibility of authenticity and totality. ' (H233). 
It is at this point that Heidegger's concern with death is brought into 
focus. The argument goes like this: if Dasein is to be grasped as a 
whole then we have to come to some understanding of death such that the 
temporal incompleteness of a living Dasein does not prevent us from 
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grasping its Being-as-a-whole. The basic move is to argue that death 
is significant for Dasein only in his Being-towards-death, and far 
from sabotaging the possibility of wholeness, this serves, albeit 
peculiarlyg to constitute it. 
Heidegger's discussion of death, most particularly as it appears 
in the first chapter of Division II, is offered asan answer to the 
question of how we can understand Dasein 'as a whole', and that question 
is critical because it is, for Heidegger, a precondition of being able 
to move from the existential analytic (Division I) to the ontological 
account proper (Division II onwards) that we have such an understanding. 
The explanation for this concern for Dasein's wholeness may be, 
as I have suggested, that Heidegger's approach to understanding man's 
Being has been from the beginning, in some sense, dispersive, so that 
what metaphysics could solve at the beginning (with eg. the idea of a 
self-identical substance) is continually postponed while its solution 
becomes more and more difficult to envisage. All our everyday models 
of wholeness have been taken away from us. (And yet Dasein cannot* 
surely just be a fragmental dispersion, scudding clouds in the sky? ) 
It might also be said that without something like a complete and full 
account of Dasein, there can be no adequate account of Being, given 
that Being only is through Dasein's understanding and our understanding 
of the-rests on a complete understanding of Dasein. This argument seems 
less persuasive; perhaps it doesn't carry the same urgency as Heidegger's 
continued insistence would require. And perhaps too, it is possible to 
think of a complete account that did not rest on Dasein's wholeness. 
one can have a complete archaeological inventory of the remains of an 
old building without that giving us an understanding of the building in 
I 
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its 'wholeness'. 
There is perhaps another explanation for Heidegger's repeated 
insistence on our getting a grip on Dasein-as-a-whole - which is that 
such a question does indeed force us to confront the. very peculiarity 
of Dasein's Being, in comparison to other modes of Being. And it allows 
him to integrate a considerable number of themes (possibility, care, 
finitude, nothingness, anxiety... ) in the question of death. It supplies 
the central thrust for Heidegger's discussion of death. 
In order genuinely to invert theorder of explanation, one would 
have to show that Heidegger for quite independent reasons wanted to 
give death (and our authentic response to it) a central, role, and then 
prepared the ground for it by inventing or at least emphasizing, the 
question of Dasein's 'wholeness'. It is hard to see how to do this 
for it is. clear that the capacity of 'death' to focus many of the issues 
he needs to focus in Division II is quite genuine, and these issues are 
a logical progression from those of Division I. Nonetheless we can and 
must bear in mind that-the question of wholeness might just be a residual 
question, one that has been left over from metaphysics, and which it is 
not the business of a fundamental ontology (let alone anything) after, 
, that) to consider. Coupled with that is the key question that will 
guide our analysis of his account of death - is it a subtle form of the 
, appropriation of death'? or is it, in fact, the site of the most far- 
reaching renunciation of the value of presence In fact as we shall 
show, it is almost impossible to subject Heidegger to this either/or. 
We shall instead offer what might be called, after Derrida, a 'double 
reading'. 
Heidegger's Chapter I Division II is entitled "Dasein's Possibility 
of Being-as-a-whole, and Being-towards-Death". It has been the source 
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of much misunderstanding of Heidegger's philosophy-in general and of 
S erious disagreements. Even now, with the benefit of these various 
discussionst it is possible to misunderstand what Heidegger is saying, 
and yet it is not, in essence, very'difficult. Whether it is right 
or not is another matter.. 
The key to Heidegger's discussion of death lies in the initial, 
move he makes to resolve the problems Dasein's Being in time and 
towards death seems to pose for the project of understanding Dasein's 
'Being-as-a-wholel. The problem is simple. From the point of*view 
of how much of our allotted time-we have eaten up, Dasein is always 
either (a) incomplete (still living, not'yet dead) or (b) dead (and no 
longer Dasein). How can Dasein be a whole when he is always, in fact, 
'becoming'? The move Heidegger makes is to remind us that what this 
means is that for Dasein death affects us existentially - that is, it 
is in our Being-towards-death that differences will be found. The 
question then becomes - how can we find a basis for Dasein's wholeness 
in Being-towards-death? 
Heidegger's central move'here is to convert a temporal limit 
into an existential/ontological one. My death is at'one level an 
event, and from an external point of view it can be dated, perhaps 
commemorated etc. When I say it lisl, an event, I mean that I can 
envisage it as happening, as about to happen , as having happened etc. 
This way of thinking about death is very important for Heidegger in 
that it (potentially) characterizes our everyday way of thinking of 
death. Opposed to it is the idea of death as 'possibility'. This 
may seem odd. Surely we can conjoin the ideas of 'possibility"and 
'event'. Do not insurance companies deal precisely with 'possible 
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events"'ý Is that not what lies behind many of the safety precautions 
we take lifejackets on boats, seat belts in cars, helmets on motor- 
cycles just in case a certain possibility (an accident) should ý 
materialize, and to ward off another possibility (our accidental death)? 
Such a way of thinking of death as a possibility is however (severely) 
limited. It presents death as an event, in a series of events of which 
it is the conclusion. Such a 'possibility' is always understood as a 
future actuality. It always and essentially gets (or could get)ýcashed 
out as something present, something actual. However, for Dasein, death 
as possibility has another meaning, and it is a meaning that is only in 
part oriented to the future. Death is primarily understood by Heidegger 
as the possibility of my non-Being - where 1possibility'As not contrasted 
with necessity or probability.. To live with a grasp of one's mortality, 
to be a Being-towards-death is to grasp in as full a way as possible 
that one's existentialityg one's potentiality-for-Being, is only fully 
disclosed in the light of the, possibility of one having no (more) 
possibilities. To say that death is possible 'at any, timel is not simply 
to say that one never knows. when one will die, but that human life itself 
in its every instance derives its fullest significance from its contingency 
I need not be at all. 
What is the status of the future here? For Heidegger, the future 
is the privileged ecstasis, and it is so because of the role that 
'possibility' and 'potentiality-for-Being' play in the distinctive 
constitution of Dasein's Being. And if the inauthentic attitude to 
death (which he calls 'Erwarten' (expecting)) treats it as a future 
event, the authentic attitude cannot deny its futurity. But what is 
the future? Existentially, and that is the perspective from which 
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Heidegger takes his orientation, the future is significant as the 
dimension in which our potentiality-for-Being is exercised. And it 
looks very much as though Heidegger understands the future via the 
notion of possibility. The authentic orientation to death he calls 
anticipation, which does not treat it as an event, but rather is receptive 
(in anxiety) to what death means for my potentiality for Being. 
It has been suggested 
2 in the quite proper cause of stressing 
the continuity of Heidegger's thought, that the central idea of his 
treatment of death already in Being and Time is a kind of Gelassenheit 
3_ 
a letting-be. Certainly many of Heidegger's sections here are devoted 
to releasing death from the grip of representative, thingly thinking. 
But surely one needs a word that captures the intensification that an 
authentic Being-towards-death is clearly meant to bring about. More- 
over, death does not have any Being in its own right; it is irrevocably 
attached to Dasein (like Being itself, and Time). 
It is worth noting, before we pass on to an assessment of these 
claims, how seriously Heidegger takes the need to distinguish negatively, 
an existential understanding of death from any other. Heidegger 
explicitly separates off all these other disciplinary approaches that 
would treat death as an event. One cannot help wondering whether matters 
are quite that simple. Psychoanalysis certainly would not treat death 
primarily as an event. Thanatos, eg., is no event. And a biology that 
ignored the death already in life_(eg. in aging) would be a poor biology. 
Heidegger also labours the point that the 'not-yet' of Dasein's death is 
quite unlike the various other kinds of incompleteness we can find in the 
world. Here Heidegger would almost qualify-as an analytic philosopher. 
4 
The many examples Heidegger uses are genuinely interesting in their own 
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right, but we shall not pause to discuss them. 
Death and Representation 
We shall start the process of evaluating this account by focussing 
on a fascinating theme he brings up early on in the chapter - that of 
Representation (Vertretbarheit) for it offers both a way of further 
clarifying his position, and also a way of beginning to ask how satis- 
factory it is. 
Heidegger associates the claim that Being-towards-death is (what 
he will come to call) my own-most-possibility, with the idea that no-one 
else can die for me (see H240). There are, he rightly suggests, many 
ways in which one man can stand-in for another. Andy Warhol is said to 
have responded to the numerous requests for him to make a personal' 
appearance by sending a look-alike, often without detection. But the 
relationship more commonly does not involve deception, but simply some 
form of taking the other's place - carrying out someone's instructions, 
as does a secretary (who may even sign my name). Or, further, one can 
represent one's fellow countrymen or one's school or firm at a conf erence 
or in some public affair like the Olympics. The varieties of this kind 
of representation are very wide - even steering clear of the sense of 
representation as idea (Vorstellen), as the translators remind us. 
Heidegger's claim, positively speaking, is that this form of representa- 
tion is not only common but in some sense. constitutive of everyday Dasein. 
Here he draws on the idea that Dasein*is, in particular Idas Man', a 
Being-with-'others. Modern role theory would confirm this dramatically. 
And yet however many contexts there are in which someone else can 
represent me, there is one in which no-one can represent me. 
'This possibility of representing breaks down completely 
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if the issue is one of representing that possibility- 
of-Being which makes up Dasein's coming to an end, 
and which, as such, gives to it its wholeness. No 
one can take the Other's dying away from him. ' 
'By its essence, death is in every case mine, in 
so far as it 'is' at all ... death signifies a 
peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very 
Being of one's own Dasein is an issue. In dying, 
it is shown that mineness and existence are onto- 
logically constitutive for death. (H240) 
Strictly speaking, the words 'own-most possibility' do not occur here. 
We have to wait until a little later (H250), at which point the word 
'non-relational' is added, which suggests something even stronger than 
'incapable of being represented by another'. 
This all sounds thoroughly plausible. We can agree, for example, 
that there are things for which it makes no difference who does them, 
that there are things which someone else can do aswell as me, that there 
are things that someone else with my permission and at my instruction 
can do as well (or better than) me, and so on. And there seem to be 
things that even if someone else could in some sense do them, it would 
matter that it was not I who was doing them. But Heidegger seems to 
move. very quickly over this question. One can only speculate as to 
why. 
He claims or admits that someone else can 'go to his death for 
another', but adds 'that always means to sacrifice oneself for the other 
in some definite affair'. This remark sounds much more like the kind 
of position that might be taken by the early Sartre, concerned with the 
dilemmmas facing members of the French resistance, or someone reflecting 
on war. But one most obvious reference of such words is surely to 
Christ's crucifixion. And is it not a quite extraordinarily mean 
interpretation of the idea that Christ died 'to save us' that this relates 
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to 'some definite affair'. Indeed, one may explain the circumstances 
of many a martyrdom without reducing what is at issue in such deaths 
to 'some definite affair'.. (How 'definite' was what was at stake in 
Socrates' death? ) And when, as has been documented, valiant souls 
substituted themselves for those in line to be liquidated in concentra- 
tion camps, is it really possible to define the 'affair' in question? 
What if the affair was the question of life itself (its value, one's 
individuality, ... etc. )? 
There. are other. directions in which Heidegger's move must be 
queried, and Sartre points the way. 
5 If one accepts that in some 
sense no one can die for me, is it not equally true that no-one can 
urinate, eat, feel joy, understand a philosophical argument, or ... I.. 
fall in love for me? Surely anyone who replies that this objection 
misses the point must at least be pressed to explain how the privileged 
status of dying arises. At some point here it may be said that what 
we are dealing with here is an interpretation, (with the form of a 
hermeneutic) circle), not a proof, so that to make (sucW an 'objection' 
is a misunderstanding. However Heidegger does-reach a very strange 
conclusion - that representation is excluded from Being-towards-death, 
and this is the conclusion of an argument which can, more or less, be 
reconstructed. 
The argument is circumscribed by the general question of totality - 
the problem of 'getting a whole Dasein into our grasp' (see 047). The 
suggestion is initially made that we might be able to get around the 
problem of how to grasp our own totality (we always seem to be either 
alive (incomplete) or dead), by some analogical transfer from the death 
of others, which we do indeed experience. Heidegger's answer is that 
we only, at best experience the death of others as a loss - to us who 
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remain alive. 
'In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of 
access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying 
man 'suffers'. ' (H239) 
And no psychological intimacy with the, other would suffice: 
'we are asking about the ontological meaning of the 
dying of the person who dies, as a possibility-of- 
Being which belongs to his Being. ' (H239) 
It is in the light of his demarcation of the failure of this enterprise 
that Heidegger focusses on the seemingly more plausible case that we 
dealt with before - that in which someone else dies for us, where the 
other is, if you like, no mere 'object' in the world, but in which the 
'for me' is doubled up. 
But is Heidegger really careful enough in his analysis of what the 
death of others can provide? One thing that does not seem to be adequately 
accommodated is that it is only from the fact that others have died that 
we 'know' of our own mortality, just as, should it come to pass, the 
technologically assisted super-longevity of. others will convince us of 
our own (possible) immortality. 
6 
Heidegger's reply, I take it, would be that if this is a 'condition' 
for our being able to have attitudes towards our own death it neither 
limits the scope nor determines the direction of our understanding of 
our own mortality. Let us allow him this. More serious, for his case, 
is the way in which he seems to be. restricting the possible ways in which 
the dying of others can guide us, by focussing on the meaning, to us, 
of the event of the death of the other. , This may 
be of limited 
importance. We have indeed become accustomed to and tranquillized about 
the death of others, especially as the range of our vulnerability to such 
information increases (newspapers, radio, famine relief appeals etc. ). 
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But Heidegger wants to make his point, without explicitly saying so, 
about the fact or event of the death of those near to us. (The 
'deceased' has been torn away from those who have 'remained behind' 
(H238) (our emphasis)). And yet he seems to do justice neither to 
the death of those near, nor to the death of those distant. Let us, 
briefly, consider two cases: the death of a loved one (my spouse, my 
child, my fathe; my mother... on the one hand, and reading biography 
(including autobiography) on the other. For what Heidegger says to be 
convincing he has to persuade us that neither of these can offer (or 
constitute for) Dasein any kind of'ontological illumination. This 
assumption appears as a rigidity in the distinction between ontic and 
ontologicalt to which the distinction between representation and 
existence is subsumed, and must surely be questioned. 
Consider first the death of a loved one. We have pointed out 
that Heidegger seems to be concerned with the deaths of those close to 
US. Yet it is strange and perhaps symptomatic that he ends his 
discussion of the possibility of existential illumination through the 
death of others by supposing that what is at stake is whether just any 
randomly selected other will serve as a substitute for Dasein's own 
Being-towards-death. (see H239). Why this impersonalization? Might 
he perhaps be trying to avoid the question of love? 
If love were an ontological event affecting my very experience 
of myself, might not the potential significance of the death of a loved 
one rest on the adequacy of one's analysis of 'mourning', 'loss'., 
'commemoration', etc. If such loss is merely an ontic event, perhaps 
susceptible to 'psychological' investigation, what kind of story would 
Heidegger give of the withering away of the bereaved? (We do not even 
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have to consider those cases in which the loved one dies at his or her 
own hand. ) Surely the lofty response that these are of merely ontic 
concern to Dasein in its everydayness is quite insufficient. But why? 
A number of possible'responses suggest themselves. Is there 
not something quite as fundamental as one could ever want about being 
born from, creating with, and giving birth to, something that implicates 
those actual beings' of whomý it is true (or deemed true) in a way that 
quite transcends 'the body'. To be of one flesh: this 'flesh' is 
already 'outside itself'. ' Its exuberance 
7 
already exceeds the way the 
body itself transcends simple self-presence (intermeshing rhythms, its 
scars and its passions, its sensory organs and its eroticism). It 
might be replied: this is all very fine and moving, but what more does 
it do than remind us of the primitiveness of being-with, and the"temporal 
structure of relations between the generations? How does it approach 
the ontological concern with the meaning of one's own Being? The 
answer, surely, is that it does not so much approach that question as 
perform a certain molework on it. 
8 
When a father shields his child again'st'the sword, and in so doing 
dies, it is perhaps neither courage nor 'instinct' but a sign of a fracture 
in the heart of 'own-ness'. It is not so much self-lessness, as a sign 
of the original rupture of the self, and one which, surely, is not reducible 
to the ultimately limiting 'being-with'. We do not pretend to any exper- 
tise, but it would not be unreasonable to read into these remarks a 
certain evocation of the spirit of Levinas? 
It is in that respect interesting that to our knowledge, Levinas 
does not seriously (if at all) take account of Heidegger's analysis of 
authentic solicitude, which surely goes out of its way to liberate the 
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Other from objectification. However it does not liberate the Other 
fiom him/herself, but rather, charged with the weight of a renewed 
responsibility, returns it to him. 
Is this all something of a side-track? Not if Heidegger would 
otherwise be allowed to return to the totally individuating nature of 
one's relation to one's death. We have tried to, show that he cannot 
succeed in establishing this without a satisfactory account of love. 
We have not really even begun to offer this. The writings of Marcel, 
for example, would have to be mentioned. But we have, I believe, shown 
where Heidegger's ice is thin. 
It is equally thin at the point at which he dismisses the value 
of the death of strangers (and hence, one would suppose, of biography 
and autobiography). As we have said, he accomplishes this by an implicit 
narrowing-down of the meaning of 'the dying of-others' to the fact or 
event itself. Clearly it is then all too easy to contrast the Being- 
towards-death of my Dasein. But what then of (auto-)biography? Surely 
the ideal is precisely to reveal the existential choices and circumstances 
that shape a life, and many of the most interesting (auto-)biographies 
are of those whose life is conducted with an eye on their own temporal 
finitude, their own mortality. Biographies of martyrs, saints, zealots, 
great soldiers and adventurers, etc. provide only the most graphic examples. 
Now it is of course true that there need be nothing adventurous about 
reading the biography of an adventurer, and one gets no closer to the 
flames by reading about Joan of Arc. To read about the comportment of 
Others in the face of their own mortality does not eo ipso makes one's 
own attitude authentic. Indeed it can, quite the contrary, be a form 
of escapism, a deferment of self-confrontation. Heidegger's claimg 
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however, must be that it can have no ontological value, and that seems 
highly unlikely. 
Perhaps we are being unfair, to Heidegger. He might simply 
be saying that understanding what it means to be-towards-death, and 
acting and experiencing at that level are two different things. There 
is a radical difference between my reading about St. Augustine having 
his doubts about becoming Christian removed by reading Paul, and my 
doubts being so removed. But even if this were true, the general 
distinction between understanding and acting/experiencing will not do, 
because Heidegger is at this stage concerned precisely with understanding 
what it is for Dasein to be Izum Tode'. And when one considers the 
extraordinary power eg. of the Gospels - of the accounts of the teachings 
and sufferings of Christ - to affect men's lives - one begins at least 
to consider how far possibilities-for-Being can be thought of entirely 
in isolation from prior example, from the choices others have made in 
different circumstances, from the historical stock of significant ways 
of Being. The reference to biography is only the most obvious way in 
which the horizon of such 'ways of Being' is radically expanded beyond 
what our local community may offer even as possibilities. The suggestion 
is not that we choose our own Being-towards-death as we would a commodity 
in a supermarket. We are claiming, rather, that to think of our Being- 
towards-death as something that inherently individuates us need not and 
perhaps cannot exclude some sort of grasp of the horizon of possible 
choices - which derives from tradition, in the widest sense. We are 
not convinced that it is possible to separate, in the way Heidegger 
would requires the level at which the understariding takes place, and 
the various thematized and unthematized possibilities that have perhaps 
always offered themselves to us. 
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What we are beginning to question, or perhaps only to grope 
towards questioning, is the way in which Heidegger's concept of 
authenticity, his references to authentic solicitude notwithstanding, 
essentially excludes the other, and not only the personal other, but 
also the other as Sign, as Representation. Might it not be that 
Heidegger's reference to death as Dasein's 'own-most non-relational 
possibility' here retained the goal of Husserl's reduction to a 'sphere 
of ownness"O transforming it from an epistemological to an existential/ 
ontological setting? 
Finitude and Mortality 
Clearly all these points must be redeemed (or. otherwise) in a 
further discussion of the concept of authenticity, but before we move 
on to that topic, it is worth perhaps considering another of Sartre's 
major points of disagreement with Heidegger on the subject of death. 
Put bluntly, it is that Heidegger confuses, or at least conflates 
finitude and mortality. Surely we would still be finite beings even 
if we were, or believed ourselves with reason to be, immortal. 
What is it to be finite? To be finite surely has its most 
distinctive manifestation not in our inescapable death, but in the 
'death' involved in every instant as one has to choose (even by not 
choosing) to realize some possibilities and not others. Even immortal 
beings have to live somewhere at some time, have a particular body, sex, 
culture, etc. (and a particular order of their acquisition) and so on. 
Does this not show that finitude and being-mortal are different because 
we can imagine one without the other? The situation is a little more 
complex than this. (Even"immortall beings (as we have defined the 
term) may be vulnerable and are capable of dying so the possibility of 
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their death, even if never brought about, could still be a source of 
anxiety. ) Would it not follow that even 'immortal beings', beings for 
whom death is not an inevitability would still be able to think of 
themselves as wholes only in relation to the possibility of their non- 
existence? That is to say - is that not what Heidegger would/could 
respond? And that would seem to suggest a difficulty in conceiving 
of a finite being that was not at the same time capable of an authentic 
Seinzumtode. It is even more difficult to think of a mortal being 
that would not be finite. So are the two concepts not, contra Sartrep 
after all intimately connected, and perhaps not even to be distinguished 
at all? 
This certainly does not follow. Many of Heidegger's lexistentials' 
are equiprimordial, hard to think of as occurring in separation, and yet 
'conceptually', if one can say so, quite distinct. Surely just this is 
true of finitude and mortality. But if it were so, what would hang on 
it? Our remarks here run the risk of being all too finite, but might 
it not be that Being-towards-death can function for Heidegger as the 
answer to how Dasein can 'be a whole' only if finitude can be absorbed 
into being mortal. And if it cannot, might it not be that Dasein's 
Being was inherently incomplete, or perhaps lundecidablel, for Being- 
towards-death would be no resolution of our everyday finitude. 
one last dangling thread still needs to be taken up. Heidegger 
does not want to treat death as an event, but he does say that it cannot 
be circumvented. (Let us suppose that the sense of 'cannot, here is 
stronger than the confident assertion in the 1930s (I believe) that man 
could never see the other side of the moon. We shall not contest it 
here. ) How important is it that death is inevitable? The whole tenor 
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of Heidegger's discussion of the. existential dimension of death is to 
. play 
down death as an actual future event, and to accentuate death 
as possibility in a different sense. As I understand it the force 
of this idea is that existence is most radically to be understood as 
a multi-levelled relationship with the possibility of not-existing. 
It is multi-leveled because the mere passage of time involves the 
closing off (the death) of 'openings-onto' (the future), while the fact 
that we need not exist (both in the sense that one's birth was not 
necessary and that nothing guarantees my persistence) gives further 
intensity to every such opening. It happens that for none of us can this 
possibility of non-existence be circumvented. But surely that is to 
go further than Heidegger really needs. Does not Angst for example 
actually reveal not our Being towards certain death, but rather that we 
can never rule out the possibility of death. Indeed so much are we 
tempted to rethink Angst as disclosive of contingency or finitude that 
we would not rule out the possibility of Beings certain of this immortality 
suffering from it, assuming, that is, that they had been born and had 
once not existed, and that their existence had never been 'necessary'. 
Their Angst could be in respect of thefact of their own finitude and 
'groundlessness'. 
What have we claimed in this section? We have given notice that 
Heidegger's account of Being-towards-death as Dasein's ownmost non- 
relational and uncircumventable possibility is open to doubt in each 
respect, and that those doubts provide the opening for a reading that 
treats Heidegger! s discussion of death as an exclusion of the other - 
the other person and the other as 'sign'. However as we shall see, 
while these doubts will be developed further, they will in no way amount 
to a wholesale rejection of Heidegger's remarks on death and authenticity. 
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What is however brought to light in this double reading is an unresolved 
tension in Heidegger's thought between the necessity of grasping Dasein 
as a whole, and the recognition of time as the possibility of the other, 
beyond appropriation. If Heidegger is right in thinking that the move 
from an existential analytic to the ontological. sphere, to the question 
of Being, rests on grasping Dasein as a whole, then we claim to have 
unsettled the very structure of the book. 
Authenticity 
There are a number of key features of authenticity, as Heidegger 
presents it. As they are often misunderstood, it would be as well to 
state them clearly, whether to correct these misunderstandings or to 
reveal our own. Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is centrally linked to 
the idea of intense individuation - ownmostness - even if it can be 
plausibly said to redefine rather than presuppose-any sen6e of 'individu- 
ality'. Authenticity is utterly dependent on everydayness, of which it 
is nonetheless a distinctive modification. The 'choice' is not between 
everydayness and authenticity, but between inauthenticity and authenticity 
Inauthenticity is perhaps best seen as the self-satisfaction of every- 
dayness. One might indeed prefer authenticity to. inauthenticity but it 
is not for all that an ethical concept, but an ontological one. As such, 
of course, it might well be essential for any ethics to take account of 
it. Authenticity makes no concrete prescriptions, nor is it (as Hegel 
said of Kant's ethics) merely a formal notion. Rather it is an 
existential notion, one to be understood as a certain way of Being, a 
certain ontological self-relatedness, in which one relates to oneself 
as the kind of Being one is. Although one rarely gets a hint of it 
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(Heidegger's discussion of poetic creativity at the end of The Origin 
of the Work of Art might be a case in point) a certain universality and 
anonymity is built into the whole discussion. To be oneself (rather 
than losing oneself) is to have achieved a rather difficult form of 
self-understanding, and to direct oneself in that light. 
It would be easy to conclude, especially before having read him, 
that authenticity was for Heidegger what Absolute self-knowledge was 
for Hegel (and for Spirit). Negatively - they agree that what is at 
issue is a non-object-like kind of 'wholeness', and that the resulting 
whole presupposes rather than 'destroys' the level(s) through which it 
must pass for its realization. (A discussion of the intermediation of 
Kierkegaard, though a risky move to control, might be thought to seal 
the matter. ) 
Does not Hegel insist that man must accept 'determinate Being' 
or have his light fade away without making any mark? Does not Hegel's 
account of the struggle to the death in the section in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit on "Lordship and Bondage" give the same or a similar status to 
death as Heidegger? (He who lives in the possibility of his own death 
(non-existence) wins? ) Do they not both share an affection for 
H81derlin's tender mortality? These are all interesting and important 
issues. And certainly Heidegger's words did not fall from heaven (any 
more than Hegel's). But we can at best use any prior understanding of 
Hegel's problem and solution as a handrail to reassure us that what is 
at issue is not entirely new. Moreover it is some help to consider the 
importance for Hegel of the appropriation of the Other, the reduction of 
the Other to the same. It is the point of the dialectic to offer a 
method and a justification for this. And it is for that reason that 
both Nietzsche and Heidegger have little good to say about dialectical 
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thinking. What we can ask, however, is whether this motif - of the 
appropriation of the Other (what is different) into a final whole is 
not still at work in Heidegger. And it is with this question in mind 
that we shall open up, in a more detailed textual manner, Heidegger's 
discussion of authenticity. 
Before Heidegger can address the particularly temporal nature of 
Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, there is a preliminary step in the 
exposition which we must first go through. The need for this step 
rests on a sense of. the limited nature of what Heidegger has, up to 
now, managed to show. It is Heidegger's methodological scrupulousnessq 
one might say, that reveals itself here, even if we shall have occasion 
to cast certain doubts on the precise moves he makes. 
For what he claims he has shown so far, in discussing 'the 
ontological possibility of an existentiellBeing-towards-death which is 
authentic', is 'the possibility of Dasein's having an authentic 
potentiality for Being-as-a-wholel. But, he adds, in a way that 
stresses this as a limitation. lonly as an ontological possibility'. 
(H266). In other words, we lack any assurance that it is a real 
lexistentiell' possibility for Dasein rather than 'a fantastical exaction'. 
Heidegger believes we need to uncover an experiential attestation of the 
possibilities of authenticity, and, interestingly, and without apparent 
justificationg sees this as evidenced by Dasein's demanding authenticity 
for itself. What Heidegger has in mind is a treatment of conscience. 
His treatment in 11.2 might be thought somewhat marginal to our 
concern - the investigation of his understanding of time. But if, 
as we believep that understanding is at least in part (eg. in his 
discussion of Being-towards-death) part of the project of trying to 
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answer the question of how we can have a grasp of Dasein as a whole, 
then it will be as well to take a serious if brief look at 11.2, in 
which he takes one further step in attempting to attain this. As we 
have saido Heidegger's interest here is in a phenomenological attestation 
of the possibility of authenticity in conscience. A mark of the 
limitation of his treatment in this chapter is apparent in the final 
paragraph (060) 37. pages later, where he writes that 
I... as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, 
the authentic Being-toward-death which we have deduced 
existentially still remain a purely existential project 
for which Dasein's attestation is missing. Only when 
such attestation has been found will our investigation 
suffice to exhibit (as its problematic requires) an 
authentic 'potentiality' for Being-a-whole, existentielly 
confirmed and clarified -a potentiality which belongs 
to Dasein. ' (H301) 
The discussion of conscience, and resoluteness contributes 
to the question of authenticity but not insofar as it relates to death. 
So in a sense, 11.2 represents a pause in the temporalization of the 
problematic of Dasein that is the distinctive feature of Division II. 
Its appearance here confirms our suggestion that Heidegger's treatment 
of time must be understood as subservient to the wider problematic of 
grasping Dasein's wholeness (which itself is directed towards the 
'question of Being'). All this is both to, place our discussion of 
11.2, as well as to justify a certain brevity in our treatment of it. 
Our central contention will be that this chapter does not resolve 
our question about whether Heidegger is ultimately committed to an 
appropriation of the Other. It makes it clear that he cannot be said 
to be committed to this in any simple way, but it leaves open the 
question of whether he can, at some deeper level. We shall focus on 
the question of 'what' conscience can be said to disclose, and in 
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particular, whether Heidegger successfully disposes of the suggestion 
that its function is (merely) ontical. 
The disclosure of conscience 
The importance of conscience for Heidegger can be explained very 
simply. Lost in the Ithey, Dasein already possesses, but is not 
explicitly aware of, an authentic potentiality-for-Being-itself. 
Indeed as this Ilostness' prescribes a self (the 'they' self), criteria 
of significance, a level of discourse, etc., it is easy to suppose that 
there was 'no way out' of it. What is needed is an experience by 
which. inauthentic Dasein can be drawn out of its, complacency. And 
this is provided by the 'call of conscience'. This calls Dasein to 
'its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self'. 
Heidegger insists we take the greatest care over this phenomenon. 
In particular he wants to stress the difference between a disclosive 
experience and something merely present-at-hand. Conscience, as befits 
a fundamental experience of Dasein, is such a disclosive experience, 
and any attempt to understand it in the ordinary way distorts this. 
At this point Heidegger's language gets rather strong 
'The demand that an 'inductive empirical proof' should 
be given for the 'factuality' of conscience and for the 
legitimacy of its 'voice', rests upon an. ontological 
perversion of the phenomenon. This perversion, however, 
is one that is shared by every 'superior' criticism in 
which conscience is taken as something just occurring 
from time to time rather than as a 'universally established 
and ascertainable fact'. Among such proofs and counter- 
proofs, the fact of conscience cannot present itself at all. 
This is no lack in it, but merely a sign by which we can 
recognize it as ontologically of a different kind from what 
is environmentally present at hand. ' (H269) 
The language is strong, but it betrays, we believe, an important weakness 
in Heidegger's position. And our discussion of this weakness will be 
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one of three critical moves we shall make in preparation for a more 
detailed probing of Heidegger's analysis of conscience. 
Heidegger's argument here begins by making its case on the 
easiest ground (against the demand for an 'inductive empirical proof') 
and then generalizes the argument to 'every "superior" criticism'. 
There is not much of an argument offered here, but surely it is an 
argument, and a thoroughly weak one at that. It rests, at its most 
elementary, on the claim that no inductive procedtxrp-s can demonstrate 
the 'legitimacy' of its 'voice'. Mere facts cannot determine 'essential' 
truths, and certainly not evaluative ones. But even if we accept thisp 
nothing shows that all 'superior' criticism (which may attempt to under- 
stand 'conscience$, from within, say, some theoretical framework), is 
equally inadequate. Heidegger's contrast between what is present-at 
-hand and what is lontologically of a different kind' is surely question- 
begg - ing. And . so too . is his . reference to 7 the Fact I Of consc i-enc-e* 
(our emphasis). These remarks aim at seducing us into supposing that 
there is one correct ontological understanding of conscience, by 
castigating in a broad-brush way attempts that fail to meet that standard. 
What it suggests is that there is. no room for argument about the meaning 
of conscience, and that, surely, is unacceptable. 
This same imperiousness had emerged, -unfortunately, only on the 
previous page: 
'That the very 'fact' of conscience has been disputed, 
that its function as a higher court for Dasein's 
existence has been variously assessed, and that 'what 
conscience says' has been interpreted in manifold 
ways, all this might only mislead us into dismissing 
this phenomenon if the very 'doubtfulness' of this 
Fact - or of the way in which it has been interpreted - 
did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of 
Dasein lies before us. 
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This argument is a stronger version (in force, but not in validitY) of 
the one he used to justify our continuing interest in the question of 
Being, despite the wrangling over whether it is a serious question. 
But does it really work? It is quite true, and important, that 
disagreements about the status of conscience are quite compatible with 
it being a primordial phenomenon (but equally one that only seems 
important from time to time for certain extrinsic reasons). And it is 
true that if one had established"on independent grounds the primordiality 
of consciencel then one might well come to treat alternative accounts 
symptomatically (eg., as attempting to cover up what it was unacceptable 
to believe). But it is, surely, quite unjustified to suppose that 
disagreement about the status of something proves it is 'a primordial 
phenomenon'. It only shows that its status is contentious. And if, 
indeed, the issue at stake was whether it was or was not primordial, it 
would surely be a perversion of reason to conclude that it must therefore 
be primordial. 
Tho- third difficulty with Heidegger's account, one which becomes 
apparent in the very first section of this chapter (054), is this. 
Conscience is on the agenda because it offers a way out of the self- 
enclosure of Dasein's Ilostness in the "they"'; it is supposed to attest 
in an lexistentiell' way to the possibility of Dasein's 'authenticity'. 
But in Heidegger's analysis 
'conscience will be taken as something which we 
have in advance theoretically, and it will be 
investigated in a purely existential manner, 
with fundamental ontology as our aim'. (,, 7,, ) 
This suggests that our understanding of conscience will not be confined 
to the indivicLual- Dasein's experience of it, but will engage in an 
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analysis of the meaning of that experience. But this would not 'show 
how it was that conscience actually does succeed in letting lost Dasein 
rediscover itself. For everyday Dasein is familiar with the 'voice 
of conscience' and has its own everyday interpretation of it. ýHeidegger's 
account would be quite unsatisfactory if he had to say that whatever 
the everyday account of conscience was, 'the authentic story was different, 
because that would give'conscience no radically disclosive power at the 
existentiell level, where it is needed. 
From these difficulties we extract two questions for the critical 
guidance of our discussion of Heidegger*s treatment of conscience: 
(1) might we not allow the importance of a phenomenological treatment 
of conscience while arriving at conclusions'different from Heidegger's? 
(2) does Heidegger adequately clarify the way in which the voice of 
conscience can actually appeal to everyday Dasein? Let us follow - 
through, selectively, some of Heidegger's presentation here. 
Everyday Dasein is disclosed to itself 'understandingly' in terms 
of the world in which it is involved. This is a public world, dominated 
by the public interpretations of the 'they'. In being attuned to these, 
Dasein loses touch with lkself. In listening to 'they', Dasein no 
longer hears itself. Into this situation, the call of conscience serves 
to break or interrupt this-listening that listens-away (hinhuren). 
Heidegger describes this call as one that not only redirects our hearing, 
restoring a lost possibility, 'but also one that does so 'unambiguously', 
leaving no foothold for curiosity', and with these qualities, it is 
radically distinct from ordinary world-directed 'listening'. This 
claimp as we shall shortly see, is soon repeated, and elaborated. 
How, we might ask, can the call of conscience make an impact on 
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the they-selfg which is essentially and by definition blind to such 
possibilities? Heidegger's answer is two-fold. First, that the 
disclosedness of Dasein's world is always accompanied by some sort, of 
self-disclosedness. Dasein always has some self-understanding, even 
if it is 'the they-self of concernful Being-with-others'. Secondly, 
Heidegger claims, the call of conscience appeals not to this they- 
self, as a whole, but only to the Self itself. 
'(The they-self) ... gets passed over in this appeal; 
this is something of which the call to the Self takes 
not the slightest cognizance. And because only the 
Self of the they-self gets appealed to and brought 
to bear, the 'they' collapses. ' (" 2.75) 
He further suggests that in being passed over, the 'they'(-self) is 
also affected (--almost as if snubbed? ) - and 'the Self ... gets brought 
to itself by the call'. 
Now it has to be said that this account is almost magical in 
its absence of any kind of explanatory model. The ease with which the 
self is detached, when appealed to in this way, from its public 
involvement, is startling. Heidegger is quick to remind us that we 
are not dealing here with any kind of world-4ess ego, but with a Self 
that is still essentially (though in a different way) Being-in-the-world. 
What the call in each case discloses is Dasein's lownmost possibilities'. 
As we have already mentioned, Heidegger claims this happens without there 
being-any ambiguity. This claim is expanded and underpinned by the 
distinction he draws between the content and the direction of the call. 
Thought of as having a content, the call might arouse a kind of inner 
dialogue, but the call essentially tells us nothing, it just points 
to (summons us to) a possibility of Dasein's Being. (Understanding 
the call is an ontological not an ontic affair. ) Heidegger strongly 
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dismisses the possibility that the call of conscience might properly 
induce a reflexive self-scrutiny. (Such possibilities are discussed 
in fact in 0379 on Ambiguity, and have a place only in everyday Dasein. ) 
Can nothing go wrong with the call?. 
Heidegger does make two important claims at this point, though 
without giving them much emphasis. 
I ... what the call discloses is unequivocalq even though it may undergo a different interpretation in the individual 
Dasein in accordance with its own possibilities of under- 
standing. ' 
(2) 'When 'delusions' arise in the conscience they do so ... 
only because the call gets heard in such a way that 
instead of becoming authentic understanding, it gets 
drawn by the they-self into a solioquy in which causes 
get pleaded, and it becomes perverted in its tendency 
to disclose. ' (IJ27+) 
The first claim is I take it simple. The call discloses-in 
each case an ownmost-potentiality-for-Being, but we each give that 
content in a different way. - Allowing that disclosure and interpreta- 
tion can be keptdistinct, we can let this claim rest. But the second 
claim is surely not so easily dealt with. The call of conscience. does 
not always succeed. The problem is that the case'in which it does not 
succeed is precisely the one that one would suppose was standard and 
predictable. The 'they-self' interprets the call in its own terms - 
as it does everything else. This, for Heidegger, is a perversion 
of conscience's disclosive possibilities. But if we think back to what 
we called his magical account of a successful call of conscience, we 
find no explanation of why and how it succeeds on some occasions and 
fails on others. It is not that the call is inadequate, he claims. 
The explanation must lie in the way it is heard. 
The Idealization of Conscience 
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Suppose we ask, why the call succeeds here and fails there. 
Heidegger can say no more than he has said. But an explanation can 
be offered - that we are not in fact dealing with a disclosive event 
which may or may. not succeed, but that we are dealing with, on the 
one hand, an. lideall. possibility', (which may nonetheless, or perhaps 
thereby, never be actualized) and on, the other, the ordinary messier 
types of self-understanding to which the call of conscience can be 
assimilated. How then could we understand the authentic self-dis- 
closure supposedly wrought by conscience? It would be the elimination, 
the expulsion, of all, that-would sully the purity of a silent and word- 
less grasp of one's authentic Being-as-a-whole. When Heidegger was 
describing the interruption of Dasein's 'listening-away', he says that 
'(this) possibility ... lies in its being appealed to without mediation' 
(our emphasis). If we were right, Heidegger would be presenting as a 
real possibility what is in fact an ideal accomplishment of reflexive 
thought, onep to be sure, that responds to a genuine demand, as we 
shall see. 
A brief parallel to Husserl is again justified. The innocent 
reader of, say, Husserl's Ideas comes away with the impression that 
bracketting-outt epochel putting to one side one's everyday and theoretical 
views of the world, is an operation it is possible to carry out at a 
certain timet by taking extreme care. Three problems (at least) arise. 
First, it'is far from clear what 'attitude' one is, in (the natural 
attitude? the 'reduced' or 'transcendental' attitude? ) when one performs 
this. Second, it is*unclear how within the complacency of the natural 
attitude the motivation to transcend it can arise. And third, the, time 
and thought needed to spell out what the -reduction involves 
(not just its 
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consequences, which might indeed be complex, even supposing it were a 
simple act) makes it hard to see how the reduction could be any sort 
of simple operation. There is surely an instructive parallel to be 
drawn with Heidegger's account of the power of the call of conscience 
to effect an unambiguous, unmediated, separation of the 'they' from the 
'Self'. Clearly the fact that the call of conscience is sdid to come 
from 'beyond' (though it turns out that this 'beyond' is none other 
than the authentic self as understood by the they-self) is meant to 
explain how the cosy complacency of everyday Dasein can be interrupted. 
And as we have said (though it falls short of an explanation) Heidegger 
will soon talk of the demand for a conscience, which supplies the 
motivation. But the parallel with the problematic status of the epochg 
for Husserl is the most instructive. Husserl came to see, I believe, 
what Merleau-Ponty made quite explicit (see his Preface to The 
Phenomenology of Perception) - that the reduction was not a one-off 
operationg but something to be repeated indefinitely. one is misled, 
perhaps, by a spatialized topology (eg. entering 'the sphere of the 
transcendental reduction') to suppose that one can, in these matters, 
actually be in one place rather than another. Is this not just as 
plausible in Heidegger's case? For it is clear, I would claim, that 
the various forms of self-understanding that Heidegger carefully 
distinguishes from-whAt is disclosed by the call of conscience are quite 
as commong if not far more so. They, in their wealth of diversity, 
include various modes of self-objectification, self-interpretationt self- 
scrutinyl self-criticism; they are all, indeed, 'mediated', by models, 
by theories, by values, by language. If we suppose that what is so 
unsatisfactory about these modes of self -interpretation is precisely the 
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same as what is unsatisfactory abbut 'signs' - that we are led from one 
sign to another, without end - then we might come to think that what 
Heidegger has done for 'the call of conscience' is to have cleared a. 
site for its appearance as a mode of self-interpretation that precedes 
all signs, and radically excludes them. On this reading, the name of 
this desire would be metaphysics, the metaphysics of presence. 
Clearly the possibility of such a reading was ruled out by the methodo- 
logical remarks with which Heidegger begins this chapter, but as we showed, 
they did not in fact justify any particular determination of the 
experience of conscience. In any pursuit of this critical reading we 
would clearly have to offer some account of the experience other than 
the one Heidegger provides. - 
It may be that we have launched prematurely into a critical 
discourse. On the one hand the scope of our remarks is such as would. 
disturb the whole of Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, and indeed 
the very 'question of Being' that illuminates this book. On the other 
hand, there are so many responses that Heidegger could make, or that we 
could make on his behalf, that we will seem perhaps to be doing him-an 
injustice by not pursuing them at this very instant. There are, however, 
further important things to be said about his particular discussion of 
conscience. 
Further Remarks on Conscience 
Ve note only in passing that Heidegger's distussion of conscience 
as a call has in common with his later discussion of les gibtl 
11 
that 
he operates a kind of transcendental abstraction from a transactional 
term. In particular, while the call seems to come from beyond, there 
is in fact no caller distinct from Dasein itself; nor is there any real 
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voice, nor are words actually used, nor is it a question of 'anything 
like a comment'. The parallel here to what Husserl calls 'solitary 
12 
mental life' in the Logical Investigations., is most striking. it 
tdrns out that the caller, like the called, is none other than Dasein 
itself - not any external power. 
13 (H278) Again the 'caller*' is 
not to be understood or identified in everyday terms. Rather it is 
Dasein 'in its uncanninessl. 
The 'call', as we have said, is stripped of its literal everyday 
linguistic significance. Now it is stripped of any suggestion that 
it requires a relation to another being. Heidegger is offering an 
interpretation of the call of 'conscience' that, at first glance, we 
might call 'internalized', but of course Dasein is not, for him, 'internal' 
at all. The question of whether Heidegger effects some sort of meta- 
physical closure of Dasein's Being will ultimately hinge on how we assess 
his alternative to a conversation in inwardness. His secret, of course, 
is that he can work a dialogue, or at least a relation between two aspects 
of Dasein's Being - as care, Dasein's existence (projective of possibilitiesý 
and Dasein's facticity (thrownness). This is what is going on in his 
otherwise somewhat odd discussion of Guilt and being Guilty, the signi- 
ficance of which is brought out in his discussion of what we might call 
Dasein's existential self-grounding. The call of conscience leads to 
the recognition of our 'Guilt', but this guilt is no ordinary matter 
thatý. -. -. we could have avoided, or could make amends for. It is a primordial 
condition of Dasein that results, as I understand it, from Dasein's 
f acticity -f rom his I thrownness And the basic move that Heidegger 
makes here is that Dasein's Being has its basis in the fact thats as 
thrown, it has no ordinary basis, but rather exists in its projection 
of possibilities. Heidegger's position. here can be seen, dialectically, 
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as a denial both of anything like an ego cogito, and of a theological 
location of the ground of my Being 'outside' me, in another power. 
Kierkegaard's discussion of Despair and the Self is on precisely these 
same lines, but concludes that man cannot be his own ground. 
14 
To talk about Dasein's primordial guilt, to say that it is this 
which the call of conscience finally reveals, is, as I understand it, 
to"talk of the, constitutive negativity or nullity, " of Dasein. ' It is 
as difficult as it is important to pin down a precise sense to this 
Being-guilty' but I would suggest the following senses, at least, should 
be included: (1) Dasein is characteristically 'lost' in the 'they'. 
In this sense it exists as a falling short of its true possibilities. 
This is one sense of negativity. (2) Dasein always has itself to be 
- it is as projected towards the future. This is nullity in a positive 
sense (eg. Dasein is not an already established substance, but this should 
not dismay us). '(3) Dasein does not choose to be, nor that it one day 
will not be. (4) If Dasein always understands itself in terms of its 
possibilitiest then every action - every actualization of itself -"will 
rule out other possibilitiesq, and that, particular. *. cases of this"may 
result in remorse is based on this more primordial necessity to choose, 
and so to exclude. 
It has to be said that Heidegger's discussion here presents the 
greatest difficulties of as-sessment, not just of comprehension. In 
particularl Heidegger clearly cannot be accused of'offering an onto- 
logical fundament in the sense of some full and self-subsistent ground. 
Guilt is a primordial ineliminable negativity in Dasein, 'and, as with 
so many of the existential phenomena Heidegger deals with, would seem 
both to prevent any simplistic (eg. ontic) sense of Dasein's Being a 
whole, and to make even more radically difficult the construction of 
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another sense. 
We suggested earlier that Heidegger's analyses of conscience 
might perhaps be understood as accounts of an ideal possibility, one 
that had eliminated all those features (such as. ambiguity, sign ... 
which would threaten its purity. Such a clarity of self-understanding 
would be thoroughly desirable, and it is surely no accident that 
Heidegger's account of what it is to understand the appeal should lead 
15 
to the idea of 'wanting to have a consciectcel . Not unexpectedly, 
Heidegger immediately tells us not to think of this wanting in any 
voluntaristic sensel but rather as a sort of 'preparedness for, or 
being 'ready for' the appeal. This is, of course, a very common 
theological notion. But it is not easy, in Heidegger's own terms, to 
pin it down. What would it be for the 'they-self' to be ready for 
the appeal? And what would it be for Dasein's authentic self to be so 
ready? Indeed, if the authentic self were dissatisfied with its lost- 
ness in the 'they', why would it need the call of conscience to effect 
a break? Is it not quite as plausible that the desire, the wanting, 
might be the metaphysical desire on the part of the philosopher for an 
idealization that would satisfy the requirements of not being subject 
to the doubts, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the sign? It is 
worth noting that this desire would, beyond all doubt, be distinct from 
anything psychological, and would have no less 'primordialityl. 
Heidegger's response would surely be that, apart from anything 
else, this interpretation would surely have to conveniently ignore that 
the features of conscience that he has stressed are disclosed in 
experience. They are not an invention of the philosopher. There are 
two responses to this: (1) that disclosures are always subject to 
interpretationý which is not without its risks. Certainly Heidegj'er is 
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no friend of self-evidence. And we might take his question at the end 
-of 058 as something more than a rhetorical one. ('Is, then, the 
phenomenon of conscience, as it 'actually' is, still recognizable at 
all in the Interpretation we have given? ') (2) That the question of 
the status of our experience of conscience (and/or of Heidegger's 
interpretation of it) cannot be settled without an account of its 
temporality. It is strange that this question has been deferred, 
but it is clearly important. A single example will suffice. 
Conscience reveals Dasein's authentic Being-for-self 'unambiguously'. 
But if doubts subsequently arise, this unambiguousness becomes subject 
to scrutiny. For Heideggerg it might be said, the very thoroughness 
of the penetration of the conscience of 'authenticity' with Angst, 
uncanniness, wish, etc. allows him to relegate doubts, uncertaintyp 
and even criticism to the inauthentic, as a kind of second rate anxiety. 
Critical questions about 'authenticity' itself are then symptomatic 
of a basic misunderstanding. But this would be sheer intellectual 
hubris. 
The question of the temporality of conscience, of course, keeps 
us close to Heidegger's own line of questioning - the concept of 
resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is an obvious advance here, and we shall 
turn to it shortly. But we shall first briefly discuss the alternative 
to Heidegger! s account of conscience that we mentioned at the beginning 
- that of conscience as. critique, and Heidegger's dismissal of this. 
Conscience as critique 
Heidegger's (059) discussion of conscience as critiquet to us the 
most plausible account, is set within a broader discussion of a distinc- 
tion between the existential and the vulgar (everyday) understanding. 
The suggestion that conscience has a critical function is one of four 
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alternative possibilities he deals with, the one he mentions first 
but deals with last, and this itself may suggest he takes it most 
seriously. His general argument in this section is that these 
vulgar interpretations all have their place, but are all ultimately 
derivative from the more fundamental account he has given. - We shall 
question this, focussing on 'conscience as critique'. Heidegger argues 
(1) that understanding conscience as critique presupposes 
that the call is related in each case 'to some guilt-charged deed which 
has been factically willed' (H293). 
(2) that this (perfectly genuine) experience (that conscience 
relates to particular deeds etc. ) does not permit it (conscience) to 
'proclaim' itself fully (293). 
However, neither of these two claims is satisfactory. The first fails 
by overstatement, and the second simply begs the question of what it 
is for conscience to proclaim itself 'fully', and seems disinclined 
to assist such a process. 
Let us expand on these points. , Heidegger does not explain 
what he means by conscience as critiquet so let us offer a brief 
characterization - to understand conscience as critique is to see it 
as a withdrawalt a standing-back, a detachment from some particular 
involvement, or some mode of one's involvement in the world, one in 
which one asks oneself whether one wants to continue with that involve- 
ment or act otherwise, and one in which what is at stake is whether one 
can fully avow that involvement. Let us now look at Heidegger's 
argument. (1) The 'critical' element is found in the combination 
of detachment with questioning. Now clearly we need not be concerned 
with a 'guilt-charged' deed, nor even a 'deed' at all, nor one that has 
been 'willed'. These are all possible, but one may equally be concerned 
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with 'where one is at' ('am I not wasting my life as a writer ? I)p 
f4ithout any prejudgement of guilt, without reference to a particular 
deed, and without a particular act of willing. (2) 
this we could argue that conceived of as narrowly as 
this relationship of conscience to particular deeds, 
bring out the meaning of conscience. But it is, as 
open to us to conceive of it less narrowly. 
In the light of 
Heidegger does, 
may not fully 
I have suggested, 
The essential difference between our way of thinking of conscience 
as critique, and Heidegger's understanding of conscience as disclosing 
our authentic potentiality-for-Being, centresq as Heidegger seems to 
realize, around whether and in what sense conscience reveals anything 
'positive', and/or whether its disclosive power must be thought of 
negatively. Heidegger admits the value (albeit limited) of the critical 
account when he says' ... one can indeed point to nothing which the voice 
'positively' recommends and imposes'. -However, to rest content with 
this 'nothing' is not sufficient. For it is undersItood in relation to 
'assured possibilities of 'taking action' which areavailableand calculable'. 
It may tell us nothing of that sort, but that is because it takes it out 
of 'things', and confronts us with our existence. This latter is not 
just a 'negative' affair. 
Surely, however, this trivializes the critical interpretation of 
conscience. Even the 'everyday' experience of conscience is more than 
a mere not this, and not that. When it leads one to ask 'what should 
I doV it is already more than negative criticism. But are we not just 
expanding the sense of critique until it becomes identical with Heidegger's 
account of the disclosive power of conscience? If Heidegger insists on 
the unambiguity, the direct, unmediated nature of the call of conscience, 
then this cannot be what we are doing. But suppose he were to say that 
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he has never denied the confusion that may result from the call, only 
that its direction is clear (the direction/content distinction again)? 
If we allow ourselves, as Heidegger does, to include within a phenomenon 
those features which appear when it is 'fully disclosed', then our 
response would be that, the question 'what should I doV is not a question 
that is asked by and addressed to an authentic self, but, precisely, 
leaves unresolved the question of whether there is such a self, whether/how 
it can be distinguished from the everyday self, and so on. Clearly the 
idea that I may have authentic possibilitiess possibilities which are 
most my own, is one that, for all its radicality to a world-absorbed 
'they-self', is also reassuring, for it precisely allows the possibility 
of a direction distinct from a content. 
Further evidence of the divergence between Heidegger's position 
and our own - though not entirely unproblematic evidence - is to be 
found in his account of Dasein's authentic existence as resoluteness 
(Entschlossenheit), which while embracing 'anxiety' nonetheless seems 
to involve an overcoming of the ambiguity, the doubt etc. that we have 
earlier pointed to. Resoluteness is characterised in many ways, it. 
is the name for one's authentic liberation from the 'they'. And yet 
it is essentially in-the-world, not some 'free-floating It involves 
a kind of decisiveness about one's mode of Being. But it. is essential 
that one understands this aright. Resoluteness not only makes choices, 
but resolves in the sense of focussingg the potentialities for Dasein's 
Being. Beidegger captures it as 'the disclosive projection of a deter- 
mination of what is factically possible at the time'. Hegel has written 
that we truly exist only if we are prepared to be finite and not while 
away our time contemplating possibilities. And resoluteness surely 
captures this thought. Resoluteness is also meant to carry with it 
261 
that sense of finitude found in the idiom of 'guilt' and 'conscience' 
that we have already come across. 
Clearly this is an important beginning to an answer to our 
question about the temporality of conscience. It will be taken up 
again very shortly in our discussion of authenticity proper. Before 
that, we must make just one small point, which will again probe the 
relation of ambiguity, indecision etc. to authenticity. Heidegger 
writes rather interestingly'. 
'To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of 
every potentiality for Being into which Dasein has been 
factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. 
Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. 
The existentiell indefiniteness of resolution never 
makes itself definite except in a resolution; yet it 
has, all the same its existential definiteness' (H298) 
As I understand this, Heidegger is saying that it is precisely our 
existentiell (pre-analytic) indefiniteness that resoluteness resolves. 
Does this not, again, suggest that resoluteness is brought in to satisfy 
a desire? Indefiniteness is unsatisfying. Does it contribute to a 
temporal understanding of conscience? Surely not. The meaning of 
resoluteness is simply that what conscience disclosed must be made good, 
ultimately in relation to the future. But all the problems about the 
idealization of what 'conscience' discloses arise again for 'resoluteness'. 
What can it possibly mean to have one's ownmost possibility of Being 
(completely? ) disclosed? Such doubts, Heidegger would say, are just 
the symptoms of the they's failure to understand (see eg. H296). But 
that is mere assertion. 
Anticipatory resoluteness and temporality 
We have suggested, without offering much proof, that the concept 
of resoluteness reinscribest without itself resolving the problems we 
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discerned in Heidegger's earlier description of what it is that conscience 
discloses. That points, (we suggested) in the direction of a vital task 
- the temporalization of our understanding of conscience. Our reasons 
for insisting on this temporalization are not however the same as 
Heidegger's, as we shall now see. For Heidegger, conscience points in 
an unambiguous direction - towards my authentic, potentiality for Being. 
We see this formula as the expression of a desire that such a possibility 
be available, a desire which can be explained without any consideration 
of its possible satisfaction. And it is, one would suggest ,- character- 
istic of such desires that their character (of being a desire) is revealed 
in the course of time, when the exhilaration of the moment fades and the 
need to give body to such a vision reasserts itself. -Resoluteness would 
bring to conscience a certain constancy (as we shall shortly see) and 
determination which would allow such a grasp of one's authenticity for 
Being to be retained. But it would be a mistake to think of this 
constancy as occurring within time. Rather it effects a certain trans- 
formed understanding of time itself. 
Heidegger has already taken the first step towards such a trans- 
formed understanding in his discussion of Being-towards-death, where 
death was seen as something to be anticipated as the possibility of one's 
non-existence, rather than, as expected (Erwarten) as an event some time 
in the future. Clearly anticipation (Vorlaufen) is a mode of tempora- 
lization that builds in an understanding of Dasein's finitude - that one 
of its possibilities is not-to-be at all. So Heidegger suggests that 
we understand resoluteness more fully if we understand it as involving 
'anticipation' in this sense, and that it is as 'anticipatory resolute- 
ness' that 'temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial 
way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-wholel. And here is announced the 
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pivot of the whole book, and of our interest in it. 
'The primordial phenomenon of temporality will be held 
secure-by demonstrating that if we have regard for the 
possible totality, unity, and development of these 
fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto 
exhibiteds these structures are all to be conceived as 
at bottom 'temporal' and as modes of the temporalization 
of temporality' (H304) 
It is the pivot of the book not only because it explains the need for 
a temporal rewriting of the earlier more structural description, a 
rewriting on which the book turns, but also because it articulates the 
degree to which time as temporality does not merely penetrate Dasein's 
existence, but is also fatefully bound up with it. The question that 
will continue to guide our reading of Heidegger here is whether there is 
not room for disagreement with Heidegger about the interpretation of time 
and temporality even while accepting, indeed gratefully accepting, his 
demonstration of the need for illuminating it via an existential analytic. 
Constancy 
The existential account is all very well, but Heidegger insists, 
to ensure that anticipatory resoluteness not be construed as a mere 
abstract conjunction of ideas, that it be borne out existentielly. 
Heidegger rightly stresses the methodological importance of this move. 
We have already suggested that he may not always be quite as successful 
in articulating the two levels as we would like. 
We shall pursue this question at the point where Heidegger himself 
endeavours to explain its importance (062) and we shall focus on the 
issue of constancy. Heidegger has already helpfully explained how the 
concept of care transforms our understanding of the self. No longer 
16 
can we think of it as a kind of self-subsisting substance that endures. 
It will be just this undermining of the idea of the self as a fixed 
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point, and time as a secondary modification that will be reflected in 
such formulations as 'temporality temporalizes' - for the subject 'is' 
itself temporal. We shall shortly pursue this in more detail. ' 
What the self-as-substance did however achieve, was a sense-of 
permanence and constancy, not surprisingly, because time was 'external' 
to it. With the concept of resoluteness, Heidegger attempts to re- 
establish the value'at least of constancy. He must do so, ' it would 
seem, for the effect of 'the call of conscience' to be more'than a 
'pin-prick'. 
This desire to maintain constantlyla strong sense of that 
potentiality for Being disclosed by conscience is, 'we have said, a 
philosopher's desire. (We also suggested that Heidegger' needs to but 
fails to retain a clear grasp of the distinction between the existentiell 
and the existential level of analysis of conscience. ) , Here we find 
proof that such retentive constancy concerns him as a philosopher. 
'The Interpretation of the ontological meaning of 
care must be performed on the basis of envisaging 
phenomenologically in a full and constant manner 
Dasein's existential constitution as we have exhibited 
it up till now' ý(H303) 
(and compare I ... the unwavering discipline of the existential way of 
putting the question' (H323)) 'It is perhaps worth commenting (briefly 
on how he does this. I 
It can be said without criticism that Heidegger's style at -times 
exhibits a very considerable density. This density is a rough and ' 
ready name for the way he tries to maintain a constant vision of 'Dasein's 
existential constitution'. There are of course many other aspects of 
his style, as we show later. But here we shall just mention those 
that contribute to this density: condensation, compounding, repetition 
and reworking. They are the consequence of adopting a method which 
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circles ever deeper, rather than proceeds through a series of easily 
stateable logical steps using a taken-for-granted language. 
Condensation: without the handle of 'care' by which to refer to 
lexistentialityl, Ifacticityl and 'falling', the text would be largely 
unreadable. 
Compounding: consider the work of preserving and displaying 
theoretical insight accomplished by all the articulated expressions 
(such as Indieweltsein/Being-in-the-world) and by such expressions as 
anticipatory resoluteness. These are vital ways of expanding the units 
of discourse, and so increasing what can be thought in one go. 
Repetition and reworking: Being and Time is itself built on a 
reworking/rewriting principle in the movement from division I to - 
division IL Heidegger's methodological scrupulousness means a great 
deal of repetition of material as similar points are made in different 
terms, or from slightly different perspectives. One of the key patterns 
of continuity, which is also a reworking, and which maintains the past 
is the very common move of offering one account as a mere filling out, 
clarification of, deepening of a previous one. Everything gets 
reworked, but more primordially. As we have said all this is mandated 
by and also required for his hermeneutic method of investigation. 
How does Heidegger elucidate the existentiell dimension of 
anticipatory resoluteness which, he rightly says is essential methodo- 
logically, to avoid the charge that he is engaging in 'mere' theorizing. 
The existentiell dimension is necessary for the existentieLl' analytic, 
and it concerns all those modes of existence in which, while there is 
understanding, (self-)disclosurep etc. the'philosophical implications 
of these are not, as such, being drawn out. But if the existential 
requires the existentiell, the existentiell, to appear as such, has to 
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be displayed, and section 061 involves a series of ways of displaying 
at an existentiell level, the various ways in which resoluteness 
involves in an intimate way anticipation, with death as the ultimate 
horizon. 
The complexity of the relationship between existential/existentiell 
is enormous. Heidegger's method is one which gives the existential 
level a certain autonomy, at the level of thought, - but which insists on 
the need to ground any results. of that thought on the existentiell level. 
Thus resoluteness is said to have to 'take over' Dasein's 'guilt' and 
this is only achieved when Being-guilty is seen not as some act-related 
state, but as a constant condition. This constancy, itself has to be 
understood in relation to Dasein's potentiality for Being 'right-to- 
its-end'. This is as far as the existentiell account goes. But we 
know, existentielly, that this 'right-to-its-end' has to be understood 
as a towards relation, and ultimately as 'anticipation of-deathl. ---- 
This result of existential analysis must then be validated existentielly 
and that is what the section (061) is all about. And it is here that 
the question about constancy is raised. Heidegger wants to affirm the 
idea of constancy, but translate it from its connection with things 
present-at-hand, into a sense appropriate to Dasein. 
And that sense is surely this: Dasein, understood in terms of 
its Being, is only in terms of its potentiality-for-Being, that is, its 
Being is to be able to be in various ways. And one of the vital dimensions 
on which we can assess its Being is that of the degree to which Dasein 
has taken on board, appropriated, these truths. The constancy that 
attaches to one's 'Being-guilty' is thus not the constancy of a state of 
an objectt but of an existential condition of a Being whose Being is 
essentially bound up with its potentiality for Being. 
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Is it then still possible to ask the question (or has it already 
been answered) of the precise temporality of this Being-as-potentiality- 
for-Being? 17 
It is sometimes easy to feel that Heidegger's basic move is a 
reversal. Kant's reversal was to say that if we are in. time, time was 
first in us. Heidegger on the other hand thinks through, and deepens 
the metaphor of containment, and any reversal would have to be reformulated. 
Death, for example, is 'for-us', before it is anything 'in-itself'. But 
this 'for-us' is to be understood not as a reference to IsubJectivity' but 
to Dasein's Being. And Heidegger's discussion of resoluteness turns out 
to be a discussion of the modalities of our appropriation of our Being- 
towards-death. What is difficult to accept - and it is equally difficult 
to decide the status of that difficulty is that questions about the 
continuity, constancy and perpetuation of a certain potentiality-for-Being 
can be answered without resort to ordinary temporal categories. Resolute- 
ness as 'anticipatory' emphasizes the sense of its Being-towards-death, 
towards the ultimate possibility. But ordinary questions about how to 
understand the temporal status of resoluteness (eg. as an act of resolu- 
tion, as a momentary insight, as, once achieved, a permanent level of 
Being ... ) surely remain. Heidegger's strategy seems to be 
(a) to defer 
these kinds of questions to a later discussion of the temporality of every- 
dayness (b) to suggest a priority of potentiality-(for-Being) over 
actuality that would undermine any attempt to give weight to these ordinary 
questions'. 
In this light, let us consider certain of Heidegger's formulations 
in this section. First, it is clear that 'resoluteness' cannot be thought 
of within the temporality of an act. He writes 'By "resoluteness" we mean 
"letting oneself be called forth to one's ownmost Being-guilty"'. This 
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'letting-be' signals the refusal of act-psychology. What is this Being- 
guilty? A 'potentiality-for-Being'? And how can it be constantly 
guilty? 
It is 
I... not just an abiding property of something constantly 
present-at-hand but the existentiell possibility of being 
authentically or inauthentically guilty, In every case, 
the 'guilty' is only in the current factical potentiality- 
for-Being. ' (14306-) 
In so far as Dasein is understood as a potentiality-for-Being, it has no 
'is' independently of this potentiality for Being. Authentic and 
inauthentic existence are modalities of the 'is' dependent on whether 
the full understanding of this potentiality-for-Being has been appropriated. 
(Anticipatory) resoluteness seems to be the name for that appropriation. 
But again what of its own temporality? Heidegger writes 
'The explicit appropriation of what has been disclosed or 
di. scovered is Being-certain' 
'The primordial truth of existence demands an equi-primordial 
Being-certain, in which one maintains oneself free for the 
possibility of taking it back' (H305) 
Heidegger is trying to describe a certain resoluteness with regard to a 
situation which, maintains the possibility of determining the situation 
differently, without lapsing into an indeterminate or irresolute indecis- 
iveness. His solution is a kind of redoubled resoluteness. 
... this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself- 
free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which 
resolves to keep repeating itself'. (M308) 
It is this resolution to repeat that seems to bear the weight of the notion 
of constancy. But can it possibly succeed? There would seem to be 
two immediate difficulties. The first is that any problems attached 
to resolving would apply equally to resolving to resolve. The second 
is that unless the idea of resolving builds in its own success, it is 
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surely open to all the vagaries of time - bad memory, the dimming of vision, 
falling back into inauthenticity etc. And the only way it could guarantee 
its own success would be by referring to an act of disclosure, which 
would be judged in terms of its luminosity, etc. rather than its being 
sustained through time. And surely no reference to potentiality-for- 
Being is going to improve matters. A concept like constancy involves 
an achievement in time, and cannot be reformulated in terms of anticipa- 
tion, possibility, or potentiality for Being, without losing that sense. 
The desire for constancy can of course be so reformulated, but that is a 
different story. 
These doubts are, perhaps, ill-conceived. Are we not falling- 
back to an understanding of anticipation etc. which treats them as 
psychological acts9 albeit of a privileged sort? Surely anticipatory 
resoluteness is neither an act, nor a momentary state, but a certain 
mode of Being continually revealed in one's thoughts. behaviour, etc. 
or one revealed whenever it would be relevantly brought into play. 
That formulation, however, merely throws back to us the question of. the 
basis of this continuity. It cannot be habit, for that would reduce 
Dasein to being'the subject of properties like some sort of present-at- 
hand thing. It must surely be something like a, power of ontological 
disclosure which can both open up the widest horizon (and deepest dimension) 
for the appreciation of and determination of the situations one finds 
oneselfin, and can also see that this is directly applicable to all 
situations whether or not one does so apply it. This second clause is 
fundamentally only a weaker version of the. -redoubled resoluteness 
that we looked at above. It too leaves unanswered the question 
of how one moves - existentially or existentielly - from revealing 
experiences (beginning with and developing from the call 
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of conscience) to a life-permeating transformation. We claim that 
Heidegger can only multiply the levels and complexity of anticipation 
and desire. In the case of death, anticipation is not (from this point 
of view) problematic. For death, as the limit, as'a positive negation, 
is a single thiný. But the anticipatory transformation of the rest 
of my life, 
18 
the projection of the decisiveness of anticipatory resolute- 
ness onto the series of events which will trace my future, cannot be based 
on the supposition that the appropriation of death be distributed in 
dilute form, as it were, over every future event. 
By making this contrast we have left intact the suggestion that the 
anticipation of death is both' possible and legitimate and that it is a 
proper modalization of resoluteness. It is clearly vital to discuss 
this briefly for failure to understand these matters can lead to what 
Heidegger calls 'the grossest perversions'. Chief among these is the 
suggestion that anticipatory resoluteness is an attempt to escapedeath, 
to 'overcome' death. 
The Appropriation of Death? 
I take it the remark of Heidegger most vulnerable to such an 
interpretation is the one we quoted above and repeat here 
'When in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up 
(eingehelt) the possibility of death into its 
potentiality-for-Beingt Dasein's authentic existence 
can no longer be outstripped (Oberholt) by anything! 
(H307) 
The importance of the misreading that Heidegger sees as the grossest 
perversion is that it raises again the question of whether Heidegger 
is not (and if so whether he is right to) taking for granted the ideas 
of unity, identity and wholeness, of a life, and (merely) giving an 
existential underpinning (perhaps the only possible one) to that whole- 
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ness. We have already pointed out the importance of this for Heidegger. 
Without Dasein's Being-a-whole, he cannot make the move from an existential 
analysis of Dasein's Being to more general illumination of the question 
of Being. But a requirement of method cannot dictate what must be the 
case in any absolute sense. We say this not to begin toreject Heidegger's 
understanding of death, simply to say it is possible to deny it with no 
other immediate consequence than that Heidegger's own wider project wouldp 
in his own view be broken-backed. Heidegger's view seems to be based on 
the idea that a complete understanding of Dasein's Being requires an 
understanding of Dasein's. Being-a-whole, attested in an existentiell 
manner. With such attestation there is no possibility that the 'wholeness' 
one obtained would be a mere theoretical picture. In this light, is 
Heidegger right to deny the charge of trying of 'overcome' death? 
As we have suggested already, Heidegger seems to perform a certain 
inversion on death. When he first introduces the question he insists 
that death is 'not *to-be outstripped'. Now he says that with the antici- 
pation of death, it is Dasein's authentic existence that 'can no longer 
be outstripped by anything'. It might seem as though authentic existence 
has displaced death in this way. But the sentence clearly suggests that 
it is by virtue of having incorporated death (as possibility) that 
authentic existence has this status, not by contrast with it. Is there 
not, nonetheless, a sense in which by anticipation the fear, even terror 
of death has been muted? And is notthat an 'over-coming'? We must 
listen to the text more carefully. 
(1) 'Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, 
fabricated for the 'overcoming' eUberwinden') of 
death .... (H310) 
(2) 1 ... it is rather that understanding which follows 
the call of conscience and which frees for death the 
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possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence, 
and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-conceal- 
ments'. (H310) 
(1) Heidegger somewhat loads the question. The words 'fabricated for' 
suggest he might think his intellectual honour was at stake. It could 
still be that some sort of escape was the functional consequence of the 
concept of anticipatory resoluteness even if there was no fugitive 
intention. It is quite correct to say that at the level of everydayness, 
anticipatory resoluteness offers no escape from death, in the way thatt 
say, the elixir of youth might, if regularly imbibed. But in that quite 
literal sense, nor does the promise of life after death, where that life 
is spiritual rather than material. However Heidegger's point would be 
that this religious solution does deny that the event of physical death 
is a true end, and this finality Heidegger does accept. 
The crucial issue in assessing Heidegger's position is whether 
there is not a sense in which grasping the possibility of anticipating 
death rather than merely expecting it as an event, is not to transform 
one's understanding, and perhaps dispel one's fear of death. For on 
Heidegger's reading the fact that death, from one point of view, may come 
at an inconvenient time - too soon, too late - peacefully or painfully, 
is unimportant when compared to the question of whether one's existence 
when alive is illuminated by the possibility of one's death. Clearly 
if by 'overcoming' (Igberwinden') were meant either the denial of death 
or the lifting of its burden, then anticipatory resoluteness does not 
'overcome' or escape death. But it is nonetheless the case that 
anticipatory resoluteness is an appropriation of death, such that its 
primary significance is no longer that of something absurd, something 
radically externalg something which radically subverts the human endeavour 
- which is surely Sartre's position. Sartre takes Heidegger to task for 
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19 just this. The question however is how we understand the entity to 
which death has been appropriated - whether the appropriation of death 
completes a process of ontological closure, or whether it demonstrates' 
as powerfully as anything could, the impossibility of such a closure. 
(2) The second half of thesentence we quoted makes clear how it is meant 
to achieve the latter. For it portrays death not as something safely 
internalised within some enlarged concept of existence, but a's itself 
holding sway over Dasein's existence (as the possibility of the 
'impossibility' of that existence). If 'overcoming' death means a kind 
of cosy tranquillization then Heidegger surely does not do this. And 
when one reflects on the matter, the fact that Heidegger certainly does 
direct our attention from the mere eve nt of our biological demise is both 
thoroughly justified, and in no way a lessening of our concern with death. 
Heidegger transforms our understanding of death, but thenew shape it takes 
is no less powerful. 
We said we would consider both the possibility and legitimacy of 
Heidegger's account of the 'anticipation' of death. We have extended 
Heidegger's own defence against the charge that this is a form of escape 
in a way which makes some contribution to the question of its legitimacy. 
(Though even so it only denies one basis for its 1 egitimacy. ) But of 
course the question of its possibility, is not thereby decided. Something 
could be legitimate were it possible, but not in fact possible. We have 
already questioned the mode of achievability of anticipatory resoluteness 
and it would perhaps be worth extending this. 
The comments that follow carry a risk of misunderstanding Heidegger 
20 
to the extent of arguing what is his own position against him. The 
reader must judge. 
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Anticipatory resoluteness is a condensation of an account of how 
the recognition of one's finitude can effect an intensification of existence. 
That account is presented through a range of concepts - conscience, guilt, 
the call, anxiety, the 'they', for which Heidegger gives' existentiell 
foundations and to which'he applies existential clarification. Insofar 
as anticipatory resoluteiess is a condensation of such an elaborate 
account it will possess all the, strengths and weaknesses of the terms 
involved, and their articulation. The problem is surely that while 
one can give existentiell illustrations of these concepts, it-is quite 
another matter to demonstrate their necessity or completeness. That 
is simply a formal point. More concretely, it might be suggested 
(a) that the English (or modern) reader's difficulties with the idea of 
Z are not merely difficulties Ste= ng Dasein's'fundamental Being-LuiLt 'i 
from an inauthentic refusal of the thought, but from a deep suspicion 
of its (theological) roots in a particular tradition, 
(b) that even if in every case Heidegger will perform a shift of sense 
on the terms he employs (so that 'conscience' cannot be identified with 
the result of wrong-doing, for example, the-'the call' is neither audible, 
nor in words, nor from anyone else) it is surely still the case that what 
he, discusses is a deeper sense of these particular everyday words in the 
German language. What else could he do? it might be retorted. The 
point however is not to suggest an alternative, but to feel one's way 
to discovering the limits of his thought. What if anticipatory resolute- 
ness was unthinkable in some other natural language? (The philosophical 
privilege of the German language is hardly an acceptable position. ) 
21 
But quite apart from these gestures to radical cultural diversity 
there are surely other difficulties with anticipatory resoluteness, which 
centre on whether the disclosive orientation it captures is in any way 
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prescribed by our finitude, even when understood as our ultimate 
potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger, I would argue, follows Hegel in 
giving determinateness a privileged value for finite beings. In 
Entschlossenheit one focusses, one determines, one resolves. For 
Hegel, the alternative was to waste away in dreams and fantasies. 
For Heidegger, the alternative is being lost in 'the they'. It would 
of course be a separate project to compare the two thinkers on this. matters 
but they surely share a basic assumption, which is that the proper response 
to finitude is commitment - albeit retractable - rather than a mere 
wavering in indecisiveness. But finitude could equally teach a positive 
indecisiveness in which the failure to come to a decision would be no 
mere wavering, but eg. a deep suspicion of the frame of reference in which 
the demand for a decision is posed. It might be said that the very 
concept of Entschlossenheit rests on just this rejection of an, everyday 
eitber/or. And yet it still echoes the ordinary sense of decisiveness, 
resoluteness, at the same time as it insists on the radical distinctness 
of the authentic and the everyday levels. 'In such a distinctness, 
ambiguity is necessarily, methodologically, denied. (Indeed, such 
ambiguity was earlier (037) diagnosed as itself a form of everydayness. ) 
Consider what Heidegger says about wanting-to-have-a-conscience 
it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of taking 
action" (H310). Now Heidegger is at this point denying that antici- 
patory resoluteness is an unworldly attitude, so the reference to 'taking 
action' should be set into this context; action is not being stressed, 
it is simply the focus of his remark. 
But what sort of actions are being recommended? Surely taking 
a stand, telling the truth, honouring one's commitments etc. are the 
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models here. And yet the suggestion that once one has cleared away 
the 'incidentals' of one's everyday existence, freed oneself from 
illusions, these authentic possibilities of honest straightforwardness 
will remain, is surely itself illusory. Built into the whole idea of 
anticipatory resoluteness is a denial of ineliminable ambiguity, faith 
in a space of purity... Heidegger's position rests on a radical incom- 
patibility between resoluteness and illusion. But what if illusion 
was in principle not separable from truth? Indeed why does not Heidegger 
stress, as he does elsewhere with other forms of disclosureq*that it is 
accompanied by a necessary concealment? 
The notion of anticipatory resoluteness may not have a moral 
connotation to it, but it is hard to deny a certain seriousness of. tone. 
I will endeavour to bring this out by some comments on Heidegger's 
dismissive remarks about skiers. 
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Heidegger on Skiing 
Heidegger here takes as his model the peasant who silently puffs 
on his pipe and is in tune with his world. He contrasts this humble, 
honest belonging to the shallow pleasure seeking of the skiers who drive 
up from the city. It will be left to Sartre, who almost, certainly did" 
not read this piece of Heidegger's, to give an existential interpretation 
of skiing; Heidegger's thought seems wholly negative. ' What is character- 
istic ofthe peasant's-W'Orld? The regular beat of the changing seasons, 
the repetition of simple pleasures, a life in which little changes .... 
And the skier's? Our response to Heidegger would be this:, First he 
knows what the peasant may not - that the peasant's world is not the 
only one. The visitor to the Provinces may, of course learn nothing 
about himselfo but the peasant can not even begin the journey. And 
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what of the skiing itself? It is an elaborate act of pleasure, one 
which shows no return. For the peasant this would be wasteful. What 
use has the peasant forthe brightly coloured ski costumes, the waxed 
fibreglass skis? And why do the skiers just go up and down? The 
peasant can see no point in this Sisyphean activity. And think of 
the skiers conception of time. For the peasant every day, in its 
season, is much like the rest, a sequence of reassurances. He is a 
creature of tradition, repeating what he has seen done by his elders. 
The skier is different. His element is speed, 
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technique, controlp 
risk, a play on the edge between gripping the snow and fallingt perhaps 
suffering injury or even death. For Heidegger the skier makes the 
world of the peasant into a spectacle. But this. reduction of the 
skier and his world is itself the consequence of reducing the skier 
to a spectacle. 
How do these doubts of ours relate to anticipatory resoluteness? 
If we allow that skiing for pleasure has bound up with it risk, excitement, 
and a taking pleasure in playing at the very limit of control, we might 
suggest that this is an alternative way of appreciating finitude in the 
project of the intensification of the present. It is one in which the 
future is anticipated, but always in the form of danger, unlike the 
present, for whom the main danger is-to'become lost in the illusions 
of the city. For the skier the question of his Being-a-whole is not 
posed. What matters is whether he can cross a certain slope, execute 
a certain turn at a certain speed, gracefully, skill-fully, in control. 
In an important sense, the whole problematicof lownmostness' 
24 
and 
authenticity dissolves, and not in passive pleasure, but in'active 
boundary play. 
278 
We have taken seriously Heidegger's dismissal of the skiers because 
it can be seen as a symptomatic refusal to contemplate a radically different 
mode of Being-towards-death, a refusal which undercuts the necessity which 
Heidegger gives to his analysis. However, the idea of anticipatory 
resoluteness remains, and even if it represents a questionable ideal of 
authenticity, it does provide us with something enormously importanto 
perhaps the answer to our complaint about the unresolved question of its 
temporality. For when Heidegger discusses its relation to careq and the 
temporal foundations of care, he provides us with something of a model 
for understanding, at least one important possibility of existential 
temporality -a complex articulation underlying the structure of care 
("ahead-of-itself-Being-already- in (a world) as Being-alongside entities 
encountered within-the-world") - and its role as the basis of 'projection'. 
And it is his development of, the idea of 'temporality' from the structure 
of care'that we shall now pursue. 
Care and Temporality 
One can see at a glance that 'care' has a tripartite structure to 
which past, present and future can easily be made to correspond. It is 
hard to imagine that this consequence did not influence Heidegger's 
original characterization of care! But the re lationsh ip between the 
three parts has to be shown to be other than a simple juxtaposition. 
And to this end, Heidegger links authentic care with anticipatory resolute- 
ness and elaborates the multiple projective overlapping of modes of 
temporality that are involved in anticipatory resoluteness. In this 
multiple projectivityt temporality itself is disclosed. 
As is true of the whole of chapter 3, the section 065 in which 
this is carried out bears repeated reading, and it is hard to do it 
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brief justice. We shall simply illustrate and comment on certain. of 
Ireidegger's formulations to show how anticipatory resoluteness is deemed 
capable of effecting this temporal condensation and intensification, 
and hence, how temporality itself appears. 
We can set the scene. by noting the primacy of the future for 
Heidegger. This devolves from the primacy of Being towards death, and 
from the kinds of existential moves required to give sense to Dasein having 
a relationship to its own wholeness. The future is conceived of not as 
a reservoir of new 'nows' but rather as what makes possible 'the coming in 
which Dasein in its ownmost potentiality for Being, comes towards itself'. 
But how, then, do the other temporal ecstases come in? Heidegger argues 
(H325-7) first that Dasein! sfuturity and pastness are intimately connected, 
and that ultimately the future has priority. 
25 He does so beginning from 
his understanding of Dasein as Being-guilty, as 'being the thrown basis 
of nullity'. This sets a condition on any authentic anticipation (future 
oriented) that Dasein is first recognised as an 'I-as-having-been'. And, 
at the same time, one's rootedness in the (absolute? ) past of one's own 
nullity can only be existentially manifested in our relation to the future. 
("Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having-been". ) 
Having a past is one thing, but for one's past to be part of one's being, 
one must first exist, projectively - that is towards the future. And yet 
anticipatory resoluteness situates itself, in situations, -, by making- 
present'. This 'present' he treats as what is released by the future as 
it becomes a future that Ihas been'. And he uses these interlacings to 
define temporality. 
'This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes 
present in the process of having been; we designate-it 
as "temporality". (Zeitlichkeit). I (H326) 
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Heidegger will then proceed to spell out the temporal map underlying the 
structure of care in a way that is fairly obvious. 
Let usnow comment on temporality as Heidegger has just introduced 
it, for we are fast approaching crucial questions about the connection 
between time and Being. Heidegger rightly and at all costs wants to avoid 
any understanding of-the articulated structure of time that would give to 
its discrete component some sort of independent status. But there are 
easier ways than the one Heidegger pursues to achieve this. We could 
(as Kant and Husserl did) simply talk about time as subjective. However 
Heidegger's critique of the 'subject' and Isubjectivityl. precludes that 
option. For him, temporality emerges as an articulation of modes of ',. 
Dasein's Beingt itself thought in terms of the structure of care, and of the 
'authentic' care he calls anticipatory resoluteness. So all the onto- 
logical delicacy which attaches to his discussion of Dasein's Being is 
equally applicable to his account of temporality. 
When we apply temporal predicates to things, the question tradition- 
ally posed is whether to count the resulting 'objects' as real. Do 
future or past things possess Being? When they are applied to Dasein, 
they modify - in necessary and fundamental ways - its Being. They answer 
the question how. And the sign of this in Heidegger's formulations is 
the expressive 'as'. Dasein is an 'I-am-as-having-been', 'the future 
as coming towards', 'as-it-already-was', 'as authentically futural... 
etc. 
?6 
Heidegger has already discussed the 'as' structure explicitly, 
it appears as the structure of interpretation. In the as-structure 
interpretation lays out the meaning of its subject matter: _ 
'the 'upon- 
which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible 
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as something' (H151). This account suggests only one of the aspects of 
the 'as' which are important for understanding how Heidegger uses it in 
introducing temporality. -Here the 'as' represents a dimension of 
explicit disclosure. But it does not merely function in interpretation. 
The as-structure is, as it were, part of the structure of Dasein's Being. 
Equally it locks temporality into the question of Being. Heidegger has 
attempted to displace the traditional problematic of the self as substance 
with the explication of the structure of care, with temporality as its 
fundamental structure. And problems that have always accompanied 
Heidegger's talking about Being'and Nothing arise again for temporality. 
And Heidegger attempts the same'Iormulation. 'Temporality' is so much 
not the name of an entity that it seems to Heidegger misleading even 
to allow it to function as the subject of a predicative 'is' let alone 
the 'is' of existence. He'is'happy only, with the explicative verb 
form 'temporality temporalizes (itself)' (Zeitlichkeit zeitigt) (H238) - 
to which Idas Nicht nichtet im selbs tj27 should be seen to correspond. 
Heidegger's formulations here have important implications for our 
ultimate assessment of his success in having found. in temporality an 
adequate basis for his account of Dasein's Being, and equally, for our 
assessment of his account of temporality itselfý- 
'Temporality', he writes, Itemporalizes 'possible ways of itself. 
These-make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being and 
especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence,. 
(H328). It is when he proceeds to a discussion of temporality as the 
'ekstaticon' that the radicality of this really emerges. 
Temporality as the 'ekstaticon' 
In an important sense the whole of Heidegger's discussion so far 
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has been concerned to elaborate a non-metaphysical conception of 
iemporality. But it is only too easy to say that by going existential 
one somehow transcends metaphysics. In the last few sections the precise 
way in which the investigation of Dasein will yield the required result 
has become clearer. His persistence in posing questions in terms of 
Being has more and more convincingly opened up the possibility of a thinking 
that does not centre itself on things, on substances, on the present-at- 
hand. With Heidegger's discussion of the ecstases of temporalityl he 
accomplishes at one and the same time both a grounding of Dasein's Beingt 
and a transformation of our understanding of time. " 
From our brief discussion of the 'as' of temporality, it would 
seem both to fill out, and yet in the end to constitute Dasein's Being. 
The relation of temporality to Being might be said to have something of 
the structure of supplementarity as Derrida describes it. 
28 Here, 
however, with Heidegger's discussion of the lecstases', the Derridean 
parallel is surely Idifferance'. 
29 And Heidegger himself focusses on 
more of the little words: ' 'to', 'towards', 'alongside', 'being, ... etc. 
with which the various modes of temporality are articulated. They each 
mark a primitive break-in self-identity, for which Heidegger-uses the 
Greek-derived word lecstasis'. In clearly Hegelian language, he describes 
temporality as 'the primordial 'outside-of-itselfl and for itself'. 
And he continues: 'Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which 
first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing 
in the unity of the ecstases. 1 (1432. q) 
In other words, primordial temporality is difference rather than 
identity. It is not something 'from-which... I but the 'from which' 
itself. Heidegger calls it a process, and yet it is not one process 
among many. It is prior to all entities, and all entity-dependent 
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forms - such as 'events', and 'processes' ordinarily conceived. These 
lecstases' are fundamental modes of 'activity', and the need for such 
formulations as 'temporality temporalizesIbecomes clearer. Temporality 
is only in its temporalizing. That is not just one of the things it 
does. 
Heidegger's discussion of temporality, and its awkward and 
tautological syntax forms one of the strongest arguments for a continuity 
of project between Being and Time and his later writings, including 
Time and Being, where all these same difficulties re-emerge. (Ereignis 
is an 'event' but an extra-ordinary one; we cannot say simply that it 
, is I .) 
30 
One of the key consequences of this exposition of primordial time, 
is that it means that we can treat our ordinary understanding of time- 
C ... a pure sequence of Inows', without beginning and without end') 
as a 'levelling-off' of the ecstatical character of primordial temporality. 
And in particular it obscures (a) the primacy of the future 'ecstasy', 
and (b) the fact that primordial time is finite. These claims are 
interesting and important for different reasons - the first because it 
raises a rather interesting methodological problem. Heidegger later 
came to reject the primacy of the future. 
31 How is this possible? 
When we referred to his claim that it is only as futural that 
Dasein can 'be authentically as having been', we were not in fact able 
to find any very convincing arguments for the dependence between the two 
being unidirectional. Dasein's finitude has a clear future flavour to 
it, but when thought of as the 'possibility of my impossibility' that 
flavour is somewhat dissipated. I am finite backwards too, after all. 
Dasein's projectivity, again, even if one thought to apply it primarily 
to the future, might equally well be said to depend crucially on my 
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thrownness, and on what in each case I bring to bear on the situation, 
6ut of the past. 
But, more pointedly than these three ways of bringing a certain 
reasoned doubt into the 'primacy of the future' thesis, there is the 
methodological question - how could Heidegger have got it wrong? What 
scope is there for error in existential analysis? And if acknowledged 
here, where else might it reside unacknowledged? Paradoxical questions 
arise at this point: for Heidegger, interpretation rests on a fore- 
having, fore-conception etc. If we question their disclosive adequacy 
in this case we still seem to confirm the primacy of the future! 
Disclosure-in-advance seems to be the condition on which the status of 
the future would be judged. If this circularity is not to be a defecto 
it must either be that this hermeneutic priority of the future is quite 
legitimately self-justifying, or that the priority of the future disclosed 
in advance is itself of a different order. And to explain how the 
priority of the future could be dropped, the same alternatives arise. 
It may'be that the thought, responsible for the fading of the future is that 
disclosure cannot be adequately thought on strictly temporal lines, and 
with the advent of time-space comes a falling away of the future. The 
horizonal features of spatiality displace the primacy of the future. if 
such speculation has any basis, it will run parallel to doubts about the 
possibility of a distinctly primordial time, and consideration of this 
topic must await our discussion of Time and Being. 
The second claim - that primordial time is finite - is interesting 
for a different reason. On the one hand it undermines our confidence 
in the ordinary concept of time as infinite in both directions, 
(Heidegger argues that this infinite time is the product of a levelling- 
off of finite time). But on the other hand, there is an important sense 
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in which the two concepts of time are compossible, and have their own 
spheres of valid application. 'For Heidegger agrees that time goes 
on after my death. Infinite time andfinite temporality are in a sense 
compossible because incomparable 
'The question is not about everything that still can 
happen I in a time that goes on I, or about what kind 
of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter 'out 
of this time', but about how 'coming-towards-oneselfl 
is, as such, to be primordially defined. Its finitude 
does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is charac- 
teristic of temporalization itself. The primordial and 
authentic future is the 'towards-oneself' (to oneself) 
... I (H330) 
In fact there is a tension between the claim that time and 
temporality are derived one from the other, and the claim that the two 
have their own legitimate domains. 'Heidegger is arguing uphill for 
the legitimacy of conceiving primordial time as finite, and in doing 
this he both wants to acknowledge that time appears endless, while 
insisting on a place for a temporality that is not. And a legitimate 
place for that temporality is ensured by arguing that infinite time 
requires it. His argument is basically that the ordinary understanding 
has not understood infinite time. And for this understanding we need 
to go to primordial temporality, for which the distinction between finite 
and infinite is significant. But, as the last but one sentence we quote 
above makes clear, finite and infinite are not really in opposition, 
because finite does not mean 'stopping', 
This both makes Heidegger's position easier to accept, and more 
difficult to understand. Consider the last sentence above, in which 
Heidegger jokingly alludes to Husserl's 'to the things themselves'. 
What this brings home to the reader is that the idea that for Heidegger 
existential time is just concerned with the humanly meaningful organization 
of time, is quite mistaken. This may be our loss. What he is committed 
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to, it seems, is a sense of time or temporality in which the guiding 
thread is the transformation into a temporal framework of the problem 
of selfhood - of self-gathering, returning to self, self-fulfillment 
The question this raises is whether there is room for, and whether 
Heidegger can himself provide room for, an understanding of human 
temporality which is neither harnessed to the question of self-hood, 
nor to the simplicities of 'the ordinary understanding of time,. if 
not, we may come to suspect that his guiding question, the question of 
Being, has functioned not only to illuminate, but also to limit. These 
questions must be pursued in relation to his discussion of Dasein's 
everydayness, historicality, and the phenomenon of within-timeness. 
When Heidegger introduces these themes he sketches out the kinds of 
relationships he will establish between them. Both everydayness and 
the within-timeness of things will be seen to be dependent on primordial 
time and historicality will modify primordial temporality itself. 
Equally he points forward to yet another level of analysis ýin which 
the concept of Being is discussed in principle' that is not in fact 
provided, but only, again, suggested at the very end. (083). 
%ý,, Heideggerls Treatment of Time and Temporality: 
A Critical Analysis of Being and Time 
CHAPTER THREE 
Time and Temporality 
Temporality and Everydayness 
In a later chapter (see Part III, ch. 3) we discuss a variety of 
temporal structures, those that borrow their organization from the texture 
of language, some that mingle representation with experience$ and others 
which may seem free of all representation. We argue that the understanding 
of time as structured in various explicit ways does not in itself reek of 
authenticity or inauthenticity., Heidegger does give everydayness both a 
derivative and yet a positive status. But will it supply the horizon of 
intelligibility for the outstanding issues to which we have alluded? or 
will it insist on reducing their pertinence to the problematic of every- 
dayness? Our next task will. be to assess the status Heidegger accords 
feverydayness'. What is at issue is the precise way in which the sphere 
of everydayness is demarcated, and the insight it gives us,. by contrast, 
into the values constitutive of authenticity. 
We all have what might be called an everyday understanding of 
'everydayness'. And to a large extent Heidegger relies on this, both 
in the sense that he himself does not make clear its precise meaning. ' 
and in the sense that it names a pre-philosophical or reflectively in- 
explicit mode of existence, but one which for all that can serve as a 
starting point. 
1 His 'preparatory analysis of Dasein' relied on it, 
and so does much of what he wants to say about temporality. The chapter 
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he devotes to discussing its links with temporality (11.4) 'gives more 
content to it, but opens as many questions as it resolves about what it 
is: A number of claims can be made ina preliminary way. Everydayness 
is not the same thing as inauthenticity. The latter is something like 
the 'self-satisfaction' of the former, the belief in or assertion of its 
adequacy. Everydayness is a way of existing characterised by evasiveness, 
a reduction of existence to familiarity, the domination of a kind of 
shrunken horizon of complacency. 
The very word 'everydayness' (Allt! z; glichkeit) suggests, correctly, 
a link with time (a link which would be lost if, for examples one thought 
to equate everydayness with common sense. ) At the end of this chapters 
and indeed the previous one, Heidegger anticipates his further discussion 
of this connection by pointing to the need to discuss Dasein's historicalityt 
and his within-time-ness. But here the inner connection is best amplified 
by his account of daily life (071) as the breeding ground of existential 
complacency. Everydayness both has as its domain of application one's 
common, daily, repeated, unsurprising mode of existence and also derives 
from this repetition a certain limitation of vision. Dailiness constitutes 
a frame of reference by which possibilities are determined in advance, and 
in which the borddom and dullness this generates seek constant diversion. 
The concept of everydayness therefore already embodies an interpretation 
of time. In consequence the relation between everydayness and temporality 
with which Heidegger here deals is more intimate than one might imagine. 
2 
Let us first chart the course of Heidegger's discussion of every- 
dayness in this chapter. Everydayness is a mode of Dasein's Being-in-the- 
world, and as such exhibits a disclosedness distributed across the structural 
limbs of care. The temporality of everydayness can most economically be 
described by following the sequence they offer: understanding, state-of- 
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mind, fallingg and discourse. With the exception of discourse, each will 
be claimed to exhibit the dominance of one particular ecstasy, in such a 
way that the tri-ecstatic structure of care and of temporality is confirmed. 
Heidegger has also discussed our general Being-in-the-world in terms 
of our distinctive relation to things ready-to-hand and present-at-hand 
(Zuhanden, Vorhanden) and has argued for the derivativeness of the latter 
from the former. Insofar as these can be seen to exhibit a temporal dimension, 
he will try to show that any objectified or objectifying (egg scientific, 
theoretical) understanding of things merely 'present' will be derivative 
from the time of our practical involvement in the world, that of Icircum- 
spective concern'. Here it becomes clear that everydayness, for all its 
deficiencies in relation to the possibility of authentic temporalizing 
that can develop out of it, is nonetheless the true, positive ground of 
our temporal being, and the presupposed basis of any representations of 
time. Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of the scientific neutral 
projection of beings as 'present' leads him to question yet further how that 
thematizing or objectifying is possible. His answer is that it rests on 
Dasein's transcendence. And this too has to be understood temporally. 
(The same claim (later withdrawn) will be made for Dasein's 'spatiality' too. ) 
Dasein's transcendencel not distinct from that of the world, is accomplished 
by temporality in relation to the things we encounter. Temporality 
provides the ecstatic-horizonality of that encounter, articulating a 
dimension in much the same way as the syntactic articulation of language 
allows the transcendence of mere things ('present-at-hand') in the world. 
(Indeed intense and mood the temporal and linguistic modes of articulation 
co-incide). 
Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of everydayness clearly 
demonstrates three things: (1) the immense resources of temporal signi- 
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ficance buried in the structure of our daily existence, (2) the possibility 
of understanding more theoretical and representational ways of thinking 
of time as founded on or derived from these resources, (3) (a corollary 
to M) the power of a temporal hermeneutic, by which we can come to 
understand the deeply layered significance of existence in temporal terms. 
This chapter alone is a strong argument for the claim that it is indeed 
structures of time that can give 'content' to the 'is' of human existencet 
that would otherwise have to be defined negatively (man is not a thing 
etcý). To say that man is a temporal Being does not immediately resolve 
the question of how to talk about his Being in a non-objectified wayo but 
it does hold out the prospect of such an understanding. The problem of 
talking, about Being and of talking about Time are the same problemo and 
the analysis of the'temporal structures of Dasein's Being shows, in an 
exemplary and privileged way how this can be so. 
Appreciation of the general aims and accomplishments of this chapter 
does not however absolve us of critical responsibility. And any departure 
from its precise conclusions will of course require that our appreciation 
be tempered by a critical appraisal. We begin by, looking at his dis- 
cussion of the temporality of disclosedness. 
First, a brief word about disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), and its 
fundamental importance for Heidegger. It unites two vital features of 
Dasein's Being as Heidegger presents it. On the one hand it captures 
the way Dasein is not a closed-off substance but is rather articulated 
in various dimensions of relatedness. We could call this disclosedness 
an essential articulation. At the same time, these dimensions of 
disclosure constitute the truth of Daseint the modes of its openness, and 
are presupposed by any other sense of truth as propositional, represen- 
tational etc. If disclosedness is fundamentally temporal, then this 
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essential outside-of-itself of Dasein will also have a fundamentally 
temporal sense, and Heidegger will have accomplished, or taken vital 
steps toward accomplishing, the task of substituting for any substantial 
atemporal sense of self, a radically temporalised interpretation. The 
systematic working-out of the temporality of disclosedness follows the 
structure of care, as we have said, which will cover understanding, state- 
of-mind, falling and discourse. We. shall not attempt a survey, but try 
(a) to draw out the analytical distinctions Heidegger makes; (b) to 
comment on the interpretive achievement at a general level; (c) to 
pose specific difficulties with particular analyses. These specific 
difficulties will, we believe, add up to (and indeed are motivated by) 
doubts about the drive to formal and systematic completeness that is - 
exemplified here, which is itself predicated on the persistence in this 
3 
work of foundationalist thought, undertaken in all seriousness. 
Consider, first, that mode of disclosedness, that existentiale, 
to which he gives the name understanding. This is not the name of a 
cognitive achievement, as one might think, but a primitive condition 
for a whole range of capacities. Abstractly and primitively, Heidegger 
defines it as 'to be projecting towards, a potentiality-for-Being for the 
sake of which any Dasein exists!. He goes on,. 'In understanding, one's 
own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in such a way that one's Dasein 
always knows understandingly what it is capable of' (H336). Those two 
remarks point, respectively, to what might be called the temporal/structural 
question and the ontological question. We shall deal with the former, 
and in a way that should be seen, in part, as exemplary for the other 
dimensions of care. 
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The Privilege of the Future 
There are three main analytical claims: (1) that this projective 
understanding unifies, in its temporalizing, all three temporal ecstases. 
(2) That it nonetheless does this in such a way as to give the future a 
dominant role. (3) That each of these can occur in an authentic or 
inauthentic manner. 
Suppose we use the expression 'ahead of itself' as a neutral term 
for Dasein's futurity. This can take the authentic form of anticipation, 
in which Dasein 'comes towards its ownmost potentiality for Beinglq or 
inauthentically, in which Dasein 'awaits this (potentiality for Being) 
concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its 
concern' (H337). Expectation of future events occurs within the horizon 
of awaiting. Again the crucial distinction between the authentic and 
inauthentic forms is that the inauthentic understands Dasein's potentiality 
for Being in terms of beings, and loses the distinctive sense of Dasein's 
Being. 
We can portray the primacy of the future to understanding with' 
reference to his discussion of the present. It too has an authentic and 
an inauthentic form. The inauthentic Present is called lmakingýpresentl, 
a 'being-alongside the things with which one concerns oneself'. An 
example, one presumes, would be being engaged in an activity to which one 
was paying attention (listening to bird-song, writing carefully, neatly 
arranging the books ... The authentic present, on the other hand, 
he describes as the 'moment of vision', and here the primacy of the future 
stands out more clearly. This 'moment of vision' actually occurs in 
the present, (and indeed what it discloses may not survive the passage 
of time) but more importantly it brings to light the possibilities latent 
in a situation, in a"rapture which is held (ideally) in resoluteness. ' 
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The moment of vision occurs in the present, but points to the future in 
iýs projection of possibilities. 
Heidegger also distinguishes between forgetting and repetition of 
the past, but we shall pass over these for the moment. 
The significance of the primacy of the future and this account 
of the authentic present should not be underestimated. For if Heidegger 
is right in supposing that the history of philosophy has been charact- 
erized by a metaphysical privileging of the present, and of presence, 
then we have here two different directions from which this privilege could 
be unseated. The primacy of the future suggests that no attempt to find 
some foundation, or ground, or privileged point in present experiencet' 
intuitiont &c. will succeed, because the meaning and value of what that 
'present' reveals will always be subject to a reference to the future. 
But secondlys Heidegger's distinction between an inauthentic and an 
authentic present is such as to correct any remaining interpretation of 
the present as a 'now', For the now-present belongs to the specific 
mode of temporality known as within-time-ness (see below). And the 
moment of vision, both because it is an ecstatic rapture, and because it 
is subject to the future, I ... in principle can not be clarified in 
terms of the 'now'. ' (H338). The privilege of the present can never 
be the same again. 
Ambiguities of Authenticit 
In mentioning the authentic/ inauthentic distinction we have already 
broached what we called the ontological question. Let us now spell it 
out. Heidegger distinguishes knowledge of facts from understanding one's 
potentiality-for-Being. He writes, as we have seen, 
'In understanding, one's own potentiality-for-Being is 
disclosed in such a way that one's Dasein always knows 
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understandingly what it is capable of. It 'knows' this, 
however, not by having discovered some fact, but by 
maintaining itself in an existentiell possibility. ' (H336) 
But this formulation is surely problematic. We have suggested 
above that Heidegger's account of the structure of existence is an 
attempt to give voice to, make sense of its distinctive 'is', (and thence 
to that of Being in general). There are two ways, however, in which 
this could be achieved. (1) The distinctiveness of the existential 
'is' would be seen in each of the elements of the temporal structure so 
distinguished. (2) It would appear in the unity of that structure; 
Heidegger has made so much of the unified structure of care, and of the 
triadic unity of every mode of temporalizing that we might think he had 
opted for the second alternative. But surely the remarks above show 
that the problem of the 'is' is merely dispersed'among the different 
existentials. The assertion that gives us trouble is this: 'Dasein 
always knows understandingly what it is capable of'. And our difficulties 
with this go deep into the heart of the idea of authenticity. Heidegger 
seems to us not just to be treading a very narrow line, but from time to 
time to be falling off it onto the wrong side. Authenticity is a way 
of beingt and as such to give it content is both a temptation and a 
danger. The temptation is one that language keeps offering us - to 
say something about it. The danger is that what one says will be 
radically misleading. Does not Heidegger run this risk with this remark? 
What can it be to always know what one-is capable of? Heidegger's gloss 
is that Dasein Imaintain(s) itself in an existentiell possibility'. But 
surely this language, and indeed the whole problematic of authenticity 
betrays its own phenomenological ground - which is that of-the problem 
of (one's own) Being, of a sense of not being wholly identifiable with 
one's everydayness, of having to define one's Being without guidance, 
in the midst of anxiety etc. Authenticity, then, is surely closer to 
a not knowingg a self-questioning, a desire to know oneself for which 
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there is no guarantee of satisfaction. One tendency of Heidegger's 
thought is surely such as to convert this self-questioning into a 
prescription of a positive existential possibility. Such a conver- 
sion would suggest that the problematic of authenticity was, after all, 
in the service of a re-establishing of the self at a higher level, 
rather than the continual re-affirmation of its epistemological fragility. 
These doubts could be summarised as the suggestion that Heidegger 
may have transformed a negativý phenomenon into a positive one. But 
the same point could be formulated somewhat differently. Heideggerg- 
it might be said has made a condition of possibility into a, discrete 
phenomenon. Could this not be claimed for his general, account of 
disclosedness, and perhaps even of his descriptions of the temporal 
ecstases? Take understanding, again, as an example. If we exclude 
from understanding, as we are meant to, any sense of projection that 
would involve either factual knowledge or prediction or planning, surely 
we have nothing left that could ever be entirely. separated from newly 
conceived modes of worldly involvement? These may indeed be so con- 
ceived as to embody a certain self-understanding or to exclude another 
inadequate one, but the idea of a knowledge of one's 'potentiality-for- 
Being' that was not either a negative revulsion at a particularly anonymous 
or unchosen mode of involvement, or a, new commitment with the new 'content' 
this would involve, is surely a fiction. 
Heidegger's discussion of the temporality of disclosedness is not, 
of course, confined to understanding and we must indicate somewhat more 
succinctly, the kind of specific things he has to say about state-of- 
mind, falling and discourse. The question we ask is what does this 
temporalising re-run add to our understanding of these existentials? 
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Are There Dominant Ecstases? 
In the case of the temporality of state-of-mind - mood - the most 
striking claim is not that temporal predicates are essentially (and 
illuminatingly) attached, but that there is again a dominant ecstasy, 
and that it is the past. Heidegger takes as exemplary the cases of 
fear and anxiety. Contrary to the common-sense view that fear is 
primarily oriented to the future, he, argues that it rests on a clinging 
to what one has (or is) already, in the face of some disturbing possibility. 
After all, he says, we could be faced by something threatening without 
feeling fear. What one already is must, as such, be threatened. Now 
there is real merit, in this demonstration that the future is not alone 
in determining the temporality of fear, but surely his argument for the 
priority of, the past is unsatisfactory. For it could, symmetrically, 
be said that one's sense of what one already is (such that it might be 
threatened) could actually emerge only at the point of being threatened. 
Might it not be fear that crystallizes the 'already'? And certainly 
without the threatening future, one might just be complacently absorbed 
in the past and present. If the threatening future is so clearly what 
distinguishes fear from a sense of security, how could one fail to credit 
the future, 'yet again, with the privilege? A similar point could be 
made for anxiety. And Heidegger's interpretive efforts on other moods 
seem to us to fare no better. 
We would like to make two comments on this whole question of a 
privileged ecstasis. 
(1) Even when less than totally plausible, the interpretive effort 
involved is not wholly unfruitful. It provokes a searching scrutiny 
of the less obvious temporal dimensions involved, for example. And it 
enables the claimed unity of temporalizing in each case to take an ordered 
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f orm. For instance, he claims that I ... anxiety ... must ... come back 
as something future which comes towards (zukunftiges) (H343)1. The 
'as' and the 'which' rest upon the determination of the 'come back' as 
the focus for modification. Might the need for diagnosing a dominant 
ecstasy in each case be a grammatical one? 
(2) The particular case of 'mood' requires a comment similar in spirit 
to our doubts about the positive presentation of Dasein's 'potentiality 
for Being'. And again it is a doubt that would accentuate a particular 
side of our double reading of Heidegger. Moods are understood from the 
outset as 'bringing us back to something' (H340), and in eqlaining how 
hope, which seems primarily futural, really is not, he talks of it as 
'hoping for something for oneself' (H345) (-an 'already' self! ). In 
each case, the philosophical value of moods is that, far from being 
mere emotional clouds on the clear sky of the intellect, they reveal us 
literally under to ourselves in our thrownness. Now this thrownness 
stood clearly involves a reference to the past, but more abstractlyp if 
what it means is the 'that it is' of Dasein, then it is not specifically 
the past that is privileged. Moreover it can seem gratuitous to bring 
in one's self and one's 'having been' self in particular, (a) as if there 
were not moods in which the self is not entirely left behind, or margin- 
alizedt and (b) as if we could not eg. hope for others' happiness (which 
would mean that that one does not always 'hope for something for oneself'. 
The claim we are making, broadly speaking, is that Heidegger's 
discussion of the temporality of mood, while correctly eschewing any 
reduction of mood to twinges and tweaks, or to mere emotional disturbances, 
seems nonetheless to understand them as disclosive of a possibility of 
authentic selfhood. This seems to us to rest on a dubious privileging 
of the past in this case, and a challengeable optimism about givIng a 
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positive characterisation of what anxiety discloses. Even more succinctly, 
Heidegger is using temporality in the restoration of a sense of human 
self-identity, one which we would prefer to leave an open question. 
It might be said in reply that it is anxiety above all else which 
puts in question all our worldly attachments, all our commitments, and 
any worldly'sense of selfhood. Anxiety is justý the opposite of'complacency 
... etc. This reading would make Heidegger intothe hero of non-identity, 
of fragmentation. A double reading is required, however, because of the 
ease with which what anxiety discloses is named and pressed into service. 
Heidegger's discussion of disclosedness makes a further contri- 
bution to a re-evaluation of the status of the present both in his 
discussion of the temporality of falling and of discourse. The temporal 
significance of falling (which can only have an inauthentic form) lies in 
the way it represents an entanglement, eg. in mere curiosityl in the 
affairs of the present. Discourse, however, is somewhat more interesting. 
It has always been clear that 'discourse' was different in type 
from the trio we have just dealt with (understanding, state-of-mind, 
and falling). They by themselves disclose the 'there' of Dasein, and it 
is this that discourse then articulates. Linguistic articulation is 
only a possibility for discourse, and as such it does not have a primary 
ecstasis of temporalization. However, in its familiar form of spoken 
and written language, he claims, discourse is typically dominated by 
'making-present', addressing itself to the significant world about us. 
Heidegger makes this claim very briefly largely because much has already 
been said about discourse in Division 1 (034). But in all its innocence 
it is actually a very important claim. For it takes a very clear position 
in debates about the respective privileges of reference, meaning, and play 
in languaget one which would seem to give circumstantial application (here 
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and now reference) the privilege. And yet it is not difficult to argue 
that reference is only possible if language is constituted by a structure 
(or play) or differences, or differential functions whicý do not them- 
selves carry any primitive referential power. 
4 It is only on such a 
position, it has been suggested, that it is possible to take account of 
that literature and those literary effects that break with referentiality. 
This is perhaps too large an issue to be explored here, but it is not 
without relevance to his next move. 
The Intrinsic Temporality of Language 
Anticipating the position we ourselves offer in a later chapter 
5 
Heidegger offers a further very condensed discussion of the intrinsic 
temporality of language. He distinguishes (a) the fact that discourse 
can discuss time, temporal processes etc., (b)-that it takes place in 
time, (c) that it is temporal 'in itself'. And it is of course this 
last which is the most-revealing, and is itself revealed in the fact of 
'tense' and 'aspect'. Tense and aspect in discourse themselves require 
a grounding 'in the ecstatical unity of temporality'. ' The time of. 
language, in other words, is derivative from the time of existence. 
Now this is a crucial claim. It means that the reason for the 
inadequacy of ordinary temporal concepts for understanding the time of 
language is much clearer. It further means that existential problems 
that take an explicitly linguistic form (eg. how to rescue the 'is' from 
the status of a mere copula) can be more appropriately dealt with. it 
is also crucial in that it might conceal a more complex relation between 
the temporality of disclosure and existence than it suggests. We discuss 
this in greater detail below. 
6 
We will take this opportunity simply to lay down some questions. 
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Would the dependence of the temporality of discourse on that of existence 
survive a radical interrogation of the foundationalist model implicit here? 
If we come to doubt that 'in any discourse one is talking about entities' 
(H349) would we not have released discourse at least from being informed 
(and constrained) by a particular rhetorical mode? If the link between 
discourse and existence is retained, what would be the effect on our 
understanding of the temporality of existence if our understanding of 
the temporality of discourse were, on independent grounds, to change? 
The possibility of some of these questions bearing fruit should be assessed 
in the light of our persistently critical approach to a whole succession 
of Heidegger's formulations. The claim will be made that Derrida's 
writing supplies the theoretical justification for just such an attempt 
at a transvaluation of the relationship between discourse and existence. 
And most importantly, it does so without compromising Heidegger's claim 
that ordinary concepts of time are inadequate to comprehend either. As 
we indicated at the outset, Derrida will claim that the concept of time 
itself is circumscribed by metaphysical motifs, a claim we shall dispute. 
We have made a number of critical claims in the course of our 
appreciative discussion of the temporality of disclosedness. We have 
voiced our doubts about the possibility of giving a positive significance 
to authenticity, and suggested, in the specific case of understanding, 
that it might better be understood negatively, or as a condition of 
possibility. We have expressed reservations about. Heidegger's claim. 
that each of these modes of disclosedness has a dominant ecstasy. And 
we have suggested that Heidegger's account of temporality for all its 
revolutionary impact is still subservient to the problematic of self- 
hood, and the project of restoring a sense to the self. But we also 
promised a general comment on this section. 
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Heidegger has been engaging in what we have called a hermeneutic of 
temporality. And notwithstanding all of our doubts, there is no doubting 
the success with which he has demonstrated that the most fundamental 
phenomena of human existence (or at least those he has chosen to focus on) 
are susceptible to, and are greatly illuminated by being rethought in 
temporal terms. Of course the possibility of doing this rests heavily 
on the way he has transformed our ability to articulate-the temporal 
dimensions of existence, in the form of iterable modifying phrases, q thus 
supplying what we have elsewhere called a Ivirtual, temporality, for 
every apparently simple position, orientation, projection etc. -And 
we do not mean to patronize when we say that it is Heidegger's exampletquite 
as much as the particular results he arrives at, that is so enormously 
compelling. We criticized as unconvincing, for examplel his account of 
fear, which as a state-of-mind is meant to be based on Dasein's having- 
been (rather than, as is popularly held, on the future). But whatever 
the truth of the matter, the temporal multidimensionality of fear 
is incontestable and Heidegger has made the search for such dimensions 
into an intellectual habit (in the best sense). 
The Time of the World ' 
It might however be argued that the temporality Heidegger has 
displayed is limited to Dasein in its self-understanding, or to a 
'subjective perspective', or at least that the existential dimension 
is being considered very much from the point of view of Dasein, and with 
little reference to the world. And interesting as this might be, the 
place of time cannot be so limited. Surely Heidegger needs to offer 
some sort of account of what we think of as the time of the world? In 
Heidegger's view such an account is only now possible: the temporality of 
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'concern' (our involvement with the ready-to-hand) can only be understood 
on the basis of (in the language of)'the more general temporality of 
disclosedness already developed. And if his earlier analysis is correcto 
that the present-at-hand is derivative from the ready-to-hand, it is 
only now that we can pose the question of the temporality of the present- 
at-hand, of the theoretical attitude, and of the transcendence of/by the 
world that makes it possible. In short, Heidegger believes he can 
follow through, in a logical sequence, the derivation structure of 
temporality - the theoretical being based on the practical, the practical 
on the disclosedness of the 'there' in general, and the theoretical also 
presupposing the possibility of transcendence, which possibility is 
itself to be understood temporally. In following this through we shall 
complete our discussion of Heidegger's account of the temporality of 
everydayness. 
Central to Heidegger's being able to open up this new dimension- 
of temporal reflection is his original conception of Dasein as Being-in- 
the-world. And for Heidegger, it is the ready-to-hand that is primitive 
here. His general argument for its fundamental temporality goes like 
this: we relate to things with which we are concerned not singly, but 
within a framework, which he calls 'the equipmental totality,. And that 
relation is one in which we projectively disclose (= understand) the 
involveme nt of one item of equipment (a typewriter) in an equipmental 
context. 
7 Heidegger uses the expression 'letting be (involved)' which will 
emerge later and more prominently in such essays as 'Gelassenheitt. 
8 
Even here there is as much importance in the word 'be' as in the 'letting'. 
What is at issue is the constitution of the specifically ready-to-hand 
mode of Being. 
Now if we are dealing with a case of understanding, we know, from 
our previous analysis of the temporality of disclosedness that its 
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structure is fundamentally temporal. His way of showing this is to 
insist that the relation of involvement (which he dubs a 'towards- 
which') between an individual item and that context of use in which 
it is located; is one which, as an example of projective (i. e. pre- 
thematic) 
9 
understanding, must itself be understood not as an 'analytic 
relationship but as a dynamic, or better, temporal one. And the two- 
way relationship (between part'and whole) is characterised by the terms 
awaiting and retaining. 
'The awaiting of what it is involved in, and ... the 
retaining of that which is thus involved, make possible 
in its ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative 
way in which equipment is made present' (H353) 
and 
I ... (this) making-present ... makes possible the 
characteristic absorption of concern in its equipmental 
world' (H354) 
In almost Husserlian language, Heidegger insists on the debt of the present 
to past and future projectivity. 
At another level, one which necessarily compromises the authenticity 
of such a mode of involvement, the possibility of the kind of absorption 
and loss of reflection that_goes with it requires 'a specific kind of 
forgetting'. And the interest of such a comment lies in the fact that 
it shows how - given the Heideggerean problematic of authenticity - the 
complexity of temporality is not confined to the possibilities of over- 
lapping or modifying ecstatic projections, but that any one such complex 
can itself be the result of or made possible by, an essentially temporal 
move at another level - in this case, forgetting makes- possible 'the 
unity of a retention which awaits' i. e. absorbed involvement. 
10 
With this analysis of the temporality of involved concern, Heidegger 
can and does proceed to show how it allows him to make sense of those forms 
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of Icircumspective 
things break down, 
other way 'obtrude 
these succumbs to, 
awaiting. 
11 They 
concern' with the ready-to-hand which arise when eg. 
are damaged, go missing, surprise us, or in some ' 
from their inconspicuous context of use. Each of 
is illuminated by an analysis in terms of retaining/ 
take us an important step closer to the emergence of 
I the theoretical attitude (069(b)). The important move Heidegger makes 
here is to claim that the theoretical attitude is the result of change- 
over' from that of practical manipulation. What is particularly in- 
teresting is his denial that this 'changeover' is simply the result of 
the suspension of the practical attitude. When that happens 'our concern 
then diverts itself specifically into a 'Just-looking-around'. 
There is surely little doubt that it is Husserl and his account of 
the suspension of the natural attitude that he has in mind here. Heidegger 
argues in fact that the active circumspection (eg. checking equipment) 
often born from our suspension of practical activity, is again, not theory. 
However, it is his contention that the theoretical (scientific) 
vision is derivative from the circumspection that can arise out of practical 
involvement. Such circumspection, based on Dasein's basic care structure, 
takes as its object the world of equipment, and although it involves a 
break with unreflective involvement', also 'brings the ready-to-hand closer 
to Dasein' by interpreting it within if-then frameworks of utility. 
There follows an account of what Heidegger calls 'the genesis of 
theoretical behaviour', one which is supposed to demonstrate the temporality 
underlying this behaviour, and, if the title of the section is to be 
believed, of the transition itself. Heidegger's line of thought seems 
to involve the filling in of various steps, and the implications of these 
steps, from practical involvement to theoretical detachment. Circumspectiont 
for exampleg is a making-present which brings to light the if-then structure 
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of Dasein's deliberation. But what is thereby linked together in if- 
then relations must already have been understood as this or that. And 
understanding something as something, in which the future and having- 
been are drawn into the present, provides circumspective understanding 
with a temporal foundation. 
Now, although it is far from clear in his exposition, I take it 
that Heidegger is saying that 'understanding-as' is the closest we get, 
on the side of the ready-to-hand, to a radically new mode of relating to 
the world as present-at-hand, between which two there is a 'new way of 
seeing', one which marks the gap between the hammer being heavy and the 
hammer possessing weight as one of its properties. 
This particular move, even in the elaborate version Heidegger gives 
us, is surely disappointing. We may in some sense have been prepared for 
it, but it seems to be more descriptive than explanatory, andq moreover, 
to little involve anything significantly temporal. It is important then 
to realize, as Heidegger insists, that even if it is possible to have the 
ready-to-hand as such, the 'object' of a science (eg. economics), the 
fully scientific approach involves a completely new projection of the 
Being of the present-at-hand. And it is here, I take it, that the 
temporal foundations of the theoretical, scientific attitude are truly 
found, for (taking physics as the paradigm): 
'In this projection something constantly present-at-hand 
(matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened 
so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive 
items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, 
force, location and time). (H362)1 
Heidegger is saying that the physicalist model - in which space and time 
are mere qualitatively determined dimensions - has an existential ground. 
That this is fundamentally temporal might be thought clear from the 
reference to this as a projection (which takes us back to underitanding, 
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the temporality of which has already been shown) and to its being 
,a priori'. 
12 But for Heidegger, this peculiarly scientific kind of 
making-present, a unique form of disclosedness, grounded in Dasein's 
Being-in-the-world, has its temporal foundations best illuminated by 
an account of the temporality of the transcendence that its thematizing 
presuppose. 
A superficial comparison of Being and Time with Time and Being 
might try to develop the idea that the latter abandons the possibility 
of a purely temporal perspective in favour of time-space. Heidegger's 
attempt (070) here to subordinate Dasein's spatiality to its temporality 
might be thought to support this view. Both readings would be mistakeng 
and it is Heidegger's account of the transcendence 'of' the world that 
makes this clear. The key word will be 'horizon', recycled from Husserl. 
A brief word: the 'of' in 'transcendence of the world' is a 
subjective gentive. It refers to the 'world's' transcendence. Equally; 
it refers to Dasein's, transcendence (qua Being-in-the-world). What is 
transcended? Both Dasein and the world, or, Dasein as-being-in-the- 
world, are transcendent in relation, to I things conceived of as just 
there, present. But how? Heidegger's answer, in a phrase, is Dasein's 
'ecstatic-horizonality', and the claim is surely a brilliant one. 
The world, understood as a unity of significance, involving such 
relationships as 'in order to', 'towards-which', and 'for-the-sake of' 
is essential to Dasein's being and vice-versa. And to each of the, temporal 
ecstases we have already isolated corresponds a Ihorizonal schema': 
'The existential-temporal condition for the possibility 
o7f the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an 
ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon'. 
(H365, Heidegger's emphasis) 
And the distinct horizonal schema (future ["for-the-sake-of-which"3; 
having ["in-the-face-of-which"]; present ["in-order-to'3 ) constitute a 
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unitary framework within which things in the world can-be encountered. 
Two comments on this: (1) it*can helpfully be contrasted with the 
Kantian treatment of time as the form of inner intuition. On such a 
view, time would be subjectively real, but in some sense an imposition 
on our experience. Heidegger, borrowing the word 'schemata' from, , 
Kant's 'Schematism of the Understanding', shows how it is possible (and 
sketches the possibility in principle), to see temporality not merely 
as a subjective condition but as constitutive of the world itself. 
This account of course both rests on and further consolidates the original 
insistenceýon understanding Dasein as primitively Being-in-the-world. 
(2) That these ecstases constitute dimensions of significance of the 
world is surely incontestable. But that they are the last word on 
what makes transcendence possible is less clear. ý The other obvious 
candidate is languagei or discourseý At every level - the individual 
word, the assertion, the complex articulation of tenses - language 
exhibits a transcendence in relation to what it discloses. If it is 
thought of as constitutive (in whole or in part) of, the world, then its 
candidacy is ensured. But the status of language, certainly in Being 
and Time, is limited. Propositional truth rests on a-pre-predicative 
disclosedness, discourse articulates pre-theoretical understanding, tense 
reflects Dasein's primordially ecstatic conditions. Language seems 
derivativet and at best a 'supplement'. And yet (a) one cannot fail to 
notice that Heidegger later comes to credit language with a much more 
originary role. (b) Even in Being and'Time, the argument is borne on 
the shoulders of tiny but vital words (in the face of, in order to, IasIp 
'is' etc. [vor, um-zu, als, ist]). Minimally, one might suggest that 
his consideration of the temporality of transcendence at least raises 
the question of the role of discourse here, and of the inner relation 
308 
between language and time. 
Critical Reflections 
What is the status of Heidegger's discussion of the relation between 
everydayness and temporality, and what conclusions can we draw from it? 
Above all else, We have to recognize the tension in the notion of every- 
dayness. For it names both the basic and normal condition of Daseinp 
one on which the possibility of there being a temporality at all depends 
("Temporality is essentially falling" (H369)). It is, in other wordso 
an inestimable source of temporal significance. (Indeed, he writes, 
... at bottom, we mean by the term "everydayness" nothing else than 
temporality' (H371)). And it is also a way of being characterised by 
evasion, suffering, (self-)dispersion, and 'enigma after enigma'. if 
Heidegger equates everydayness and temporality, is it enough to say that 
authenticity is a modification of everydayness in order to make sense of 
the idea of 'authentic temporality'? The notion seems to be all too 
I 
easily squeezed out. Heidegger's own remarks suggest considerable general 
uneasiness. He doubts whether 'the explication of temporality ... so far 
is sufficient to delimit the existential meaning of "everydayness"'(H370) 
- and his final chapters on historicality and within-time-ness will attempt 
to make this good. But he repeats a sentiment that has become increas- 
ingly frequent in this chapter - that the clarification of the meaning of 
Being in general is the ultimate aim of the book - one which as we shall 
see, remains unachieved atAts conclusion. 
Our own response to this vital chapter must now be formulated. We 
have already drawn together a number of our critical themes - our dis- 
satisfaction with the role played by authenticity in its negative descrip- 
tion of the phenomena of everydayness (eg. as a forgetting of one's own- 
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most potentiality-for-Being), with the attempt to exclude representation 
from his description of primordial temporality, and with the'attempt at 
assigning dominant ecstases to the different modes of disclosedness. 
And we have taken a persistent interest in the relegation of the structures 
and functions of language to a secondary status in relation to time. 
What if they could not be separated? (Heidegger's discussion of the 
las'(H360) could serve as a point of departure). But there are one or 
two particular criticisms so far unvoiced, that it would be appropriate 
to, now bring forward. 
The Temporality of Pleasure and Desire 
We could ask, first of all, whether Heidegger's whole existential 
frame of reference, for all its internal subtlety does not reflect a rather 
traditional and unexamined view of the nature of everyday life - which is 
essentially that of purposeful activity, means/ends relationships, etc. 
As a hermeneutic of the temporality of concern, it is surely unrivalleds 
but the place of such concern is surely not established beyond question. 
There would seem to be two lexistentials', ones perhaps of greater . 
importance than he would allow, not covered by such an account, existen- 
tials which have their rightful place in 'everydayness' - those of 
pleasure and of desire. And what is important about them (and in this 
they are doubtless not unique) is that they may be thought to suggest 
modes of temporality somewhat disruptive to Heidegger's overall aim. 
To convincingly demonstrate this, even supposing that these terms 
(pleasure, desire) could be innocently deployed without a glance at their 
philosophical (and wider cultural) history, would be an enormous task. 
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It might however still be of some value to stimulate a re-reading of 
Heidegger's account by suggesting certain limitations. 
We could distinguish pleasures into those which are ontologically 
conservative (which reassure) and those which are ontologically sub- 
versive (by exhilaration, by rupture, by challenge etc. ). 
13 Let us 
hold on to the second, and add to it a third pleasure, which we shall 
begin by calling ontologically innocent - say the taste of honey, 
14 
Let us further distinguish two types of desire - that desire which 
seeks to fill a lack, to remedy a deficiency, and that which proceeds 
from an original exuberance. Again, we shall hold on to the latter. 
There is no doubting that in each case, the overlapping modifica- 
tions of Heidegger's temporal language would be appropriate, often reveal- 
ing. But we claim that in each case, Heidegger could only treat their 
unrelatedness to a self negatively. And yet their significance is in 
no way confined to that of a 'forgetting' of my potentiality for Being. 
They cannot be regarded as deficient modes of my coming-towards-myself. 
The 'taster of honey' may be tasting, enjoying, 'a 
liberation from the 
whole question. of his rpal Being. And,, the man of jouissance, or of 
exuberant desire has found a mode of action which is not a mode of self- 
enactment. The clue to the break with Heidegger's account that these 
each involve is the positive disappearance of a projected horizon of the 
future. The future is allowed to be absolutely other. 
The Ordinary Conception of Time 
To the extent that Heidegger's account of existential temporality 
is successful it also poses a problem: how are we then to think about 
time? For there is a clear sense in which Heidegger, like Husserl has 
brackefted out the question 'of time to deal with temporality more ef f ect- 
ively'. By 'time' we mean something that was not immediately obviously 
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just a mode of Dasein's Being,, but could capture the thought that events 
take. place 'in' time, that certain operations 'take' time, that times 
can be shorter or longer than one another etc. In our ordinary way of 
thinking about time, even if it is not a thing, it seems to have some 
independence from our individual Dasein, it seems to serve as a dimension 
in which things out there arise anddecay. The book is titled Being and 
Time, so what can we now say about it? If Heidegger is right, it is only 
now that he can properly answer the question. For his answer will consist 
of a complex derivation of our ordinary understanding of time from those 
most primitive modes of our temporality. - It is complex, because as we 
shall see$ it involves a number of stages, and because it involvesýa 
certain reflexive redoubling of temporal structure. At a vital moment, 
the'full'existential horizon of temporality is forgotten. And, forgetting 
is itself a mode of temporalization. The ordinary conception of time,, as 
a series of 'now' points, dominated by the levelled-off present, is an 
inauthentic temporalization of (primordial) temporality. The import 
of this analysis is two-fold. On the one hand, it serves to explain the 
origin of the unreflective references to time that we make in countless 
everyday expressions. 'On-the other hand, it also enables Heidegger to 
offer an explanation of the source of what in his view has become the 
standard philosophical treatment of time, from Aristotle onwards. We 
shall take the opportunity at a subsequent point to discuss the way 
Heidegger amplifies his views of the traditional philosophical treatment, 
in his Baýic Problems of Phenomenology, and how this affects D6rridals 
discussion of a seminal'footnote on Arlstotle in Being and Time in his 
essay "Ousia and Gramme". The question will be the one with which we 
began our treatise: whether and how far Heidegger still shows allegiance 
to the traditional metaphysical understanding of time. Let us first 
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look at derivation of wi thin- time-nes s and of the ordinary conception of 
time. 
In his discussion of circumspective concern he had argued that it 
was 'grounded in temporality ... in the mode of a making-present which 
retains and awaits'. His first move is to say that to each of these 
there corresponds what we could call a mode of temporal reference. These 
can be thought of as represented by the words 'then' 'once' (as in 'once 
upon a time'), and 'now' (dann, zuvor, jetzt). To each of these temporal 
references, there corresponds a horizon, for which, again, we have simple 
words: later on, today, and earlier. And implicit in our. use of words 
like once, now, and then is a further elaboration, such as 'once, when' 'then 
when' etc. In other words they play their part in a relational structure 
of datability. And in such a use the primacy of the 'now' already becomes 
clear. For the references 'once' and 'then' refersýto a past and future 
'now' respectively. We can see, then in the primitive activity of temporal 
reference which he calls datability (no calendar dates need be involved) 
the emergence of the privilege of the now as 'making-present'. 
This set of corresponding triads of words was obviously not intended 
by Heidegger as an explanation of the possibility of giving dates, because, 
he immediately asks the question, implying that he has not yet answered it, 
of how this datability is grounded. The common sense answer supposes 
that there are points of time, and that these temporal references simply 
indicate them. But if we are seeking an explanation of such expressions 
as 'now thatIp 'once when' etc. this will not do, for such 'points' would 
have to have a significance which they aret as-such, incapable of bearing. 
Databilityl then, has to be grounded in something by which significance 
can be bestowed. Heidegger's answer is that expressions like 'once when', 
'then when', 'now that' reflect not just an interpretation of what I am 
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concerned with, but also a self-interpretation. Dasein is expressing 
itself as 'Being-alongside the ready to-hand'. Moreover, it does so in 
the form of a 'making-present'. This is quite obvious. We say now, 
then etc. (a) within a certain interpretive context, in which we are 
involved ýeg. recounting one's life, reminding the other of a promise, 
remembering a scene etc. ) and one does this from the point of view of 
and with reference to 'the present'. It might be asked why, if we always 
mean 'now that', 'then when' etc. we do not always spell out the tacit 
elaboration of significance. Heidegger's answer employs the reflexivity 
we noted above. We do not because although the ecstatic character of 
temporality is built in to each act of dating, it equally gets covered 
up in each 'making-present'. 'Making-present' hides its own ecstatic 
character in the 'now'. 
In addition to these cases of what we have called temporal reference, 
that go to make up datability, Heidegger shows how Dasein understands 
itself not only in relation to temporal points, but also periods. He' 
explicates phenomenologically Dasein's spannedness, stretched-out-ness, 
through such simple phrases as 'during', 'meanwhile', 'until-then And 
he could have talked of the continuous present tense. It is this spanned- 
ness that makes it possible for Dasein to 'take time (off)', to Ispend! time, 
to 'have' time to spare etc. and for every temporal reference to have its 
own span (some Inows' are longer than others! ). 
But this spannedness, stretchedness, of Dasein cannot be understood 
in terms of a sequence of nows. It does not, for one thingg offer the 
guaranteed (if spurious) continuity of such a sequence. So what is its 
basis? Clearly a linguistic phenomenology is not enough, as we saw 
before. Heidegger's answer is that our ordinary stretching along, our 
ordinary ability to think of ourselves as living in spans of time, is an 
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inauthentic falling away from that projected stretching ahead of oneself 
opened-up in the 'moment of vision'. 
'One's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes 
itself as something that has been stretched along in 
a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the 
authentic historical constancy of the Self'. (H410) 
The person who says he has no time for this or that has (inau then tically) 
lost himself in objects of immediate concern, and to someone for. whom the 
moment of vision is no longer operative. In other words, Heidegger inter- 
prets the possibility of periods of time in terms of ecstatic temporality, 
transformed and covered over. But is this not confined, as we have 
formulated it, to each individual, one at a time?. Where do we get the 
idea that we share the same time? Heidegger's answer is that the signi- 
ficance of expressions like 'now' and 'then' is one that rests on our public 
Being-in-the-world. We do not always mean precisely the same thing by 'now' 
even when we say it together, but the everyday disclosedness of Dasein, is 
something all the, more shared for being everyday. Indeed it is one of 
the distinguishing features of this public time that we think of it just 
as something 'thereis', in contrast to, say the authentic understanding of 
time in relation to one's ownmost-potentiality-for-Being. 
But in a sense this only raises more problems. For one might 
well think that we had only been offered an explanation of how 'public 
time' arises rather than an account of what 'it is' that has so arisen. 
And Heidegger insists on the need to return to such a question., We 
might, for example, still wonder whether this 'public time' was something 
we imagine, project, impose on the real world, or whether, it was really 
there. In his view, these sort of metaphysical questions only get 
confronted seriously by detailed phenomenological work. 
The publicness of time cannot be dependent on the business of 
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applying numbers, the quantification of time, for there is a reckoning 
with time which is altogether more primitive, and which is quite sufficient 
to establish a public time. Moreover it is one in which the question of 
whether time is objective or subjective seems out-of-place. The difference 
between day and night, and the height of the sun in the sky, supply us all 
in a publicly available way, with a grid for the assigning of times)one 
that applies equally to the natural and the social world. This is the 
first clock, on which all subsequent clocks, or at least all subsequent 
use of clocks ultimately depend, Heidegger insists, however, that 
'temporality is the reason for the clock'. 
His sometimes complex formulations have as their goal (a) to 
demonstrate the dependence of any sense of time as an autonomous thing, 
on its being 'publicl, (b) to show that its being public is dependent on 
our utilzation - in a shared world -. of natural and manufactured clocks 
for measurement and dating, (c) that such utilization has tobe undetbtbod_ 
in existential. terms, and (d) that these terms are ultimately temporal in 
their significance. 
What is the relation between this public time and the 'world'? 
What can be made of the expression 'world-time'? Heidegger presses 
forward his demonstration that our use of simple temporal words has a 
built- in-worldly signif icance. Time references often have a built-in 
element of appropriateness or inappropriateness. We talk of 'time 
for ('Time for teal) and again, a reference to the present betrays 
the structure of awaiting-retaining that extends its ultimate reference 
beyond, the present. But this significance structure that we are drawn 
into is nothing other than the world itself. This public world-time 
is not something in the world, but part of it, belongs to it. Perhaps 
the relation could be summed up like this: concern structures the world 
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and is rooted in temporality, and the temporal way it structures the 
world appears as time. 
Heidegger, as we have mentioned above, has claimed the peasant's 
world as his inspiration, but he does not want to restrict his discussion 
of public time to the way we can make appointments by measuring the length 
of our shadows, however significant such primitive time-reckoning might 
be. He is interested in the existential significance of the fact that 
we have moved on from there to the increasingly sophisticated use of 
clocks etc. and, as he might have added had he been writing a few decades 
later, to the regulation of clocks by the vibration of a caesium atom, 
even more reliable than the sun in its travels. 
A Phenomenology of Measurement, I 
At this point, Heidegger attempts, in effect, a phenomenology of 
the measurement of time, a move which both confirms and yet in another 
way challenges the berridean claim 
15 
that Heidegger is still wedded to the 
traditional Aristotelian view which connects time with measurement. 
Heidegger's response must be, of course, that the connection is undoubtedly 
there and the question is whether phenomenology, and in particular this 
existential phenomenology can transform our understanding of that connection 
in a significant way. We discuss this question explicitly below. 
There is more to telling the time than looking at a clock. -We can 
see the hands, even their spatial position and the divisions-on the face 
of the clock, but we do not see what time it is unless we already bring 
an understanding of time to bear on our looking. 
'when we look at the clock and regulate ourselves 
according to the time, we are essentially saying 
'now" (H416) 
and as he saysp this 'now' has already been understood in terms of 
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Idatability, spannedness, publicness, and worldhood'. Heidegger is 
surely right here, in supposing that-our use of clocks already pre- 
supposes temporality. Think of what it is like to wake up after a 
doze and wonder after looking at one's watch, whether it was morning 
or evening. It would not make sense to say that one knew what time it 
was but one did not know whether it was morning or evening. And yet 
one might know that it was 7.30. 
Versions of 'Present' 
What is the ontological significance of our ability to tell the 
time? Heidegger's answer to this begins with a paragraph (H416-7) that 
deserves a certain unpacking. * For anyone who relies at all on the English 
translation of the work, 'it becomes essential at this critical point 
for our understanding of the significance of a'phenomenological reading 
to return to the German-original. A number of translation choices that 
are justified independently come together to wreak confusion. 
Etymological connections are lost when'they are important, and parallels 
appear which were never intended. 
In the sentence that ends 
I ... an entity which is present-at-hand (vorhandenen) for everyone is every "Now" (Jetzt), is made present 
(Gegenw*a*rtigen) in its own presence (Anwesenheit)l (H418) 
the word 'present (-ce)l I occurs three times, in various forms, in English, 
where three quite different words are employed in German, And the sentence 
beginning the paragraph to which we first referred makes it far less 
mysterious how Heidegger connects making-present with retentive-awaiting: 
'Saying "now", however, is the discursive Articulation 
of a making present (Gegenwirtigens) which temporalizes 
itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting (behaltenden 
Gewartigen)l (H416) 
To these illustrations, we should also add the words 'the Present' (die 
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Gegenwart) (literally, the 'waiting-towards') and 'in the past, 
(gegenwa"rtig). The complexity of the interconnections between these 
words, (to which in all forms, the translators allude in their footnotes 
to H25), raises all manner of questions which we hardly know how to 
begin to answer. Is Heidegger's whole problematic, or parts of it, 
(eg. the etymological suggestion of futurity in the literal sense of 
'Gegenwart') dependent on the peculiarities of the German language? 
(If we tried to do the same thing in the same way in English, might we 
not conclude that the present was a pre-esse, that 'is before', with 
roots in the past? ) Still one might at least confirm the importance of 
the connection between time and Being by such etymologizing. And 
Heidegger might well argue that the ontologico-etymological parallels 
between par-ousia, an-wesen, and pre-sent (L. praesens, praesentumt 
prop. pres. ppl. of praesse, to be before, to be at hand; _SOED p. 
1573) 
were obvious enough. There is a remaining difficulty: if for Heidegger 
the historical 'translation' of Greek temporal terms into the Latin 
language represent 
. 
ed a covering over of the temporality of time 
16 
then 
the attempt to recapture Heidegger's claims in a term (present) with 
Latinate roots may be a further historical reversal. The same would, 
of course, be true of French. While one might occasionally find, if 
not solace, at least an explanation for the difficulty of understanding 
Heidegger in such a consideration, one's hope must be that even if such 
a problem did exist, it could be overcome (a) by awareness of it, (b) by 
having a multilingual basis of comprehension, and (c) by the use of 
subtle syntactic forms to compensate for the unwanted implications of 
the terms we must use (eg. the verbalizing tautology - Idas Nicht - 
nichtet', 'the present presences'). Clearly Heidegger thinks one 
even needs them in German. 
17 
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It will be appreciated that a presentation of Heidegger's 
phenomenology of measurement - which, as we have suggested comes to a 
head at H416-17f - is far from easy. Although we are writing in English, 
there is a sense in which it is an Anglo-German hybrid that is getting 
written in English. It might therefore be helpful to remind ourselves 
of one or two of Heidegger's fundamental claims about what history has 
done to our understanding of time, claims first made in his famous 
section "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology" (Being and Time, 
06) (see our Part II Introduction above). 
Heidegger believes that it is only in ontology that the fundamental 
questions can be posed, that the possibilities of ontological thought were 
once open to ancient thought, but closed off by their particular formula- 
tions and need toýbe re-opened. The key to this de-struction is that it 
was always in relation to Time that Being was interpreted. For them, 
... the meaning of Being 
(was) ... 7r; k pour I Ok or OurIaL 
which signifies in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' 
("Anwesenheit"). Entities are grasped in their Being as 
'presence': this means they are understood with regard to 
definite mode of time - the 'Present'. ' (H25) 
There are two points here: (1) 'presence' is an ontological term; 
'present' is a temporal tem. The claim is that the temporal has 
determined the ontological. (2) A definite 'mode of time' has been so 
privileged, i. e. the present, rather than the past or the future. 
Heidegger's aim is to re-evaluate both of these connections. For the 
reader the fundamental interpretive question must be: does Heidegger 
accept the determination of Being by time as 'presence' (and simply want 
to give a new sense to 'presence') or does he want to challenge the 
relationship more fundamentally? Derrida, as we shall see, will claim 
the formerl 
18 but it might be more accurate to say that with Heidegger 
the question becomes undecidable - which is not to say that we cannot 
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decide, but that in a sense the terms in which the question is posed 
hgve themselves been put in question. 
Discussing the waning of the importance of 'dialectic' after Plato, 
Heidegger continues 
... Aristotle 'no longer has any understanding' of it, for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a 
new level (aufhob). At"yowp itself - or rather Yoglv' - 
that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its 
sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken 
to guide him in his own interpretation of Being - has the 
temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. 
Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, 
and which are understood as entities in the most authentic 
sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; 
that is, they are conceived as presence (H25-6) 
Both our fundamental mode of awareness and the things of which 
we are aware, both poles of intentionality, to use Husserlian language, 
are indebted to an emphasis on a specific temporal mode - making-present 
(Gegenwgrtigens). The possibility of a phenomenological investigation 
seems here to reside in a certain receptiveness to etymology. 
A Phenomenology of Measurement II 
Let us now turn to the task of elucidating Heidegger's phenomenology 
of measurement. We will first briefly explain what Heidegger is doing, 
and then comment in more detail. 
What is Heidegger doing? He is giving a temporal interpretation 
to the apparent immediacy with which we 'tell the time' and understand 
and measure intervals in time. 
which he begins to explain this. 
We have already cited the sentence in 
When we say 'now' we are giving voice 
to a 'making-present' (Gegenwgrtigens) which temporalizes itself in a 
unity with a retentive awaiting (behaltenden Gew*a*rtigen), (H416). In 
other words, the immediacy of the 'now' dissolves in an activity in 
which a bringing about of the present, making-present, presencing, 
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presentifying grasping/affirming something as present, is itself 
'performed' only in conjunction with an orientation that points both 
forwards and backwards. What we relate to in this measuring activity 
is something Vorhanden, something just 'there' ("present-at-hand". ) as 
it seems. But our relating to it, involves more than just passive 
receptivity -a 'making-present'. There is a sense in which the 
measuring of an interval involves a double relatedness to the standard' 
by which I take it he means the 'unit of measurement' say the way the 
clock is divided into minutes, hours etc., and to the actual extent of 
the interval. Each of these is confronted as something present-at-hand, 
and measuring consists of a making-present of what is thus Vorhanden. 
We may not think of ourselves as relating to Time as such when we measure 
it, but the-fact that measuring thinks it is dealing in a public way with 
a present-at-hand multiplicity of Inows' provides a basis for its 
subsequent theoretical interpretation. 
It might be said (and many, including Bergson have said it), that 
the measurement of time involves a (misleading) spatialization, but- 
Heidegger's response is that the 'space' supposed to be responsible for this 
is itself dependent on temporality, and so we are not dealing with a 
misplaced transformation of modes. Measuring is not a reductive spatial- 
ization but a specific making-present. 
-What does all this tell us about time's ontological status? 
Clearly 'time' is made public by the institution of measurement and 
things can have 'times') attached to them as soon as they are seen to 
be 'in' this public time. However, this time in which it is possible, 
for things to be 'in time' is neither objective nor subjective (ie. in 
Heidegger's language it is not Vorhanden (present-at-hand) in any way. 
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We could call it 'objective' (though it is no 'object') insofar as it is 
the 'condition for the possibility of entities within-the world'. it 
is certainly not just (with Kant) the form of inner intuition; it is 
encountered in the world just as immediately. Again we could call it 
subjective, but only as a condition of 'the Being of the factically 
existing Self' - not as some psychical faculty or component. What then 
is the status of this world-time, this time-within-which? We cannot now 
think of it, if we have followed Heidegger's argument, as a Dasein- 
independent framework. Rather it is a product of 'the temporalizing of 
temporality'. Keeping this in mind allows us to see through these false 
ways of construing time as either 'objective' or 'subjective'. Within- 
time-ness is both a legitimate and important phenomenon, but it also 
hides its own temporality in its immediacy. Through it, the everyday 
concept of time becomes intelligible. 
Heidegger's moves here are surely commendable. He is giving a 
plausible account of how we can think of 'time' as fundamental without 
adopting the usual course of calling it either 'objective' or 'subjective, 
while yet managing to keep in the air at the same time the fact that its 
status is distinct from and makes possible particular things (, in time'), 
its publicness, its role as condition of factical selfhood, and its 
relation to the (significant) world. 
Aristotle and the Ordinary Concept of Time 
With this account of what it is to be 'in' time, of the time 'in' 
which things are to be found, he is now in a position to offer an , 
explanation of how our 'ordinary conception of time' (as a series of "now"- 
points) has arisen. Heidegger explicitly and for the first time acknow- 
ledges (0819 H421) that what he has been offering is 
I nothing else than an existential-ontological 
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interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time' I 
(which was I... that which is counted in the movement which we encounter 
within the horizon of the earlier and later'). It is not clear from 
this context whether he means that it just so happens to have this 
connection with Aristotle or whether it has been his underlying aim all 
along to provide such a phenomenological deepening. But it is fairly clear 
from the early remarks we have recently cited (H25) that he has seen a 
close connection between the ordinary conception of time and Aristotle's 
view. But the claim is not that the ordinary concept of time is some- 
how derivative from Aristotle's. Any appearance to this effect is 
explained by the fact that Aristotle and philosophers after him have 
interpreted time on the same basis as is shared by the ordinary (pre- 
philosophical) concept of time, namely our common-sense horizon (or 
lack of it). 
There is clearly a considerable gap between what Heidegger has 
called 'world-time' which possesses 'significance' (eg. time we were 
finished, time to get up) and Idatability'. His explanation for this 
is in terms of 'covering over' and 'levelling-off'. In fact these terms 
seen to walk the line between description and explanation somewhat uneasily. 
For at one level they are purely descriptive of the difference between 
the 'now' to which significance relations are essentially related, and the 
cleaned up and isolated 'now' that stands in a series, without suggesting 
how the change has been effected. Heidegger's answer to this question 
is essentially that everyday concernful, living in the worl&gets lost 
among the objects of its concern and fails to see the horizonal structure 
that makes this 'content' possible. , So we treat each 'now, as some- 
thing 'present-at-hand'. The ordinary conception of time as infinite 
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is then only symptomatic of such a view. For once all relations between 
Inow6I have been reduced to those of sequentiality there is nothing to 
put an lend' to the series. Apart from the levelling brought about simply 
by the myopia of everyday concern, the ordinary conception of time as 
infinite also serves to underpin our flight from our own mortality, 
19 
this levelled-off, infinite time belongs to everyone and no-one. 
Heidegger's symptomatic reading is elaborated by two further 
claims: (1) that the expression 'time passes away' should be seen as a 
clue to our recognition that our own passing-away has not been entirely 
forgotten, and (2) that the irreversibility we attach to this ordinary 
concept of time should be seen as the legacy of primordial time poking 
its way through. 
Have we then exposed an error? Heidegger claims that the ordinary 
concept of time has its place, its natural justification, as belonging to 
'Dasein's average kind of Being'. Error arises, one might say, only 
when it 'errs' - when it strays beyond its horizons of legitimate applica- 
tion. Heidegger is offering diagnosis, interpretation, not critique. 
It is the relationships of derivation, dependence, grounding, between 
temporality, world-time, and the ordinary concept of time that are quite 
crucial. 
'From temporality the full structure of world-time has 
been drawn; and only the interpretation of this structure 
-gives us 
the clue for "seeing" at all that in the ordinary 
concept of time something has been covered-up, and for 
estimating how much the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of 
temporality has been levelled-off' (H426) 
Starting from the ordinary concept of time (as of course Heidegger 
has not) so much is simply invisible and unthinkable - not only 'temporality' 
but the primacy of the future for lecstatico-horizonal temporality,. 
Thereis a radical difference between the temporal elements of ecstatic 
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temporality and those of the ordinary concept of time, even (and precisely) 
where they seem to map onto one another. What has 'the moment of vision' 
to do with a 'future-now'? 
It is Heidegger's contention, of course, that it is the neglect of 
this 'ecstatic-horizonal temporality' that characterizes not just the 
ordinary concept of time at some preliminary commonsense level of reflectiong 
but also the key philosophical accounts of time offered after Aristotle, 
for example, by Hegel and Kant (and, he would add, Nietzsche). Certain 
remarks to which we have drawn attention in passing suggest that Husserl 
too would be included in this list. And near the end of Being and Time 
(082(b), H433f) Heidegger explicitly discusses the difference between'his 
own views and those of Hegel, and in a long footnote (n. xxx, H432) discusses 
Hegel's indebtedness to Aristotle. This important question, raised again 
by Derrida 
20 in his essay "Ousia and Gramme" and by Heidegger's Fundamental 
Problems of Phenomenology 
21 is discussed separately below. 
22 It supplements 
in a more historical way our discussion of, the possibility of a non-meta- 
physical concept of time. 
From Temporality to Time: Some Critical Thoughts 
We have presented Heidegger's discussion (in this last section) of 
the genesis of the ordinary conception of time, largely without criticism, 
so as not to detract from the course of the argument. But passive 
acquiescence is neither possible nor desirable. 
We can accept broadly speaking his account of the dependence of 
theoretical concepts of time on one which is more tacit or primitive. 
Heidegger's main insight here is the double sense of everydayness - both 
as the source of significance and of its concealment. There is however, 
surely room for doubt about his explanation of the ordinary concept of 
time. 
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He makes no reference to the possibility that this abstract succession 
of Inows' might have its basis elsewhere in the development of the number 
system, which exhibits the same unending seriality (in both directionsq 
if we allow negative numbers). This is of course debatable. 
23 But 
the following arguments might be adduced in its favour: 
(1) that the idea of an infinite series of dimensionless, meaning-less "now" 
points is one it would be rash to attribute a priori to primitive people 
(people lacking, inter alia, a number system of the sort to which we are 
accustomed). But the scope of Dasein is not restricted to modern 
Western man. Indeed one might have thought that, as Durkheim said of 
primitive people, they might display-the essence (Being) of men all the 
more clearly. 
(2) The move from the practice of measurement to the conception of time 
asqn infinite series of nows is not that convincing, taken as an argument. 
Quite why the 'now' should come to be seen as present-at-hand, shorn of 
significance, is left unclear. This is not to deny the value of a 
phenomenology of measurement, but it might suggest an acknowledged role 
for 'structures' and 'representations'. Surely something ought to be 
made of the fact that when we measure temporal intervals, we mark the 
limits of these intervals and in themselves, these point instants have 
no meaning. If we think of time as something in which, then the dimen- 
sionless time of the 'limit' can have no meaning of the sort that requires 
the scope for an event to occur. However, if inner meaning has been 
eroded ('shorn' - Heidegger's word is Ibeschnitten') we can still have 
outer relations - of serial order - and we have in the number series a 
model of just how that is possible. 
This last remark, however, marks the point of difficulty without 
resolving it. Brouer, for instance, might argue that any idea of 
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succession we found in the number series would have to be derived from 
our experience of real succession, (i. e. that of time). But if Heidegger 
is right, our fundamental intuitions are not of empty intrinsically 
meaningless points succeeding one another, even without bringing in the 
poly-ecstatic nature of temporality. They rather consist of meaningful 
periods, in which the 'units' of significance, if one can so call themp 
would be existential. The time it takes to tie a shoe-lace would be 
more primitive than 'the instant'. This primacy is not chronological, 
nor logical, but hermeneutic - i. e. making reference to 'that in terms 
of which something can alone be fully understood'. 
But if it is central to the ordinary conception of time that its 
elements be meaning-neutral, and their succession be endless, then we 
are surely dealing with something from which representation cannot be 
excluded. -A structure of external relations is being broughtto our 
awareness of temporal succession-and surely cannot just be derived from 
it. The argument would be this: meaning-neutrality and infiniteness 
(just to begin the list-of formal attributes of such a'series), could not 
be thought to be discovered true of the series and its elements nor could 
they plausibly be thought to be derived from each individual now,. But 
whatever the source of this ordinary concept of time, its status is an 
a priori one in relation to any part of the series we, may be confronted 
with. And in each case grasping its-infinity is cashed out in a confi- 
dence that one will always be able to continue counting, measuring, and 
projecting time in any direction. Again, one might say, we are clearly 
dealing with a concept'and as such with something that has a representa- 
tional content. Heidegger presents. the ordinary concept of time as a 
product of a certain covering-over, levelling out. But surely it has a 
positive content -a content manifest in the clarity of its structure, 
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one which compensates to some extent for its apparently 'negative' origins. 
If one were to take a piece of paper and cut out of it a perfect circle, it 
could be said that one had just cut off certain bits, but the circular line 
one followed or the template one cut around gives positive guidance to the 
scissors. By analogy, one might suggest that the existence of the number 
system might supply a model from which could be drawn the ordinary concept 
of time. This is not a proof, rather a possible solution to a deficiency. 
There is, however, a danger of opposing a facile objection to a 
more interesting error, and we should at least spell out the kind of 
response open to Heidegger. Suppose we insist that the idea of infinity 
should be understood as a rule - eg. to any series of Inows' another 'now' 
can be added at either end. This we might claim is an a priori concept 
guided by an interest in formal properties, not derived by a negative 
process from a certain mode of existence. But Heidegger might reply - 
this recursive rule is fundamentally a temporal projection, one that 
applies equally to past and future. So even if we admit that we are 
dealing here with an a priori structure, we need only take one further 
step to realize that we have thereby confirmed its fundamentally temporal 
status. (Even the words 'a priori' give that away). 
24 That must be 
true. But it still seems that what we find here confirmed is an intimate 
fusion of the formal and the temporal, structure and time. One cannot 
specify the rule that gives infinity to the series without involving both 
senses. 
If we were right and the ordinary concept of time were to be inhabited 
or informed by a structure imported from outside, then the possibility of 
a very different explanation of its origins could be opened up. One might 
wonder whether the philosophical theorizing about time had not so much taken 
for granted an historically invariant 'ordinary' concept of time as it has 
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privileged that mode of representation - the number system - associated 
with the birth of systematic measurement. Heidegger's account (particu- 
larly in 11.4 and 11.6) should then be seen as an attempi to incorporate 
one language of time into another. The other is that found in. ordinary 
language, in tense, 
25 in certain indexical expressions, in numerous 
little words (and indeed in suffixes and prefixes). 
26 If the argument 
has a linguistic level, this however is itself treated as underpinned by 
the existential. Discourse merely discloses existential, articulation. 
Were this view to be questioned, however, were one to come to believe, 
that no concept of time could be kept f ree f rom the determinations of this 
or that language, model, schema, or mode of conceptualization,. then a third 
term - Language - would have to be added to Being andýTime. And in, effect 
this is, what Derrida, building on Heidegger's own later, work, hasýdone. 
II-. ' 'HdideSg6r'8 'Tredtment'df 'Tiuýd'zirid 'Tdiiiý6tAlitZ 
CHAPTER FOUR 
From the Earlier to the Later_Heidegger ( and Derrida 
, 
Our discussion in the last three chapters could, be likened to a 
critical trawling along a path layed down in advance by the internal, 
development of Being and Time . The key question determining-the shape 
of the 'net' had to do with the way Heidegger's-ultimate concern with the 
question of Being opened up the possibility of a radically new existential 
sense of temporality, and yet at the same time remained subordinated to 
values of wholeness, unity and closure. Heidegger's requirement that 
Dasein exhibit itself as a 'whole' stems not from the 'facts' of human 
existence, but from his wider project of making the existential analytic: 
open the way to an illumination of the question of Being. To be specific, 
we take issue with. his attempts to exclude'representation' and 'otherness' 
in general from an account, of the existentiat significance of death, we 
deny that Being-towards-death can-serve as the foundation for Dasein's 
wholeness, we question Heidegger's claim that what conscience discloses it 
does so unambiguously, and directly, and argue that it is *., its negative, 
critical role that is important We trace in detail a double inovementý, 
of opening up and closing off one indeed which Heidegger's very account: 
of disclosedness would have anticipated. We would like to think that just 
as something of the Hegelian, dialectic can survive loss of confidence in 
the Absolute as telos, so much of the Heideggerean account of existential 
temporality still retains its plausibility, and in two different ways: 
(1) It is possible to repeatedly discount the positive content ofýhis 
moves towards authenticity, wholeness, and resoluteness, and take them in 
their negative, critical aspect., 
-,, 
(2) one can read Being and Time as a witness to a 'metaphysical' desire 
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the elimination of which - either for Dasýin, or for the reflective 
philosopher - still remains problematic. 
In making these points we do not imply that Heidegger just stood still 
after Being and Time. He himself clearly found the transition from his 
existential analytic to an account of Being as such to present more than 
a temporary difficulty. In his writing after Being and Time, he moves 
in a direction that gives to our thesis its double trajectory. Our 
interest in developing an account of temporal structures, informed and 
guided by those of Itextuality', could'be said to be grafted onto a 
version of existential analytic purged of the problematic of-Being. And 
yet in our account of time as an opening onto radical otherness, drawing 
on Nietzsche, there is some convergence with the path Heidegger takes 
from Being and Time ( 1927 ) to Time and Being ( 1962 ). I shall now. 
try to sketch this move. 
In Being and Time, while the orientation of the book as a whole is 
ontological, directed towards the renewal of the question of Being, the 
actual content, as we have seen at length, deals more specifically 
with the existential structures of human being, of Dasein. In the second 
half of the book an adequate account of these structures is shown to be 
possible only by their interpretativn within the horizon of temporality. 
Temporality is understood as a quite general existential condition, illum- 
inating Care, Dasein's basic existential structure. It is through Care, 
for example that the different temporal ecstabies - being-as-having-been, 
being-as-making-present, and being-ahead-of-oneself - are united. The 
time we associate with the clock, time as measured, is not basic, but 
dependent on human temporalising. Time is not only existentially primordial, 
but also primordially existential. Time has long ceased to be a sequence 
of nows. It has become a basic existential condition. 
As we hope to have demonstrated, there seem to be all sorts of virtues 
in this position, not least of which is that Heidegger has given us a 
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a phenomenological account of temporality which is not merely that of 
an internal time-consciousness . While Heidegger was undoubtedly indebted 
to Husserl, we are convinced that an adequate account of, human temporality 
is not possible unless we can take on board the fact of existence as 
self-questiofiing, moodful, embodies, concerned and historical beings. And 
in these respects,, Heidegger marks a certain advance on Husserl. But in 
Heidegger's view it would be a great mistake to think of this existential 
analysis as an end, in itself. The existential analysis of Dasein ,' Being-i- 
there, was intended, as a gateway to Being itself. Without this wider gloss, 
who 
we would risk confusing philosophy with anthropology. Huiserl/had previous- 
ly levelled this charge against'Heidegger had himself fought long acainst 
such dangers . But whatever doubts Heidegger was later to have about 
whether it was philosophy he was doing, he was certainly not just offering 
a general account of man, anew 'humanism'. 
An existential account of temporality'seems to us to be extremely 
fruitful, but Heidegger perhaps only scratched the surface of'such an 
account in Being and Time . And yet in his later work he not only moves 
away from a phenomenology of Dasein, he moves away-from an account of Time 
as related to Dasein at all. 
I. 
For all the brilliance of Kant*and*the Problem of Metaphysics, in which 
he draws out the latent thematics of finitude in Kant's first Critique, 
there is very little mention'of man as a being-in-the-world'. "If Kant's 
central aim, as he claims, was not epistemology ( any more than his own, 
in Being'and Time was anthropology ) it is still true that Kant poses the 
problem of metaphysics within the framework of a theory of knowledge. And 
central though time is to this account, its role is cognitive, both in rel- 
ation to the transcendental imagination and to the three modes of synthesis. 
Heidegger's account of temporality does not'substantially change here. '' 
Rather the framework of Being and Time offers a way of reading the Kant 
333 
book, and as a result of that reading we can see Being and Time as an 
advance on Kant's first Critique. 
Suggestions of a break or reversal in Heidegger have been 
exaggerated. But there is an implicit devaluation of Being and Time 
in the direction tiken by his later work, one which affects his account 
of temporality. In our view, the account of time in Being and Time; is'not 
not peripheral to his developmentl. Itsecstatic temporality' , when: * detached from any particular existential content, can be seen to serve 
as a kind of optics or framework, within which Being can be determined 
in various ways - as 'presence', for example. For time has ceased to 
be an objective succession in terms of which independently identifiable 
beings could be ordered. It has become an essential feature of the 
'constitution'of such beings , to use a phenomenological expression. 
Heidegger has always avoided the hint of subjective activity that 
the term constitution might be thought to imply. The concept of the 
subject as active origin becomes increasingly important for him to 
avoid. -So time cannot be something we add to raw data to create temporally 
complex objects. Rather, through the opening, the time-space as he comes 
to call it, -Being gives itself, or it gives ( es gibt ) or there'is an 
event of appropriation ( ereignis ). 
As weunderstand it, the central point of all his meditation on the 
es gibt , and on ereignis is the repudiation of the categories of activity 
and passivity, subject and object, in understanding Beingo for the good 
reason that these categories always presuppose Being in some way or other. 
But no-onepwe venture to say, will come away from Time and Being with any 
real sense of having-grasped at last what Time is all about. Time is here 
not only assimiliated into time-space, but even that general dimensionality 
has lost most of its content. 
This seems to be inevitable given Heidegger's project. But it either 
casts doubt on the value of that project, or on the concern to elucidate 
the nature of time. Might it not be that 'time' is irextricably bound up 
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with metaphysics, as Derrida has suggested ?, So that we ought to expect 
. that 
increasing clarity about time would see it dissolve away as some sort 
of metaphysical illusion. 
The relationship of historical determination between Time and Being 
goes in each direction. In the first direction, a modality of Being 
determines our conception of time. This, we find in summary forms, at the 
end of, Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, 
3: 
I in the beginning of Western philosophy the perspective governing 
the disclosure of Being was time, though this perspective as such 
remained hidden, and inevitably so . When ultimately ous3. ameaning 
permanent presence, became the basic concept of Being, what was the 
-unconcealed foundation of permanence and presence if not time ? But 
this 'time' remained essentially undeveloftd and ( on the basis and 
in the perspective of 'physics' ) could not be developed. For as soon 
as reflection on the seence of time began, at the end of Greek 
philosophy with Aristotle, time itself had to be taken as something 
somehow present, ousia tis. Consequently time was considered from the 
standpoint of the 'now', the actual moment . The past is the 
'no-longer- 
now' , the future is the 'notJ-yet-now'. Being in the sense of already- 
thereness ( presence ) became the perspective for the determination of 
time. ' 4 
The essential argument here is that while Being had since the pre- 
Socratics been understood through time, this temporal condition was not 
reflected on until 'time' had been taken over by physics. And this way of 
conceiving of time made its earlier role in interpretini-ileing impossible 
to formulate. 
This fascinating argument opens up the possibility of rethinking the 
original phenomenon of time, while at the same time making it clear how 
difficult that would be. It is this project that Heidegger takes as his own. 
In. the reverse direction, Heidegger offers. us an analysis of four, ways 
in which Being has been determined, in particular oppositions, by time. 
Let us again briefly quote Introduction to MetaphZsics , at a point at 
which a long and detailed discusgion is being simmarized: 
over against becoming being is permanence 
over against appearance being is the enduring prototype, the 
always identical 
over against thought it is the underlying, 'the already-there 
over against the ought, it is the datum, the ought that is not yet 
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realised or already realised 
Permanent, always identical, already there, given - all mean fundament- 
ally the same: enduring presence, on as ousia. 5 
So we can see that in Heidegger's view, it is a temporal modality - 
'presence' - that each of these determinations of Being shares. And 
together these constitute much of the fabric pf metaphysics . For while 
the fact that being can be determined in these ways presupposes a distinct- 
ion between Being and beings, this distinction, which is absolutely 
necessary for Heidegger, is itself covered over and hidden. To raise 
again the question of Being is to render problematic the very meaning of 
Being and the possibility of such determinations. And this means to ask 
about 'presence, to ask about what we have called primordial temporality. 
But will it help'us in understanding Time, to follow Heidegger down 
this path 7 Are we not being lured by a phrase into a discussion with a 
quite different focus ? Heidegger's conc6rns are with Being, with an 
original disclosure of Being, such as can Sive man a new historical orient- 
6 
ation... Surely anything he might say about time would be by the way 
And yet Heidegger is making a move which seems essential for any 
account of time that does not merely reflect our ordinary prejudices. He 
is trying to reawaken an experience not only of Being but also of Time, 
an experience which is both non-standard and fundamental. The odds are 
against such an enterprise: 
I an age which regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched 
with both hands looks on questionifig as 'remote from reality' and as 
something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered. ' 7 
Nevertheless the prospect is held out of an understanding of time 
that is more basic than that of a succession of 'nows', and which can be 
developed in relative independence of the existential analytic of Dasein 
in Being and Time. And for this we have to concern ourselves with 'presence' 
again. (See "Versions of 'Presence'" above ). 
This is a particularly difficult and yet important question. 
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That it is difficult will soon become apparent. It is particularly 
important for us because of the weight attached to the concept of 
'presence' by Derrida, and in the ambiguous distance from Beidegger 
this involves him in. Very crudely, Derrida regards an appeal to (a) 
presence of one sort or another as the hallmark of the logocentric or 
metaphysical tradition, and he is not sure that Heidegger, on whom he 
draws for this analysis, actually escapes from this tradition. 
'to the extent that ... logocentrism is not totally absent from Heidegger's thought, perhaps ir-still holds that thought in the 
epoch of onto-theology, within the philosophy of presence, that 
is to say, within philosophy itself' ( Of Grammatology )8 
We shall return to this later. Meanwhile we can at least take our 
cue from it in looking at Heidegger's account of 'presence' ('Anwesen- 
heit') . For it is true, Heidegger does not seem to claim that the 
interpretation of Being as presence is wrong but rather that we need 
to rethink the meaning of this 'presence' . We need to re-experience 
it. 
An excellent account of what the author calls 'the presencing process' 
9 is offered by Werner Marx in his book Heidegger and the Tradition. and 
I shall draw substantially on this in the remarks that follow now. Marx 
tries to capture Heidegger's account of the 'presenting process' or what 
we could call 'presencing' , by-focussing on three of the key Greek words 
that Heidegger rethinks or reworks: physis, aletheia, and logos. 
As we have seen before, Heidegger had already talked about presence in 
the form of the Vorhanden, Being-present-at-hand, in Being and Time, a type 
of Being contrasted with the Ready-to-hand ( Zuhanden also translated 
as 'tools' or'equipment' -, by its inert, static presence. 
10 The most 
obvious example of this is Descartes' conception of a res extensa, a 
merely extended thing. This reading of presence would weight iton the 
side of the object. But in his later work, Heidegger came to understand 
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presence as characterising at the most general level, the relationship 
of man to the world, and to himself, or what Werner Marx calls the 'subject- 
object' relationship. Heidegger calls presence the constant abiding that 
approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him. It has taken a number 
of different historical forms: 
I... presencing shows itself as the hen, the unifying unique One, 
as the logos, the gathering that preserves the All, as idea, ousia, 
energeia, substantia , actualitas , perceptio, monad, as objectivityp 
as the being posited of self-positing in the sense of the will of 
reason, of love, of the spirit, of power, as the will to will in the 
eternal recurrence of the same. ' 12 
But to see what presence really involves we cannot identify it with 
any of these historical embodiments. Heidegger's way of probing the 
meaning of presence is by way of what we could call a speculative etymol- 
ogical phenomenology. For Heidegger, certain words preserve fundamental 
experiences, and these experiences can be wrested. from them sometimes only 
by violence. He often translates physis, when used by the pre-Socratics, 
as Anwesen , an active presencing, or making present. To physis as Anwesen 
he attaches a number of distinct phenomenal characteristics: 
1. Creative occurrence. The emergence of something out of itself, 
illustrated in the overwhelming powers of nature, or the fruits of the earth. 
2. (subtly distinct) Originating. Bringing out, exposing, producing. 
3. Appearing. Showing-itself, coming to light ( even while pointing 
back to the darkness). 
All these together, or each of them at different times, go some way 
I 
towards capturing the early Greek sense of physis ,a 'concept' which so 
interpreted is not really a concept at all but rather a pointer to a 
productive flux, governed by no restitutive necessities, or teleological 
principles. This is the first way in which presence can be unpacked. 
Next we have aletheia. Marx relates it to physis in the following 
way: 
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'the basic traits of the presenting process thought as physis were 
manifested in its ' self-emerging-prevalence' which as a coming to 
be, an appearing, a coming to the fore, is a stepping forth into the 
light. ' 13 
We are offered, in other words, something like a primal scene as the 
14 
underlying link between physis and aletheia. In the Essence of Truth, 
it is understood as openness, in Letter on Humanism 
15 
a clearing. So 
aletheia, usually translated simply as truth, is for Heidegger the 
'openness-characteristic of the occurrence of presence experienced by the 
early Greeks'. But Heidegger is not suggesting that in aletheia we have 
some absolute transparency, some perfect illumination, or unconcealment. 
That would lead us toward the idea of an unmediated presence, in which 
truth, for example, would just be a matter of contact or correspondence. 
For Heidegger, aletheia is light always struggling with the powers of 
darkness, lodged in a field of strife. Openness is always threatened and 
defined against what threatens it. Plato had already forgotten this. 
In all too summary fashion, we must also mention log6s . Through 
his interpretation of Heraclitus, 
16 Heidegger has developed a reading of 
logos that rounds out our understanding of 'presence'. Presence*as logos 
is expressed in a number of ways: 
1. a laying down, a laying out, laying forth 
2. a depositing in unconcealment 
3. a gathering of all that strives apart, out of its dispersion, 
a collecting together 
But logos does not mean order, for as with aletheia, and indeed 
phZsis, there is no finality about this 'gathering', no necessity. 
There is no relief in this logos from struggle. 
'on the contrary , presence must be kept in contention as a "conflict" 
a "primeval strife", if it is not to lose its creative power, if it 
is to remain an occurrence in the original sense. ' 17 
Aletheia , we said, was no final illumination. Amd logos is no 
privileged static order. The huge importance of this latter claim is that 
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lop; os itself has no ground, but i's a 'groundless play' 'indifferent 
to our search for principles and foundations. So the logos for Heidegger 
can offer no absolute grounding, and this in his eyes is enough to dis- 
mantle the pretensions of ontology and theology. 
Clearly there is a great deal more to be said about the logos, 
especially about its intertwinings with language. But already it IS 
clear how Heidegger can be said to have returned from 'presence' 
understood on the basis of some pre-constituted concept of time, to a more 
original process of presencing. We shall shortly make explicit some of 
the elements of this analysis, elements that Derrida picks up in hiý 
continuation of the general thesis about the history of metaphysics as 
the history of Being as 'presence'. 
But we must first at least attempt an assessment of this account 
of presence as an I account of, - or as suggesting an account of a primordial 
temporality. I would suggest two meanings of I primordial temporality': 
(1) A phenomenon which, although not itself temporal, is nonetheless 
specifically related to the temporal and makes it possible. 
(2) A basic form of temporality on which other more developed and 
familiar forms depend. 
The issue in either case would then be whether the phenomenon in 
question was itself temporal or not . But we cannot decide this unless 
and until we have some standard of what counts as the 'temporal'. And 
the trouble is that the assured constitution of the object of our inquiry 
cannot be presumed in this case. The question of what 'temporality' 
means is not independent of the question of whether presencing ( Anwesen 
can be treated as primordial temporality. 
Within the Heideggerean framework we would not expect all that is 
true of Time, as commonly understood, to be true of primordial f temporality. 
We would not for example expect primordial temporality to involve a 
sequence of nows. But are there not some characteristics it must have ? 
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Primordial temporality - understood through presencing - has, 
we believe, the following important features: 
(1) It is neither the temporality of a subject nor. of a pre- 
constituted object (*this theme reappears in the language of the es gibt 
and ereignis in Time and Being 
. 
). 
(2) In a corollary way, its description has to constantly resist 
nominal forms . Heidegger is far. happier with verbal forms . His use of 
language here is often itself a kind of presencing. Presen6ing itself 
appears, emerges, is shown, drawn together, through verbal forms. 
(3) This temporality is weighted on the side of the creativet the 
emergent, while not ignoring its relation to what lies hidden. 
(4) Temporality is understood in oppositional terms . Its essential 
moment is that of struggle, conflict. 
(5) This temporality is void of any supervening principles of order. 
It has no purpose, its form, is not even linear, it has no dialectical 
powers of resolution. 
(6) It is not a neutral base, but always has a 'colour' . It is 
always something that emerges, or is given, or is appropHated, or it 
always occurs in some way or other. 
(7) The purity of temporality itself seems to recede in this 
account. With aletheia for example we have an opening, a clearing - more 
of a spatial concept. We might be forgiven for thinking of presence as 
a primitive spatiotemporality. And indeed in Time and Being, Heidegger 
talks of a primitive time-space, as if time by itself were a later 
abstraction. 
If this characterization is at all fair, it begins to seem as 
though there is no clear answer to whether presencing so described 
is itself. -a form of temporality, or rather. an 'event' or 'process' 
underlying temporality. On the one hand it would seem it could be equally 
construed as in part a primitive spatiality, and on the other handq it 
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clearly does describe an event, presencing, that does not cease to be 
temporal. But it does not seem to be all there is to time. Might it not 
better be thought of as a theory of irruptions in time, not of time 
'itself' ? 
So it might be argued that we have overestimated Beidegger's 
account. Surely it is not an account of primordial temporality - 
but rather of a phenomenon - 'presence' - which is both more than a 
temporal one involving something like a general man/world relationship), 
and also only handling directly one OLSpect of the temporal ( what about 
the past and the future ? What this question raises more generally, 
is whether it is at all proper to try to understand Time on the basis of 
an analysis of a particularly importaýt role that interpretations of 
time have played in the history of philosophy. 
In so far as these interpretations seem to hold enormous sway 
over the ways we think of time, we might well conclude that these 
interpretations of time could at least be profitably drawn up into a 
more general theory of time . Surely time has all sorts of descriptive 
features independent of any value that has been accredited to different 
temporal modalities. 
Two disconcertin3replies can be made here. First, it might be said 
that if there are these descriptive properties, they would hardly be 
the concern of a philosophy of time, philosophy being concerned with 
theories, rules, principles but not mere description. The answer to this 
of course is that philosophy can indeed be descriptive and that phenom- 
enology is a prime example of this possibility. The second reply is in 
many ways more worrying . Derrida has suggested that the concept of Time 
might be essentially linked to the metaphysical tradition, so that to try 
to think of time outside that tradition would be a vain undertaking. This 
position of course undermines the project of a philosophy of time from 
the outset, insofar as it undermines philosophy. 
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As a way into Derrida, this account of Heidegger's discussion, 
of temporality. and presence is not complete. Mention ought properly 
to be made of Heidegger's emphaiis on the ontological difference between 
Being and beings, his essay on the"Onto-Theological Constitution of 
,, 18 19 20 Metaphysics of the Question of Being . of his Nietzsche books, 
of his essay, on Anaximander, 
21 
and of his Basic Problems of PhenomenologX. 
22 
But what we would like to do now is to evaluate, in the light of, 
Heidegger's account of presencing, the account Derrida gives of the role 
of time both in metaphysics and in particular in the theory of the sign. 
After this I will explain what I take to be the limitations of Derrida's 
approach to an understanding of Time. 
Derrida shares with Heidegger the general analysis of the history 
of philosophy as the history of presence. In addition to Heidegger's 
own arguments, Derrida makes use in, particular of Husserl's account of 
time-consciousness, 
23 
and of Saussure's account of language as a system 
of differences, 
24 
as providing ammunition for the deconstruction of the 
value of presence. The use of Husserl is ironic in that it appears in 
the course of an internal critique of Husserl's theory of ideality, of 
intuition, and of the sign. Husserl is committed to an account of ideality 
that refers to a particular type of consciousness, one which has an essence 
directly presented to it. Derrida as we have seen uses against Husserl 
his own theory of time-consciousness, in which the present is never 
simply distinguishable from the past and future but overlaid with pro--_ 
tentions and retentions. As such this present is never pure, says Derrida. 
And yet such purity is required for there to be a pure intuition. Husserl, 
he suggests9 for all the superiority of phenomenology over previous 
25. 
philosophy, is still a metaphysician, in that he is covmitted to creditifig- 
presence with a value and status that it does not have and cannot-sustain. 
Again, he argues against Husserl that. there are no purelZ expressive signs, 
no signs that would or could simply convey a meaning expressed through 
343 
them. All signs function as part of a signifying system in which it is 
the play of differences between signs that gives each of them meaning. 
Derrida is committed to the view that all meaning, all signification 
functions like this, so the idea of coming face to face with an essence, 
or the meaning of a sign a true presence - is an illusion, or better, 
a fantasy . Or rather, the possibility of an experience one might describe 
in such a way is dependent on relations outside that experience which 
destroy its sense of magical purity. 
The belief in a fulness of expression, by the voice, of a meaning, 
which has given human speech a privileged value in the history of philos- 
ophy, is based on the idea that through the voice, the other is somehow 
directly given, or revealed. But if speech is equally a system of signs, 
then it too must be governed by the Saussurean principles of difference. 
And this time he operates an internal critique against Saussure* 
For Saussure, inconsistently Derrida claims, reviles writing, as a 
mere external copy of speech, crediting speech with a privileged primacy, 
a thesis Derrida dubs phonocentrism. If we accept that the properties of 
detachability and arbitrariness that we find openly in writing are in 
fact typical of any systematic use of signs, it is not too far fetched 
to generalise the concept of writing and to consider every use of signs 
a writing. This is like the move that generalises the term 'language' 
to the language of art, of the body etc. Derrida instead, and with more 
persuasive intentq extends the term writing, and even to include speech. 
Whatever the problems this brings, it has, for him, the advantage that 
he seems to have cleared a site in which one might be able to think in a 
way free from the metaphysics that seems to appear whenever one talks about 
the subject, consciousness, meaning, experience.,,., 
Derrida is taking up the task that Heidegger laid at our feet that 
of thinking iE not beyond metaphysics, at least along different lines. 
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But there is surely another topic we could have added to the list- 
I TIME. According to Derrida, as we have often remarked, 
'the concept of Time belongs entirely to metaphysics and 
designates the domination of presence'. 26 
Andýyet surely Derrida, makes considerable use of temporal considerations 
in setting the stage for, what he calls his grammatology. 
27 After all it 
is the pervasiveness of the illusory temporality of presence that makes 
his project of deconstruction plausible. 
One of theýfullest-accounts he gives of what we will provisionally 
call the primitive role of the temporal is to be found in his essay 
Differance 28 (with an a ). We do not propose to go through this point 
by point, but, we would like to show what role the temporal plays in ,-- 
developing this vital 'tem' because it is via differance that Derrida's 
consistent distance from philosophy can be measured. I 
After a few precious pages in which he makes it clear that differance 
is really a thoroughly undecidable term - neither-a word nor a concept - 
he nonetheless tries to-explain its manifold, lmeaning' by a little, 
semantic elaboration. -The French verb differer apparently does service 
for both'the English verb, to*defer and to differ. Both of these, senses 
are embraced at once. Signs are quite traditionally thought to defer their 
meaning, they stand iA'fer something not immediately available. Derrida 
calls this. temporizing. 
29 And the sense of differer which means to differ 
neatly expresses the Saussurean sense of the differences, dissimilarities, 
between signs that allow them to mean anything. This would could call a 
spacing. 
So far so good. But we must be careful. Firstly, the traditional 
understanding of the sign as deferring its meaning, treats. the sign as 
_ 
secondary and provisional; in relation to some primary meaning. And this 
is a thoroughly retrograde view. Rather, the deferment, the temporizing 
aspect of differance involves an other which may never have been present, 
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and may never become present. In other words what is deferred is not 
to be thought of as a present just temporarily absent, but as outside 
the whole system of presence and absence. 
The spatial aspect of difference - differing - also requires more 
thought . Briefly. we must remember that the. principle of difference 
applies not just to the signifier but also to what is siDMLified , for 
example, meanings. 
So, what about differance ? Can we say it produces differences ? We 
can, but we have to be aware of the dangers of hypostatizing differance 
as some sort of real source or origin. If we can grasp such a productive 
play without attributing to differance the status of an originating 
presence, fine. If not, we have to think of some other way of putting it. 
Derrida tries to handle this problem by the term Itrace"p which, 
were it possible would be an effect without cause. The trace, if anything. 
is, is an element in the signifying process. Each trace relates to a 
past element, and to a future element; it is separated from other traces 
by an interval, and in such a fundamental way that this spacing can be 
said to be constitutive of its present. In sutmary, to use his own words: 
I It is this constitution of the present as a 'primordial' and 
irreducibly non-simple and therefore in the strict sense non 
primordial synthesis of traces, retentions and protentions ... that 
I propose to call protowriting, prototrace or differance. The 
latter (is) (both) spacing (and) temporizing. ' 3o . 
We are very close to being able to compare this account with Beidegger's 
account of presence. But let us search just a little further for an 
even more appropriate place to turn off. 
'Presence... 'is no longer ... the absolutely matrIcal form of being 
but ... a 'determination' and an 'effect' Presence is a determ-,, 
'ination and effect within a system Which-is-no longer that of. ''-- 
presence 
' 
but that of differance; it no more allows the opposition 31 
between activity and passivity than between cause and effect... ' - 
As weread him here, what Derrida is saying*here is this: we can 
reconstruct the phenomenon of'presence within a framework that. makes 
no use of its basic terms and assumptions. If it did not risk a lapse 
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back into metaphysics, we could say that presence on this reading is 
merely a system effect , and not the ground, source, origin, foundation 
... of meaning or anything else. 
a, 
Surely this is something oftFriting experiment ( along the lines of 
a thought experiment ). The term differance is, as he puts it, an 
assemblage of the basic themes of a number of thinkers from Ilegel to 
Bataille, and it seems to be possible to put it to work. to construct 
an account of how presence could be produced non-metaphysically. 
How, we might ask, does this square with the Heideggerean account of 
presence 7 We will briefly compare these two accounts with respect to 
two questions: 
(1)- Where do each of them leave time 7 
(2) Where do each of them stand with regard to metaphysics 
We take the second of these questions first. 
Derrida, is not at all sure where he stands in relation to 
Heidegger's account of the onti6oz6ntological difference, the difference 
between Being and beings, one obvious point of correlation iqith 
Derrida's differance. Certainly, he says, differance is in part 'the 
32 historical deployment of Being' . But, equially, he would be happier 
if we could think of differance outside of all considerations of Being 
and/or its-relation to beings. Certainly Heidegger himself came to 
be less interested in the ontological difference and more in Being 
as such. But Derrida. seems to want to say that even then,, metaphysics 
has not been thrown off. It is not enough, it seems, to awaken the 
question of Being, as Beidegger had done. We have in someway to actively 
forget it . 
33 
Derrida suggests that the ontico-ontological differance 
might be a particular determination of his more original differance. 
To return now to the first question, there are some fascinating 
parallels between Derrida and Heidegger as far as time is concerned. In- 
particular: 
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a. In both cases, presence isýunderpinned by something not itself a 
presence. Whether we call it primordial temporality or whatevert it 
seems to have some-quasi-temporal properties, and it certainly undermines 
the privilege of what it underpins, the ordinary metaphysical, concept 
of time as a series of nows. 
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b. Both Derrida andTeidegger talk about this,, process as one of playp 
a movement in'which principles of order, finality, origin, havefallen 
away . 
c. Finally, both suggest in a way quite distinct from relativity physics, 
that fundamentally temporality and spatiality are not distinct. Derrida 
finds these linked in differance, and Heidegger in his time-space. 
When all is said and done ought we to be convinced by this general 
thesis about the interplay between the history of philosophy as meta- 
physics, the-interpretation of Being, and the value of presence ? 
As far as its consequences for philosopHy are concerned, it can 
be immenselyýfruitful. One is thrust forcibly against a whole series 
of questions tbatJurk on the boundary between philosophy and non- 
philosophy. One is driven to asking questions of a basically Nietzschean 
sort about the theoretical investments involved in the tools of 
philosophical thinking - in particular those systematic and pervasive 
investments that seem to be self-concealing. And there is no doubt that 
a value - in part temporal - which has been called 'presence' - can be 
seen to unify, if loosely, a number of key philosophical concepts and 
values - 
What are we to make of the suggestion that a new way of thinking, 
or a new writing is required ? Eas not a radical break in the history of 
35 
philosophy often been advertised in these tems, ' to the point that it 
is almost a genre 
Much of the problem lies in the temptation - to which we perhaps 
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succumb in the Appendix - to offer a description of a primal scene - 
either of presencing or differance, in which certain ways of thinking 
about space and time are legitimized. For even as description of this'. 
scene recognises, say, the enormous wealth of language, or the variety 
of ways of Being, it cannot help unifying this variety, comprehending 
it, and anticipating its diversity . And the consequence is a novel sort 
of reductionism. Moreover, the unifying drive that each of these 
positivns reflects, makes one wonder whether the understanding of time 
has not been sacrificed in an ostensibly greater cause. 
The conclusion we are to draw from Derrida is that in the only 
place at which the question of time can properly be posed - within the 
discussion of differance - it is welddd to a spatiality and has no 
genuinely. independent status. 
Both Derrida and Heidegger emphasise and draw our attention to the 
fact that a philosophical study of time is systematically beset with 
the problem of taking into account the role time has already played 
in constituting the terms and standards within which the discussion 
is to take place. I take it this is what Derrida meant when he said 
that 
'in a certain sense it is always too late to pose the question of 
time since it has already appeared' 36 
And it is not merely a question of discounting the work already done 
by time in these terms and standards . If Heidegger and Derrida are 
right there would be no philosophy left if we decided to put to one 
side the interpretation of time as presence, for that has determined 
the interpretation of Being since the pre-Socratics, and that has 
shaped all or almost all of philosophy. 
Surely one general thesis to be drawn from their work is that what- 
ever the consequences for philosophy in general an investigation of the 
role of Time in philosophy spells the end of the philosophy of Time. 
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And the residual nature of the temporality described in the primal 
scene would seem to confirm this. 
However we regard the demise of the philosophy of Time as a 
sad prospect and an implausible one. We hope to show, by pursuing the 
project of the deconstruction of our ordinary concept of time one 
further stage, how this conclusion can be averted. 
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III. *Time Beyorid'Deconstruction 
PREFATORY NOTE 
In Part III it will become apparent to the reader that ! -, 
surface linearity diminishes in importance as an organizing 
principle. We would, like to think of this as bearing witness to 
the theoretical displacement of simple succession to which the 
deconstruction of time gives rise. The truth, however, has more 
to do with what lies outside the text- the force of circumstances. 
At the serious risk of laying false trails, we include here a few 
advance words about each chapter. The Appendix will be*left to 
speak for itself. 
Part III weaves discussions of time with discussions of textuality, 
style, 
_and 
strategy. The rationale for this is to be found in the 
belief *(a) that questioni of time and signification cannot 'finally' 
be separated, and that the readier access we have to textual structures 
of signification affords us powerful insight into the complexities of 
temporal organization,, (b) that in both strands of the double movement 
traced_by, this thesis time as structure, time as event - thequestion 
of style and strategy indeed of writing itself, has repeatedly 
become problematic. Indeed Derridean deconstruction necessarily 
problematizes writine, his-, 'own included. 
The apparently untroubled innocence of our owfi style reflects in 
part our sense of the limits of alternative styles and strategies 
while fully appreciative of their value. 
* 
In chapter I we argue that Derrida's concern to expose the 
metaphysical determination of our ordicary concept of time I* as 
tpresence' opens up. the possibility of a 'positive' account of 
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the temporality of language But by lodging his residual 
sense of the temporal in such a"quasi-transcendental term as 
.I 'differance', this possibility is unfortiinately closed off. 
In chapter 2. (A) we discuss style and strategy. Husserl admits 
that his word Flup - for the Absolute-Flux of time - is a 
metaphor. Perhaps the understanding of what is primitively 
temporal puts a strain on our ordinary linguistic resources. In this 
light we look at some of Derrida's innovative 'philosophical' 
styles and strategies of writing, and suggest some alternative. 
In chapter 2(B), by comparing Heidegger. 's style with Derrida's 
'strategy' we argue that the success of Derrida's philosophical 
writing depends on our illicitly ( in his own view) privileging 
his strategic (meta-) intentions in the guidance of our reading. 
In the Postscri2t to chapter 2, we further suggest, in relation 
to Derrida, (i) that'differancel and 'presencet are not transcend- 
entally butlaialectically'related, (ii) that deconstruction is 
open to the charge of a certain formalism. Again we take serious 
issue with Derrida's use of the 'sous raturel, and-claim that he sails 
too close to the winds of metaphysics for his own good. 
In chapter 3, we illustrate the consequences of restricting the 
scope of a range of philosophical views of time to regional applic- 
ations, serving .1 more modest hermeneutical goals. We consider 
covýnig, dialeciical, phenomenological, existential time, and the 
'time of the sign'. We suggest a limited privilege to the existential 
dimension outlined by Heidegger in Being and Time. 
We suggest that something like the existential framewoik of' 
Heidegger's Being and Time.., with radical pluri-dimensionality 
replacing considerations of authenticity, might ( if only for 
methodological reasons ) have a privileged position-here. 
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In chapter 4, we argue that an alternative model of time can be 
drawn from the structures of*temporal textuality . We begin by 
looking at more or less structural features of discourse, defend the 
role of representation andýdiagrams of time against the charge of 
spatialization, and discuss the exemplary structure of narrative. 
Distancing ourselves somewhat from traditional 'structural analysis' 
we distinguish seven levels of temporality in the narrative ( that 
of the reader, the narrator, the plot, the action, the characters, 
and of the narrative discourse itself ) and argue that these sustain 
a strong analogy between text and experience. 
In chapter 5, we distinguish two traditional grounds for giving 
the concept of 'the future' a special place in philosophical thinking: 
hermeneutical and ethical. Post-structuralism, it has been claimed, 
'has no vision of the future' . We draw on Derrida's writing to 
show why this is so, and try to interprete it more positively. We 
suggest, reflexively, that philosophy be treated as a fundamental 
event. 
- 111. Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER ONE 
Derrida's Deconstruction of Time, and-its. Limitations 
In this chapter the discussion centres on the possibility of an 
adequate account of the temporality of language. We claim that Derrida's 
contribution here is essentially preparatory and that he does not ( and 
perhaps cannot ) himself offer such an account. The force of this demonst- 
ration for our argument as a whole rests of course on the generalizability 
of these claims about the temporality of language to 'time' itself. Our 
general line here ( developed more explicitly in the next chapter) is that 
this expansion of scope is achieved whenwe'see language (in its widest sense 
as the significant articulation of experience)las the very source of that 
wealth of temporal structures we only begin in this thesis to describe. 
We argue that Derrida's specific sterility here is a consequence of his 
one-sided development of a quite tidditional philosophical opposition bet- 
ween identity and difference, and particularly, of his inability to shake 
free of what is for him a necessary strategic detour through transcendental 
argument. 
The fact that my remarks will be fairly straightforwardly philosoph- 
ical does however present in itself a kind of theoretical problem. For 
Derrida does not pretend to, or pretends not to seek the approval of phil- 
osophy. His aims lie elsewhere. 
He writes 
To make enigmatic what one thinksone underst , ands'by the'words 
"proximity". g"inmediacy", "presence" (the proximate, the own, the 
........ ......... 
This chapter is a very slightly revised version of*Time*and the Sign 
published in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenologyp vol. 131 
No. 2, May 1982. It was presented in an earlier form to the International 
Association for Philosophy and Literature at the University of Maine at 
Orono in May 1980.1 am indebted to Andrew Benjamin for his he-ýpful 
criticisms 6f0that vergion. 
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pre- of presence), is my final intention in this book 
(Of Grammatology) 1 
There may be a certain amount of irony in these words, but we need not 
dismiss them. Nor should we ignore their implications. Derrida is 
trying to produce an effect. His writing is governed by a strategyt 
not by, say, the ideal of truth. Indeed one reply to my claim that 
his position is onesided and undialectical, is that he is not actually 
taking up a position at all. A position implies a location within a 
space and Derrida is a frontiersman. To accuse him of theoretical 
overkill is to forget this strategic status of his writing. ' 
But this strategy involves and invokes numerous philosophical 
arguments and numerous stands taken on other philosophical positions as 
well as on philosophy itself. Derrida's writing. is armed to resist 
traditional philosophical reappropriation for as long as possible, and 
in trying to open-him up, I have all the hesitation he has about trying 
to bite into Hegel. One-can come to a sticky end. While I do not want 
to dismantle these defences in detail, I will just suggest a couple of 
ways of getting a foot in the door, ways of dealing with his most general 
defences against philosophy, so that a philosophical approach to Derrida 
will not seem futile from the outset. 
The structure of this defence mechanism is classic. It could be 
called rebuttal by pre-emptive engulfment. Derrida knows what the essence 
of philosophy is, and he has taken its measure. Philosophy is the 
systematic deployment of concepts invested with a privilege which (after 
Heidegger) he calls presence, such as meaning, truth, experience, con- 
sciousnessl the subject ... the list is very long. In each case we find 
the same value demanded, promised, preserved ... of a ground, a founda- 
tion, a beginningg a point of privileged encounter. 
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Is there not at least a danger - to put it no more strongly - 
that the whole vast bulk of writing we call philosophy, and much besides, 
might be thought to have been reduced to this one character? Are not 
all those enormous differences being treated as evidence of the Same? 
Surely this closure of philosophy, as Derrida calls it, is a gesture 
born and bred in the stables of philosophy itself? And yet on Derrida's 
own premises, premises independent of the thesis that philosophy is the 
development of presence, no writing, philosophical or otherwise, can have 
its meaning so summarily represented or extracted. Why does his circum- 
scription of philosophy not commit him to an essentialism untenable on 
his own terms? 
But pre-emptive engulfment is never a conclusive ploy, against 
philosophy especially. The second way I would demonstrate thist after 
which Derrida's writing should be sufficiently softened up to withstand 
a little philosopohical probing, is by offering a rather non-Derridean 
characterisation of his treatment of philosophy. In writing about the 
privilege of presence in philosophy, he uses terms like 'security', 
'reduction of anxiety', etc. The value of presence is the value of a 
desire for such security, expressed in a variety of ways. Derrida's 
totalizing treatment of philosophy can be understood as a hermeneutic 
of Desire. More often even than philosophy invokes the value of a 
presence. Derrida interprets philosophy as the desire for such a first 
point or arche. This interpretation, albeit as a partial reading is 
generally accurate, but surely not legitimate for Derrida. As I read 
Derrida, the real meaning of philosophy is this Desire. But there are 
no real meanings for Derrida, and if there were, to privilege one, as 
he does here with such a Desire, would be an interference with play. 
2 
With these two attempts to jam his basic defense against a 
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philosophical intrusiong I have simply tried to create a little space 
in which to think critically and yet philosophically about, Derrida. These 
lines of argument may be thought both unnecessary and unjustified. Un- 
necessary because Derrida is the first to admit there is no real escape 
from philosophy. And. unjustified because of the precautions with which 
he. surrounds his writing. I cannot here take up the issue of the logic of 
precautionary gestures, 
3 but I can offer the conclusion I came to: that 
Derrida privileges his precautionary gestures - graphic and propositional - 
in a way he cannot justify, for there can be no such privileged writing. 
I began with a claim about the absence of an adequate accountlof 
the temporality of language in Derrida, and how this defect is rooted in 
and undialectical promotion of difference at the expense of identity. 
will first try to show how the specific temporality of language. gets 
both partially uncovered and then covered over again. Fortunately the 
ground is still fresh. 
The last section of Linguistics and Grammatology, (LG) entitled 
The Hinge (La Brisure) will provide us with most of our material but the 
problem can be most sharply fronted by three brief, quotations from the 
end of Derrida's long and difficult Ousia and Gramme. 
4 
1. 'The concept-of time, in all its aspects, belongs to 
metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. ' 
(p. 63) 
2.1 ... if something which bears a relation to time, but is 
not time - is to be thought beyond the determination of 
Being as presence, it cannot... still... be called time. ' 
(p. 60) 
3* 'an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it (the 
whole historical system of metaphysical concepts-DCW) 
since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality., 
(p. 63) 
We are essentially in Heidegger country here. Heidegger's general 
thesis 
5 
was that the history of philosophy could only be understood through 
the way it had interpreted Being. And for Heidegger, since the pre- 
Socraticsq Being had always been determined-, in some form or other, as 
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presence. But by the time this temporal determination of Being came 
to be reflected upon - by Plato and Aristotle - the understanding of 
Time had been taken over by physics. Time's ontological status receded 
from view. 
It should be clearfrom this account that Heidegger leaves room 
for reappropriation of a more original time or temporality, a recovery 
of what was lost. And indeed he writes of authentic or primordial time 
in Being and Time (1927), and in Time and Being (1962) he refers to true 
time, to designate admittedly different readings of this original time. 
For all his debts to Heidegger, Derrida not only thinks of the 
question of Being as a metaphysical residue, but explicitly questions 
this hankering after a lost primordial time. And here our quotations 
come to life. There is no alternative concept of time to the metaphysical 
one. To think outside metaphysics, or to try to, we must abandon the 
concept of time. The traditional way of understanding the concept of the 
sign, according to Derrida, is in part at least a secondary, instrumental 
and disposable representation of a meaning or referent which is not itself 
present, whose presence is absent and deferred. This concept of the sign 
invokes a value of presence which only the traditional conception of time 
can sustain. On Derrida's view, if we reject that concept of time, there 
is none other available to take its place. It is that or nothing. We 
may not be stuck for words, but they will not announce an alternative 
temporality. 
We might think that some sort of compromise could be reached here. 
Could we not agree on a 'new' sense of time and temporality? One perhaps 
fundamentally different from the old one. The reason for his intransi- 
gence here is revealing. Derrida has a thesis (that slips in and out of 
erasure), which provides a transcendental ground for time (and indeed space). 
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Naturally this transcendental thesis is hedged by qualifications, for 
there could be nothing more metaphysical than such a claim. But in 
the first sentence of that section The Hinge-it appears in all its 
birthday innocence 
'Origin of the experience of, space and time, this writing 
of difference, this fabric of the trace, permits the 
difference between space and time to be articulated, to 
appear as such, in the unity of an experience. ' (Pp. 65-6) 
There are three problems with this. Is it a transcendental claim? if 
not what sort of claim is it? Do we not find a primordial temporality 
in diffe*rance or the trace? 
These questions are only sharpened when we notice the extraordinary 
structural parallels between this description of the role of differance 
(let us say), the role Kant attributes (on Heidegger's reading) to the 
transcendental imagination in the first Critique and the role Heidegger 
gives to what he calls the es gibt in Time and Being. 
6 But whereas for 
Kant, transcendental imagination is (sometimes 'is rooted in') temporality 
of a primordial sort, and for Heidegger what is given is true time, Derrida 
has no such alternative temporality. At least he says no such is possible. 
This is not to say of course that what seem like temporal characteristics 
are not central to his characterization of the trace and differance. The 
stumbling block, as I see it, is that Derrida takes seriously the traditional 
link between time, the logic of identity and the law of non-contradiction. 
And it is not possible to characterise the trace or diff / erance without 
violating these logical principles. 
I will now try to show the vital role of time in the development of 
the terms trace and diffdrance, and how they in turn then absorb that very 
same temporality. 
The term trace can be understood as a transformation of the concept 
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of sign, a transformation in which the horizon of presence that governs 
the classic concept of the sign gives way to the 'horizon' of diffeOrance. 
While a sign is classically understood as standing in for a meaning or 
referent which while not actually present, is potentially so, the. trace 
on the other hand refers to a past that cannot fully be reactivcLEed-, even 
potentially, a 'past' that can no longer be thought of as a past present, 
now dormant. The term trace is the result of depriving the concept of 
sign of its signifier/signified structure. This deprivation rests on 
the claim that the idea of the signified here is a metaphysical legacy. 
With this term trace arrives a problematic temporality, which may 
no longer be a temporality at all. We might think, for example, that 
what was needed was some sort of phenomenological enrichment of the 
traditional concept of time as a series of nows. Would it not help in 
understanding the peculiar mixture of dependence and independence of what 
is other than it to consider the phenomenological account of temporality 
elaborated by Husserl? Here the present is from the very beginning 
permeated with past and future, -as retention and protention. But the 
past and future are here each grasped as presents, albeit potential presents. 
That is, they are experiences that we once were having, or may soon be 
having. In this expanded living present, the value of experiential 
evidence, of 'presence' remains and is indeed shored up. And it is this 
very value that the trace denies. There can be no phenomenology of the 
trace. 
Now it is easy to see that an account of the temporality of language 
could not just make use of clock time, physical time. The words I am 
now writing or speaking, even understood from the point of view of simple 
succession have no single order to them. They can be ordered as in- 
dividual word-units, or as parts of larger units of articulation, such as 
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sentences. We have elsewhere called this 'nested articulation'. And 
succession is by no means the key to the temporality of language. One 
might have thought that a theory of temporality that began by bracketing 
out objective, world time, as phenomenology does, would be exactly what 
was required. The force of Derrida's criticism here (LG p. 67) is to 
claim that it cannot account even for the most basic temporality of the 
trace, ultimately because its structure is anterior to even phenomenological 
temporality. Phenomenology was after all concerned with time-consciousness 
and Derrida's trace is an attempt to handle something like the 'unconscious' 
of language. 
The trace is said to have a structure. Loos'ely speaking we could 
say that it involves a certain sort of relating. Derrida was prepared 
to use the word referring. If it breaks with the idea of time it is I 
believe inpart because that relation neither requires nor establishes a 
dimensionality, any form of neutral extensiveness such as a concept of time 
always seems to require. To pursue this question, we will now turn to the 
related term differance (with an a). We draw on the versions found in 
LG and on the essay Differance, 
In this latter essay, he puts the term through its hoops*so that 
without defining it he can nonetheless show what use can be made of it, 
and explain the historical context of its appearance as what he calls an 
'assemblage' (not a word or a concept). In LG he uses it to do the work 
for which a transcendental critique is traditionally reserved - to unsettle 
a naive objectivism - in this case that of Hjelmslev's linguisticism. 
The term differance allows us another access route to Derrida's 
theory of writing, this time through Saussure. Derrida's relationship 
to Saussure has three key aspects. Derrida endorses in broad terms, 
the priority of language over the language user. To make sense we have 
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to make use of a pre-existing language. Secondly, he shows that Saussure's 
account of the sign is at odds with his privileging speech over writingo 
and Derrida himself argues that the rupture with presence, with the trans- 
cendental subject, that we find openly in ordinary writing is characteristic 
of all signification, including speech. Even speech one could say, is a 
kind of writing. Thirdly, he appropriates Saussure's diacritical theory 
of the sign, the idea that language is just a system of differences. 
OP Differance, indebted to Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud and others, is most directly 
drawn from Saussure. The sign has no meaning in itself, no semantic 
content, If we think of it as having a meaning, then it is not a 'presence', 
not a unity graspable in itself. For Saussure, both the signifier and 
signified have their identity only through. the ways they differ from other 
signifiers or signifieds in the system. But how are we to think this 
relationship of difference? Derrida's development of the term Idifferance 
brings out what looks at first glance like an original spatiotemporality 
of differance, and does so using the semantic duality of the French verb 
differer. It stands for both the English verbs, 'to differ' and 'to 
defer'. In differing we have a kind of 'spacing' and in deferring a 
*0 
temporizing, that is a delaying. Differance is meant to capture both. 
This 'spacing' and this 'temporizing' are each offered as the fundamental 
conditions of any signification at all. They are two ways of unpacking 
the idea that a sign is constituted not by a re-presentative relation to 
another presence, but by a deferment to and a spacing from what is 
absolutely other. Identity is the product of difference; presence 
derivative from a fundamental absence. 
So while Derrida makes important use of a temporal notion like 
delay, or temporizing in his account of differance (a good example is 
Freud's delayed effect) we are not to think of this as an operation that 
I 
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takes place in time, nor as constitutive of another sort of time. Some- 
how, diffIrance is a 'movement' that makes time possible. But is not 
itself temporal. Does it then offer us an account of the temporality of 
language? The answer to that, I think, is that if it succeeds at all, 
it does so by offering an account of the temporality of the sign, of its 
'presence'. Derrida is, as it were, saving the appearances. The spacing 
and temporizing of differance makes possible the underwriting of the 
apparent simplicity of presence as a manufactured complexity. 
'It is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and 
irreducibly non-simple (and therefore stricto sensu nonoriginary) 
synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions, and protentions 
[terms used only provisionally - DCW1 ... that I propose to call 
differance ... which (is)(simultaneously) spacing (and) 
temporization. ' 8 
So the argument is that differance precedes time understood through 
presence - that is for example, as made up of a series of now points9 or 
as the living present - in that it is only on the basis of differance that 
presence is possible. 
We quoted Derrida earlier as saying that no alternative temporality 
was available outside time as presence. One of the important consequences 
of this is that he will not allow us to have a kind of two-tier temporality, 
in which, say, an unconscious temporalityg one governed by diffe"rance for 
exampleg was woven on to an underlying phenomenological time. That would 
leave phenomenological time in itself untouched by differance. And of 
course it precisely is affected if its presence is a mere "effect" of 
differance. We cannot use differance as a corrective; it transforms 
what it touches. And the implication certainly is that the very idea 
of an unconscious temporality is based on this idea of using diff6rance 
in a merely corrective way, so it must be dropped. I think this is a 
mistake. An account of what we could call the unconscious temporality 
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of language can be provided and we can even begin to construct it out of 
some of the material that Derrida himself has gathered. 
To license my efforts in assembling a few hints towards a genuine 
temporality of language I must first justify my misapprehensions about 
differance, albeit too briefly to be absolutely satisfying. I begin with 
a general reminder. Derrida's writing as we have said, -is governed by 
strategy and the historical situation in which he finds himself. Preceded 
by and surrounded by a vast sea of philosophical writing, 'unaware as he 
believest of its naive and uncritical, commitment to presence, Derrida's 
response is to write a shadow text. By a shadow text I mean one which 
precisely in its intransigent repudiation of presence as a founding value, 
makes a difference that a more conciliatory text would not have made. 
But this is just assertion, not an argument. 
There is'after all, an important objection to be made to giving a 
transcendental status to the relationship between differance and presence, 
a relationship which he characterises by all the forbidden words - priority, 
production, origin... in and. out of formal dress. He argues, I think 
correctly that one has to go through transcendental types of argument, 
rather than just bypass them. But he retains the value of privilege and 
priority that only such arguments bestow. Remember his words "Differance 
is a constitution of the present as a synthesis of traces". Or "This 
writing of diff6rance ... (is the) ... origin of the experience of space 
and time" (My underlining). In neither of these cases, and they are not 
unusual, are precautions offered. It will be said that he knew what he 
was doing.... But have we agreed on what that was? In making 'enigmatic' 
the idea of presence, Derrida cannot be indifferent as to the legitimacy 
of the means he employs. He is, I believe, engaged in high-grade mimicry 
of transcendental arguments. But he does not and cannot show that differance 
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can be the origin of anything. Let us suppose that there are always 
scare-quotes or erasures implied in such terms. 
9 But then surely the 
consequence isthat, they do not have the required force. They cannot 
establish the priority they claim. 
In my view undeconstructed presence, and various of the concepts 
associated with it, are ineliminable in principle. Derrida himself 
says something like this - that we cannot imagine abandoning the concepts 
of metaphysics when deconstructing it. I mean it in a rather different 
way. At the rarified level of argument we have just left, I concluded 
that Derrida could not claim a privileged position or priority for 
differance over presence without self-stultification. Is there room 
for the term differance without this privilege attached to it? I think 
there is and, it is at precisely the same level as there is room for 
'presences', 'unities' and 'identities' functioning without the metaphysical 
security that philosophy is apt, to bestow upon them, 
10 
There is in Derrida's work a self-confessed danger of inducing 
sterility. The language of differance not only legitimates a school of 
criticism, but has terror potential in its exclusion of a whole range of 
importantanalytical concepts. More importantly for my purposes it 
discourages interest in the temporality of language. 
The level I have referred to, at which presence and differance 
meet without privilege, I would call the level of human finitude. We 
are satisfied with partial answers to questions, incompletely fulfilled 
meanings, good enough cases of immediacy. We do have a tacit knowledge 
of contextsl we construe situations, we know what it is to see a piece 
of papers to go for a walk, etc. Derrida would probably not dispute this. 
What I think he forgets is that it is from these everyday securities, 
and our tacit grasp, however vague and average that we necessarily start 
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with when considering, say, the contribution of diffe"rance to their 
constitution. The always-already present is the condition for diffdrrance 
being thinkable. Derrida's way of handling this problem involves the 
use of the concept of economy. The play of diffýrance is not infinite. 
Stabilities are the product of an economy of forces in-a field. And 
that is importantly quite as true of the"terms' difference and differance. 
Difference and identity, or differance and presence, are each linked 
pairs, and that we might do well to think of metaphysics as the result of 
a hypertrophic privileging of one of the terms in each pair. 
We can now turn to consider the temporality of language more freely. 
We have said that, in spite of his rejection'(in LG) of an alternative 
temporality, he nonetheless supplies some material and points the way. 
The best sources for this are to be found in-his discussions of the 
linearity of the- 'vulgar conception of time"' and a similar account in 
Grammatology as a Positive Science (GPS). 
12 
And there is a surprise 
in store for us. For he refers in-passing, at the end of the second 
source, to our increasing 'access to pluri-dimensionalityl and to a 
Idelinearised temporality'. This-gives us hope that we are not on the 
wrong track. 
It will help to be guided by a question: What is wrong with the 
picture of the temporality of speech or writing that represents it simply 
as a linear succession of elements? Saussure seemed to claim just this, 
at least about speech: 
Auditory signifiers have at their command only the dimension 
of time. Their elements are presented in succession. They 
form a chain. ' 13 
Now there are two fundamental things wrong with it. (1) It is rarely 
if ever true, even superficially, ' of writing. So it is not generalizable 
to all signification. (2) It is only very superficially true of speech. 
14 
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For Derrida it reflects the historical domination of the linearist 
conception of time, the 'vulgar concept of time' as Heidegger calls 
it, of time as a series of now points. Its hopelessness as a model 
of linguistic temporality should be obvious. 
Derrida describes this linear model of time in a number of places. 
Its various attributes include consecutivity, irreversibility, unidimen- 
sionality, homogeneity, and 'dominated by the form of the now and the 
ideal of continuous movement, straight or circular'. 
But if such a model of time has to be abandoned to account for, 
among other things, the temporality of language, Derrida's account of 
the 'trace' and of IdiffeOrancel does not offer us an adequate concep- 
tuali2ation of the alternative - and not just because they are not 
properly speaking 'concepts', but because their power to articulate 
the complex temporal structures of speech and writing is restricted in 
scope. Even if differance were basic to all the other temporal structures 
of languages it need not hold the key to their complexity and variety. 
There is no reason to suppose that an adequate account of the temporality 
of language can be generated from an account of the temporality of the 
sign (or the 'trace'). An adequate account, I suggest, would-have to take 
note of four different levels at which language production is temporally 
involved: (1) ludic (2) intentional (3) structural (4) communicative. 
The ludic level is that of the play of sounds and shapes that allow 
patterns of echo and repetition to be set up in discourse. The intentional 
level concerns itself with the way the construction and comprehension of 
discourse involves both protention and retention, and complex layerings 
of each. The structural level deals with the multiplicities of orders of 
unit (and thus levels of successivity) in a text, the different series to 
be found in the same text (constituting character, theme, plot, etc. ), 
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the many continuities and discontinuities it enclosed, and so on. 
15 
Finallyq seen as communication, speech or text production enters into the 
whole field of interaction, interpretation, understanding, interruption, 
response, correction, etc. 
These gestures towards the different levels at which the temporality 
of language can be elucidated is designed only to suggest one thing: that 
a pluri-dimensional and delinearised temporality - one that escapes the 
most obvious forms of the metaphysical determination of time - can be 
developed by a careful elucidation of the complex weave of temporal structure 
found in discourse. A deconstructive practice that obscured these different 
levels would do us a great disservice. And what we are suggesting is if 
not stricto sensu a new concept of time, at least a new model of temporal 
structuration. 
The obvious response to this from one who insists that the notion 
of time itself is inescapably metaphysical a thesis we attribute to 
Derrida is to say that each of these different levels are identified 
under classically 'metaphysical' headings - how else can references to 
intention or to communication be understood? Do they not involve an 
appeal to presence in some form? And if so, does not the contribution 
each makes to what we have called the weave of textual temporality just 
re-establish the old concept of time on new ground?, 
think we have to take seriously Derrida's own claim (quoted in 
note 10) that concepts are only metaphysical when, inscribed in a particular 
way in a text. And I take it that the kind of textual inscription that 
counts here is one that gives a foundational value - the value of 
presence - to such concepts. But this is just what we have not done, by 
referring to a weave. Consider 'intention' first. If we want to under- 
stand the temporal structure of 'telling a joke', we have to refer to the 
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setting up of expectations, and the retroactive cancellation of these 
expectations in the punchline. This is not the whole story about the 
time of the joke, but it is an essential part of it, and it involves a 
reference to the intentional. Or again, consider 'communication'. 
We could think of communication as the establishing of some ideal co- 
presence in which minds, if only briefly, are unified. That would 
indeed be a metaphysical notion, as would the idea that it involves the 
transmission of some 'meaning' from one person to another. But we do 
not have to abandon the whole notion of communication, and the effort 
to understand its more subtle temporal structuring, just because it is 
open to a metaphysical appropriation. 
To summarize: Derrida's deployment of Idiffe*rancel and 'trace' 
so as to strategically displace 'identity' and 'presence' in a decon- 
structive manoeuvre, would become an act of destruction if it were allowed 
to obscure the place at which 'identities' and 'differences' meet without 
privilege, without, that is, the relation between identity and difference 
being reduced to a foundational relation in either direction. 
Derrida's claim that there can be no non-metaphysical concept of 
time is founded, we argue, on an illegitimate conversion of the status of 
the term Idifferancel into one with (quasi-) transcendental significance. 
only then can he argue that as diffýrance is 'prior' to time (and its 
distinction from space) 'time' is only a fundamental concept within a 
framework that denies diff6rance, i. e., within metaphysics. But if we' 
refuse to allow diff6rance to play this (quasi-) transcendental role, 
then the possibility of an alternative non-metaphysical temporality is, 
opened up. To this end Derrida's work supplies much of the motivation 
and some of the tools but finally he obstructs the path. 
III. Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Question of Strategy 
A. Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflection 
Reading Derrida's work as philosophy, perhaps a foolhardy enterprisep 
one soon realises that something like a paradox courses through it. 
Derrida is proposing an account of writing which refuses even, philosophy 
(or particularly philosophy) the status of 'purveyor of truth' in any 
linguistically naive way. For Derrida, linguistic naivety does not 
consist in forgettingt as Whorf might have said, that we are using a 
specific natural language when we make our universal pronouncements, and 
that these might not even be sayable in a language with different onto- 
logical commitments. It consists in supposing that philosophy could 
ever escape the condition of writing, which he thinks of as semantically 
ungrounded, as 'originating' with what he calls the 'trace' (which is not a 
'trace of anything) rather than a meaning which can be grasped in itself. 
Writifig is constituted by a play of differences, a constant deferring of 
the point at which its meaning could be cashed out. 
1 For those who 
would pin down a text to what it really means, *Derrida's account of the 
determination of meaning is like that of catching an infinitely slippery 
eel. 
The paradox lies in the status of what he writes, and the fact that 
he too is writing, " If what Derrida writes is true, it would follow that 
we ought to read him and other philosophers in a new way. But if what 
he says is true in the ordinary philosophical sense of truth (which he 
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describes as metaphysical) then in fact it cannot be true, for there 
would then be at least one species of writing - namely Derrida's type 
of metaphilosophy - which has escaped the universal condition of writing 
of never just being able to deliver the truth for consumption. But if 
we drop the claim to truth, then how and why should we believe Derrida's 
claims about language as writing? Derrida has the problem of saying 
what he means without meaning what he says. 
If Derrida were not aware of the form of this problem our task 
would be lighter and shorter, but he is very much aware of this paradox 
and his highly reflective and self-conscious texts can in part be seen 
as responses to it. He talks of his writing as strategic (though without 
an end according to which the strategy could be more or less successful), 
he insistently admits that metaphysics in some form or other is inescapable,, 
but that does not make all texts equally metaphysical, and he varies his 
style. The difference between Speech and Phenomena and Glas for example, 
makes it clear that he is almost as concerned about his relation to his 
texts as was that master of authorial disguises Kierkegaard. it is 
finally worth pointing out, as further evidence of Derrida's concern with 
reflexivityq that when he deals with Hegel2 one of the places he makes 
for is Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind in which Hegel expresses 
his distaste for prefaces. It is after all inappropriate to offer the 
reader reflections on a work he has not yet read, and, more importantly, 
it is impossible to summarize a work that is inseparable from its actual 
detailed textual development. A philosophical preface is, as such, about 
the worst introduction to philosophical writing. Despite Hegel's attach- 
ment to the logocentric ideal of presence, in the shape of Absolute 
Knowledgev albeit with a long delayed delivery date, Hegel's concern that 
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we realise that philosophical work cannot be represented by summary 
ýorms, that one piece of writing cannot stand. for another piece of 
writing, gives him a place in the fictional history of non-logocentric 
philosophy, philosophy not detachable from its written form, even if 
Hegel still hung on to a telos. 
3 If I am right, the way Derrida latches 
on to Hegel's most important textual reflections is symptomatic of the 
importance of reflexivity for understanding Derrida's own work. I hope 
that pursuing this theme will help us to answer the question of the 
status of his writing. 
By the question of its status I really mean its relationship to 
philosophy and possible future philosophical practice. I have already 
explained how this problem first arises. I have claimed that if we take 
his claims in a straightforward philosophical way, they can be reflexively 
applied to themselves to generate a puzzle about their own status. One, 
way out of this problem is to abandon this naive reading. Derrida's own 
agreement with my suggestion about the inadequacy of a naive level of 
reading him is reflected in the apparatus of internal warnings, instruc- 
tions, security systems, recommendations and the general level of guar- 
dedness with which he writes. Whereas the initial first level paradox 
I began with depended on making his conclusions reflect on themselves, I 
will now try to show that a second level of paradox 6an be discerned in 
the internal reflections within the text itself. I will argue that the 
use of these strategies of textual reflexivity which can be seen as a 
solution to the first order paradox, seems at least to realign Derrida 
firmly within the logocentric tradition he is criticizing, and moreover 
that it does this in ways that he did not anticipate, and cannot find 
acceptable. 
But the problem about the status of his writing can be put another 
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way. Following Heidegger, he has a large scale view about the 
pervasiveness in the history of philosophy of a single underlying theme. 
For Heidegger this was the forgetfulness of Being - or forgetting the 
question of Being. It took the form of substituting some specific 
determination of Being (such as Plato's Ideas, or any other specific form 
of ontological commitment) for Being itself. Instead of a question we 
have a series of answers unaware that they are answers, because the 
questions have been forgotten and are now hidden. Derrida agrees with 
this analysis of the history of philosophy as a series of 'determinations 
of Being as presence' but does away with the reference to Being, adding 
that even Heidegger's 'Being' is just another product of the philosopher's 
desire for 'presence'. The concept of presence is Derrida's term for the 
principle that unifies all epistemological and ontological touchstones - 
intuition, self-consciousness, direct awareness of the other, the revelation 
of meaning, etc. 
4 Now if we deem metaphysical those philosophical texts 
which are organised by some appeal to the privileged value of presence, 
it raises the question as to whether there could be any non-metaphypical 
philosophy -a question which Derrida has himself also raised. 
What Derrida opposes to the ideal structuring of a philosophical 
text by the appeal to the value of presence is the status of all texts 
(as well as speech, and even consciousness) as. writing. 
5 And he uses 
the term writing to capture a view of language as a dispersion of signs 
with no centre, no point privileged by presence. The structure of 
presencecouldbe regarded as the false-consciousness of the metaphysical 
text, and it is reflected in the refusal of such texts to recognise their 
own status as writing (by the kinds of timeless ideals they endorse, for 
example). If we suppose that such a blindness was a constitutive feature 
of all philosophy and yet that it is inconsistent with the ideals of 
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clarity, autonomy and self-justifiability that philosophy holds, then 
Derrida's account of writing puts in question the very possibility of 
philosophy not determined by metaphysical and thus ultimately contra- 
dictory values. 
6 
There are a number of more general external considerations relevant 
to assessing Derrida which I shall simply list: 
A. It seems to be a lesson drawn from his analysis of the work of Husserl 
and Heidegger that the principle that effort is rewarded does not apply to 
attempts to escape metaphysical determinations. 
.I 
have already mentioned 
Heidegger's case. Derrida thinks of Husserl too as someone who despite 
the best intentions built into phenomenology the most basic metaphysical 
motifs - intuition as a guaranteed basis for. knowledge. And Husserl 
had made the avoidance of metaphysics a thematic aim of phenomenology! 
It follows that Derrida's own efforts to (more modestly) limit the 
extent. of his. involvement with metaphysical aims need bear no-relation 
to his success. History teaches us that the road back to metaphysics 
is paved with the very. -best intentions. 
B. Metaphysics as Derrida, understands it, is not simply to be found in 
the use of certain types of arguments, or the holding of certain sorts of 
propositions (those which cannot be verified, say). One is implicated 
in metaphysics as one might be implicated in an ontology 
7 
even by the 
language one uses to escape it. The way Nietzsche describes truth applies 
in large part to the terminological armoury of metaphysics'and hence its 
insiduousness: 
'What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomorphisms... illusions of which one 
has forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors 
which have become powerless to affect the senses... 1 *8 
Our language contains all the conceptual oppositions within which 
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the history of philosophy unconsciously plays itself out. And that 
language is not isolable from the one used in what Derrida calls the 
deconstruction of metaphysics, 
9 
C. Finally perhaps a rather provincial problem in assessing Derrida. 
On this side of the Channel, the thinkers who, in Derrida's view have 
been most successful, and in the light of whose writing Derrida is best 
understood, are as much the subject of philosophical suspicion as Derrida 
himself. And the success of Joyce, Mallarme or Artaud is no guide to 
judging Derrida who never seeks a wholly literary evaluation. 
I have called these considerations 'external' because while they 
bear on Derrida's writing, they can be grasped without special reference 
to his work and allow some advance scene setting. I have mentioned the 
names of a number of philosophers with whose work Derrida's is intimately 
linked. I make some further connections and comparisons below, in 
assessing Derrida's textual reflexivity in a historical context, but 
before such comparisons, I shall spell out what I mean by his strategies 
of textual reflexivity. 
What interests me here are the various ways in which Derrida 
explicitly focusses in his texts on the ways in which they break new 
ground, the remarks he makes about the complicity of any such critical 
writing with the metaphysical matrix that it is taking as its object, and 
his account of the strategic way in which, as a consequence he is using 
the terms he cannot avoid using. I shall argue that these strategies in 
cluding Derrida's claim that all writing in this area is a matter of 
strategy and risk) are not the only possible responses to the theoretical 
situation as he sees it, and that, by the very reflective devices he uses 
he appeals to the most traditional metaphysical values, values he himself 
has analysed. While one might be prepared to accept the metaphysical 
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complicity of deconstructive theory on the strength of Derridals 
explanations, if these explanations themselves are even clearer and more 
obvious examples of metaphysical thinking, we will surely have cause for 
a certain scepticism. I am saying that the general line of prudence 
with regard to metaphysics that Derrida takes is directly self-defeating. 
The first level of reflexivity I would point to is that of Derrida's 
lexical innovations and appropriations. I am thinking of such examples 
as 'trace', Idifferancel, Ibrisurel,, lecriturel, 'presence', Igrammatology', 
#supplement', etc. These terms have the function of occupying a space 
created by the first stage of a deconstruction, that of reversing the 
dominance relationship between two opposed concepts, 
10 
so that the value 
of presence is annulled. They are used as sticks can be used to hold 
open a crocodile's mouth. In each case we are not only treated to examples 
of the use of these terms, we are offered remarks about them which are 
designed to prevent us understanding them in traditional logocentric 
ways: 
Idifferancel is neither a word nor a concept 
a 'trace' is not a trace of anything 
a 'supplement' is neither an increase, nor an addition 
These are cases of what he calls undecidable terms, which do not obey 
ordinary logic and grammar. And yet it seems-as though they can be 
given work to do in a text, and they are repeated in like contexts. 
one way of ensuring that we remember their special status is to write 
the words 'under erasure' - by first writing them and then crossing them 
out, and then leaving them in that state. Even when Derrida does not 
use this Heideggerlan device, we are expected to remember the fact that 
these terms*do not in any ordinary sense have a meaning. One might 
compare the way inwhich mathematical fictions such as the square root 
376 
of minus one can function in equations without themselves being rational 
numbers. The idea is an interesting one but we must look at just how 
they are used. If we were just to read them in a new attitude, we might 
be amused at this appearance of something like a phenomenological shift. 
But we are also supposed to accept accounts of the functions of such terms 
which sound suspiciously as though they are fitting into the very same 
patterns as the terms they have displaced. It is of interest that Derrida 
vigorously denies this but such denials constitute a different level of 
textual reflexiono to which I shall return, 
Let me quote some remarks he makes about Idifferancel in his essay 
of that 'name': 
'What we note as differance will, thus be the movement of 
play that "produces" (and not by something that is simply 
an activity) these differences, these effects of difference. ' 
'Differance is the nonfull, nonsimple-"origin"; -it 
is the 
structured and differing origin of differences. ' 
'Differance is what makes the movement of signification 
possible. ' ., 
I .. we shall understand by the term differance the, movement 
b; which language, or any code, any system of reference in 
general becomes "historically" constituted as a fabric of 
differences. ' 11- 
There is no doubt that he can seem to be offering us a new transcendental 
argument, with differance as the ultimate ground. 
12 But that would be 
a disaster if it were true because the term Idifferancel is set up in 
direct opposition to just such an appeal to a first principle. Derrida 
not only employs an army of scare quotes to prevent us understanding his 
elucidatory terms In normal senses, he proceeds to point out that to take 
these accounts with their normal metaphysical weight would be quite mis- 
taken. He insists that he is using these quoted terms only strategically. 
But surely we do have to understand the scare-quoted terms in order to be 
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able to grasp just how they situate a new sense for differance. And 
yet this we are not allowed to do. The tide however is pulling strongly 
and we are not encouraged to linger over these problems. Derrida already 
knows where he is going. He will refuse the identification of differance 
with Heidegger's Being, he will deny that there is any sense in which we 
can point to the essence of differance, and he will finally insist that 
differance is not a name at all. The reason for this is that what it 
would name, if it were a name, is 
'the play that brings about the nominal effects, the 
relatively unitary or atomic structures we call names, 
or chains of substitutions for names' 13 
The reason It cannot name this is presumably that the condition for the 
possibility of names cannot itself be named. 
I have a number, of worries about this theological argument. First, 
I cannot see why, if there was such a condition, it could not be named. 
After all it seems to be possible to describe it. My second worry is 
rather deeper. For it begins to seem as though Derrida's coyness about 
differance is based on his own mystical understanding of names. And I 
just do not see why we need to go all the way through Heidegger to dis- 
cover that a term can be functional without being a name, and that its 
function can consist in both the substitutions it allows and those it 
engages ing i. e., its paradigmatic possibilities. Derrida is here 
following both Nietzsche and Heidegger in conceiving of language primarily 
at the lexical level, allowing no independent form to syntax. Are 
14 
sentences just plays on words? The whole problematic of language as 
representation seems to spring from such a limited conception. And I 
am not sure if one escapes it by meditations on the mystery of names, 
and the unnameable relation between names and things that Nietzsche called 
I 
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both metaphor and a lie. My concern over the term Idifferancel cannot 
be applied in quite the same way to Derrida's other terminological 
appropriations. Before making some general remarks about these, I 
would like to single out for comment one of his most powerful terms - 
'Presence'. When he explains the extension of this term 
15 he does so 
in a way that reminds me again of the very sort of thinking that 'the 
philosophy of presence' itself designates. Derrida lists a whole set 
of themes, which also appear as philosophical concerns and problems, 
which all exemplify the same privilege, albeit in different forms. 
Does not the deconstruction of the history of philosophy of presence 
already posit as a history, as a series of expressions of the same theme? 
Does it not, in other words, at the very moment at which it discovers the 
pervasiveness of presence, thereby make 'Presence' present, display it as 
a unity of the series of its appearance? Derrida's list goes on like 
this: 
.... (presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, 
presence as substance/essence/existence (ousU7 -, 
temporal presence as point (stigme) of the now or 
of the moment (nun), the self-presence of the cogito, 
consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the 
other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the, 
intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth (op. 
cit., supra)' 
Derrida has had something like this point made to him before 
16 but 
he did not seem to understand it. The condition of the unity of the list 
is surely the way in which each of its elements exemplifies the essence of 
presence. And I think this is one of a number of cases in which it is 
simply not open to Derrida to refer us back to his claims that avoiding 
metaphysics is a difficult task, even an impossible one., Here for 
instance we are concerned with the very principle on which it is possible 
to identify what he has called metaphysics, i. e., the condition on which 
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I even the sense of his doubts about total metaphysical hygiene rest. 
I am saying that the very term metaphysics, as Derrida uses it, is 
metaphysical, in that it rests on essentialism. The consequence. of 
these and other objections is to cast doubt on what Derrida thinks he 
is doing, not necessarily on whether it is worth doing. 
More generally, I would point to the extrordinary care and detailed 
control that Derrida tries to exercise over all the terms he uses, the- 
exceptional self-consciousness of his texts. Where there is a chance of 
misunderstanding, we usually find at that very point, or a little later, 
a polite insistence that we understand him in the way he intends, that we 
bracket out the logocentric meanings of words. I point to this because 
whatever he says about the merely strategic value of his writing, the 
function of control, of internal reflexive interpretations, vigilance', 
ultimately responsibility, seems to me to be a transference to the field 
of writing of an ideal relationship between subject (writer) and object 
(writing) which is nothing short of metaphysical. It is as if having 
admitted the ineliminability of absence, alterity, -otherness1n writingi 
that all the old values of directness, contact, and dare one say it, 
presence (the presence of the author to his reader) can be reinstated 
at another level. Is it a metaphor to call his writing constitutionally 
self-conscious? And whence does such self-consciousness draw its value? 
The second level of textual reflexivity covers a number of different 
ways in which Derrida has spoken about the status of his own work, particu- 
larly in relation to philosophys literature and metaphysics. And I would 
insist that we, bear in mind when considering what he says that these 
reflections, to be accurate, must accommodate the fact of their own 
perpetual appearance within his writing, as well as from one text to 
another (this most notably in the published interviews Positions in which 
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he talks abotit his texts). 
I have been unable to avoid trespassing on these themes already, 
but I shall try to make any repetitions clarificatory. 
I have often triedto show that Derrida's writing is metaphysical,, 
in his own sense of the term. I have also implied, and sometimes 
explicitly stated that despite his own claims about the unavoidability 
of this state of affairs, that such assurances were not adequate to. the 
cases I mentioned. But I ought to give more flesh to his remarks about 
the stickiness of metaphysics. 
17 In one of his papers on, Levi-Strauss - he summarizes this complicity 
strikingly: 
'There is no sense in doing without the concepts of 
metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We 
have no language - no syntax, and no lexicon - which 
is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single 
deconstructive proposition which has not already 
slipped into the form, the logic and the implicit 18 
postulations of precisely what it, -seeks-to contest. 
And he cites the use of the concept of the sign to attack the-metaphysics 
of presence (as in his critique of Husserl, for example) a concept which 
suffers from the same illness. Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger each 
in their own way tried to step outside the circle, and each were recap- 
tured. 
It is given this recognition of the trap set by the circle that 
the concept of-risk appears. If hard work only digs one deeper in, 
perhaps what is needed is a different approach which may involve taking 
risks. And why not - it seems there'cannot be anything to lose. 
After all, the risk is one that one could not help, taking - the risk of 
having finally said nothing, or having repeated a movement that could 
have been foreseen. And I think the method of deconstruction is what he 
considers to be the best way of actually going about the task with some 
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limited chance of success, 
What is this task? It seems to me that it is not simply the 
academic one of exposing for all to see the logocentric commitments of 
the great philosophers, but more importantly bringing about what Heidegger 
called a changed relationship to language. Indeed deconstruction can 
accomplish both these ends. The change is not easy to spell out but 
one might call it the recognition of the materiality and vulnerability 
of writing, and thus the impossibility of those forms of discourse predicated 
on writing having some higher status, like the expression of truth. 
What interests me at this point are the norms that guide the 
particular way he has chosen to bring about this changed attitude, as I 
suspect that they are such as to make it impossible to put in question the 
sort of writing in which Derrida himself is engaged. They take it for 
granted, even affirm its. neutrality with respect to metaphysics. Derrida 
believes in the classical values of theory, rigour, system, precision and 
control. - He says that his texts Ibelong. neither to the philosophical nor 
to the literary register', but they do belong to the register of theory 
and they do not question it fundamentally. And my remarks about lexical 
control and proprietorship apply even more importantly at this level. 
Derrida at one point in Positions says that it makes a difference how 
rigorously and systematically one takes up onel. s distance to metaphysics. 
As I see it this involves a distinction between good and bad metaphysics. 
And it is a distinction which can be immediately deconstructed by refusing 
'the value 'good' (orbetter') to that which'is merely more rigorously 
controlled and self-conscious. 
His wkiting is governed. by rules, by norms, even I would say by a 
telos. (Such as: A changed relation to language) It is very unlike f 
that Heraclitean play of differences to which he often refers. I will 
382 
not repeat my question about the logocentric nature of these very principles 
of textual ordering. What does strike me is the poverty of Derrida's 
middle range understanding of linguistic form. He is very interested in 
both the lexical and the systematic level but does not seem prepared to 
conceptualise the middle range forms of syntactic construction, except in 
the case of his general account of the strategy of deconstruction. 
One of the reasons for my making these points about Derrida's 
residual choice of theory as a mode of writing is that it does seem to 
be a choice, it does not seem to be necessary; it is not so unavoidable 
for necessity to be an excuse, To show this I will make remarks about 
Nietzsche, by way of contrast. 
One of Nietzsche's guiding threads was the finiteness of the circle 
of metaphysics, and the ease with which escapes can be just illusions. 
Heidegger takes over most of Nietzsche's history of metaphysics, but 
finally locates even Nietzsche's Wille zum Willen within that very same 
tradition - as, however concealed -a kind of 'presence'. And Nietzsche's 
account of language merely seems to be a radical sensationalist inversion 
of idealism. This is too fast a tour of a much more subtle diagnosis, 
but Heid egger is still too fast with Nietzsche. Nietzsche cannot be 
understood separately from his style. Many of Nietzsche's inversions, 
for example can be read as a sustained rhetorical device. And then it 
would cease to be true that Nietzsche was locked into a simple opposition. 
it is too large an issue to go into here but it seems that one can only 
decide on the degree to which Nietzsche (or anyone for that matter) has 
evaded the framework they have tried to escape from, after one has decided 
that they are serious in what they say. And we know perfectly well that 
while Nietzsche was serious in what he sought to convey, he did not 
restrict himself to serious forms of expressions. Nietzsche is amusing, 
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he exaggerates, he plays with his reader. 
As we have already demonstrated. Nietzsche was well aware of what 
Derrida called the closure of metaphysics, its exhaustion, the fact that 
it had played itself out. And I think he chose style as his way out. 
19 
He chose a way of writing by which he could be taken literally, referentially. 
I think Nietzsche continued to contribute to philosophy and did so by 
abandoning theory. However much Derrida may say he is not serious, many 
of the problems he sets himself arise from the ideal which may no-longer 
be even intelligible in a strictýsenseq of being able to say what he means, 
in a theoretical form. 
20 Derrida's work is not marked by nostalgia, but 
a fixation on the importance of going through all sorts of traditional 
manoeuvres (one could'almost say academic, ones), many of which Nietzsche 
abandoned. 
There may also be lessons to be learned, from Kierkegaard's pseu- 
donymous writingsq'which again use stylistic-devices to effect-a changed- 
attitude to writing on'the part of the reader. 
At one point Derrida'says that the passage beyond philosophy involves 
a new reading of philosophy, but unless that also includes an assessment of 
a philosopher's own understanding of the-status of his writing, that new 
writing could be a form of blindness. 
21 It is'not possible for Derrida 
to dismiss such considerations as too much concerned with what the writer 
intended, because he too is obsessed with having his intentions properly 
read. 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche developed real alternatives to scare-quotes. 
Quite how satisfactory they--are as alternatives depends on how far one 
takes the activity of deconstruction to be a means to an end obtainable 
by other routes, and how far one takes it to be an end in itself. Derrida 
does not seem to me wholly clear on this point. 
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There is another philosopher whose strategies one cannot ignore 
in trying to come to terms with Derrida. Surprisingly enough I am 
referring to Husserl, the very object of Derrida's most sustained 
'philosophical' critique. Yet there are some strange and unexpected 
parallels between Husserl and Derrida. 
Both philosophers share the view'that-metaphysics can only be 
escaped or its impact lessened by the strictest control over one's 
writing. Husserl's phenomenological'reduction was in part the intern- 
alising of a rule that one should not read off ontological'conclusions 
from one's experiences. It was'a refusal to bi-committed to the onto- 
logical seriousness of ordinary everyday experience and language. ' 
Husserl's solution is to transform that experience so that it can support 
a new sort of seri6usness, 'that which confines itself to essential structures 
rather than empirical matters of fact. Husserl is constantly reminding 
us-that we must not understand'what he is-writing-in-*a'psychologistic way, 
however tempting it seems, for that is quite contrary to his intentions/ 
meaning. Many of Derrida's strategies'seem very close to Husserl here. 
Like Husserl, Derrida knows he cannot avoid using ordinary language. All 
he can hope to do is to warn us against taking it seriously. While 
Husserl tries to organise a new permanent way of avoiding taking it 
seriously (= ontologically), Derrida, realising that Husserl only achieves 
this by giving to language a new phenomenological seriousness, offers us 
strategic uses of terms as an alternative short-life answer to the avoid- 
ance of seriousness. 
But this appeal to strategy is only to a means. Finally Derrida 
wants to bring about a transformation of our ways of reading and under- 
standing language quite as global and total as Husserl, and he would like, 
ideally, to arrive at a point at which it would be no longer necessary to 
385 
bracket out the logocentric meanings of words, to cross them out, to 
remind us that a certain expression is only a transitory evil. 
Both Derrida and Husserl offer visions of 'philosophical' work 
to be done, discover or anticipate new sciences, logics, hold out promises 
to disciples. Husserl's dreams of the final scope of phenomenology are 
notorious. As far as judging the value of phenomenology was concerned, 
Husserl made constant references to the future work to be done. 
Doesn't Derrida repeat this?, Grammatology, a logic of the supplement, 
even a parasitology are announced, but are they more than gestures in 
the direction of a new, organisation of a theoretical space? 
It has been said of Derrida 
22 
that his main strength lies in the 
fact that 'he does not destroy anything or even refute - but simply 
offers a diagnosis'. There is a certain amount of truth-in this. 
Derrida believes-that the structures he discovers are actually there 
already. in, the. texts,. constituting them. as the philosophical texts they. 
are. Thus 
'a patient reading of the Investigations would show the 
germinal structure of the whole of Husserl's thought. 
On each page the necessity - or the implicit practice 13 
of eidetic and phenomenological reductions is visible. 
While lisible would be strictly more accurate a translation than visible, 
in the last line, the commitment to a realism with regard to the structures 
discerned is brought out well by the perceptual term. Derrida seems 
to me to be committed to a science of the structures of metaphysical 
writing in the same way in which Husserl was committed to phenomenology 
as a descriptive science of experience. The belief in the existence 
of structures of presence is a form of textual realism. On what other 
basis does he claim such a privilege for his readings? And yet such 
realism is utterly metaphysical! 
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Derrida cannot refute metaphysics for all the reasons that I (and 
he) have documented. And he began at least by merely exposing it. I 
suspect however that the attempt to draw a parallel with Husserl's neutrality 
would begin to fail if we followed the development of Derrida's thought. 
The use of terms which are lindecidables' is the kind of active intervention 
in a field which Husserl never contemplated. 
I have not the space to develop this point here, but I think it will 
one day be seen that Derrida's debts to Husserl, through his transformed 
appropriation of some of the strategies of phenomenology, are quite crucial 
in understanding why Derrida is not more lik6 Nietzsche or Heidegger than 
he is. We must not forget Husserl's passion for, theory. 
One wonders whether, quite apart from its philosophical perversity, 
the preparatory and internally directing care with which Derrida releases 
his texts into the scattering winds of history will ever have the consequences 
for which he must-hope. -It-was Husserl, -again, who insisted-on the difference 
between his phenomenology and any ordinary philosophy, that it was not just 
a branch of philosophy, but the only serious substitute for it. But for 
all his training of disciples, they ended up betraying him, and his 
writings were absorbed into the public domain of philosophy. 
Derrida talks of himself as having set up camp at a distance from 
philosophy from which he can still. communicate with it. But if that 
communication is the condition of his writing bearing on philosophy, it is 
also the source of the greatest risk - reabsorption, a condition we might 
describe as the mortality of the text, and a condition which Derrida's 
passion for acute textual control seems tobe based on ignoring, or 
excluding. 
Would he be entirely disappointed by such an absorption by the 
philosophy of the future? What would remain? If we consider for example, 
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1. Derrida's recognition that it is ultimately the strategies, articulations, 
and recourses of texts that are / are not metaphysical, not simply the concepts 
themselves. And that surely opens up an extraordinary range of possible textual 
ruses, from which it will become impossible to exclude questions of intention. 
2, There is a sense in which the future of deconstruction depends on a steady 
supply of texts that at some not too deep level take themselves seriously, 
that continue to pursue a stateable truth in a reasonably straightforward way. 
But whether as a result of deconstruction or not there is no reason to think 
that philosophy will just stand still and offer itself for deconstruction. 
Not only could Derrida's defence of Nietzsche against Heidegger ( using his 
2S 27 tstyle') be more generously extended to other philosophers who might 
similarly be -, thought to have sailed dangerously close to the edge of language 
and yet carried on writing, but deconstruction could spawn a range of texts 
that knowingly anticipated the ýnevitable possibility of their own deconst- 
ruction., ( Derrida's own texts, he agrees . have just such a status. ) 
the 
difference such anticipation would make is not one for which we yet have an 
adequate name. 
* 
These considerations on the power and limits of the strategies of 
writing are not, however, meant as abstract conjectures, but are intended 
to license our own post-deconstructive temporal musings. For we claim that it 
is possible at least to imagine a post-metaphysical pluralism about time(s) 
in which the demand for primitive 'elements' would give way to proliferation 
without foundation. We claim to have taken a short step at least beyond 
mere imagination!. On this view Derridats 'trace' and Nietzsche's 'self- 
exceeding moment' are each cuckoo's eggs hatched in the nest of foundation- 
alist thinking . There'is no primitive unit, but if there were it would be 
like this 
III. Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Question of Strategy 
B. Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: Heidegger and 
Derrida 
1. The Question of Style 
The distinction between the form and content of language, between 
the how and the what, is not only traditional but formative for philosophy. 
It is formative in that it implies their genuine separability and so 
authorizes focussing on one side, on the what, relegating the question of 
how to such 'peripheral areas' as rhetoric, stylistics and pragmatics. 
1 
Despite the more recent interest of analytic philosophy (especially 
Austin and Searle) in speech acts, and of phenomenology in the noetic aspects 
of intentionality, this concern with the what, with the propositional content 
of language, has been the dominant tradition. The how of a philosophical 
text, what we will very broadly refer to as its philosophical style, -has 
too long been seen functionally, as a means of conveying a content, or 
aesthetically as an end in itself. We have had exhortations to clarity 
on the one hand, and stylistics on the other. But might it not be that 
the "style" of philosophical writing is not treated with due philosophical 
seriousness when understood in either of these two ways, either as a means 
or as an end? 
And in fact, whatever philosophy's dominant concern has been, its 
history does offer us examples of philosophers for whom style was more 
than a peripheral'matter. Consider the examples of Plato, Hegel, Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein. Platonism is always represented as an otherworldly 
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the rhetorical exaggeration to be found in such phrases as 'the originary. 
violence of writing 124 or 'there never was any "perception" 125 we soon 
come to realise that the exaggeration does have a function. A memorable 
phrase drags with it the special attitude needed for its comprehension. 
But the changes that one can envisage being brought about in philosophy 
cannot easily be determined in advance. In particular I can imagine two 
quite different 'ideal' effects: (1) the disappearance of certain forms 
of writing, and their 'replacement' by others (2) a change in attitude 
to the written word (such that writing was no longer understood as the 
articulation of meanings). I am not clear which Derrida would wish 
because the substitution of new forms of writing might well take place 
as the consequence of trying to maintain the seriousness of writing. 
While such changes would not be necessary if one ceased to treat writing 
with that reverence. 
26 The difference is between ceasing to use the word 
God because it has been shown it is not a name, and continuing to use it 
without using it as a name, without that seriousness. If Derrida takes 
the former path, it seems to me that he follows Husserl in this respect. 
If he takes the second path, it is quite possible for logocentric texts, 
even authoritarian texts to continue to be produced, with a kind of 
ironic sub-scriptj as a new rhetorical form. Indeed such texts could 
even reappear grounded by the self-conscious assertion of the unground- 
ability of their basic premises, as a new irrational voluntarism, asserted 
not justified, and logocentrically clean. Or, such texts could simply 
remain as rhetorical forms with the appeal to a ground appearing as an 
explicit textual structure, with a Icentring' 
27 
as a formal device. 
These various possibilities of learning from deconstruction without 
practicing - it rest, fundamentally, výe claim, on an exploitation of 
two factors: 
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philosophy; knowing has in each case an ideal form as its proper object. 
And yet Plato so often uses not just the figure of Socrates, but the form 
of his philosophizing, the dialogue. The Socratic maeutics is a dialectical 
art. This dialectic is a necessary preliminary to the earthly contemplation 
of the forms for those not trained in such vision from birth. So in our 
view, Plato's use of the dialogue form is no mere means of exposition nor 
a gilding of the truth. 
Hegel's use of the speculative proposition, as he called it, allowed 
what he called the dialectic to appear at the level of syntax, as well as 
almost every other level of his work, including that of the individual 
word. It is the German language (the only truly philosophical language, 
said Hegel) that we have to. thank for allowing the form of his philosophy 
to so intimately reflect his method. 
Of Nietzsche more will be said shortly, but two aspects of his 
81style" are worth mentioning here. Firstly, he constantly changes his 
style in an attempt to avoid all appearance of building a system. 
System buildersl Kierkegaard claimed, never occupy their castles, but 
live in huts next door. As Heidegger put it., "What is important is 
learning to live in the speaking of language. " Secondly, his provocative 
style makes it impossible to treat his work as a picture of the truth. 
In requiring a reaction from the reader to supplement it, it loses that 
"imaginary" status. 
Finally we ought to mention the style - questioning, bitty, 
$#speculative" - of the Wittgenstein of the Investigations. This philo- 
sophical bricolage again demands a participation of the part of the reader 
that would have been redundant on the picture theory of language of the 
Tractatus. 
Analogous remarks about the importance of style could have been 
391 
made about Hume, Spinoza, Whitehead and others. For many a philosopher, 
th& problematic status of language is not confined to a localizable 
I 
philosophical topic, but invades the expressive medium of philosophy 
itself. He may merely believe in the importance of clarity, or he may 
I 
try to make his style consistent with his philosophical views, or finally 
he may try to use the way he writes to convey something that cannot, or 
cannot as effectively, be said. 
If this story is plausible, those who make a habit of impatience 
with continental philosophy might begin to consider that very often a 
difficult style is not a gratuitous disfiguring of a more simply stateable 
truth, nor a veil covering the shame of confusion, but a careful$ serious 
philosophical choice. We would like to take the cases of Heidegger and 
Derrida as object lessons for this general thesis. We shall argue that 
the motivation for their somewhat different difficult styles is an easily 
stateable philosophical problem. 
Consider the problem posed by a universal solvent. The problem is 
how to store a liquid that could dissolve any container one put it in. 
By analogy, a philosopher who wields a method highly critical of the history 
of philosophy has to be very careful of his own philosophical production 
lest it be reflexively destroyed by its own critical method. Both 
Heidegger and Derrida wield such methods, both indebted to Nietzsche, and 
Derrida-indebted-to Heidegger. 
Some will feel that the interest in such large scale enterprises 
should go no further. The original error can be seen in the use of 
such overgeneralizing critical methods, for they reduce the delights of 
philosophical variety to a grey nocturnal sameness. The short answer 
is that some games can be played for high stakes and philosophy is one 
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of them. Logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy were both 
baied on the most'general principles of'method. 
If we provisionally accept that this problem of an undermining 
critical self-reference is a real one, we can best illuminate what 
difficulties Heidegger and Derrida encounter by a brief reference to 
Hegel - another philosopher with an all-embracing critical method. 
Hegel's dialectic, if we let it, . would allow us to mark the limits 
of each previous philosophical position. "'If we thought of metaphysics 
as a kind of, blindness to the finite and transitory nature of our con- 
ceptual schemes, the dialectic might seem to have a meta-metaphysical 
status. And yet closer scrutiny detects a, teleological presupposition, 
which can itself be thematised and sublated. 
In contrast, Heidegger and Derrida do not set out to rank the great 
philosophies of the past in some hierarchy of spiritual elevation 
although they each have their heroes - rather they are concerned to reveal 
the metaphysical pre-structuring of the texts they analyse and to avoid 
reproducing these moves in their own'thought. 'Heidegger uses the terms 
'ontology', 'onto-theology', and Derrida the Ilogocentric tradition' as 
roughly synonymous with metaphysics. ForýHeidegger, metaphysics is 
characterized by a forgetfulness of Being (what it is to be) and for 
Derrida it appears as the philosophy of presence. We shall expand on 
these phrases later; for now it is important to realise that both of these 
characterisations of metaphysics appear as structural features of philoso- 
phical texts. Heidegger's reference to "forgetting" is not to some 
mental process, but rather to something like the conditions of possibility 
of a metaphysics which manifests itself in the structure of philosophical 
texts at a number of different levels. 
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To complete our preliminary account of the philosophical importance 
of-their style, we must make one further point. Both Heidegger and 
Derrida associate the metaphysical history of philosophy with mistaken 
attitudes to language and misdirected attempts to use it, and each has 
something approximating a theory of language that renders suspect a number 
of traditional philosophical moves (such as definition). This theory of 
language is as we have suggested, heavily indebted to Nietzsche, and, a 
brief account of that relation would not be out of place. _ 
Once we accept that there is a problem concerning the relation 
between metaphysics and language, we still have to determine the scope. 
of that problem. This makes an enormous difference. If we suppose 
that the problem is just a regional problem about the-relationship between 
metaphysics and its language, and that its language-could be isolated from 
the rest, we could at least in principle, stand outside it, so to speak, and 
with a quite separate, clean and hygienic language, handle the local in- 
volvement of metaphysics with its language from a distance. -But if this 
was how we were to read, say, Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics - 
treating as specially philosophical such oppositions as Being and Becoming, 
Existence and Essence, Appearance and Reality, Fact and Value... it soon 
becomes clear that such concepts, let alone all their synonyms and derivatives, 
cannot be thought of as specifically metaphysical, but are parts of ordinary 
discourse. That would mean we would have to expand the scope of our 
problem to that of the ordinary discourse of the West, and consider, its 
relation to metaphysics, both informing it and informed by it. 
Nietzsche points to both these levels and to a third: that of 
language itself. Language as such is, if not plain metaphysical at least 
a dangerous foundation on which to build anything, being a lie and a 
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deception. For it not only enables us to, but demands of us that we 
ignore differences between particulars to which we apply the same term. 
In summaryt we can at this point distinguish three levels of concern with 
the metaphysical adequacy of language- that of the language of metaphysicst 
that of the permeation of'ordinary language with metaphysical concepts 
and the problem of the original lie of language as such. 
If we consider this last more deeply, we discover something appare ntly 
paradoxical. In. On Truth and Falsity in their Ultra-Moral Sense 
2 Nietzsche 
gives us his answer to the perennial question as to how general terms can 
have multiple reference. His answer is that they are lies or metaphors. 
But surely to predicate 'lie' or 'metaphor' of a general term is to treat 
a word as a proposition or a figure of speech, that is as an entity of a 
higher order. And even if we side-stepped that one it is hard to see 
how such judgements could ever get off the ground. The very word 'lie' 
or 'metaphor' would be a lie or a metaphor etc. Clearly Nietzsche cannot 
here be taken literally And this is particularly ironic because what he 
is nonliterally trying to get across is that we should not think of the 
literal relation of naming as paradigmatic'for language., If we do, it 
should not be taken to be an external relation between a word and something 
just taken off the shelf. Rather we must think of naming and referring 
as textualo or even intentional phenomena, 
3 
and-in any case not a direct, 
word-thing relation. 
If we accept this analysis of Nietzsche's aim in using the terms 'lie' 
and 'metaphor', we realise that quite apart from the different levels at 
which language and metaphysics are interwoven, Nietzsche's text offers us 
a quite different direction to investigate - that of style. 
Derrida is right in thinking that Heidegger was wrong in calling 
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Nietzsche the last metaphysician. 
4 Through his style, -or rather the 
vai: iety of his different styles, Nietzsche-escapes this charge. All 
of Nietzsche's promotions of laughing, dancing, leaping and other ways 
of modulating a distance from a surface are metaphors for the advocacy 
of style as a field for philosophical innovation. Quite what it is 
capable of is one of the questions we have before us. But when we grow, 
weary of trying to eliminate metaphysical terms from our philosophical 
and everyday discourse, might it not be a change of style that we need? 
We are now at the point at which we can summarize the claim we 
hope to be able to make good: -I 
Heidegger and Derrida both employ highly critical philosophical 
methods, the generality of which threatens to encompass their own 
philosophical work. In both cases, their diagnosis of the sources of 
metaphysics is linked to views about language and what it can and cannot 
do. Their respective "styles" are deliberate and careful attempts to 
direct their own writing so as not to retread too many of the paths of 
metaphysics and in this and other respects they are each following in 
the footsteps of Nietzsche. In support of this claim, we begin with 
Heidegger. 
2. Heidegger and the Performance of Language 
Our aims here are fairly limited. Firstly, we shall be talking about 
the later Heidegger rather than the Heidegger of Being and Time. Second, 
a comparison with Derrida will always be on the horizon. So there will 
be sins of omission, selection and simplification. 
Heidegger's later philosophy can be interpreted as a rejection of 
the subject as origin, or ground of meaning. This perspective helps us 
grasp the transition from the early to the later Heidegger. What is 
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wrong with metaphysical subjectivity is. that it has an inadequate under- 
standing of its own activity. It takes itself to be a source, when in 
fact its very status as a being is grounded in a relation to Being. 
The forgetfulness of Being manifests itself as a forgetfulness of the 
conditions of one's own being. The consequence for one's (mis)under- 
standing of language 
5 is that one takes one's possession of language for 
granted, and treats self-expression or communication as its essence. In 
doing so one forgets that language is a condition for one having anything 
to express, indeed for one being a subject at all. Language is not a 
means but rather constitutes the world of means and ends. More strongly 
than most philosophers, Heidegger conveys the autonomous power of language. 
Heidegger distinguishes broadly speaking two modes of language. 
The first we could call technical/logical and the second, poetic/hermeneu- 
tical. These should be thought of both as actual ways people use 
language and as capable of being expanded into theories about the basic 
nature of language. In this very duality we will later find a point 
for a new departure. 
In its technical/logical use, language operates primarily to 
communicate what has already been understood. Words function as mere 
counters; the linguistic appropriation of the world is a thing of the 
past; the language space is closed. Language is a transparent medium 
to be filtered clean should it ever cloud up. It is the language of 
(at least) normal science, of some philosophy and of much everyday 
conversation. In poetic language on the other hand we listen to what 
language itself already says, we work with rather than use language, we 
follow rather than force language, wait rather than lead. It is not a 
passive "use" of language - the poet is even creative - but it is a use 
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aware of the conditions of its own, activity. 
For Heideggert the technical use of language is naive, covers over 
its own truth, and when he talks about language it is about that language 
that makes the poetic possible. Many of the remarks I have made above 
are captured in the following quotation on which we will focus some 
attention. 
'Language is - language, speech. Language speaks. if 
we let ourselves fall into the abyss denoted by this sentence, 
we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward to a 
height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. The two span a 
realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to find 
a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man. ' 
'To reflect on language means - to reach the-speaking of. 
language in such a way that this speaking takes place as 
that which grants an abode for the being of mortals. ' (, 
Heidegger writes, like this rather than in a more straight-forward 
way to avoid the circuit of metaphysical repetition. One cannot distance 
oneself. from the history of metaphysics just by exercising care over the 
ordinary use of ordinary or theoretical words, or a robust confidence in 
the subject-predicatia proposition. ' For these words and the privilege"of 
certain sentence forms belong to that history. - We are stuck at the level 
of the ontic with the unconscious products of long forgotten determinations 
of Being. We are stuck with beings, and Being never gets a, word in. 
When describing Heidegger's views' of language, I was unable to say that 
he sees man either as active or passive in relation to language. Thid 
active/passive-opposition already presupposes the independent describability 
of man and language which Heidegger is questioning. It'is by a trans- 
formed style that he attempts to transcend such limitations. We are now 
in a position to return to our passage-, 
Heidegger began the essay with "man speaks. "' Now we find the words 
"language speaks. " The substitution of 'language' for 'man' is part of 
398 
an exercise in undermining the status of man as a metaphysical subject, 
in deepening our sense of the dependence of the speaker on language. 
When someone speaks, is it not language we hear? When he continues: 
"if we let ourselves fall ...... Heidegger is suggesting a response to 
this sentence that is not merely one of understanding it, but allowing 
ourselves to be affected by it, or moved by it. He promises that the 
risk of falling or loss of self is illusory. Rather we will 'fall 
upward'. He is suggesting what he elsewhere calls a new experience with 
language. Or again, 
'It is not a matter of stating a new view of language. What 
is important is learning to live in the speaking of language. ' 
This sentiment is repeated in the next two sentences. The space 
opened up by the height to which we, in. fact rise. -and 
the depth to which 
we feared we would fall 
spans a realm in which we would like to become at home, so 
as to find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man. ' 
Here as elsewhere it is important to see Heidegger's exploitation 
of ontic language - the language of housest dwellings, abysses etc. - 
to metaphorically capture the ontological. These particular metaphors 
capture the decentring of man that he is emphasizing. We are in language. 
And again, in the last sentence, which begins "to reflect on 
language means to reach the speaking of language. " We see in a gramm- 
atical transformation Heidegger's insistence on the need for a new 
relationship to language rather than discovering some new truth about it. 
The way in which a style can carry a "message" we could call ex- 
emplification. When we discussed earlier other philosophers (from Plato 
to Wittgenstein) for whom style was of more than peripheral importance, 
we left open the possibility of an exemplification that could not be put 
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in any other way. This we will call a necessary exemplification. 
Heidegger's general style fits this description, but in an extraordinary 
way. For we must realize that Heidegger would reject the very term 
exemplification and its associated logic. For that presupposes a 
meaning that can be plugged into and detached from a language at one's 
convenience - precisely the view he rejects. Such an exemplification 
that rejects the logic of exemplification (i. e. detachability) we call 
performance. Heidegger's insistence that what is at stake is a new 
relation to language rather than a new view is entirely consistent with 
this account of his textual practice. The point of such performance 
is to speak so as to show what it is to speak. 
An account of his style that cast its net over a broad selection 
of his writings would also remind us that (1) Heidegger introduces new 
words in an innovatory way, exploiting the German language to the full 
and even beyond, in his imaginative etymology. Oddly, enough, Heidegger 
always seems wholly serious about his etymology even when it seems to this 
reader like play. (In this respect, among others, he differs from-Derrida. ) 
(2) Heidegger yokes old words into new service, especially metaphorical. 
Those most favoured we call pre-reflective relational words. They fall 
into three main categories: (a) those modelled on the body and its space, 
such as Zuhanden, Vorhanden, standing, reaching, remaining ... (b) those 
that relate me to an outer space, so to speak - such as house, world, 
space, openness, dwelling ... (c) those that relate men and Being 
disclosureq concealment, withdrawing, granting, clearing. What he calls 
thinking unlocks for philosophy a whole barrel of previously unemployed 
terms. This is roughly coincident with what Hofstadter calls Heidegger's 
primitivism. 
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(3) Heidegger promotes ontological language at, the expense of the 
epistemological by what we call Germanic nominalisation. Sentences 
like 
'The greater the concealment with which what is to come 
maintains its reserve in the foretelling saying, the 
purer is the arrival' 7 
stick in one's mind. 
(4) The provisionality of Heidegger's later philosophy - most of it is 
as "on the way" as On the Way to Language 
8- is registered in the many 
occasional formats he employs - such as the lecture, ý. the, addressq the 
dialogue, the conversation. 
Heidegger's practice 
9 
of crossing out Being (Being) is an attempt 
to both name and not name Being, for if we-thought we had succeeded in 
catching it in a name,, it would be lost again. 
(6) He uses what has been called philosophical tautology (care cares, 
temporality tempoFalises; nothing noths... Sch6fer sees this as an-. - 
attempt to name without subjecting the thing named to the dispersion of 
normal syntax. He closes with a remark that gratifyingly confirms 
I 
our approach. By this device of philosophical tautology, he says, 
"the performance of the thing and the performance of language coincide 
lhere". " 10 
We have discussed six different elements of the style that Heidegger 
has forged for himself. Does it constitute a solution to the problem 
we began with - that of avoiding metaphysics? Within-its own terms it 
is an extrordinary achievement. Metaphysics is characterized by for- 
getfulness of Being; that condition is finally only to be cured by a 
new relation to Being; that can only be explained with performative 
consistency by a new way of "using" languagep a new way of writing. And 
that is the project he takes on. 'The-achievement lies as much in the way 
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he follows his problems through as in any one of the means he adopts to 
solve them. As we accept the claim that there are things that can be 
done with words that cannot be said - though Heidegger does not rely, as 
Austin does, on pre-existing conventions for his performative language - 
we grant Heidegger some sort of success. 
However his solution is not without its own problems 
(1) It is easy to misinterpret the later. Heidegger and just as easy not 
to know if you have or not. That a difficult style is not uncommon among 
great philosophers does not give any of them immunity from misunderstanding, 
and wanting to be understood - if only, as in Nietzsche's case, by another 
age - is a communicative a priori. 
(2) As much as Heidegger is linguistically innovative, these innovations 
are only understood from the standpoint of an existing language to which 
they are bound, a language that they attempt to escape. And yet the 
figurative nature of Heidegger's language sets severe limitations - however 
necessary it is - to the privileged status it seeks. For it is continually 
necessary to pass through the world of images - of woods, homes, hearths, 
and clearings to get to his thought. And how can that not rub off on 
the ontological level he aims at? 
(3) Even if it is beyond all doubt philosophical, it is only doubtfully 
still philosophy. It is still highly relevant to philosophy because it 
is thoroughly determined by the whole history of philosophy, and represents 
both a drawing of the boundary round what remains philosophy and a question- 
ing of the continuing possibility of that discipline. 
(4) Lastly, and most critically, Heidegger seems to be aiming at an ideal 
coincidence between what sceptics would still call the act and the content 
of language. And if we are right, it is in the performative use of 
language that, if anywhere, he achieves this. But this is an ideal, one 
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that the sheer materiality of language can never allow to be achieved. 
Heidegger is projecting onto his linguistic performance an imaginary 
unity, in a desire which is as old as philosophy. 
There is some reason to suspect that Derrida might have tried 
to avoid some of these objections. He begins with much the same problem 
as guided Heidegger (distancing oneself from, if not overcoming meta- 
physics) and he shares some of our criticisms of Heidegger. So it is 
to Derrida that we now turn. 
3. Derrida and the Language of Strategy 
We will shortly see what Derrida's practical response is to the 
metaphysical predicament posed by the closedness of the conceptual and 
thematic repertoire of the history of metaphysics. " It is first worth 
explaining his response to Heidegger, or'at least to that style which 
is dominant in Heidegger, for he accepts that even in Heidegger's text 
there are "ruptures and changes in ground. " 'Derrida's main reservation 
can be put simply: Heidegger'has not been radical enough in his solution. 
Having diagnosed the' privilege'of presence - or'the attempt to make Being 
present - as the hallmark of metaphysics, Heidegger seems content to 
give a'kind of phenomenological filling out of presence, to rethink it 
rather than radically displace it. The very thematics of Being is of a 
"transcendental signified, ` a resource that escape s the play of language, 
that escapes difference. Heidegger in short reinstates the value of-- 
presence, and in doing so suffers the limitations of his strategy of 
immanent deconstruction. 
For Heidegger, Being cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in 
ontic metaphor. But this gives a particular interpretation to the 
sense of Being. In thinking through presence, Heidegger 'only metaphorises, 
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by a profound necessity which cannot be escaped by a single decision, the 
language it deconstructs'. But the use of metaphor, for Heidegger, is 
entirely devoted to the project of bringing men nearer, closer into the 
presence of Being. This appears in Heidegger's exploitation of the 
language of light - brilliance, illumin ation, clearing, lighting etc. 
But more important still, it appears in the privilege accorded to language, 
and in particular spoken language - with talk of listening, hearing, the 
voice, speaking, speech. 
Heidegger's metaphorical style - the poetic style of many of his 
later writings - draws its power from the ability of metaphor to make 
present. For Derrida language is not so easily bent to such ends. it 
should not be thought that all Derrida's judgements on Heidegger are 
negative. This is not even largely true. 
12 
The limitations of Heidegger's text lie in the area of what 
Derrida calls strategy,. At a number of points, Derrida makes thematic 
what we could call the logic of reappropriation or system recuperation. 
The sheer interconnectedness and diffusion throughout language of meta-' 
physically burdened concepts and themes make it very likely that attempted 
escape moves will have already been covered, will themselves be just moves 
in the game. One does not, for example, escape from the sphere of 
influence of a concept just by negating it. What is required is an 
analysis of the possible strategies for success. 
13 
On at least two occasions Derrida offered two possible strategies 
by which to handle the problem of distancing oneself from metaphysics. 
Each time he contrasts 
(a) an immanent deconstruction, aft internal critique which would exploit 
the resources of metaphysical language against itself, demonstrating 
contradictions etc. with 
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(b) an abrupt change of ground, in which one would take a step 
outside, philosophy. To begin. taking such a step one would 
question tsystematically and, rigorously the history of these 
concepts' -a kind of deconstructive genealogy. 
He takes the first strategy -. immanent deconstruction - to describe the 
approach of Levi7Strauss and of Heidegger. And the second approach, 
certainly, when characterized as an abrupt change of ground, to capture 
the typical choice of current French philosophy. 
As we have seen, Derrida believes that the first strategy risks 
merely confirming the prison one is trying to escape from The second 
strategy runs a different risk, - sterility - one ends up not being able 
to say anything interesting. But. it is a risk he feels he has to take. 
He finally concludes that we need to somehow interweave these two 
different strategies producing complex and multiple texts. 
It seemed at first that. the way to contrast Heidegger and Derrida 
was to focus on Heidegger's style and Derrida's strategy. But in fact 
the difference is more subtle. It lies in the fact that Derrida's 
highly self-conscious styles are governed by considerations of strategy, 
whereas Heidegger simply does not have such a field of options "ready, 
to hand. " One way of answering those who complain about Derrida's 
tricksiness is to explain this puppetting. 
Derrida's references to strategy shoqld not just be thought of 
as opening, gestures; they are to be found throughout his texts. 
14 - In 
Differance, 
15, for example, an essay in which he introduces the title 
tem as a kind of cipher in the text, he gives us a long lecture on its 
merely strategic use. What he is insisting on by reference to strategy 
is that he is not trying to introduce a new theological constant or 
metaphysical mooring. 
16 If we are right to focus on these references 
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to strategy, what we are being offered is a text that no longer has 
a. straightforward surface, which constitutionally resists being read 
as a metaphysical text by virtue, of the multiplicity of determinations 
and indeterminacies to which it has already been subjected. What we 
need to do now is to spell out some of the ground rules of Derridean 
writing-to see just how such a text is constructed. We will draw from 
many different texts despite the danger of ignoring their proper 
boundaries. 
Derrida owes much to Heidegger in his understanding-of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics is a theoretical writing organized around a privileged 
point -a presence. He includes here 
'presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as 
substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal'presence as 
point (stigme) of the now, or of the moment (nun), the self- 
presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjec7t-ivity, the 
copresence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity... 3 
17 
Not much is left out. Derrida's basic criticism of this privilege 
goes something like this: presence, even in its literal temporal 
sense, is never simple, but structured by a relation to what is not 
present, what is other or absent. This is nothing other than the basic 
structure of the sign, which from the beginning, if we could put it like 
that, involves a reference to other signs. If all meaning has 
the structure of the sign, then all candidates for the privilege of 
presence are constitutionally in debt to something outside of, other 
than themselves. Derrida's elements, which exhibit in their own name 
this deferred, derived nature, are "traces. " The trace structure, and 
its pervasiveness, is the lever by which the privilege of presence is 
deconstructed. 
Derrida's earliest, best-known and perhaps most successful object 
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of scrutiny was the logocentric or phonocentric tradition, that which 
privileges the voice, or the inner voice, as having some special hot- 
line to meaning. Derrida's deconstruction of this tradition - especially 
as it appears in Husserl and Saussure is father to the term ecriture 
(writing, and perhaps "scripture"). Writing serves to determine the 
entire field of signs or traces (including, one might add, speech), where 
this field is all the time understood as language loosened from any such 
privilege as a relation to meaning, or to the soul, or to the voice etc. 
**so Writing, 
in this persuasive definition, is characteristically 
understood as a play of differences (in a way that takes up and radicalizes 
the Saussurean diacritical account of meaning) or as free-play. 
If the metaphysical text can be described as the centred text,, 
Derrida's is pervasively decentred. The complexity of Derrida's texts 
results from the attempt both to keep one foot in philosophy and yet to 
systematically avoid, creating in his texts those structures by which 
philosophical effects have traditionally been created. We have already 
referred to his overriding concern for the correct strategy. We will 
now try to explain in more detail what his textual tactics are. I 
distinguish them into five categoriesq for convenience: graphic, lexical, 
structural, methodological, and self-reflexive. It is by the parallel 
control of each of these levels that Derrida achieves his effects. 
Under graphic tactics, I include all the standard devices of 
scare-quotespbrackets, italics which can be deployed singly or together 
to indicate many different degrees of using or mentioning of terms whose 
full implications one might not want to embrace. Derrida also appropriates 
the crossing-out device Heidegger employs in The Question of Being, 
although with Derrida there is not, as there is for Heidegger, the whiff 
of presence round the corner. 
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The lexical level is much richer. I would particularly point to 
appropriations and modifications of words that give rise to a charac- 
teristically Derridean army of terms, some of which one hesitates to call 
words, let alone concepts, In the term diffe'rance (with an 'a') Derrida 
creates a hybrid of which Hegel would have been proud, except for the 
fact that Derrida is adamant in retaining a proprietary control over its 
lack of any full meaning. Terms like suppl6ment and trace resist 
ordinary incorporation by being "inde'cidable" - not licensing the normal 
inferences. A trace is not a trace of anything, for example. Elsewhere - 
with brisure, hymen, pharmakon, what Derrida fastens on is the whole 
field of associations (sometimes contradictory) that they have. The 
point of all these innovations must not be missed. They are intended 
as a kind of fifth column undermining the tendencies towards theoreiical 
centring and congealment. 
The level I call structural covers the surface structuring of his 
texts. And I am thinking of those paginal arrangements that reach their 
creative peak inklas with insets into insets in parallel texts on the 
same page. In this multiple writing, the very linearity ofwriting is 
questioned, and the place of the author is made problematic. In the 
language of intentionality, it is as if the interrelationships between 
the parallel texts constitute an intentional nexus that severs the 
primacy of the author-text relationship. 
The methodological level is perhaps a misnomer. There is much 
here that escapes the category of methodology - the many subtle and 
detailed ways he handles the texts he parasitizes. But if we were 
to pretend for a moment that Derrida had a method a pretence he once 
himself madeq even if he later regretted the simplifying lever it gave 
to others - that method would be deconstruction. And this involves 
4 
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him in a particular textual practice, one that offers niches for the 
appearance of the lexical innovations we described above. 
If we understand the metaphysical structure of a text to betray 
itself in a founding opposition, in which one of the terms of the 
opposition is weighted over the other (we might think of the speech/ 
writing relationship in Saussure), then Derrida has a definite strategy 
for deconstructing this, in such a way as to try to prevent it from 
simply closing ranks after the first assault. 
18 He first of all inverts 
the opposition, crediting the lower term with the privilege previously 
accorded the first, and secondly, he injects a new term, or an old one 
reworked that will permanently disrupt the structure into which he has 
intervened. Thus writing in the broad sense is what comes to disrupt 
the opposition between speech and writing (in the narrow sense). De- 
construction, it will be seen, is not merely a case of "leaving every- 
thing as it is" although the early Derrida seems to have thought of it 
more like this. 
19 It is a procedure that aims to bring about a changed 
reading of a text. 
Finally, self-reflection, or perhaps better, self-commentary, 
This includes all those remarks in which Derrida explicitly explains the 
problems of writing his kind of texts, the need for strategy, the risks 
of sterility, the debts he has to other thinkers etc. What is so 
important about. them is that they seem to themselves occupy a privileged 
position in his texts, of being meant LITERALLY, SERIOUSLY, even URGENT, 
and yet they are a part of, and necessary parts of, texts that question 
the very possibility of such a privilege of the serious and the literal. 
It is as if by going up one level we could escape the limitations of 
the level beneath. But we have not escaped language, so that cannot be. 
We will expand on this criticism shortly. 
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Several avenues of criticism open up: the danger of sterility, 
his text-centredness, and the status of his textual reflexivity. 
However much Derrida's writing has inspired literary criticism, 
he seems to many philosophers if not to be actually sterile, to have 
at least washed his hands of a whole range of classical philosophical 
problems. And while his own textual dissemination shows no sign of 
flagging, the risk of sterilizing the reader, too anxious of error to lift 
his frozen pen, is very real. 
The criticism of text-centredness can be made at many different 
levels. Our basic objection is that Derrida treats the central extra- 
textual conditions on which textuality is alone possible, as mere 
extensions of textuality. And yet the human world of action and per- 
ception is not a text, but a context. Derrida cannot handle the idea 
of context. 
Finally there is the problem of his textual reflexivity. While, 
for Derrida, the language of intention cannot be the site of a privilege, 
he has to privilege his own self-reflective remarks to ensure that we 
i 
understand his texts properly. When trying to explain why, in Derrida's 
eyes, Nietzsche is innocent of Heidegger's "last metaphysician" charge, 
Spivak 
20 
suggests, "Perhaps this entire argument hangs on who knew how 
much of what he was doing. " And she refers to an exasperated Derrida 
replying to Houdebine in a Positions interview that he "knew what he was 
doing" at an important gap he appeared to have left in a text. 
We said of Heidegger that he aimed at an ideal coincidence of 
ltstyle" and "content" and that the ideality of that coincidence was of 
the same order as the metaphysical dream of presence, that pure perform- 
ance was a desire doomed to unfulfillment. We are now in a position to 
I 
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offer a parallel critique of Derrida. The very requirement to expand 
an his stylistic repertoire in the interests of a strategy that in the 
absence of an end found itself showered with means 
21 involved the 
creation of a space of textual intentionality, which has to take itself 
to be privileged in order to assure us of a correct focus on the rest of 
the text. And yet by this very privilege the Derridean strategy under- 
mines itself, the solvent begins to dissolve its bottle. 
Derrida characterizes metaphysics as philosophy of presence. A 
deconstruction of such a philosophy reveals a structure of textual 
privilege licensing classical philosophical moves. In our view, while 
Derrida is careful not to adopt any of his terms on a permanent basis - 
his innovations for the most part come and go - the common s2ace occupied 
by these terms, and the deconstructive intentions they are designed to 
serve do claim an analogous privileged status in relation to the texts in 
which they are embedded. Derrida is not producing a separate meta- 
language but he is producing a bifurcated text with an internal controlling 
order established only by the appeal to authorial intentions. And in 
this appeal there is a fundamental obstacle to the Derridean project. 
On many occasions, Derrida points out the impossibility of doing 
without metaphysical ploys to deconstruct metaphysics. In this respect 
he differs from Heidegger in being prepared to get his hands dirty. The 
inevitability of metaphysics is meant not to encourage it, but to focus 
attention on textual strategy and economy rather than schemes for its 
final elimination. In these respects, the Derridean project is impor- 
tantly modest. But we do not think that this can serve as an escape 
clause to justify Derrida's resurrection of the ultimate importance of his 
own intentions at that vital hermeneutical centre - our strategically 
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informed understanding of his texts. 
4. A Cautionary Tail 
We have great admiration both for the effort and the results of 
Heidegger's transformation of his style, even when it. takes him outside 
philosophy. altogether. But it seems to us like an experiment in 
philosophical writing that should, not be imitated, but further developed 
and explored. Heidegger breaks through not to a world of answers but 
to new problems and questions. The new paths opened up by appropriating 
one's style in an exemplifying manner are not paved with guarantees of 
success. In the conditions of its use, in its semantic and pragmatic 
presuppositions, in the arbitrariness of meaning of so many words, in 
the contingent historical circumstances that shape it, a language has 
what can best be described as a material aspect. 'From this materiality 
language derives both its depth and richness and its resistance to serving 
any higher end, such as philosophy. If a new style can mark a trans- 
formed articulation of Being, it does not protect language from its own 
materiality - indeed nothing could. 
Heidegger's turn to style we find both productive and stimulating if 
unable to provide any ultimate solution. Much the same could be said of 
Derrida. But from the limitations of the Derridean project valuable 
insights can be drawn about the interpretation of philosophical texts. " 
Our critical treatment of Derrida (and Heidegger) mostly took the 
form of an immanent critique. In this respect our criticisms followed 
the same line as our expository premise - that both philosophers could 
be seen as turning to "style" as ways of avoiding being caught in their 
own metaphysical search lights. , In 
both cases our critique took the 
form of claiming that they were so caught. To remain at the level of 
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such criticism is not however, satisfactory. - One is not obliged to 
gpecify the weak spots in the position being criticized, nor to make 
a positive attempt to correct matters. We would, finally like to in- 
dicate the direction this might take. 
The weak point in Derrida's philosophical position lies in the 
fact that while it has certain rules for suspecting metaphysics the 
list of structures of presence constitutes a kind of field guide it 
has only ad hoc procedures for lifting this suspicion. Thus, despite 
the fact that the will-to-power seems to function as a centre, an 
ungrounded ground, Derrida finds in Nietzsche's, style(s) reason 
to have him released from custody. For the most part, we agree with 
Derrida here. But if we try to capture the grounds for this exemption 
of Nietzsches-in the form of a principle, we find ourselves wondering 
whether many, others, already tried and convicted ought to be released. 
Nietzsche wears his style on his sleeve but might not the entire history 
of philosophy have been enacted by masked men? 
The general question, we have to ask of a philosopher is - what 
attitude does he take up to the signifier? The importance of analyzing 
the "rhetorical" aspect of, philosophy,. its "stylellýlies in the degree 
to which it betrays this attitude. But the example of Derrida's 
defence of Nietzsche shows us that what we have called the attitude to 
the signifier can manifest itself at a number of different levels of 
the text, and that there may even be, at least locally, a hierarchy of 
such levels. 
For example, Nietzsche not only talks of the will-to-power, he 
psychologizes, he materializes, he even tries his hand at philosophical 
hit-man. There is no doubt that both at the lexical level and at 
the lower level of philosophical argument, he works the old language, 
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and deftly handles the old conceptual oppositions. How the "Real 
World" at last Became a Mxth 
22 
is a classic piece of anti-idealism. 
But even at this stage Nietzsche must still be regarded as a meta- 
physician from Heidegger's viewpoint. He escapes because it soon 
becomes perfectly clear that Nietzsche's texts are elaborate construc- 
tions. He is not committed to the frames of reference he temporarily 
inhabits. The method is slash, burn and move on, -a nomadology. He 
has no fixed address. 
If Nietzsche's attitude to the signifier could be described as 
_p_layful, 
we are talking of a feature which can be directly attributed 
to his texts without further evidence of a contextual or psychological 
nature. The way Derrida includes a theory of language within his own 
texts, his accounts of the strategies one needs to follow to avoid the 
errors of others, his warnings of the dangers of misinterpretation - all 
this self-documentation answers to the same demand, that-a "successful" 
text should contain within it the principle of its own interpretation. 
Derrida is not easy to understand but he is much, less easily misunder- 
stood than Nietzsche was. 
However, as a statement of a necessary condition for a "success- 
full' text, this demand is a mistake, and one with unfortunate consequences. 
There is just no good reason apart from an idiosyncratic methodological 
hygiene-, - to suppose that a text can always be accurately judged on its 
appropriation of language, its attitude to the signifier, its meta- 
physical commitment, in the absence of an investigation of its conditions 
of production. 
A revolutionary pamphlet may invoke a range of crude conceptual 
oppositions. It aims to incite. It may make all sorts of questionable 
assumptions. But they may be shared by its readers. Such indexical, 
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situated properties of a revolutionary pamphlet are shared by all 
occasional texts. While not all texts are written for particular 
occasions, they have some pragmatic, situated qualities. The 
importance of this dimension is that it is the condition for what is 
unsaid in the text, for what does not need to be said because it is 
self-evidentv or taken for granted without ever being thematised by 
those to whom it is directed. If this is so we cannot read what is 
unsaid in a text unless we know what was taken for granted in its 
production. 
On this view, the fact that texts have structures, centress 
formal properties, is an internal reflection of the fact that texts 
are produced under specific conditions, they address certain problems, 
that they make certain assumptions, some of a factual nature, others 
about the very nature of facts. ' The finitude of the text - of which 
structures of presence are symptons, is a reflection of the historical 
specificity and particularity of its Being. The formal. analysis or 
dislocation or manipulation of a text brackets out concern with the 
context of its production and reception. And this unnecessarily 
restricts the value of the method. 
In this limitation, the Derridean texts display their own finitude. 
They intervened at a time of blindness to the structures they revealed, 
and exploited to the full a new liberty of style. But it is no less 
a mistake to treat the limitations of a particular method as limits on 
what can and needs to be done. Much of what is thought of as meta- 
physical disappears as such when the context of its appearance is supplied, 
for what seems to be a formal property is then seen to be a reflection of 
a need, an interest, a desire 
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POSTSCRIPT to 
The'Question of Stratdgy 
1 
#4 'Tout dans le trace' de-la differance est stratdgique 
et adventureuxt 2 
In these last two chapters, we have persistenliy ( and with luck 
consistently) put in question the legitimacy of Derrida's deconstruct- 
ive strategy ., We have argued that, any positive formulations it offers 
are wedded to transcendental modes of thought, and that 'erasure' is-no 
protection. Surprisingly, however,, ýe say all this in an appreciative 
fashion, for we claim that whether 'legitimate' or not, it is success- 
ful in exposing, in its own terms, the metaphysical motifs in (philosoph- 
ical ) texts. What it cannot do, and there is some force in Rorty's posi- 
tion here 
3. 
is to offer anything like another positive account of anything, 
let alone the subject of our concern - time.,, But, the fact that deconstruction 
cannot do it does not mean. it cannot be done in, a way responsive to its 
insights. 
We are consciousq however, that this attempt to limit the scope of 
deconstruction can be opposed. We have of course already adduced various 
arguments for our position, and defended it against some of the obvious 
replies. But the reply that we, are-fundamentally misunderstanding Derrida's 
movesq and that our reading is naive. could still be made. In this Postcript 
we shall try to make our own critical-position that little bit clearer and 
stronger. 
Let us first rehearse some of the doubts we have, voiced: 
That nýither difference nor differance, can be thought except in relation 
to identity and presence. The displacement of the foundational status of 
the latter by the former cannot be sustained. The hypertrophic develop- 
ment of either pair would be one-sided and even -ý- if that-were not such 
a contested term - undialectical. The everyday mutual interdependence 
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of these pairs is the unacknowledged point of departure for any 
thinking involving them. 
2. Deconstruction is essentially a kind of'formAlism because it inter- 
prets as symptoms of a metaphysical syndrome ( fissures in a text, 
structures of supplementarity, positing of a transcendental signified) 
what are actually the internal reflections of-the'outer historical 
conditions of a, text's production 
4( 
Foucault 5 and Macherey 
6. ). 
3. 'Presence' cannot be made into the 'effect' of Idifferancel because 
the only language in which this makes anything like sense is the 
language of transcendental causation. If one uses this language under 
erasure, its force is illusory. If one uses it straightforwardly, one 
is guilty of mere ( intrametaphysical)inversion . 
4. The success of Derrida's strategy seems bound up with our recognition 
of his authorial intentions, and his generous guidance in this respect. 
But this gives an extra-textual source (the author) the very kind of 
metaphysical privilege he is at pains to purge, 
To each of these points Derridean replies can be made, and indeed have 
been, even if these replies do not settle matters. We would like to single 
out the first and last claims for further treatment, for it is they that 
are most directly concerned with the question of strategy. We shall take 
the last first. 
Despite his warnings that we should not do this, Derrida must be inter- 
preted 
- 
as offering, at least formally speaking, transcendental arguments. 
We say 'formally' for although he does not posit transcendental entities, 
he is offering us 'conditions for the possibility of... I and not just 
logical conditions, but a 'productive activity' that brings about effects. 
But is this reading of ours not somewhat naive ? Well, Derrida does not 
always caution us against understanding such claims in a traditional trans- 
cendenýal way. Great stretches of, Positions go unprotected by such precautions. 
6. 
The reply to this , as Spivak says, is that there is always an-tinvisible 
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erasuret. Why? It is clear that on those occasions on which he does 
warn against a metaphysical reading, the force of his remarks is not 
restricted to those occasions, but is quite general. 
_ 
But if we are not 
to suppose that diffe"rance literally produces effects (because the lan- 
guage of production and cause/effect is appropriate onlyto relations to 
a generative ground, ie. a 'presencet)-then his remarks do not have the 
force intended. When Saussure says of language that 'there are no positive 
terms, there are only differencest we haveýa sense of what he means that 
need not involve making difference into a principle with a power to bring 
about effects. 
Derrida's general strategy is surely this: to infiltrate diff6rance , 
into the syntax of foundationalist and generative thinking, with a view 
to depriving it of its attraction. . 
(One might compare the release of 
sterile male mosquitoes as an anti-malarial measure. ) But once we realize 
this is the strategy,,, it is possible to, ask whether this substitutive 
infiltration is acceptable, Derrida may say that of course it is not 
acceptable - that it is a transgression. But then we have to ask what is 
it to-go along*with Derrida? 
Let us go round again, and this time. with a closer focus on the paper 
7 'Differancel . Derridats texts, it may be said, always imply an linvis- 
ible erasure' - he is using metaphysical, concepts in A'restricted way. 
That is, he would deny or refuse their full involvement in all the moves 
of a metaphysical discourse. 
8 (Now we could object here along the, lines 
of our objection to the intentionalism of his insistent authorial cont rol. 
We could say that, it is an enormous claim to be able so to restrict the 
play of these terms that they do not start to do metaphysical work. 
Surely that would involve control over the reader's response? But we will 
leave this criticism undeveloped. ), If. as we suspect, it is actually 
important to the ultimate shape of his thesis (what, he wants to*do with 
the term Idifferancel for example) that he uses such terms-ott*of erasureq 
we might be more careful in automatically being so charitable. There are 
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for example explicit contradictions between different texts on the subject 
of the status of differance. In Positions'(1972) 
9 
and elsewhere, he 
writes repeatedly of the concept of differance, while in Differance (1967) 
it is neither a word nor a concept. We mention this simply to show that 
we cannot assume consistency in Derrida's writing. 
10 Nor should we 
use_1invisible erasure as a portable barrier to criticism. 
So, to repeat my claim - it is that Derrida either uses transcendental 
forms of arguments in explaining the term Idifferancel in which case he 
undermines his whole project, or he does not, in which case the force 
of all he says about diff6rance (and its intelligibility) evaporates. 
Why should we not attribute to Derrida here a theory of transcendental 
textuality? Why is what he is doing not a translatign from experience 
into writing of Husserl's account of constitution? Instead of supposing 
that there is this ulterior work going on in a text - of production and 
effacement - why not suppose that such absences and lacks and gaps are 
created by the act of transformative reflection on a text? Is not 
Derrida, in other words, projecting onto the texts he deconstructs a work 
of generation and repression that appears retrospectively only by contrast 
with the second deconstructive text? Surely it is there that all the 
work occurst where all the action is? 
To support this suggestion - an example. In his essay on Saussure 
(tLinguistique et Crammatologie) Derrida brilliantly exposes the almost 
hysterical expulsion of writing from the field of linguistics proper, 
and the language and tone that Saussure employs makes it clear that some- 
thing like'repression is going on. Writing threatens the natural life 
of languages and so is a monstrosity. But it is interesting that in this 
essays in which Derrida is really very successful in exposing 'Tepressiont, 
he makes constant use of the language of psychology, and 'speech acts' - 
not of textual structure. He writes of Saussure's wishes, his 'irritations', 
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his tone, of him not wanting to 'give in', of not wanting to be 'too 
conplacent'. It is Saussure (not his text) who analyzes, criticizes, 
confronts, IsaysIq defines, takes up etco etc, Now we do not wish to 
drive a wedge between Saussure and his text, but we do claim that the 
plausibility of treating this as a work of repression rests very heavily 
on the language of authorial desires, acts and intentions (albeit 
unconscious) and not on an autonomous textual activity. 
Elsewhere, we would claim, Derrida is making use of the language 
of transcendental causality, locating such-work in texts, by an unjusti- 
fiable analogical extension. Perhaps deconstruction does not discover 
anything but transforms texts and then allows a comparison by. contrast 
between old and new. 
It might be thought that these references to the*generativity or prod- 
uctivity of differance are inadequate to establish that it is playing 
a transcendental role - and not because of the 'invisible erasure' under 
which the terms are being operated (assuming for the moment 
(a) that the 'erasure' umbrella is always there, and 
(b) that the authorial control that such 'erasure' implies is not itself 
suspect) but simply because we are dealing with mere phrases and not with 
the detailed and subtle account Derrida gives of the structure of differance 
and its relation to the trace, 'the 
logic of supplementarity etc. 
This is a perfectly reasonable point and we will try to meet the challenge 
it throws down. 
In its analytically dual aspect - of difference and deferment 
and in the various contributions made to its lasseublage's differance 
is a condensation of a theory of the impossibility not of everyday 
presences in the empirical sense, but Of a certain philosophical/meta-- 
physical, value of presence. *, 146aning is never completely fulfilleds in 
other words. One important consequence is that there can be no arch7e, 
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no first point, no foundation, no epistemological ground etc. For any 
putative origin has its fullness (and therefore its capacity 
ýo 
originate) 
constitutionally or essentially delayed. Once we accept that the poss- 
ibility of philosophical discourse rests on the originating and grounding 
value of presence attributed to certain concepts, and to certain recour- 
ses and moves (eg. to experience, to conscience, to truth etc, ) then' 
there is the possibility of a reading of a philosophical text that 
unmasks not just the difference and deferment involved in every 'presence' 
but the process of effacing or forgetting that difference. Thus 
'the I'matinal trace" of difference is lost in an irretrievable 
invisibility, and yet even its loss is covered, preserved, and 
retarded. This happens in a text, in the form of presencet. lZ 
We do have enormous doubts about this sort of claim. But would 
these doubts not be allayed if we allowed (for? )*Derridals'gtrategy 
of writing? Are we not deliberately closing mrselves to what he says he is 
doing? We will return to this question, but first two replies: 
(a) The fact that Derrida anticipates (and in Positions, scorns) the 
transcendental reading of his work, and tells us many times that this is 
wrong, is not a conclusive reason for avoiding it. We might indeed 
interpret- these cautionary remarks as anxious premonitions of his just 
fateg or as themselves 'merely' strategic, designed to put us off the 
scent. 
(b) Suppose we are refusing to play along. CAm Ia bad reader? ) Can 
there really be a strategy of*writing. - that is not in principle com- 
promised by the residual interpretive freedom of the reader? 
We imagine Derriýa could deploy here the, distinction he draws at the 
end of Structure, Sign and'Play... 
13 between 'an affirmation that plays 
without security' (of which he approves)-and'a 'sure play limited to the 
substitution of given and existing, present piecesI. The reader who 
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refuses to play along is, the reader who plays safe, who will not take 
risks. 
'We are reminded here (and not only here in fact) of Heidegger's What 
is Metaphysics 14 and the point in that'lectures at which he discovers- 
reason's inability to dealýwith 'Nothing'. These pages make us uneasy; 
wf- seem to be cast adrift. Fortunately, with Heidegger,, as-the shores 
of Reason and Logic recede, the island of Experience becomes dimly visible 
on the horizon and our anxiety is over. Over, that is until we realize 
that it is the experience of anxiety, or Angst, that gives us independent 
access to Nothing which we should note is also said NOT to be-a (formal) 
concept. 
15 
But while Heidegger ultimately redeems the danger and the risk by 
offering us access to Nothing, through experiencev Derrida's aim is loss 
of security. Heidegger's remarks about Nothing are usually questions, 
always tentative. Derrida's quasi-transcendental claims about differance 
are not at all tentative, and are meant to be believed in some sense or 
another. If not, what1force can they have? 
We are not suggesting, that risk and danger are valuable only when 
ultimately rewarded. Certainly Nietzsche's advice to 'live dangerously' 
held out no such promise. But if Derrida were to reply to one who 
refused to play along that he/she was (just) playing safe, the obvious 
reply is that where ice is wafer thin, it is not dangerous to skate, it 
is folly. And it would seem equal folly to talk about differance 'pro- 
ducing effects' as a way of eliminating all talk of transcendental causation. 
When we discussed earlier the claim that Derrida's method was 'one- 
sided and undialecticall, we left the question prematurely unresolved, 
and we should like now to return to that question, and in particular to 
see what light it throws on the question of strategy. For, as he says 
16 
'in marking out differance everything is a matter of strategy'and risk' . 
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Derrida claims in*Differance that the term differance has profound 
affinities with Hegelian language, but nonetheless works a displace- 
ment with it - one both infinitesimal and radical. In From Restricted 
to General Economyq 
17 
and in Positions 
18 it is clear that the radical 
aspect of the displacement is essentially Nietzschean (and Bataillean) 
in origin, Dialectics is understood as always a reappropriating method 
serving ultimately to restore identity. Difference, on the other hand, 
aims to break out of this system, to renounce identity and meaning. 
Now if we accept that dialectic should be understood in this way - 
that one could not have a dialectic freed from its restitutive telos, 
one that charted the interminable struggle of opposites - then clear- 
ly differance cannot be faulted for being undialectical without missing 
the entire transgressive functionIt is designed to serve. And yet when 
Derrida is discussing Bataille's response to the master/slave dialectic - 
that of laughter - the response that 'alone exceeds dialectics 19 
19 
when he claims that Idifferance, would give us to think a writing... 
that absolutely upsets all dialectics... exceeding everything that the 
history of metaphysics has comprehended... 120 and that'differance holds 
us in relation with what exceeds... the alternative of presence and 
absence' 
21 
_ we have somehow to give a sense to, lexcede' which is not 
dialectical. In the sense of dialectical'which means teleological/ 
restorative of meaning, it is clear why. But in the sense of 'not derived 
from and essentially dependenton its derivation from the, oppositions 
between presence and absence or identity and difference or, indeed, the 
Hegelian dialectic19 it is not quite so clear. 
I 
Derrida talks of the 'displacement' of the Hegelian system - again 
a term which itself displaces any simpler filiation such as influence 
or development. But is it not quite as clear that this displacement is 
guided all along (and remainsýso guided) by that which it displaces? 
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Surely if we were to spell out all the subsidiary operations that Derrida 
engages in (reversal, insertion of undecidables, double reading, displace- 
ment etc. ) we would-find a method'in which a teleological dialectics 
has itself been transformed dialectically. We do not get a progressive 
idealization, and we do not get a 'static' telos. 
But what do we get? - 'an affirmative'writing', 'joyous affirmation', 
'the innocence of becoming', 'the adventure, of the trace'. Not 'absolute 
knowledge't not-'spirit coming to know itself', not 'the realm of trans- 
cendental subjectivity', but surely something equally idealized, and 
somethingg interestingly, enough, embodying values strikingly close to 
authenticity and freedom. To be sure, the concept of self, and what is 
proper to it have been put aside, but do we not have-a repetition of key 
metaphysical motifs at the-very*end of Derrida's project? - 
We are not objecting to this in principle. What we are questioning 
is Derrida's self-understanding - his understanding of the possibility 
of a discourse'other'than that of Imetaphysicsl. It may be said that 
Derrida has already admitted this. It is not a confession but an impor- 
tant methodological claim he makes' when he writes, that 'there is no 
sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order-to shake 
metaphysics. 12 
ý 
But for all our complicity with these concepts, this 
is a'necessary'means to an end --that of 'shaking metaphysics' and of 
exceeding it*' In other words Derrida believes in making, at least with 
one foot 'the 'Step beyond' - beyond 'metaphysics', 'beyond man and 
humanism', beyond presence, beyond security, beyond the language of 
Being. The complexities all lie in the strategyýfor bringing, it about. 
But there is no doubting, surely, the philosophical recuperability of the 
values informing his 'goal'. (And it surely is a goal; there is no reason 
to restrict 'goals' to static states of affairs) In brief, our admiration 
for his achievement does not depend-on believing in his own assessment 
of its absolute radicality with regard to the circle of Western thought. 
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Derrida has transformed the way we think about, and read (or 
perhaps write) philosophy, he has transformed our understanding of the 
relationship between the inside and the outside of philosophy, but his 
strategic dependence on such metaphysical values as 'authorial intention' 
21 
and on formally transcendental arguments tssentially limit his achieve- 
ment. There is no philosophical analogy to the chemical catalyst that 
facilitates the reading but remains unchangedo or the fictional number 
in mathematics that can be introduced and then later with drawn from a 
proof. 
"But this limit is not a negative one. Rather, his lesson, or the 
lesson we draw from him, is not mere y that, as he says, there is no 
sense in doing without metaphysical concepts in trying to overcome 
metaphysics, but there is no prospect whatever of'eliminating metaphy- 
sical concepts and strategies. Rather the project of overcoming meta- 
physics (as Merleau-Ponty said of the phenomenological reduction) must 
be repeated indefinitely. 
Derrida says of Heidegger 
24 
that one of his real virtues lies in his 
.. intrametaphysical moves. We would like to say the same of Derrida, And 
we will finally explain what shape we think this takes, consciously aware 
of the way in which ourown explanation takes for granted a particular 
25, 
metaphysical opposition. Again in. Ousia'&'Grampt- P Derrida, talking 
about Aristotle, says that what is truly metaphysical is not the particu- 
lar-question he'evades (about the being of time) but the question evaded., 
the covering upt the passing on, the failure to reflect. Conversely, 
what-exceeds metaphysics in Derrida is his writing*as'and'insofar, as*it 
.. opens up the space of*altemative'theoriýtical'postibilities and -as 
it 
bears witness to the scope of its own transformative possibilities. And 
these occur even if the outcome may seem to be A'new"theory, another 
philosophy etc. Philosophy on the move is the only possible transgression 
of metaphysics. There is no Other Place to go. 
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We can only hope that the, break with the theoretical sterility of 
deconstruction \ (when considered from the point of view of 'positive' 
X description) adunbrated at the very least in the next chapter will fall 
within this description. 
III-Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER THREE 
Time and Interpretation 
The view that philosophy has a special subjbct matter is not a 
fashionable one today, unless perhaps one treats the many versions of 
'the linguistic turn' as suggesting such a status for language. And 
even then a focus on language could not define philosophy, as linguisticst 
communication theory and semiology share the same focus. If language 
were to be treated as the subject matter of philosophy, we would have 
to specify in addition a particular approach to language in order to 
account for the specificity of philosophy. Such an approach is usually 
contrasted with instrumental, classificatory or objectifying alternatives. 
The force of such a self-understanding of philosophy can be gauged by 
the number of alternative and opposed philosophical approaches that 
share it (such as hermeneutics, structuralism, and analytical philosophy). 
However a case can be made out for bestowing on time the privilege 
currently accorded to language. This might be thought to be an 
obviously regressive move. Would not privileging time be an anachronistic 
revival of the spirit of the nineteenth c entury - of Kant and Hegel - or, 
worse, of more recent Bergsonian vitalism? Heidegger's work would seem 
to allay this fear. For even if he is clearly responsive to that 
tradition, that responsiveness takes the form of an appreciative re- 
thinking rather than a repackaging of those same ideas. Moreover, 
the development of Heidegger's thought, perhaps rather too tidily 
seen as stretching from Being and Time (1927) to Time and BeiR& (1962) 
(for it should not be treated as any sort of simple inversion) suggests 
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a number of different dimensions in which the privileged position of 
time in philosophy can be articulated (ontic, existential, historical, 
ontological etc. ). An account of the complexities of Heidegger's 
concern with time will, however, be reserved until later in the paper. 
Meanwhile we will be guided by what it opens up - the possibility of 
a hermeneutics of temporal structure, the scope of which will give 
support to the claimed privilege of time as the subject matter of 
philosophy. And in the metaphysical modesty of its descriptive and 
interpretive procedures there will be further. confirmations of its 
distance from idealist and vitalist ambitions. Some of these broader 
issues are raised again at the end. 
There is no doubting the importance of time, temporal structures 
and relations in understanding the identity conditions of different 
beings (events, things, processes etc. ). The temporal dimension of 
such beings is crucial to their being the beings they are. This 
remark applies to cultural phenomena, experience, events, actions and so 
on. They can each be shown not merely to be 'in' time but to be 
temporally constituted in some essential respect. Music, for example, 
does not just passively take place in 
_time; 
it involves the organization 
of time, in rhythm and melody. To the extent that the temporal 
organization of beings is what enables us to understand and relate to 
them as the beings that they are, an appreciation of the various types 
of temporal structure they can manifest will play a vital role in both. 
the theory and the practice of such relating. This points to the 
hermeneutic importance of a theoretical grasp of the manifold structures 
of time. 
As the art or science of interpretation, hermeneutics may take 
as its object literaryg philosophical or other texts, or it may deal 
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with historical events or even the events of, everyday existence. 
The aim of interpretation is basically to make sense of its object, or 
if you preferp to understand it. (A deconstructive hermeneutics, 
if not a contradiction in terms, would aim at teasing out a multi- 
plicity of strands of significance and indeed of modes of significance 
in a text. ) To see philosophy as a hermeneutical discipline is to 
see argument-as only one of its procedures and to see careful, 
reflective description and interpretation of phenomena as quite as 
importantg and the kind of patience and care that this requires would 
be one of the hallmarks of philosophical responsibility. 
One might suppose then that if we conceive of philosophy as 
a hermeneutical activity and direct our attention towards the temporal 
structure of the objects of our interpretation, that we ought to 
proceed without any. particular expectations or intellectual baggage. 
We should, on thisýview, just prepare ourselves to receive those 
temporal structures that happen to spring up in our path. But it 
would not too grossly compromise the values underlying such an innocence 
if one were also to take along a few models of how time can be organized. 
We have offered elsewhere 
1 
an analytical account of what such forms might 
look like. (Four types of temporal structure were distinguished: 
reflectiveg generativel participatory and active. ) Here we shall attempt 
a rather different move - to show that we can obtain useful specific 
models of temporal organization and structure by a restriction of the 
scope of the most general accounts of time that philosophy has already 
thrown up. This move has a double thrust. We will show that such 
derived models have an interpretive potential by which they can 
supplement our stock of anticipated structures. And we make the 
further claim that it is the proper fate of such general accounts to 
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be restrictively transformed into accounts'with a local application. 
We can distinguish, for example, five general ways of thinking 
about time: I 
1. cosmic time 
2. dialectical time 
phenomenological time 
existential time 
the time of the sign 1, 
Each of these ways of thinking about time can be and at some point has 
been supposed to provide an account of Time'as such and in general. 
Our transformative treatment of them clearly subverts the original 
philosophical role they were designed to play. We are making the point 
that incompatible general theories can be-rendered compatible if their 
scope is restricted. ' To say that everything is made of water is one 
thing; to restrict the-claim*-to, the oceans and-the clouds is another. 
on each occasion we pay special attention to extracting and disarming 
the explicit or tacit principle by which the generalization to Time 
as such is brought about., 
1. Cosmic time 
Cosmic time can be represented as a sequence of moments charac- 
terised by singularity$ homogeneity, transitivity, universality, and 
directionality (or asymmetry). As a general theory of Time, its 
obvious difficulty is th; t it cannot accommodate the past/present/future 
structure of temporality. Its moments are all related to one another 
by earlier than/later than relations. If somehow one were to inject a 
view-pointt a privileged point of orientation, into this account, its 
purely serial order would fall apart. It is incompatible with and 
cannot recognize intentionality. 
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Cosmic time f ills out what McTaggart calls the I B-series I, but 
whereas he wants to claim that it is logically dependent on the 'A- 
series' (the past/present/future model intentionality needs, at least 
to start with), we are making the simpler claim that it cannot handle 
the relationships described by the 'A-series' but that it can be under- 
stood (and have value) as a representation (in itself harmless) of the 
ordering relations presupposed by certain'everyday and theoretical 
practices. The structure of the calendar, for example, is a form of 
2 
the IB-series', albeit imperfect, and it is both a representation of 
and a determining condition of the practice of assigning dates to 
events. Clocks mechanically divide the basic unit of the calendar - 
the day. For computational economy, the calendar and the clock both 
make use of cycles and nesting of orders of unit but what they represent 
is a purely serial temporal order. Hence they play not just a practical 
role in everyday dating and structuring the'synchronization of social 
life (time-tables, meal times, appointments), but also a theoretical 
role in those disciplines for whidh a sequential, intentionally- 
neutralized temporality is a prerequisite, like physics. If measurement 
of motion is the demand placed on a model of time by physics, it is not 
surprising that the resulting structure is that of 'a homogeneously' 
ordered series of points, a scale, a parameter' as Heidegger put it in' 
3 
an early essay. Given that the success of physics is based on its 
mathematization of nature, and that the metrication of time is central 
to this project, it is hardly surprising that the structure of cosmic 
time, as we have called it, reflects the features of the series of 
natural numbers and indeed of any ordered series in the strict sense- 
4 
There are in short a number of areas in which treating the 
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structure. of time as simple seriality should be seen as reflecting 
real needs or functions. The complex temporal organization of daily 
life requires it. But it is a mistake to take the requirements of 
a certain sort of civilized life as proof of some deeper truth about 
Time itself. The prestige of physics may tempt us to suppose that 
what it requires of a concept of time trans'cends in significance the 
function that the concept serves''in-the theory. But if we succumb 
to this temptation, we have tacitly converted physics into metaphysics. 
Dialectical time 
For Hegel, world history is Spirit unveiled in an outert temporal 
form. For Marx, that history is the history of class struggle. In 
both cases, the shape of that history can only be adequately expressed 
when seen as a dialectical development rather than a mere chronological 
series of events.. Such simple chronology is concerned only with events 
and with external relations of'succession between them. From the 
dialectical point of view however what the surface sequentiality of event: 
reveals when interrogated is a deeper pattern of qualitative transforma- 
tions, of development through conflict, the emergence and resolution of 
contradictions and so on. Essential to such an account of Time is the 
ability to identify and relate discrete underlying processes and forces 
whose interaction can be made intelligible in rational and teleological 
terms. 
History has found many difficulties with dialectical thinking. 
The shape of dialectical progressions seems too formalistically repre- 
sented by the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model, and yet in the absence 
of such a model it can too easily dissolve into woolly and unsystema- 
tizable references to struggle, the overcoming of oppositions etc. 
432 
More importantly, there has been considerable scepticism about the 
ontological assumptions underlying dialectical thinking. The move 
from Hegel to Marx, from an idealist to a materialist dialectic, is 
a move that in displacing Spirit in favour of social relation maintains 
the assumption that dialectical thought is guaranteed applicability, by 
the nature of the subject matter in each case. Materialists claim 
I 
that idealism can offer this guarantee only by inventing a subject- 
matter - self-conscious Spirit - of which it would be true. But its 
own claim - that the field of social relations is actually governed 
by those dialectical principles spuriously attributed to Spirit - is 
no less metaphysical a claim. This has led some to question the very 
idea of a materialist dialectic. 
We can describe the relation between the idealist dialectic and 
the materialist dialectic in this way: the idealist dialectic offers 
a universality of scope and a more or less abstract form. The 
materialist dialectic on the otherhand involves a fairly drastic 
restriction of scope (leaving aside such ventures as a dialectics of 
nature) while it is less able or, willing to offer an abstract 'logic' 
for its method. Our interest here is in how the dialectical process 
can be seen as structuring time, and our aim is to show that while 
such a metaphysical ambition is misconceived something like dialectical 
time can still be employed as a hermeneutical model in a more restricted 
way. So it might be thought that the materialist version of the 
dialectic would happily fit with our programme. However, while not in 
any way denying the value of dialectical thinking in trying to under- 
stand (and indeed in influencing) the course of history we see no 
reason to restrict the scope of dialectics to the social/historical 
field. Dialectical thinking is legitimate wherever patterns of develop- 
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ment and transformation occur that can intelligibly be said to have 
some sort of 'logic', and which are the consequence of some human 
involvement. The reference to such involvement is a recognition of 
the need to set some limits to the scope of dialectics, but it does 
not, within those limits, offer any guarantee as to the applicability 
of dialectical thought. 
We use the expression 'dialectical thought' deliberately. And 
something must be said about the status of such thinking. Firstly, 
it can be employed to give shape and intelligibility to a sequence of 
connected events that have already occurred. At one level this shape 
may be nothing more than an aesthetically pleasing articulation. But 
one may in addition wish to make the claim that a particular dialectical 
sequence is the product of some underlying generative principle (eg. 
reflection, struggle, 
-contradiction). 
Clearly the hermeneutic value 
of such thinking would vary with the kind of intelligibility claimed. 
Dialectical thinking can also be used predictively, but only in a 
hypothetical manner. If experience suggests that the situation we 
have encountered or find ourselves in will develop dialectically, that 
it is subject to particular local constraints, then we may be able to 
predict its subsequent development, or the range of possibilities open. 
our prediction (as with all predictions) may not be confirmed by events. 
And even if it is, in fact, it is always possible that the success was 
adventitiousy that the sequence actually had no 'inner logic', but 
only seemed. to do so. What we call the 'logic' or the 'necessity' 
of a dialectical development is in fact a product of the events or 
thoughts or theories working themselves out within a 'closed system' 
and whether such a state of affairs obtains in a particular case is a 
matter of fact not of logic. There clearly are sequences of events 
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in the world which have a dialectical shape to them. In addition to 
world history, there are arguments, emotionally traumatic periods of 
one's life, local political swings and works of literature, to name a 
few. Whenever it helps to think of such sequences dialectically 
(at the very least using the language of opposition, conflictp struggle, 
contradictiong resolution, reflection, realization, development etc. ) 
then we are giving sense to the idea of dialectical time, a time in 
which the principle is not quantitative succession but qualitative 
transformation. 
Phenomenological'time 
The classic source of our understanding of phenomenological time 
is Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, a book rich 
in detailed analysis, and one to which we have already devoted consider- 
able space (Part I, chapter II above). And it is to this book that we 
direct our discussion of the hermeneutical value (and metaphysical 
limitations) of phenomenological time. 
Phenomenology does not see itself as just one approach among. 
othersq but as privileged in an important respect. It restricts itself 
to dealing with what we have a right to deal with - the 'things them- 
selves' - namely, the data of consciousness. And whatever might be 
said in other cases, the initial reductive move - the exclusion of 
'objective time' - is one that leaves us still with access to a genuinely 
temporal phenomenonp 'the immanent flux of the flow of consciousness'. 
(As Husserl puts it: 'The evidence that consciousness of a tonal 
process, a melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as 
to make every doubt or denial appear senseless. ' p. 23) 
The first section ('The Exclusion of Objective Time') seems to 
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announce a modest scope for the study. Its exclusions of 'objective 
time' postpone any account of its relationship to time-consciousness. 
5 
Between the time the main body of the book had been presented as lectures 
(1904-5) and their publication (1928), Husserl had shown an increasing 
willingness to bridge the gap between the analysis of the structure of 
consciousness and any possible account of the real, objective world. 
The theory of constitution offered in Ideas (1913) plays an important 
role. And this move seems already to have been begun in the lectures 
on time that we are considering. Section 31 deals with objective 
temporal points and section 32 with 'the constitution of the one 
objective time'. The exclusion of the question of the relation to 
'objective time' has broken down', and for good reason. Phenomenology 
could never have had any interest for us unless its descriptions of the 
structures of consciousness had a value that went beyond their being 
an accurate account of subjective phenomena. That value lay in what 
was always assumed to be the epistemological and ultimately ontological 
signficance of consciousness. The reductions allow an initial freedom 
from the guidance of established unities, but what they are finally 
guided towards is an account of the contribution of consciousness to 
the constitution of such unities. One of the key moves is the recog- 
nition that terms like 'real', 'objective', 'transcendent', 'outside', - 
'world' etc. derive what meaning they possess from consciousness. 
Our remarks here should be understood in the light of our 
general project, which is to demonstrate the metaphysical inadequacy, 
but hermeneutic utility of each of these 'models' of time. If we 
thought the exclusion of considerations of 'objective time' made this 
argument redundantt we can now see that it is not. 
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Husserl's main concerns in this book are quite well known. 
How, for instance, to explain that while our perceptual experience 
seems to occur always at a particular time, each time being part of 
a temporal flux, we can come to grasp the objects of our experience 
as temporal unities. How is unity across time possible (experiencing 
a melody, itself temporally extended)? The key to this question is 
his distinguishing and interrelating three different 'arms' of temporal 
intentionality: primal impression, protention and retention. Retention, 
for instanceg is treated as an intentional modification of impressional 
consciousness, which gives the two an internal linkage not guaranteed, 
say, to conscious recollection. Husserl is also, however, interested 
in recollection and memory, as well as perception and imagination. 
Ih each case what the phenomenological account of temporabilty allows 
us to grasp is the intentional structure of a certain kind of conscious- 
ness; And it is only if time could be restricted to time-conscious- 
ness that a phenomenological account could ever successfully claim 
universality. There is no reason to doubt its value given its own 
methodological premises (which an existential approach would in fact 
challenge). But to anyone who would be tempted to think that 
phenomenology has a monopoly on the description of the temporal, we 
will mention just three modes of 'intrusion' into consciousness so 
conceived, which would undermine an account of Time that generalized from 
the time-of time-consciousness. 
A. The temporality of the body: the subjectivity of a temporally 
conscious being is an embodied subjectivity. One consequence of this 
fact is that even if there are clearly isolable sequences of experi . ence 
such as-phenomenological temporality describes, they are still -the 
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experiences of a being already-occupied by and with a multiplicity 
of somatic temporalities. For example, when listening to music, 
one may get distracted, or get tired and fall asleep, or even die. 
These fracturings of the isolable calm of a particular series of 
conscious acts are the predictable consequences of the periodici- 
ties that inhabit the embodied subject. 
B. The unconscious: the unconscious canýbe thought of dynamically 
(as a set of hidden mechanisms that generate certain kinds of behaviour) 
or structurally (as a transverse structure that can be read through 
consciousness). ' Either way the possibility arises of, if not actually 
interference with consciousness, at least establishing different orders 
of interpretation. ''Under the heading of the unconscious, the phenomenon 
of repression could also be mentioned. Even if a theory of conscious- 
ness can be developed to account for forgetting surely repression is a 
harder, nut to crack., -'- -.. 1. ý -, ý.; . .., - L. ., 141-". 
C. Worldly time: those concerned with internal time-consciousness , 
cannot ignore that it, has no monopoly on the forms of temporal organ- 
ization. ' In the experience of surprise, for example, we have the 
recognition of the autonomous temporal orderings of worldly things. 
Time-consciousness has blind corners, failures and gaps in protention. 
There are, 'of courset surprises only for a protending consciousness, 
but success, let alone failure here already demonstrates a 'beyond, 
to time-consciousness that is itself temporal. 
The'generalization of phenomenological time proceeds, as we 
have suggested'$ by arguing for the dependence of all meaning on the 
constituting activity of the subject, insisting that any other temporal 
order would have to be meaningfully graspable and that such constituting 
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activity would only be made possible by a phenomenological temporality. 
But this position tends towards an unacceptable idealism. The 
references to sleep, ' death, repression and surprise provide sufficient 
counter-examples to such a position. With a glance towards Levinas, 
we could add here: fecundity. 
Existential time 
An existential account of temporality is essentially participatory. 
It treats subjects both as embodied - and thus from the beginning 'in 
the world' - and as mortal. It is participatory in the sense that it 
claims that we are temporal in our very being and that the most basic 
temporal patterns which affect us are not those that organize the per- 
sisting objects around us, but those that involve our actions and our 
self-understanding as finite beings. 
'Participatory' is perhaps to use too positive a term. 'Non- 
detached' might be more apt. It is not the temporality of a subject 
whose worldliness is in doubt, but of a person whose Being is in question, 
and for whom the temporal dimension of its Being is a key issue. On 
this account of time, the possibility of its generalization is assu red 
by its association with the transcendental character of our Being. 
Man is transcendental because his Being is horizonal. And the horizon 
in question is one of ecstatic temporality: the triadic structure of 
anticipation, making present, and Being-as-having-been. Because we 
understand ourselves in terms of possibilities of Being, and the future 
is the fountain of possibility, it is the future that is emphasised in 
existential temporality. 
one specific way in which existential temporality is given a 
privileged status vis-a-vis other forms of the temporal is by explaining 
those other forms in terms of it. For example, Heidegger says of 
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ordinary time that it cons ists6 
'precisely of the fact that it is a pure sequence 
of Inows' without beginning and without end in 
which the ecstatical character of primordial 
temporality has been levelled off' 
I... the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's 
common sense is not primordial but arises rather 
from authentic temporality' 
And in claiming, as he does elsewhere, that infinite time (= cosmic 
time) is derivative (by derestriction) from finite existential time, 
he further privileges the latter. 
We seem at least at first to be able to separate the regional 
application of existential time from the transcendental arguments in 
which it gets involved. That there should be a kind of temporality 
specific to finite, ontologically self-conscious, embodied, worldly- 
beings is not surprising, and it is enormously important in, say, 
int. exp-rq#p9 human action. This is not of course to say that there 
are no problems for an existential temporality. Think of Barthes' 
sceptical remarks about biography 
7 
or Sartre's discussion of the retro- 
spective nature of adventures. 
8 
But if existential time can serve as the ground for cosmic time, 
why could it not be thought to ground all other times? This would seem 
to be Heidegger's position in Being and Time for example. If it were 
successful, the interpretation of temporal structure would have found 
a universal basis. Its success would require satisfactory solutions to 
two basic difficulties: 
1. Existential temporality, even in its most direct application (human 
self-interpretation and projectivity) takes for granted as an ontological 
premise, the value-of unity. The whole thrust of Heidegger's existential 
analysis of Dasein is to undermine metaphysical guarantees of personal 
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unity such as 'substance', the 'ego', the 'self' etc. His account of 
the theological sources of the idea of substance underpinning Descartes' 
dualism is masterly. And yet the conceptual apparatus by which Heidegger 
achieves this - and in particular, the pervasive distinction between the 
authentic and the inauthentic, and the idea of resoluteness - ultimately 
serve to redefine and re-establish notions like personal identity and 
responsibility, and the unity of a life through time. 
9 The authentic/ 
inauthentic distinction rests on the possibility in principle of deciding 
what is 'my own' and what is not. If it does not suppose that personal 
wholeness and integrity is something given or guaranteed, it does suppose 
it to be achievable. 
Opposed to such an assumption, I have in mind the vision of 
radically fragmented man offered to us by Barthes, both in the preface 
to Sade, Fourier, Loyola and his own substitute for an autobiography, 
Barthes on Barthes: 
'What I get from Fourier's life is his liking for 
mirlitons (little Parisian spice cakes), his 
belated sympathy for lesbians, his death among 
the flowerpots .... How I would love it if my 
life, through the pains of some friendly and 
detached biographer, were to reduce itself to a 
few details, a few preferences, a few inflections 10 
It would not be difficult to see in Barthes' position that of Hume, 
carried gracefully to its logical conclusion. Barthes' hedonism, 
if one 
- 
can call it thatp dissolves the distinction. between the authentic 
and the inauthentic and seems to expose its ethico-ontological status. 
one might admit that something like systematic self-intelligibility is 
something people seek, without accepting either that they necessarily 
or actually achieve it, or that it is the only or supreme value. And 
yet existential temporality does make such a claim. One should not 
rule out the possibility of an existential temporality that embraced 
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without evaluation a multiplicity of 'selves' or tracks within a 
single person, but the concern in both Heidegger and Sartre with 
quasi-moral notions like authenticityg responsibility, resoluteness, 
and commitment, makes it hard for such pluridimensionality to get a 
grip. 
Of course, one might still want to claim that difficulties in 
assessing the status of existential temporality in its direct application 
to the question of the unity of an individual life need not vitiate 
its role in providing a foundation for other kinds of temporality. 
We would still be able to think of cosmic time as a representation of 
the structure of the human practices of dating and measuring change, even 
if we had not got answers to whether such practices could or could not 
be existentially integrated. Even so we would be left with a second 
difficulty. 
'Exis'tential UTýe co*u*ld 'only 'ýe extýndeid' to'c'o'ver - all ýiher modes-'ýf 
time by supplying the ground or foundation for such times. Such an 
extension thus presupposes the legitimacy of the notion of such a ground 
or foundation., Significantly enough, Heidegger himself came to distance 
himself from just this transcendental form of thought. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger's real aim was to reopen access to the 
question of Being, but the vehicle he used was an analytic of human being, 
insofar as the latter 'keeps itself ecstatically open to Being'. The 
existential analytic is the gateway to the question of Being itself. 
The history of philosophy has always treated Being as, in some form or 
other, presence. So the opening-up of the question of Being must take 
place within the transcendental horizon of time, in order to explore the 
status of that 'presence'. In Being and Time the existential focus 
of the question of Being means that human being (Dasein) is understood 
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within the horizon of its temporality. The development of existent- 
ialism is seen as a misunderstanding of the status of that existential 
analytic. And when Heidegger reasserts his real aim. - thinking the 
question of Being - the link between time and the existential analytic 
gets severed, to such a point that in Time and Being (1962) the relation 
of his discussion to 'the-human being of mortals is consciously excluded'o 
At the same time as the specifically existential interpretation 
of temporality disappears, and in consequence the capacity of 'existential 
time' to render other kinds of time intelligible, Heidegger also seems 
to have assigned the concepts of foundation and ground to the very meta- 
physical tradition from which he is attempting to take up a certain 
distance. 12 He comes to see the whole model of transcendental causality 
as mistaken in principle. What takes its place is a new approach to 
both Time and Being, in which we are offered instead of a ground, an 
account of that 'presence' by which Time gets involved in Being,, in terms 
of presencing, opening, giving, bestowing ... in which, if one were to 
speculate on the place of man in this scheme, something like 'active 
receptivity' might best describe it. 
A full account of the treatment of time in the later Heidegger 
would take us too far afield, but it would not be unfair to draw the 
following conclusions from the discussion so far: (a) that we would 
have to defend. Being and Time against his mature assessment if we were 
to pursue the project of treating existential temporality as a ground 
for other modes of time, (b) that it is not at all clear whether there 
emerges from Heidegger's writing an alternative understanding of Time 
that could stand alongside the various views we are discussing. But 
we have no reason to deny the importance of some form of existential 
temporality, in providing a framework for understanding human action 
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and self-reflection. -And there is no reason to rule out the possibility 
of a deeper understanding of the appearance of other types of time by 
reference to practices and attitudes the temporal structure of which 
can only be adequately understood existentially. In saying this, we 
are in effect endorsing the descriptive if not the ontological value of 
much of the detail of Being and Time. 
5. The Time of the Sign 
Derrida's critique of Saussure 
13 
and Levi-Strauss 
14 is among other 
things directed against a purely synchronic, structural account of the 
sign. From the point of view of structuralist method, there is enormous 
value in its relative unconcern with the isolable meaning of signs, or 
with their referential aspects. , Instead it focusses upon differential 
(especially oppositional) relations between signs. The representation 
of such relations in the form of grids or networks of opposition gives 
the impression - sometimes justified - that time is being altogether ' 
excluded from consideration, that difference is a static relation. On 
this view, time appears in language in the shape of tense, temporal 
terminologyt the temporality of reading and writing, the internal 
development of a text (narrative, for example) and so on. But the 
elementary unit-the sign - would be free of temporal determinations.. 
Derrida's strategic introduction of the terms-'trace' and 
Idifferance' (with an a) signals a departure from that view and although 
the whole idea of time proper is itself put in question 
15 
the sense of 
deferral built into the term Idifferancel introduces an essential temp- 
orality into the sign, and hence into the whole empire of signs and 
signification. Derrida is in effect treating both the sense and the 
reference of a sign as having the structure of desire.. It is part of 
the classical-conception of the sign that it stands in for, represents, 
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what is absent. 'Derrida is claiming that this 'absence' is necessary - 
not the absence of something that at some other time or place could be 
made present. Indeed Derrida offers a critique of the very possibility 
16 
of such a presence. Meaning and reference always defer completeness. 
Textualityl in this light, can be seen as the movement of an impossible 
desire for plenitude, presence. ' Thinking of the sign as a 'trace'. 
involves a similar relation to an imaginary time. The Itrace't he 
claims, is not a trace of anything (while the sign can be thought of as 
a representation (re-presentation) of what has been present). But while 
the trace is not a trace of anything (which is like saying that signs 
have an essential autonomy with respect to what they signify), there is, 
as it were, an imaginary relation to an origin that can alone make sense 
of using the term 'trace' at all. If the term 'imaginary' sounds 
awkwardly psychological, perhaps 'virtual' would do. Signification, 
and hence language, would then essentially involve an imaginary or virtual 
temporality. 
But before we proceed to discuss this notion, a number of 
difficulties arising from our basing an account of the 'time of the 
sign' on Derrida's treatment ought to be mentioned. The reason for this 
approach is that it is from this point of entry that the possibility of 
the generalization of the 'time of the sign' can be contemplated. And 
yet in the course of this same generalizing move, paradoxically, 'the very 
idea of Time is threatened. The generalizing move rests on two premises: 
that signification knows no limits - that there is nothing to which we 
have access that is not caught up in it (including, for example, experience 
and perception); and that such terms as Idifferancel and 'trace' capture 
the form of signification in general. - But if this is how'the generality 
of Derrida's position is produced, it is not obviously a generalization 
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of a form of time or temporality. Indeed he sees it, I think, as 
deconstructing the inherently metaphysical concept of time itself. 
(On this view presumably talk about imaginary or virtual time would 
only be permitted on the strict understanding that these were not 
kinds of time at all, but at bottom, mark the absence of the temporal. ) 
But this would not endorse our aim of demonstrating the limitations of 
scope of each of our models because it fails to establish that it is a 
way of thinking about time at all. The terms Idifferancel and 'trace, ' 
seem to be used as part of a negati, ýe transcendental argument. to deny 
the possibility of any concept of time dependent upon the idea of the 
present - that is, any concept of time at all. 
However, whatever status we do ultimately give to this argument, 
it is clear that Derrida cannot want it described in this way - as a 
(negative) transcendental argument. It would, for example, make 
Idifferancel into a ground, and thus condemn it to the status of a new 
metaphysical concept. Indeed, having identified the concept of time 
as such with the metaphysical tradition, it is surprising, although 
gratifying, to see him referring to 'pluri-dimensionalityl and Idelinearized 
temporality' in another paper. 
17 
It is precisely such notions of pluri-dimensional time that the 
field of signification - particularly textuality - opens up. A 
discussion of the temporality say, of a narrative text, would have to 
bring out not only thereal chronology of events, but also the chron-' 
ology of their presentation, the structures of internal repetition of 
wordsv situationsp themes, the mapping onto the text of different types 
and modes of time (imaginaryt symbolic, biographical, historical... ) 
and so on. There is an important sense in which the operational value 
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of Derrida's deconstruction of the concept of the sign lies in its 
liberation of textuality from the interpretive constraints imposed 
by traditional concepts of meaning and of time. Even if we continue 
to suppose that real, objective time was linear, Derrida's critique 
of the sign as representation would undermine any attempt to restrict 
textual temporality to a linear form. The text is a privileged site 
for the liberation of time, 
18 " 
This has particularly important consequences for interpretation. 
For the discovery of multiple strands of meaning within a text - part 
of what would be involved in a deconstructive hermeneutics - is heavily 
dependent on the discrimination of a variety of types of temporality. 
But strictly speaking, we have gained this status for a manifold of 
textual temporality by narrowing down rather than generalizing its 
scope. Can we really treat the world as a text? Has the age of 
hydrosemantics arrived? 
19 
Our original aim was to demonstrate how a number of different 
highly general ways of thinking of time can be successfully transformed 
into local hermeneutical 'models' by relinquishing their claim to a 
universal scope. This whole procedure is conceived of not as a salvage 
operationt not one that adopts the strategy Nietzsche attributes to the 
20 
wormq but more positively as a restoration of these models to the site 
of their more intuitive application. If we assume that the shape of 
such an enterprise has become clearerl we can now turn to consider some 
of the difficult questions it raises. 
Have we not been operating under a mantle of innocence as to the 
real compatibility of each of these 'models'? Have we not, in effect, 
brought about reconciliation simply by silencing rival claims, and by 
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ignoring all the important questions? Have we not exchanged a healthy 
dialogue between theories for a mere patchwork of their shrivelled 
remains? 
There is no denying the desire for some further account of what 
if any the principle of unity of these various models might be. One 
might reply that it is the desire for a ground, or a foundation, an 
arche, and that such a desire rested on the mistaken belief in the 
possibility of such a first point. It is just this impossibility that 
the deconstruction of presence (discussed in the last section) demonstrates. 
But it might seem that the result of accepting this diagnosis would be 
equally unpalatable. Are we not left with a barren empiricism which 
simply notes the variety of modes of temporalization and says 'How 
interesting! ' or a set of operational models, or descriptive techniques 
which might be packaged ready for use by history, literary theory, the 
phenomenology of music etc.? And is not, the value of such a result 
severely limited? Can the production of such models really be the aim 
of philosophy? 
Heidegger might have put the 'barren empiricism' charge in another 
form. He might have said that we are concerned throughout with beings 
and not with Being. He might cite in evidence the fact that we seem 
to want to keep the analytical detail of Being and Time while leaving 
aside the question of Being, the horizon within which that detail appears. 
The fact that we retreat from any serious engagement with Time and Being, 
in which the whole existential perspective is so clearly dropped, is 
further proof. 
Of course the objection is not merely that talk about Being is 
absent from our account. The history of metaphysics is full of philosophers 
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who have talked about Being without understanding 'the ontological 
difference' (between Being and beings). And in principle it should 
be possible to respond to Being without naming it. (Indeed, as Heidegger 
discovers, naming it brings its own problems. ) The objection would have 
to be that we are not responding to Being as such, but only to beings. 
Our reply to this must be seen as tentative. Firstly we insist 
on the permanent, or better continuingo importance of detailed description 
of ontic structures. In an important sense there can be no discussion 
of Being, without careful consideration of the realm of beings. It would 
be ironic if reawakening the question of Being were to start us yawning 
21 
about beings. ,, And yet just such-a possibility of dissociation seems 
dangerously suggested at the end of Time-and Being:, - 
'The task of our. thinking-has been to trace Being to 
its'own from Appropriation - by way of looking through 
true time without regard to the relation of Being to 
beings. 
To think Being without beings means: to think Being 
without metaphysics. ' (p. 24) 
But doubts about Heidegger's formulation here do not constitute 
a reply to theobjection that we ourselves are forgetting Being. We are - 
drawn to make two apparently very different responses to this. The first 
responsep put in a strong form, is that we have indeed abandoned Being, 
and rightly so. -Nietzsche was right to think of it as 'the last cloudy 
streak of evaporating reality' or as 'an empty fiction'. 
22 And Derrida's 
own suspicion that it represents an unspent yearning for presence is fully 
justif ied. Do we not find confirmation in Heidegger himself of the 
impossibility of any coherent theoretical treatment of Being? Are, we 
not always left with the. question of Being, rather than answers? Put 
more positively, ought we not finally to realize that Being is nothing 
else but 'beings' graspedo understoodo related to in a certain_Hal? 
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And does not the recognition of the sparkling play of different types 
and orders or temporalization of beings offer just such a new horizon 
for relating to things? This horizon is not just wonder, but wonder 
informed by a sense of the variety of theforms of emergence, change, 
openness etc. which collectively constitute the horizon of temporality. 
The second response would be-this: if something remains in the 
later Heidegger of the recognition that the question of Being can only 
be reopened by the location of thedominant value of presence within the 
wider horizon of temporality, might it not be that the reopening of 
that horizon just is the reawakening of the question of Being, and the 
thought that there is some further task to be undertaken is an illusion. 
our account here has demonstrated a, polyhorizonality of time. 
But are we not then committed to the perspective of Being and 
Time, one which we subjected to criticism above? And would that not 
involve just the sort of privileging of one temporal 'model' that we 
have been arguing against? 
There is a sense in which the original definition of our problem 
makes this inevitable. We are concerned with interpretation, with - 
hermeneutics, not with epistemology or metaphysics, and it is not giving 
hermeneutics a metaphysical grounding to recognise that it is a human 
activity, one that draws on existential 'categories' in pursuing its 
interpretive ends. Accepting this as an internal consequence of the way 
the problem of Time and Interpretation has been posed, it does not mean 
that we must forget our critical remarks about existential temporality as 
formulated in Being and Time. The most attractive corrective to that 
account would be one that attempted to blend our account of the multi- 
dimensionality of the text with a version of the account given in Being 
and Time from which the concept of authenticity has been dropped. The 
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claim would not be that life is a text, but that it is textured. And 
that man is a tissue of times. 
III. Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Some Temporal Structures of Language: 
Prolegomena to a Futu're Theoiy of Time 
Quite by chance, or so it seemed, two particular books recently 
lay side by side on my desk. One was Plato's Republi and the otherl 
the multiply authored I Ching. I was enormously struck by this 
coincidence as they seemed to represent a disagreement of great import 
on which I had already taken sides. For Plato, time and change lead 
down the slippery slope to chaos, and intelligibility begins with 
the elimination of the temporal. While the I Ching, the book of 
changes, teaches us to recognise intelligible patterns of change, and 
that time is a condition for these patterns and not a threat to them. 
The recognition that change can be intelligibly structured 
results, I would argue, from the absence of an enormous burden that 
Western philosophy has had to carry - the task of discovering necessary 
truths. To the extent that time is the source of changing circumstances 
it poses a threat to necessity. And it is no accident that in one of 
the most self-conscious and dedicated attempts to rescue time from the 
intellectual wilderness -I refer to the writing of Hegel - it can only 
return in the form of necessity. The more it is recognised that there 
is a middle ground of intelligibility between necessary truthand bare 
contingent facts about the world, the more plausible becomes the project 
of providing some sort of account of temporal structure and-the less 
this phrase will provoke howls of mental anguish. 
Our project has its limits. What is offered here is a frame- 
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work for a theory of intelligible temporal structure, and many 
traditional problems about time will not be directly touched upon 
at all. Let us begin with some points of orientation and clarification. 
We take it that whatever is true of time is first true of the temporal, 
that the adjective 'temporal' qualifies in particular relations, and 
that complexes of relations may be called structures. What we require 
is an analytical vocabulary by which such structures can be illuminat- 
ingly discussed. We are not-the first to suppose that language 
itself (or at least reflection on language) can supply such a vocabu- 
lary. 
What we claim is that the visible and reflectively discover-* 
able structures of language evidence a wide range of general temporal 
structures; that in language, the structures of time are writ large. 
Language we claim is an exemplary and a privileged temporally ordered 
phenomenon. If our account here can sustain this claim, one welcome 
consequence would be that we would not have to choose between the 
alternatives: time OR language suggested above. We do not supposep 
as it might sometimes seem, that without structure there is no time. 
No doubt time can appear in such primitive forms as simple duration, 
as desire, as flux. What we object to is using these phenomena as 
paradigms, for they are neither typical, nor perhaps fundamental. 
We claim that language is an exemplary, phenomenon. The temporally: 
informing features we will discuss are not restricted to language, 
and a number of our examples will illustrate this. 
The use of language as a site for excavation - and by language 
here we mean speech, writing and interior discourse - has important 
advantages over a study. of the structures of time-consciousness: 
(1) the structures of signification - intentional structures - that 
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language makes possible are infinitely more complex than would be 
. available to a 
being without a language. The 'objectified inten- 
tionalities' of a natural language not only massively expand the 
possibilities of consciousness, but are more readily accessible for 
analysis. To the extent that temporal structure is intelligible it 
is ultimately and in the broadest sense, an intentional phenomenon. 
So a study of temporal structure that did not take into account the 
possibilities that language opens up would be importantly defective. 
(2) Taking language as our object frees us to consider temporal 
structures without the doctrine of 'one man one time' hanging over 
Use If what we discover is useful for understanding experiential 
time, it has no a priori assumptions about unity, identity or 
continuity to hinder it, although these may of course creep in 
unnoticed. (3) The use of language as a mine of temporal struct- 
ures gives us a breathing space of ontological neutrality, and a 
longer one than any analysis of consciousness can possibly hope . 
to have. 
Having established the site for excavation, we will now explain 
why we interest ourselves particularly in one sort of temporal struct- 
uring, the less favoured sort. 
Language structures time in two ways which we will call explicit 
and implicit.. The explicit way involves (a) (in languages with which 
I am familiar) such modifications of the verb as tense, aspect and 
mood.. (b) use of temporal indices such as now, then and once.. 
(c) the use of various languages of time and date - both everyday and 
specialist - from the calendar to the measuring systems of physics. 
It is in these three areas that much of the work on the 
relationship between language and time is done. In our opinion 
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however, this explicit treatment of temporality by language is subject 
to certain a priori constraints which it is our intention to suspend, 
or bracket. These constraints are associated with the thesis of the 
a priori unidimensionality, unidirectionality, and continuity of time. 
We will call this, for short, the thesis of the a priori unity of time. 
This thesis has an application to the objective world - that (at least 
from a given position) all events can be uniquely ordered in a single 
temporal series; and it is applicable to subjective time in the view 
that for each person there is a single stream of consciousness, in 
which each experience can be uniquely ordered. Obviously there are 
various ways of handling the relationship between these two applications 
of the thesis, but these are not here our concern. We argue that 
the unity of time thesis is an unnecessary limitation of the investiga- 
tion of temporal structures and particularly on those we call intentional. 
Accordingly we propose to put to one side the unity of time as a priori 
assumption. For this reason, and because much work has already been 
done in this area, our focus will not be on the ways in which language 
explicitly structures time insofar as these are linked to some form of 
the unity of time thesis. 
But before we proceed to the body of the paper - the implicit 
temporalising of language - there are two important respects in which 
the explicit temporalising of language seems to already point beyond 
the unity of time thesis: 
(1) If we consider a discourse in which tense or mood or aspect (or 
all three) are employed - the unity of time thesis will appear in the 
form of rules for assessing the consistency of these uses. In 
particular one thinks of tense logic. In our view, however, logic 
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is unsuited to legislate for temporal relations in general. It is 
-itself dependent on further explanations of such key temporal notions 
as 'at the same time' (a point Geach makes in another context)l 
2 
and is only ever introduced and comprehended via our ordinary natural 
language., However, tense or mood (and aspect somewhat less) each 
allow the creative expansion of what we call ecstatic virtuality, or 
intentionality. They allow the subject to specify the most complex 
existential orientationst and indeed to conceive of them in the first 
place. And in doing so, one-dimensionality is implicitly expanded 
into a multi-dimensional texture, which opens up a crack in the unity 
of time' thesis. 
(2) The other respect in which explicit temporalising can lead beyond 
this thesis is found in the possibility of multiple histories sharing 
the same dating system. Here we are thinking of Foucault's insis- 
tence that we consider history plurally 
3_ 
that there are histories of 
toy-soldier manufacturing, book-binding and soap as well as that of the 
kings and queens of England. So while dating systems in principle 
allow any event to be uniquely located in a single temporal series 
(the history of the world), there remains the possibility of establish- 
ing a number of more limited special series restricted by content and 
in which actual serial order is not always of overriding importance. 
Thust in studying the lifework of a particular painter, it will only 
sometimes matter that one knows which painting he painted first -- when 
there is a significant change of style, say. 
These are two respects in which the explicit structuring of time 
by language can overcome the a priori constraints we have mentioned. 
Within these constraints much valuable work has already been done. 
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our concern, however, is with the ways in which language structures 
time implicitly, and for the clues this offers for more general insight 
into temporal structure. We begin looking at the implicit structuring 
of time by considering temporal order. 
Consider first of all seriality. Metrical time is merely a 
succession of instants, drawn out in a line, but language offers us more 
complex forms of seriality. We distinguish just four: 
(i) repetition - in which the same element (a sound, or letter, 
or word... ) is repeated over and over again. 
(ii) simple progression - in which different words succeed one 
another without establishing any larger units. 
(iii) syntactic connection - in which words that succeed one 
another DO form a new unity (eg. a phrase, a sentence) and in which 
the relations of succession may be much less important than say 
agreement, (in case, number, person etc. ) with a more distant element. 
one way of looking at such connections is to treat their successivity 
as only the surface consequence of generation from a deeper structure 
by some rule. 
(iv) finally we will speak of articulation of these syntactic 
units as defining another level - most important to complex temporality - 
which we will call textuality. 
- If we consider next the fact that language offers a number of 
different significant units, something like a nested structure of 
articulation becomes visible. Again if we take a lengthy text, we 
may find a plot, a collection of chapters, paragraphs, sentences, words 
and letters. At each level, a shift in attention occurs which changes 
the intentional focus and opens up a new horizon of meaning. And 
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at each level a distinct series is discovered. Ordinary empirical 
. studies reveal what we could call different orders of magnification 
of temporal structure - from the-vibration of crystals to history. 
The example of language suggests that at each of these different 
levels of magnification, distinct series can be found. 
We have said that at each level of unit a new horizon of 
function appears. Words and sentences have distinct kinds of unity. 
The sorts of series we have just mentioned are combinatory or syntag- 
matic. But there is another axis of seriality - as it were - which 
opens up a virtual horizonality based on selectional or paradigmatic 
chains. Each time a particular word is used, a chain of the 
repetitions of its token equivalents is activated and extended. 
And this chain can have different sorts of significance. The 
etymological roots of the word may for example be unconsciously or 
explicitly alluded to. A word may take on a special local signifi- 
cance through textual repetition. (Think of Dasein or differance). 
So we can distinguish within the cosmic list of word's repetition both 
the regional series to which it belongs and the relationship between 
that series and the wider one. 
What has this to do with time? The recurrence of the same is 
a primitive temporal structure. It too has its own horizonality. 
(The consequences of developing this insight can be momentous, as 
Nietzsche showed. We take up this question in our Appendix. ) 
Yet another advantage of taking linguistic productions as 
exemplary for understanding temporal structure arises from the plurality 
of texts, each of which to a greater or lesser degree allows distinct 
temporally ordered series to be identified, and 'times' within these 
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series. Thus we can talk about the early chapters of a book, the 
. opening lines of a poem, or an argument, Where there is some ground 
for intertextual grouping, we can extend this intentional seriality 
to a whole opus, for example. Consider the early and later Heidegger, 
Kant's pre-critical writings and so on, even up to such large scale 
series as the phenomenological movement or the logocentric tradition. 
In the world of texts and discursive sequences, there is no 
ONE time. Multidimensionality is the rule. This is not to say 
that by some magical process texts escape the possibility of being 
objectively dated. Rather the relationship between a text and 
physical time is likely to be less significant than between one text 
and another (or indeed between a text and the nature of its historical 
context). We would endorse here as we have said Foucault's emphasis 
on histories rather than history. But we would add that multidimen- 
sionality does not require the sacrifice of the intentional - of meaningg 
horizons etc. - rather its expansion. 
Our use of the text as a model for temporal complexity has so 
far been to expand and pluralize time understood as serially ordered, 
linear time. Before we leave this valuable but limited perspective 
we must draw attention to another consequence of multidimensionality. 
The overall continuity of a multidimensional text permits discontinuities 
of particular strands, both in the sense that a particular series may 
begin or end, but also that it may be interrupted. The overall 
structure of a text allows such discontinuities to be located and 
identified. The pluralization of time has as its consequence that 
discontinuity becomes conceptually admissable. We discuss this 
more fully when we deal with narrative, below. 
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So the text can be used as a model for understanding a historical 
break. We do not however dismiss the idea of continuity or its 
importance. Rather we argue that consciousness, experience or epis- 
temological history MAY be characterised by dis'continuities. To admit 
discontinuity does not require us to abandon all interest in temporal 
order. It only suggests that we avoid a mistakenly a priori under- 
standing of the structure of time which would find radical discontinuity 
hard to handle. 
So far, with the concepts we have canvassed - multidimensionality, 
internal horizonality, nested articulation structure, and discontinuity, 
we have tried to illustrate the way in which linguistically structured 
temporality transcends simple seriality, drawing heavily on the struc- 
ture of texts. But these particular concepts only disclose some of 
the most visible temporally constitutive intentional aspects of language. 
So as to try to anticipate in principle some of the diversity of other 
such structures, we will now look at three of the most important 
principles responsible, in our view, for their appearance, which, with 
certain reservations we will call determination, reflexivity, and 
'Presence'. 
Let us begin with determination. Put most simply, a word a 
phrase or a sentence can be determined by a rule. But this opens 
up a number of different senses of 'determined, and of 'rule'. 
There are lexical selectional rules, and syntactic combinatorial rules. 
These could be called rules of construction. It is already clear 
that a single utterance can be determined by many different rules 
simultaneously. Moreover there are other ways in which utterances 
are determined which allows them to be multiply determined. In 
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particular, one thinks of all those conditions of appropriateness 
that a linguist would treat under pragmatics. 
This talk of determination however, treats of a phenomenon 
from only one point of view. The rules involved would appear to 
function as limitations, constraints, conditions. They present 
themselves as demands that one must either meet or risk falling 
into babble or foolishness. But the other face of this same 
phenomenon is rather different. A single utterance can satisfy 
a multiplicity of conditions so as to be 'Just the right thing to 
say', the 'mot just'. And the very same rules, constraints and 
conditions can serve this creative role as well as the conforming 
role that the other model suggests. To understand and appropriate 
these conditions of sense and force, and to bring them'to bear, 
consciously or otherwise on one's speech or writing has as its 
limit something we would call discursive saturation-, the closest 
we can come to a redefinition of authentic discourse. 
There are two important respects in which multiple determina- 
tion or multiple satisfaction are temporally significant. 
(1) If we allow that some of the rules governing the surface 
structure of utterances are rules that relate that surface order to 
a deep structure -a generative model - then we have given an impor- 
tant-sense to the idea of surface order being derivative. It is not 
actually important for our present purposes that we agree on a genera- 
tive model for syntax. For it clearly applies to linguistic produc- 
tion at other levels (such as writing a book from an outline) and to 
quite different fields9 such as acting from a blueprint, as when one 
follows a recipe or a map or a flow diagram. In these cases the 
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temporal order of one's actions or decisions is derived from the order 
of another schema or blueprint. It may be wrong to treat world 
history or my monadic autobiography as the conscious or unconscious 
unrolling of some such deeper order, but the fact that a model can 
be misapplied does not invalidate it, it only reminds one of its limits. 
(2) The otherrespect in which multidetermination or satisfaction 
is temporally constitutive is more general. . It exemplifies temporal 
focussing or condensation. An act in general and a linguistic act 
in particular, with a single physical description can be part of a 
number of different intentional series. Painting a fig leaf in the 
right place can satisfy the censors as well as improve the colour 
balance. A sentence can enflame and inform at the same time. Or 
consider the note at which two pianists moving, along a piano in 
different directions cross over. That single note will have a 
different meaning depending on whether it is seen as part of an 
ascending or descending scale.. 
The point is this: language offers us examples of a very 
general phenomenong which is the conceretely multi-faceted nature 
of its instants, its moments. 
After multiple determination or satisfaction the next specifi- 
cally intentional feature of language we would single out for its 
temporal importance is reflexivity. The fact that language can be 
about itselfs or that we can talk or write about other sentences, 
or even the very ones being uttered, means that the temporal struc- 
tures constitutive of texts or discourses must be thought of as 
doubled back, or folded over on themselves. In such a reference 
back, the actual temporal gap - when there is one - is only there 
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to be ignored. Reflexivity establishes loops of immediacy amidst 
what remains-of linearity. But it does more. We could restrict 
reflexivity to the clearest case in which S' refers to S either by 
name or in quotes. But the same principle of reflexivity is at work 
in anaphora, and in clause mbdificationý It is no accident that Hegel 
associated the possibility of the dialectic'with what he called the 
speculative proposition and as we have argued elsewhere 
4, 
the progress 
of the Spirit should be seen as at least modelled on, if not at 
times dependent on a reflexivity that belongs primarily to the Hegelian 
text itself rather than to some independent object to which it might 
refer. Dialectics, in short, would be in large part an exploitation 
of the phenomenon of textual reflexivity. For us this is not a 
reductionistic thesis. Rather, as we are claiming, complexly inten- 
tional time is best revealed by the structures of language, but need 
not be reduced to them. 
The last particularly intentional feature of language is 
'Presence'. We have discussed this already in previous chapters, 
but it is worth repeating here. A certain confusion has proliferated 
around this term. According to Derrida, presence is a feature 
improperly attributed to terms or utterances because of the trice 
, structure' of any sign. And if there is differance wherever there 
is significationt even the purity of that presence we call self- 
presence is threatened, to the extent that presence in its temporal 
aspect, is infected by its relationship to past and future. 'Presence' 
is an illusion of false-immediacy, as Hegel might have put it. Or 
in Derridean parlance, language is a play of differences and defer- 
ments. But need we choose between differance and presence? ' In our 
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view, the deconstruction of presence IS effective against taking 
presence - in one or other of its forms - as a metaphysical foundation. 
And if phenomenology is committed to the value of presence then 
(insofar as it is a metaphysics) its plausibility would be threatened. 
However it seems to us (a) that the development of phenomenology since 
Husserl has been consistently away from the metaphysical temptations 
to which he arguably fell victim, and"(b) that phenomenology is not 
committed in principle'to presence in some absolute sense. Pheno- 
menology can survive without supposing,, for example, that meanings 
can be perfectly fulfilled. 
So we do not believe that a deconstruction of presence is an 
automatic deconstruction of phenomenology. Although it rightly 
breeds discontent with a narrowly intentional account of languaget 
as Merleau-Ponty was beginning to see in his last work, 
5 
But in our view this critique of presence is quite compatibleý 
with presence being an essential phenomenon of language. It is 
quite true that words do belong to series, and do have meaning by. 
virtue of unstable differences of oppositions to which they are 
related. But for all that, people use words to refer to actual 
and possible worlds. They take some words to be apt and others 
awkward, and they freight their discourse with meaning. A phen- 
omenology of discourse cannot do without the concept of presence. 
Even if, as we have argued above, 
6 
we cannot straightforwardly accept 
that differance is what makes presence possible, there is undoubtedly 
a complex relation of mutual interdependence, so presence cannot 
serve asa foundation. But equally it is no illusion. 
Presence as we understand it is the primary phenomenon of 
464 
language. It is made possible by the relationship that the term 
or utterance in question has to the various differential series to 
which it always belongs and to the intentions and references it may 
bear. Presence is difference focussed by a linguistic subject's 
desire. The product of this focussing is that ideality that Nietzsche 
rightly attributed to language. Making present draws in pasts and 
futures. Presence in language is the phenomenon of which difference 
is a condition and ideality the abstraction. 
So far we have dealt with what could be called structural 
features of language. Most if not all our claims could have been 
illustrated by a written text. We have explored textuality as 
complex temporality. We have argued that certain structural features 
of texts exhibit the general properties of this complex temporality. 
Three important problems arise out of this treatment and we would like 
to dispose of them before we go on to look at the most obvious standard 
form of textual temporality - that of narrative. 
(1) We seem to have licensed references to intentionality 
without a subject. Texts have appeared in a kind of uncommitted 
limbo between being objects of, analysis and being enlivened by reading 
or writing. References to speech, on the other hand, have not been 
sensitive to the specific temporality of the act of speaking. 
(2) We have still not explained how it is that time can be 
thought of as structured without ignoring its essential spontaneity. 
and creativity. Does not any talk of temporal structure inevitably 
spatialize time? Are we not mistakenly applying the static products 
of reflection to the pre-reflective level? Are we not confusing 
Being with its representation? 
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(3) What is the intended scope of our analysis? Are we 
talking only about subjective time, or existential timet or what? 
We will first look at the problem of intentionality without 
a subject. There are two justifications for this: 
(a) that the properties of texts and utterances we have discussed so 
far are neutral as to being written or read, being uttered or listened 
to. It is unnecessary to specify the position of the linguistic 
subject on each occasion, even if an adequate account of the onto- 
logical status of a text must acknowledge the need for its animation 
by linguistic subjects. But there is a more important reason for 
suspending the question of the status of the subject, and the precise 
sense of intentionality employed in the analysis of texts. Such a 
strategy allows the possibility to emerge that the concept of the 
subject, and of intentionality is considerably transformed when we 
take language as its field of operation rather than consciousness 
as traditionally understood. If we begin with the subject as, the 
subject of consciousness not only would we be unable to understand 
a text except by problematically invoking an unconscious, but, more 
importantly for our purposes we would still be rattling the chains 
of unidimensional temporality. 
This struggle has an important historical dimension. In our 
view the only way of avoiding psychologism, in the battle against 
which phenomenology was borno without reaching for a transcendental 
phenomenology, is to recognize the determination of our lives and 
experiences by structures of signification, structures which are 
most complexly developed in language. While language most thoroughly 
exploits signification we do not claim that there is no signification 
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without language, rather that simpler forms, such as association 
by similarity or proximity, do not provide us with an adequate 
paradigm. This is why Hume's associationism won't do. Trans- 
cendental phenomenology we understand as a reflection of the 
inability of a unidimensional temporality - like Hume's - to handle 
on its own the complex structure of experience, and particularly 
to guarantee continuity and the identity of the subject. This 
flight into ideality loses its appeal if instead we rethink-the 
temporal structure of our everyday experience and action along the 
lines we are suggesting. 
The second problem is that we might be thought to be access- 
ories to the age-old crime of killing time by spatialising it. 
Is that not what is implied by talking of structures? The importance 
of this charge is that it allows us to make historically overdue 
clarifications about the representation of time. Some philosophers 
seem to have believed that the attempt to represent time'spatially 
was either in itself a fatal error, or led with some kind of necessity 
to making such an error. In whichever form we take it, the belief 
is not only mistaken, but, theoretically stultifying. 
Our view, on the contrary, is this: that there has never 
been anything wrong with the spatial or other representation of time 
AS SUCH. ' The error can always be found in the interpretation of the 
representation or of time's representability. Put another way, the 
error has always been in failing to realize that a representation of 
any sort requires an interpretation. I take it that a version of 
our claim here is commonly accepted that, for instance, even the 
most representational painting, the most descriptive statement, -the 
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most realistic novel utilizes conventions, and that not all of the 
features of a representation can be assumed to be features of what is 
represented. 
But if this has been generally agreed, the consequence for 
representations of time does not seem to have been drawn: that we 
can describe temporal structures those that we have located in 
language for example - and we can even provide diagrams to display 
these structures more vividly - without killing time. 
Let us illustrate this point: a spatial representation even 
of what appears to be a simple linear unidimensional temporal sequence 
can be used to capture at least four different types of temporal 
structure, which we will call reflective, generative, participatory 
and active (see attached sheet). These types of temporal structure 
differ in the sorts of relation that hold between successive elements. 
In the reflective case the principle by which the succession is 
unified, is one reflectively projected on the events after the fact 
as one might look back on the outcome of a series of accidental 
occurences. In the generative case, the serial ordering is under- 
stood to be a product of some underlying formative principle - such 
as a genetic code or a transformation of a deep structure. We have 
discussed this before. In the participatory case, the order is 
one that a subject is essentially involved in unrolling. We include 
as examples, listening to a joke, watching a play, reading a book. 
Each successive step is marked by anticipations confirmed, or denied, 
and others born. Finally, in the active type of seriality the sequence 
of events reflects a plan of action in which some order at least is 
already determined. 
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4K- FOUR TYPES OF TEMPORAL STRUCTURE 
diagrammatic representation 
and interpretation 
(1) REFLECTIVE 
'. 4lec-4; on 
rA 
the connections recognised between AOB and C are simply 
a product of a later reflective grasping of their serial 
ordering. 
(2) GENERATIVE. 
ABC 
the connections'recognised between A, B and C are deemed 
a consequence of some underlying formative principle (X). 
PARTICIPATORY 
IN 
INNOCENT 
Lists of INNOVATE 
words guessed 
at each stage INWARD 
INHALE 
ETC* 
IND -- -- --r 
INDECENT 
INDUSTRY 
INDIA 
INDOLENT 
ETC. 
INDI----: ý, 
INDIRECT 
INDIFFERENT 
INDIA 
INDICATIVE 
ETC. 
-z> INDIA----> INDIAN INDIANA-----.!,, INDIANA 
INDIA INDIAN INDIANA INDIANA 
INDIAN INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS 
INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS- 
imagine watching a skywriter spelling out a word, and 
guessing it at each stage. CP 
ACTIVE 
(Abc) (aBc) (abC) 
IV 1 
4/ 4/ 
ABc 
the chosen structure ABC guides the successive unrolling 
of three stages of action. 
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Although something like a diagrammatology is required to 
adequately construct and interprete them, each of these types can 
be spatially representedt and this involves neither their reduc- 
tion to a simple type. nor the loss of their authentic tempor- 
ality. 
Each of these, as it happens, are modulations of simple 
temporal seriality. We do not claim that they exhaust the field 
of temporal intentionality. Indeed they are consistent with the 
unity of time thesis, whose limits we reject. It is a confirm- 
ation of our orientation, to language that each of these types of 
interpretation of temporal order has a clear linguistic embodi- 
ment. We have already directly discussed reflexivity, and the 
idea of a succession indebted to a rule that generates it was 
covered by the more complex principle ofmultiple.. determination., -_ 
The two remaining ways of interpreting representations of 
time - as participatory or active temporality - each have their 
place in language, indeed a place which constitutes one of the 
most fertile resources of temporal structure. They lead us back 
to those structures particularly characteristic of communicative 
interaction., 
In the active production of contextually appropriate gram- 
matical sentencest both speaker and listener will modulate the 
way they follow utterances with various kinds of anticipation and 
retention. What is retained and anticipated will reflect linguistic 
probabilities resting on both formal and contextual conditions. 
More importantly what is actually spoken, and thus whether a particu- 
lar anticipation was correct, will reflect the very participatory 
temporal structure that utterances have. Thus, to take an extreme 
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but clear case, the punchline of a Joke is both something actively waited 
for, and successful only if it is so anticipated. Part of the art of 
telling a Joke (or writing a thriller) lies in the orchestration of clues 
to the existence and nature of the climactic structure of the discourse - 
both leading and misleading clues. 
The importance of the joke, or, say, a Hitchcock film, for our 
project is that it exploits the active and participatory temporal struct- 
uring of language as this structuring gets elaborated by communicative 
interaction. 
We cannot here explore in any depth the temporal complexities of 
communicative intersubjectivity, but we will mention some of the key 
factors involved. The central condition is the fact of another linguistic 
subject with his or her own temporally structured life. Communication 
requires some sort of interarticulation of these temporalitiesI. Whether 
one is dealing with monologue or dialogue the intelligibility, and the 
effectiveness of discourse will in various ways depend on the speaker 
correctly judging the progressive structure of his audience's anticipa- 
tions. This is equally and more vividly true of the writer/reader rela- 
tionshipq or the relationship between a director of a film and his pro- 
jected audience. Communication, in short involves anticipations of 
anticipations, and ongoing modifications of one's discourse which accom- 
modate these anticipations. The precise nature of these adjustments 
of co-temporality will vary with the type of communication involved. 
7 
Making music together is often formally constrained by a score; the 
communicative aspects of climbing a mountain together will involve a mixture 
of verbal exchange, silent gesture and the interpretation of involuntary 
bodily movements. The feeling of co-presence, of shared exhilarated ex- 
haustion on the summit is a product of all these previous exchanges. 
It may be remembered that we raised three problems with our 
treatment of time structure, and we have so far only dealt with 
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two: intentionality without a subject and the alleged dangers of 
spatializing time. The third is the question of the status and scope 
of our investigation. We shall now try to answer this question. 
So far we have been guided by two ideas: 
(1) that structures of time are intentional structures, and that intent- 
ional structures are structures of signification . As language offers the 
most visible development of such structures, it is to language that we 
have biought the spade. 
One consequence of the view that all structures of time are structures 
of signification is that our conclusions are not restricted in principle 
to time-consciousness or to existential time. ' Wherever change is pattern- 
ed in ways that can be repeatedly recognised or accommodated to, or 
intelligibly grasped, a structure of signification is involved. We 
retain a certain sympathy for Heidegger's view that intelligibility and 
signification are rooted in our worldly involvement, even if discourse 
subsequently develops a certain autonomy. So the scope of our theory is 
intended to be quite general. 
(2) Our second guiding idea has been this: if it is true, as Derrida claims, 
that our ordinary concept of time is metaphysical, we see this, perhaps with 
a certain deliberate naivety, as a condition to be changed. We find it 
quite unacceptable that temporal language should be squeezed out of phil- 
osophy just because of the temptations it puts before us. 
Indeed, as Derrida knows, much of the evidence points in the 
opposite direction. Rather than supposing that time is a metaphysical 
concept it is more fruitful to consider the temporal determinations and 
commitments of metaphysics, such as the desire for the end of time. The 
same goes for a wide range of philosophical concepts. not least that of 
theory. 
472 
Something of this problem will beset us as we turn now to 
consider one of the classic ways in which texts exhibit temporality - 
that of narrative. The importance of narrative structures to literary 
studies goes without saying. But much broader claims have been made for 
its significance. For Ricoeur 
8, it is the key to understanding 
existential time and for mediating between individual and historical 
existence. ForCimille? it is the defining feature of historical discourse. 
10. 
For Jameson, it is 'the central function or. instance of the human mind' 
around which we can 'restructure the problematics of ideology, of the 
unconscious and of desire, or representation, of history and of cultural 
11 
productions. ' For Lyotard, it is the irreducible form of intelligibility 
in a sea of multiply differential discourses ('petits recits'). For 
12 
Barthes, it completely surrounds and permeates us, it transcends genre, 
and it is 'international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply 
there, like life itself'. The interest in narrative structure is as old 
as Aristotle and can, plausibly be said to, have 'taken a quantum leap in 
the modern era'., 
13 
The question of narrative is very often and understandably, the focus 
of interest, for the study of the very intersection between temporality and 
textuality that we have begun here. Our reasonsfor not taking this 
approach would be a story in itself. It would have been more difficult 
to resist the conveniences of anificreasingly established frame of reference. 
But more importantly, many of the structures to which we have pointed:. 
function at a more primitive level than that of narrative. ( Unless., of 
courseywe extend the sense of narrative to include any-and all linguistically 
mediated temporal intelligibility. ) 
In the face of such a wealth of narrative theory, we shall select 
on or two critical questions to which our approach makes a positive 
contribution. 
The first question is one raised by Barthes in his seminal paper 
473 
Introduction to the Structural Analvsis of Narrative 
14 
: 'Is there 
an atemporal logic lying behind the temporality of narrative'V His 
answer is that while Propp, 'whose analytical study of the folktale 
is totally committed to the idea of the irreducibility of the chrono- 
logical order: he sees time as reality and... is convinced of the 
necessity of rooting the tale in temporality. , 
14 
The modern consensus 
takes the opposite view: 
',,. all contemporary researchers ( Levi-Strauss, Greimas, Bremonds, 
Todorov), ... could subscribe to Levi-Strauss's proposition that 
'the order of chronological succession is absorbed in an atemporal 
structure. ' Analysis today tends to Idechronologizel the narrative 
continuum and to Irelogicize' it... or rather [givý a 
structural description of the chronological iiiiutsoion - it is for 
narrative logic to account for narrative time .... temporality 
is 
only a structural category of narrative ( discourse), just as in 
language (; angue) temporality only exists in the form of a system; 
from the point of view of narrative, Uhat we call time does not 
exist, or at least only ... as an element of a semiotic system. Time 
belongs not to discourse strictly speaking but to the referent; both 
narrative and language know only a semiotic time, 1true time' being 
only a'realist' referential illusion, as Propp's commentary shows. 
It is as such that structural' analysis must deal with it. ' (ibid. ) 
We shall focus our attention on two segments: 
from the point of view of narrative, what we call time does not exist, 
least only exists functionally, as an element of a semiotiC system. ' or 
and 
'It is as such that structural analysis must deal with it. ' 
This account, raises some most difficult issues, two of which we 
would like , albeit briefly, to discuss: (1) The question of a fundamental 
atemporal structure; (2) the general question of the dependence of temp- 
orality on narrative discourse. 
(1) For Levi-Strauss, as we see. ' the order of chronological succession 
is absorbed in an atemporal matrix'. As a description of the method of , 
structural analysis it is quite accurate. But does that tell us anything 
about narrative itself, or only about the limitations of structuralist 
meth6d ? This question can be hidden by the analytic success of a 
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structuralist illumination 'of, say,, - myth. But it should not be lost 
for ever. Consider the following: 
matrix structure, qua spatial representation is necessarily 
atemporal. At this level, so are representations even of the most obviously 
temporal phenomena - such as musical scores. 
But this gives us two senses of latemporal matrix structure'. In 
the first sense, it is the representation itself which ( qua spatial) is 
latemporal'; in the second, what is represented is represented as atemporal. 
This latter, however, can again be divided. For what is represented 
may-actually be atemporal ( eg. a map of the London Underground, conceived 
of as a labyrinth. of tunnels! ) or it may, for whatever reason, just be 
represented as atemporal. 
Clearly narratives are not atemporal. The mythical narratives Levi- 
Strauss studies are recounted over and over again, and have orders of 
events, orders of actions which are essential to the intelligibility of 
that telling. 
What Levi-Strauss's myth-analysis claims or presupposes is that 
this order is not essential and that the binary oppositions at work are 
.. 
But perhaps it is this atemporality that is the illusion. 
What is true is that 'binary logic' does not involve time or 
temporality. But it does not follow that instantiations of binary oppos- 
itions are free from temporality. And this is the case at two different 
levels. Suppose we take Levi-Strauss's analysis of the Oedipus myth. We 
find in his analytical matrix the opposition: born from the earth/ born 
from man. Clearly, (i) the individual components are as temporal 
as one could want, and (ii) for the myth to be a myth, these components 
have to be articulated in some narrative sequence, however complex. 
Freud, (psychoanalysis was one of Le/vi-Strauss acknowledged 'mistr- 
esses') can spawn a similar confusion when he declares that the unconscious 
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is atemporal. What is true is that it is no respecter of simple linear 
order. But that does not make-it atemporal; it rather suggests a new 
compley. Ety to temporal organization. If the unconscious were atemporal, 
then no significance could be attached to repetition. And the same point 
can be made against Levi-Strauss. It-may be possible to identify versions 
of 'the same myth' in which the structurally significant elements are 
distributed in a plurality of narrative orders. But that only shows that 
a particular narrative sequence is not important, not that narrative 
order is not, on each occasion, vital. And, as we. have, suggested, the 
residual and ineliminable temporality. of the elements., which are then 
organized in binary oppositions ( birth, marriage, death ... all figure in 
the Oedipus matrix ) surely clinches the argument. Levi-Strauss is talking 
of the atemporality of his representations of the structure of narratives/ 
myths. But, as we have argued above, it tells us nothing about the 
temporality / atemporality of what is represented ., Moreover we could 
ask: what is it to 'read'. understand, grasp, one of Levi-Strauss's matrices? 
If that were an essentially temporal process, what would that say for the 
claimed atemporality of these structures ? Finally, we might point out the 
clear parallel Le/vi-Strauss sees between the structure of myth and that of 
music His lfytholoýigues are organized in a, 'musical' fashion. ) This 
only intensifies the problem. Clearly music can be talked about structurally, 
spatially ( Haydn's Creation has been called'a cathedral of soundl ) and 
so on. But temporal articulation is quite simply indispensable for the 
appreciation of music ( even for those who 'read' scores, and 'hear' the 
sound. ) And that appreciation is never just the construction of an edifice 
complete only at the end, but an ongoing temporal experience, a play between 
structure, process and event. 
There are enormous gains to be made by looking at the various 
'logics' of narrative. Barthes discusses 
16 (a) Bremond's attempt 'to 
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reconstitute the syntax of human behaviour utilized in narrative, to 
. retrace 
the course of the 'choice*s' which inevitably face the individual 
character at every point in the story ... an energptic logic', (b) (linguis- 
tic ) 1ý'evi-Strauss, Jakobson, and later Greimas, showing how 'paradigmatic 
oppositions ... are 'extended' along the lines of the narrative. ', and 
(c) (analysis of action) Todorov's attempts to"determine the rules by 
which narrative combines, varies, and, transforms a certain number of basic 
predicates. ' 
In each case, the atemporality is that of the representation alone, 
not what is represented. The time that is excluded perhaps, is that 
radical sense of time as the opening onto the radically other that we draw 
out of Nietzsche ( see our Appendix ). But this is excluded not by an 
atemporal logic, but by a temporally articulated narrative. 
17 
Consider Barthes' famous account-of 'the structuralist activity'. It 
is a veritable self-subversion of any 'structuralist metaphysics'. Central 
to structuralism, he avers, is 'the notion of the synchronic .... which 
accredits a certain immobilization of time'. ' What is meant by 
Ia certain-' ? Is this an expression of reservation or of ontological 
limitation of such 'immobilization' ? Barthes seems -to be distancing 
himself when he adds, in parentheses (although in Saussure, ý this is 
a preeminently operational concept ) Is it more than that for Barthes ? 
For him, the structuralist activity aims at producing an intelligible 
simulacrum of an object, by 'dissection and articulation'. This simul4- 
acrum is atemporal, and in this project, Barthes surely reaffirms the 
Platonic connection between the timeless and the intelligible. But without 
Platonic metaphysics. For he never loses sight of the fact that these 
simulacra are human creations., which suggests that for Barthes too, the 
synchronic perspective may be purely 'operational'. Indeed, the language 
of his account is shamelessly temporal, even teleological. Not only does 
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he insist on the structuralist activity, he describes it as 'the 
18 
controlled succession of a certain number of mental operations', operations 
which have as their goal I to reconstruct an"object" 1. 
Anyone who supposes that the detemporalization of narrative is any-- 
thing more than a methodological ruse should reflect on this essay. 
We have also insisted on the inherent temporality of those narratives 
myths" ) analysed by LeviStrauss. How can we deal with his description 
of myths as 'machines. for the suppression of time' 7 
19 Our response 
would be this: it rests on the assumption that myths are reducible to a 
binary logic, that Ilogiclis timeless, and that their purpose is to 
induce this timelessness. The first we have already cast doubt on, and' 
-1 
the last is wholly unproven. We do have an explanation for Levi-Strauss's 
remark, however . Levi-Strauss suggestsýthe possibility that 
his'own 
'Mythologiquis' might itself be taken as a myth. 
20 If we take this 
seriously, it'might -be that it is not the common myths of primitive - 
people that-are 'machines for the suppression, of'timel, but rather the 
Levi-Straussian' structuralist 'myth' of'a'logic of myth that 'suppresses 
time' by its atemporal analysis of myths. Structuralism, after all does 
have that as its avowed aim; primitive people do not. 
Let us now return to ask our second question of Barthes: precisely 
what relationship is being claimed between temporality and narrative ? 
As we understand it, Barthes is claiming that extra-textualltime' is a 
referential illusion -'temporality' is a product of narrative, and not 
vice versa. 
In relation to the first question, we have already argued that 
language in the ordinary sense is exemplary for revealing those temporal 
structures that transcend simple linearity. But the stronger claim, that 
temporality is essentially dependent on narrative textuality would depend 
on our'being able to show that the temporality of 'consciousness' and of 
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'existence' was already organised in narrative fashion. 
our position is slightly different. We claim (a) that narrative, 
- time-consciousness, and existential time each share certain primitive 
features - many of the features we analysed earlier in this chapter - but 
that this does not mean that full narrative intellibibility links eg. all 
the phases of my experience; (b) that Ricoeur is closer to the mark when 
he suggests 
21 in a most illuminating way, lthat narrative activity, in 
history and in fiction, provides a privileged access to the way we 
articulate our experience of time. ' We do not here propose to give further 
justification of our theoretical preference, but we do share Ricop,, ur's 
genuine but limited appreciation for those authors engaged in the 
structural analysis of narrative for whom the aim is the reduction of 
narrative to atemporal structures. Referring to Barthes, and Greimasq he 
writes: 'the result is that the narrative component as such is identified 
with. the level of manifestation, whereas only achronological codes would 
22 
rule the level of manifestation' . Ricoeur suggests that this leads to 
the overlooking of 'the temporal complexity of the narrative matrix', and 
suggests we focus (again) on ' plot, 
23 
, not in any naive way, but seen 
as the rich 'matrix' of narrativity. Our appreciation of the structuralist 
approach is quite genuine - Barthes, Greimas, Cenette,, and many others, 
have made an enormously valuable conceptual contribution, but it is a 
mistake to confuse the analytical power of structuralism with philosophical 
completeness. What is required, one might suggest, is a structural 
hermeneutics. At the very least the limitations of a plain structuralist 
approach make it very difficult to pose_our question: how are we to under- 
stand the relationship between narrativity and existence ? 
Let us try to approach this question through what might be thoughý 
to be the exemplary case of biographical narrative. 
We may begin with two views of the relationship between existential 
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time and narrativity: '(1) thatInarrative ( eg. biography, autobiography ) 
. involves an aesthetically motivated selectivity essentiallydistinct 
from life as lived. Tfiis difference can be understood positively 
(narrative articulates one's existence as an intelligible story) or 
negatively ( narrative is a retrospective rationalizing distortion of 
life as actually lived). The ending of Sartre's La Nausee 
Z+ 
in which 
narrative intelligibility is offered as an aesthetic solution to the 
problem of the meaning of one's existence seems to leave this question 
open, undecided . Although earlier on in that same book, Sartre had 
taken a more critical attitude to the gap between a retrospective construal 
0 of a series of events as an 'adventure' and the actual experience of those 
events at the time. ' Adventure' is treated as a fictional'distortion. 
1 25 In Sartre s partial auto-biographical and his other'biographies' 
Flaubert, Genet ) 
26 his position seems more'Positive . But one has 
to ask what basis there could be for''i"positive treatment. 
In Hugh Silverman's "The Time of Autobiography", 
27 
which,, curiously 
enough begins by looking at Levi-Strauss's own autobiographical Tristes 
Tropiques 
28 ( in which, surely, there is little evidence of an atemporal 
logic underlying the narrative), he makes a number of important distinctions 
between the different modes of temporality'in 'autobiographical textuality' 
(1) "historical time", (2) "chronological time", (3) "the internal textual 
marking of autobiographical time'. 1p(4)" autobiographical'temporality, or 
the re-marking of lived time". ) But for-the'most part'-the paper operates 
with an unproblematic notion ofIlived time' , as a pliant material on 
which one works when'writing one's own life'. At one small point, however, 
he makes the suggestion that narrativity might appear at the level of 
existence itself. And surely it'is important to consider the role this 
might play. 
There is clearly a literal'. 9 literary sense ofInarrative' in 
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which applies specifically to written texts. But equally, in a great 
. 
diversity of ways, our everyday experience is full of partialt and 
sometimes complete, lnarrative' reflections, projections, memories, 
imaginings and so on. Lived experience cannot be purified of these 
sequential constructions, understood both at the level of ( unreflective) 
protention. ( say) and more, reflective and explicit projection and 
planning. It may well be that there is some limited principle of 
dependence here - that the explicit may often involve the articulation of 
the inexplicit. But we need not suppose that things always work that 
way. One's ongoing reflection may also work on actual or possible 
past or future sequences never pre-reflectively strung together. 
Of course, when we are thinking' of (auto-) biographical narrative, 
this ongoing reflection will itself include pieces of writing ( in the 
ordinary, pre-Derridean sense diaries, letters, poems, lists, perhaps 
even articles and books. And they cannot be thought of just as 'partial 
narratives in comparison to a final simming up. For they actually affect 
the way one continues to organize one's experience. Lived experience is 
dialectically related to reflection on it, in it, whether written down, or 
not. 
But is it proper to talk of reflectiors on/in lived experience as 
taking a narrative form ? Do they always do so, or just sometimes, or 
what ? What is meant -by 
'narrative' here ?I am going to assume that 
the question of author and audience can be put to one side. If autobiography 
is narrative, then, I shall assume, my mental musings about my last year 
in Paris could also be, even if only I happen to be aware of them. But 
what form must any such musings take to be considered to be alnarrative? 
Let us be clear: our theoretical interest in 'narrative structure' 
for its own sake is limited. The project of a general theory of narrative 
must be deferred. Our question is whether 'narrative' can teach us 
anything about the ways in which the standard model of-time as a single 
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linear sequence of moments can be enriched, displaced, transformed 
. deconstructed etc. Our answer to the question of what intra-existential 
reflection must be like to count as 'narrative' will be content with the 
limited aim of showing that it can display some of the most commonly 
recognised features of narrative. And the claim will be that these 
features offer us a model by which both discontinuity, non-linearity, 
and pluridiMensionality can be thought of as dimensions of both existential 
and textual temporality. The wealth of possible differences between 
existential and narrative time will not here concern us. 
We distinguish the following levels of time in narrative: 
1. The time of the reader ( and the reading). 
2. The time of the narrator. 
3. The time of the plot. 
4. The time of actions. 
5. The time(s) of the characters. 
6. The (real) time of events. 
7. The time of the narrative discourse. 
In making these distinctions we already give some of the game away. It 
would be hard to establish more than one of these and'not*find oneself - 
with the possibility of pluri-dimensional time . And the fact that they 
do not evenly cross-correlate will allow discontinuity. The inter-relations 
between such times will allow such departures from simple linearity as 
circularity, splitting/rejoining, etc. We shall briefly comment on each of 
these categories before drawing some conclusions about their relevance 
for understanding existential time. 
1. The Time of the Reader. Unread, the book is dead. (Without an 
ear there is no speech. ) And yet the reader is no passive receiver of 
strings of words. Not only is the reader already lodged in a multipicity 
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of time-tracks ( writing a book, moving house, struggling to defeat an 
illness, digesting a meal, waiting for a phone-call, wondering about 
salvation, imagining unlikely possibilities, remembering his/her child- 
hood... ) but these can impinge on the practical business of getting through 
the book, on the understanding of what the book is about, of what the 
characters are doing, of its literary merits, of its construction and 
organisation etc. If there is no narrative except in relation to a 
reader, then the reader's range of temporal insertions is a vital 
element. All this is true even of the 'ideal reader'. Should he be a 
lst Century Greek, should he be able to read the book at one sitting ooe? 
Reading is also an activity involving a very complex ongoing activity of 
retention, comprehension, protension, and imagination. The inner complex- 
ity of the book may set a certain threshold of synthetic power on the 
reader's part, bound up with his ( or her ) capacity to ' organize time'. 
2. The time of the narrator. What we have just written could be repeated 
for the activity of writing. But in principle theL-. product is independent 
of how continuous, how long, how interrupted the writing was, so we shall 
ignore this aspect. What cannot be ignored is the time of the 'implied 
author', the author as textually evident. Consider the difference between 
a retrospective narration, a'stream. of consciousness' narration, and a 
'dream'. (Whether the text is written in the first or third person is 
in_principle a logically distinct question. ) We can ask.: does the 
temporal position of the narrator remain fixed ? For it can begin with 
'memories' and work up to present description, or play with its own 
29 
temporal position in more complex ways. The time of the narrator 
also allows for complex interplay with, the other levels of narrative 
time, especially that of 'the plot and the -characters. Barthes 
30 
gives 
the wonderful example of a story by Agatha Christie ( The Sittaford 
Mystery ) in which the narrator . who is one of the characters, turns 
out to be the murderer that the story seeks to reveal. Here the 
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epistemological interaction ( essentially bound up with time, and except- 
ionally so in a mystery or suspense story ) between narrator and 
characters takes the form of the explosion of a conceit, at the moment of 
disclosure. 
3. The Time of the Plot. This category is as old as Aristotle ( see his 
Poetics ) but substantially reworked by Ricoeur, as we have suggested. 
The need to rework it results partly from the way modern narrative has 
produced vzýriations on the simple plot - multiple plots, ambiguous plots, 
plots without resolution, -as well as the more obviously subordinated 
sub-plots. ýUnless we extend narrative Idownwards'to include a simple 
recitation of events, or 'upwards' to, include any piece of prosev some- 
thing like'the notion of plot will remain essential. It does not require 
the structure of stage-setting, development, resolution of action. 
Nor does it require that the narrative be able to be reduced to alsentence' 
( see Barthes 
31 
and Genette 
32 ). But it does require some thread of 
developmental intelligibility to which the other orders of the narrative 
are more or less subordinate. (A postmodernist text could of course 
make a plot out of the refusal of one of these other elements to remain 
subordinate to remain subordinate to the plot. What makes the Goon Show 
scripts merely modernist is that the continous rebellions by the - 
characters ,( vide Bluebottle's 'I don't like this game') and even, on 
occasion the narrator Greenslade, against the plot, are always quashed, 
or at least reappropriated. A post-modern reading might argue that the 
'plot' was only a device on which to hang these acts of textual transgress- 
ion. ). If the plot cannot be simunarized in a single sentence, it can in 
principle be briefly explained. Its narrative unrolling takes the form of 
a series of actions. 
The Time of Action. By 'action' we mean stages of narrative description ' 
that contribute to the development of the plot. The agents of such actions 
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may be characters, but equally, natural forces such as a 'flood'); 
and actions may be 'physical' or 'mental' eýc. The critical thing of course 
is that the order of actions can be quite different from the order of 
events. A narrative may begin with the death of the hero, and set itself 
the (retrospective)task of tracing how that happened. 
5. The Time of Events. 'Event' here includes 'actions' and other events 
that make no contribution ( or no essential contribution ) to the plot. 
or to the plot-complex). The usual way of describing the order of 
events is to talk of their 'real' chronological order. It is assumed that 
however subtle the internal temporality of a text may be, it nonetheless 
projects ( and rests on )a 'real time' beyond itself. A flashback 
requires a'real past' to flashback to. Clearly, however, it - 
something of a literary convention that all events can be located 
in a single sequence. It is a convenient backdrop against which one can 
construct a temporal play, but it is equally a convention that can itself 
be played with. A flashback may be a memory, or a 'touched-up' memory, 
33 
or even a fantasy, and the question remain unresolved at the end. 
Science fiction can operate with unco-ordinated time-frames, in which 
questions of relative priority are again undecidable. Ceographical, 
institutional, and personal 'time-bubbles' can thwart the establishing 
of a single sequence of events. However, the convention of 'real time', 
'the actual sequence of events' is clearly very comon, and, if only as 
another fiction, essential even for these ways of playing with it to make 
any sense, and in particular for the time of action to have any autonomy. 
6. The Time(s) of the Characters. Whether or not the narrator is 
actually a character in the_narrative, characters have their own 
temporal involvements and intentionalities. Everything we said initially 
about the reader's multi-tracking, and memory and projection equally 
applies to the characters. Of course we must also distinguish (a) what we 
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are told by the narrator, directly or indirectly ( eg. via other 
characters) about their own temporal, insertion, (b) and what we can 
gather, (c) what we imagine, or suppose without much evidence. At the 
bottom of all this the point is that the characters have their own 
individual time-horizons, some. of which will be shared among them- 
selves, some not, and which will differ from those of narrator and 
reader. Again, the most obvious differences are ones of knowledge and 
perspective; some characters will know more some less, than the 
'implied'narrator, and the actual or ideal reader. In such differences 
lie the possibilities of irony, comedy, tragedy etc. One might add that, 
exceptionally, characters can of course have their own-sophistiiated 
views of time itself, which the text can enclose or refute. 
34 
7. The Time of the Narrative Discourse. What we mean by this is the 
temporality of the 'thick surface' of the narrative conceived'of as a 
string of words. At the most superficial, it is'a simple succession-' 
of words. But it will equally be broken into clauses, sentences, 
paragraphs, and chapters, ana7chapter headings... Slightly 'thicker' 
still we find various forms of repetition of words and names. (See our 
earlier account aboveý. And there are variations of tense, mood, direct'. 
and indirect speech etc. The thickness of the layer here described 
goes as far down as'it is posiible to"go without touching 'meaning". 
And wherever what is discovered exhibits a temporal organization 
(including paradigmatic'oppositions 'extended along the line of the 
35 
narrative' a la Jakobson ) we will add it to our account of the 
temporality of narrative discourse.. We are being radically unjust to this 
category, for a large proportion of the structural analyses of narrative 
would be contained within it. But our narrative has-its own plot 
requirements. 
If temporality is as all pervasive as it sometimes seems, these 
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seven levels of narrative temporality cannot claim completeness. But 
they are sufficient for present purposes. 
We shall first demonstrate that they permit the divergencies from 
our ordinary account of time to which we have already referred. And second 
we shall show that they allow us to exhibit certain features of 
'existential, time' too. 
In themselves, these seven different levels of narrative- 
temporality make narrative time multi-dimensional There is just 
no one answer to the question of what ' the temporal sequence of the 
narrative' consists in. And, as we have suggested, these varioub times 
will not just run parallel, but will modulate their independence 
interference with one another. One of the radical consequences of 
this is that the unity of narrative time can also be put in question. 
Or rather, we can propose a kind of unity' not dependent on linear 
continuity. For the interweaving*of seven different temporal dimensions. - 
can generate a kind of continuity without there being a 'single thread' 
running through it. We have in mind here the modelof a piece of string 
composed of overlapping strands no one of which runs throughout the 
length. It might be said that it is precisely the role of the plot in 
establishing such a unity that distinguishes narrative from other forms 
of prose. Let us admit that. But we would repeat the two points made-- 
earlier: (a) that 'plot' can itself be the subject of a disconcertingý 
play, generating for example, multiple plots and ambiguous and unresolved 
endings; (b) that one can produce a 'narrative' in which the-plot is only 
an arbitrary device for bringing about a more complex literary effect. 
Finally, this wealth of levels allows the possibility of temporal 
splitting ( plots can split or rejoin ( or not) 9 of circular time, 
cycles of repetition, dispersal, irresolution etc. The key to all this 
is that one or more temporal dimensions can fragment or break, or 
disperse as long as the narrative line can be continued, for the moment, 
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along another dimension. ( A Bacchanalian revel in which all (but one) 
are drunk! ) 
Yes, it may be said, such is the freedom of language ( which 
even so runs the risk of unintelligibility ). But surely that shows 
just how different it is from ordinary experience. 
At this point we could return to the question of whether (auto-) 
biography necessarily'distorts' life , and look at specific examples of 
this in the light of our current claims. We-shall leave this for another 
occasion. 
We have endorsed the Heideggerean-understanding of the tri-ecstatic 
finitude of human temporality , and his disturbing of the linearity of 
time, but cast doubt on his residual commitment to temporal unity, -as it 
is reinscribed in the gathering and focussing of anticipatory resoluteness. 
This resoluteness is fundamentally a demand that the multi-dimensionality 
be fused together, that the Babel of voices'be silenced, that the different 
levels of our (temporal) worldly involvement be assigned a strict order 
of subordination. In plurality, Heidegger finds only 'turbulence', 
ambiguity', and confusion. And yet his account of, everydayness is an 
acknowledgement of the fact of this multiplicity. 
It would be too trite to compare the temporality of the narrator 
to that of 'consciencet, of the characters to that of the multiplicity of 
our inner voices, of the plot(s)- complex to our 'fundamental-project', 
and of the narrative discourse to the sequence of our lived, thoughts and 
words. It could be done but we shall not do it here. Let us simply look 
at the difference between the temporality of events, and of actions, for 
this surely captures a key duality in the-temporality of our lived 
experience. 'It is overwhelmingly clear, even on one particillar time-track 
( saying writing a book ) that the sequence of one's experiences need 
bear no relation to the sequence in which they can best ( or at all 
be rendered intelligible. One may only discover how it all fits together 
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at the end. ( Compare picking up jigsaw puzzle pieces, compared with 
successfully putting them down. * Or listening to a long German sentence 
with the verb right at the end. ) 
The multiplicity of only contingently coordinated time-tracks is 
surely not restricted to avante garde'literature, but a perfectly 
common experience. We need only think of the way we weave together 
a life of reverie, of dream, of different kinds of perceptual experience 
( natural and artistically constructed; temporally highly structured 
and not), a whole variety of activities, some nested within others, 
many quite independent of one another, ' and the way the'various more or 
less seiled or communicating worlds we live in have their own' inner 
temporal development ( home, school, job, national politics .... ) And -so 
on. It may be that we do not need narrative, or the most general 
structures of'temporal textuality with which we began, to be able 
to focus theoretically on this multi-dimensionalityl the advantage 
of considering textuality is that it is more easily objectified, and 
that, in consequence, it is easier to develop a set of analytical 
categories for understanding it. We claim, of course , that the 
correspondence goes beyond mere analogy, and that Ilivedlexperience 
is already impregnated with those very reflective structures elaborated 
in textuality in general and narrative in particular. 
We said we would not consider the differences between them. However 
there is an obvious question which it would be hard to ignore: - is there 
not some parallel between human finitude and that of a text , of which 
biography would represent a convergence ? There is however a fundamental 
difference, that between the ethical and the aesthetic. We are our 
finitude; 'that of texts is a'quite different matter, 
1 -111 
* 
After all this, however, is there not a sense in which this whole 
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discussion of temporal intelligibility rests on a complacency 
about the values of unity, sense, self-understanding, which it endorses 
by the work of theoretical elaboration. To put it crudely, might not 
the narrative impulse ( including perhaps the theory of narrative) 
be a flight not just from a contingent disorder, but from a fundament- 
al obstacle to the kind of closure of me 'ing that it systematically 
induces. The 'fundamental' obstacle would be dispersion, death, madness, 
error, forgetfulness ... as they appear within language itself, in the 
form of its irremediable fragility . If the philosophical ideal would 
render language 'transparent' - referentially and semantically - the 
same can be said for narrative- that its 'fictions' can only satisfy the 
desire for wholeness, unity, intelligibility - through the mirage of 
language. 36 Narrative achieves aesthetically a unity that would wither 
outside the framework of linguistic'representation' . 
We would like to make three responses to this argument, which have 
a more general application to the double strategy of the thesis as a whole. 
(1) We can surely 'admit' something like the claim that madness-lurks 
beneath the skin of order, and that narrative provides just such a 
'skin', wit6out supposing that this would in any way detract from the 
importance of narrative. 
(2) If narrative is as universal as is claimed, we ought to investigate 
the wealth of its resources for generating sequential intelligibility. 
(3) There is surely a sense in which 'the function of narrativityl 
performs a kind of reversal on attempts to restrict its scope. If we 
say that madness lurks beneath the fictions of order, are we not telling 
another story, and necessarily so ? The moral of Derrida's 
37 
demonstration that Foucault's project of writing a history of madness is 
dominated by the ideal of Reason is that at some level there is no 
alternative. It is not just that narrative intelligibility has an 
infinite power to subvert the discovery of what exceeds its bounds. Even 
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such a story of necessary subversion reinstates narrativity. 
38 
This is surely a sobering thought. What it suggests is a necessary comp- 
licity between the excessive and the limits exceeded, madness and the 
1 aw. 
39 
111. Time Beyond Deconstruction 
CHAPTER FIVE, 
The Philosophy of the Future 
I So far the attempts at philosophical reform have differed more 
or less from the old philosophy only in form, but not in substance. 
'The indispensable condition of a really new philosophy, that is, an 
independent philosophy corresponding to the needs of mankind and of 
the future, is however that it will differentiateltself in its essence 
from the old philosophy. ' 
Feuerbach continues 
' The new philosophy makes man with the inclusion of nature as the 
foundation of man - the unique universal and highest object of 
philosophy .'1 
The candidates for inclusion under the heading of what has been called 
'post-modern philosophy' 
2 
are so varied that they probably do not illuminat- 
ingly share any common features, but I would have thought that they could be 
negatively unified by their distance from such a programme as this. Feuerbach 
knows what the needs of mankind are, what philosophy requires; he ha's no doubts 
about the concept of man, about man's roots in nature, or about the distinction 
between form and substance. ( What would he have said to the suggestion that 
it is perhaps a change of style that we need ?) 
These remarks are taken from his Principles of the Philosophy of the 
Future 1843) and the title itself calls for comment. Feuerbach was confident 
about what 'the future' needed, that philosophy could supply it, and that the 
very idea of the future was unproblematic . We, who now exist in Feuerbach's 
future , are less sure. What is called post-structuralism seems to articulate 
a withering away, or perhaps better, a mutation in the concept of the future. 
But is it the future as such, or is it only a particular conception of the 
f 
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future ( teleological, utopian . etc. ) that is put in question ? If the 
very horizon of futurity is suspect, are practical and intellectual defeatism 
and inertia appropriate responses ? Is the power to provide intellectual and 
practical ideals still a sound way of ranking competing discourses or should 
possessing such a feature be seen as the legacy of a metaphysical desire ? 
The first alternative, which gives a positive value to a vision of a 
future - was spelled out recently by. Cornel West, an American critic of 
deconstruction, who wrote 
I post-modern American philosophers ... have failed to project a new 
world view, a counter movement, a 'new gospel' of the future. ' 
He accuses them of offering no way past the nihilism they usher in. Instead, 
he goes on 
Their viewpoints leave American philosophy hanging in limbo as a 
philosophically critical, yet culturally lifeless rhetoric mirroring 
a culture ( or civilization) permeated by the scientific ethos, 
regulated by racist, patriirchal, capitalist norms, and pervaded 
by the debris of decay. ' 
Clearly West can have no serious dispute with rhetoric per se . But a 
gentler version of his views must surely be quite widespread. If they seem 
harsh it is worth remembering that we are living in Nietzsche's future too 
and that in his Preface to The Will to Power he claimed to be describing 
'... the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, 
what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. ' 4 
How does Nietzsche know ? 
I ... necessity itself is at work here. The future speaks even now in a 
hundred signs; this destiny announces itself everywhere. ' 
West's argument is that Nietzsche offers the possibility of a stage beyond 
nihilism, a post-nihilism, but that post-modern American philosophy ( and I 
confess not to knowing exactly who. he means ) is stuck'at the 'stage of 
nihilism itself. 
In the Winter of 1887, Nietzsche wrote of nihilism as a necessary 
stage 
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We must experience'nihilism before we can find out what value these 
values' really have - we require sometime new values. ' 5 
It is a stage that he sees himself as only at that point having completed. 
Until then - which would cover most of his writing! - he had been a thorough- 
going nihilist. He describes himself as 
I the firat perfect nihilist of Europe, who ... has now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving, it behind, outside himself. t 
Clearly the overcoming of nihilism is an operation vulnerable to mirage and 
illusion. But there is a beyond for Nietzsche - affirmation - or what he 
sometimes calls active or affirmative nihilism . 
Accepting for a moment Nietzsche's characterisation, of-'modernity' 
as 
',., overabundance of'intermediary forms ... traditions break off, 
schools [appear] ... the willing of ends and means 
Lis] weakened. ' 
then arguably post-modern American philosophy has not even left modernity 
behind. Post-modernity, on this view, is a treat in store, is yet to come. 
It would not so much lack a future, or any projection of the future, as 
be in the future.. And the present, in Westis words would just be 'lifeless 
rhetoric' and the smell of decay. How fair is this judgement ? 
Clearly at this point it matters who one chooses to look at, but 
suppose we take the case of Derrida , who has had such an impact on the scene 
West describes. One can easily conclude that some justice lay in the 
verdict, not by a Politically motivated analysis of Derrida's writing, but 
by reflecting on a remark he once made in (published ) discussion. 
II don't see why I should renounce or why anyone should renounce the 
radicality of a critical work under the pretext that it risks the 
sterilization of science, humanity, progress, the origin of meaning, 
etc. I believe that the risk of sterility has always been the price 
of lucidity. ' 8 
Can we conclude then that Derrida, for one, took the risk, and lost 
These remarks need more careful attention. Contrary to what these sentences 
might suggest, Derrida is not actually wagering anything he values. The 
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values of1humanity', 'progress', and 'the origin of meaning' are precisely 
the sort that, following Nietzsche, and with reservations Heidegger, he puts in 
question., To sterilize them, to render them no longer productivet, would not 
be an unwanted by-product that deconstruction has to risk but is in fact, if 
we can say this, a central aim. It remains true, then, that for those subjects 
whose hopes and dreams are arganised by reference, to these values, sterility 
might indeed be the result of their being deconstructed. And then West's 
challenge to post-modern philosophy to produce Nietzsche's new values returns 
in force. 
I have not yet-made good, nor made precise, my claim that post-modernism 
allows the idea of. the-future to wither away. But, to set the scene for my 
discussion of that theme, let me offer, perhaps prematurely , two opposing 
views of the philosophical status of the future, at a fairly general level. 
Let me put the choice in what is perhaps an over-simple way. On the 
one hand there are those for whom some sort of projection of a future would 
be a condition for the intellgibility of the present. And ranged against them 
there are those who would treat such references to the future with a certain. 
caution. We begin with a statement and discussion of the first option. 
1. 'No theoretical account of any present ( whether it be the ' 
P resent epoch or lived experience ... ) is complete, adequate, or even (perhaps) 
intelligible, without an account of the future. An account of the'future does- 
noý 
Amean a prediction, but rather a projection. I would distinguish two 
diffeient waysýin which this positive'account of the importance of the 
future can be articulated , which I shall call hermeneutic and ethical. 
a. The hermeneutical importance of the future. This view can be traced back 
to Heidegger's concern with the role of the future as a horizon of intelligib- 
ility for action, for meaning, for truth and so on. Understanding is never 
a mere grasping of the present, or the presence of something, but always 
occurs within a triple ecstatic horizonality - of past, present and future. 
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For Heidegger, of course, this complex'projectivity comes in different 
fbrms ( authentic/inauthentic ) but the underlying horizonal structure 
remains. This meant to be true at many different levels. The understanding 
of a sentence as it is spoken is an achievement in which a mobile synthesis 
of retention, current awareness and anticipation operates at fairly short 
range. But equally, one's understanding of the events in the morning paper 
is necessarily predicated on'anticipating their consequences, how things 
might turn out. To multiply examples here would-be otiose, for each aspect 
of everyday lifeý- listening to music, watching a film, reading books, eating 
a meal, writing a letter, going for a walk - exhibits this same structure of 
horizonality. And even if Heidegger was later to drop the privileged position 
he had given to the future in Being and Time, there is no doubting the 
hermeneutic importance of the asymmetry, between past and future; the future 
is the horizon of possibility in a strong sense. And, it is a horizon that 
is essentially finite, 
9, 
limited for each individual by death. We take this up 
again later. 
Although it stretches the word'hermeneutic' it is worth adding here 
that on a dialectical view of history, an analogous general point can be made, 
in a rather different way. To understand any present, we have to grasp the 
contradictions at work within it, by which its capacity for (self-) transfor 
ation is marked. Understanding a state of affairs is to grasp its possibil- 
ities of change. Here, we might think, the future is only logically or abstractly 
required; but in another sense, of course, this transformed state is the 
future. If we were to allow ourselves to take Hegel's version of this view, an 
easy transition opens up from the general hermeneutic role of the future, to 
the specifically reflexive importance of the future to philosophy itself. 
Two different versions of this can easily be distinguished. The first 
envisages the future as fulfilling the ideals of philosophy in a way contin- 
uous with the past; the second announces the possibility ( or necessity ) of 
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a radical break either within philosophy or with philosophy itself. For 
convenience, we shall discuss the role of the future in philosophy's own 
fulfilment within the framework of the ethical importance of the future. 
The projection of the future required by the various forms of break, closure, 
fulfilment, or end of philosophy cannot be dealt with just yet. For such 
issues mark the point at which the whole question of the future becomes 
problematic. So let us'turn to the ethical importance of the future. 
b. The ethical importance of the future. We--could'state-thisýthesis as 
follows: no account of an ideal state of human affairs, no account of basic 
human values, and indeed no prescriptions as to how things ought to be, or 
what ought to be done, are complete without a projection of the futur 
IeI 
as the' 
condition of their realization. The practical move from the real to the ideal 
requires the positing of a future . Thomas McCarthy 
10 
in words that echo 
Feuerbach, describes Critical Theory in just these terms, as 
a theory of the contemporary epoch that is guided by an interest 
in the future, that is, by an interest in the realisation of a truly 
rational society in which men make their own history with will and 
consciousness. ' 
And such projections-are clearly not confined to Critical Theory . Phenomen- 
ology was from the very beginning inspired by the prospect of bringing about 
the realization of such ideals. For Husserl, for example, philosophy 
'has claimed to be the science which satisfies the loftiest theoretical 
needs and renders possible from an ethico-religious standpoint a life 
regulated by pure rational norms. ' 11 
Philosophy undertakes, to satisfy 
... humanity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute knowledge 
and what is inseparably one with that, its demand for pure and absolute 
valuing and willing). 1 12 
Philosophy will 
13 
teach us how to carry on the eternal work of humanity' 
His claim of course is that it has failed miserably, and that only 
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phenomenology can actuall satisfy this demand. We shall modify this claim 
a little later. 
One could multiply examples of this theme. Kant's essay on"Perpet4al 
Peace" 14 would be another-obvious soerce . At one level, -of course, there 
is nothing problematic about this at all. What is not-yet finished needs more 
time to be completed. But what if 'the future' were nothing but the horizonal 
complement of a desire that, in principle could not be fulfilled ? The 
problematic referentihli. ty of the future is notorious. Is it not extraordinary 
how easily we slip between indexical, substantive, and lqualitativi! --senses 
of this term ? Some such slippage might actually be part of the mechanism 
by which the future plays this ethical role. But before we! turn to some of the 
caution about the future that just such considerations can engender, let us 
just rehearse in a positive form, this claim about the ethical value of the 
future. If we judge life as improveable, then our hopes and plans demand a 
dimension of futArity as a condition for their realization. If we think of 
philosophy as having a telos as yet unrealised then the future will be pro- 
jected in such a fashion as to allow for this. If the improvement of life can. 
come only through, or with the cooperation of philosophy, then these two 
futures fuse. And, on the whole, it is this strong version which we have been- 
looking at. 
I have little doubt that at whatever level of explicitness and intensity 
such views are widely held even today. They are, however, ificreasingly difficult 
to defend. That may-only be symptomatic, but the proliferation of reasons for 
treating references to the future with caution is worth closer scrutity.. 
2. There are a number of grounds for such caution. 
a. The future as unpredictable. Firstly, and without being able to offer 
an adequate account of its philosophical significance , there is renewed 
vigour to plain old scepticism about our knowledge of the future. This has been 
brought about, paradoxically . by the massive expansion in human technological 
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control. I say paradoxically, because this would, seem to suggest an increase 
in predictability. And yet the necessary incompleteness of this control has 
wildly unpredictable consequences, not least of which is the possibility 
of total self-destruction - at which point issues of technology and theology 
could be said to merge. 
b. The future as riRe for ideological apEropriation. The second ground for 
caution we can put succinctly. There is a clear ideological potential in 
normative references to the future. In the absence of a Ere-destined path, 
interpretations of its proper course have a field day. The hand that charts 
the future rules the world. ' 
However momentous, these first two grounds for caution do not seem 
conceptually problematic. There are others - we shall select three - which 
surely are, and each of which belongs to post-structuralism. 
c. The future as myth of fulfilment. The most common theoretical role played 
by a reference to the future is as a supplement to the deficiencies of the, 
actual present. The future then will bring a time, a future present, which will 
not have these deficiencies. Heaven, utopia, the war to end all wars, absolute 
knowledge, I a. truly rational society'- are all examples. The critique of the 
future, so understood, is continuous with the critique of the value of-presence, 
of fullness of meaning, of freedom from 'differance', from 4 relation to the 
outside... 
d. The future as unintelligible discontinuity. If we understand words like 
'present' and'future' to refer to something like current and future, paradigms 
or general frameworks of discourse, rather than merely to events in chronolog- 
ical time, then any difficulty we might have of-thinking outside our current 
framework of discourse will set an immediate limitation on our ability to 
project the future. Herelthe future' would be another way of referring to 
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what is (absolutely) other. That, I take it, is the sense of Derrida's 
claim that ' the future can be anticipated only in the form of absolute 
danger 1 15 What is the absolute danger ?I take it that it is the 
breakdown of all intelligibility - madness: a radical discontinuity. 
16 
e. 'The'futurelas a concept within a discredited loSocentrism. If we accept 
that references to the future are inseparable from the general apparatus of 
historical discourse, and if it can be shown that the concepts involved in 
historical discourse ( development, progress, evolution, influence, cause and 
effecto context etc. ) belong to metaphysics, to logocentrism,, a consistent . 
attempt to mark out a distance from logocentrism would trequire what I called 
a certain caution about the future. This argument would rest on the 
complicity of references to the future with traditional historical discourse. 
Somewhat differently, it could also be argued that a deconstructi6n%of 
the future as telos, as end, as fulfilment, is possible by a straightforward 
transposition of the kinds of analysis Derrida gives of Husserl's discussion of 
the idea of 'origin', of the transmission of meaning, of reactivation, in his 
introduction to The Origin of Geometry. 
Husserl had realized that it is only through writing that geometry 
is guaranteed historical, continuity and hence the possibility of a reactivation 
of its origin. Yet this. ' at the same time, is the source of the very danger 
that threatens it. For writing is ruled by- the absence of any absolute origin, 
an original absence. Might not the same paradox affect the future - that it is 
not so much what writing demands, for its fulfilment ( such as the ideal 
cashing out of its meaning in experience) but. it is the always withheld 
impossibility of that fulfilment. If the future were such an impossibility 
of achievement, if such distance were inherent in the philosophical function- 
4. 
ing of the future ( consider the Spanish manana ), then we might come to 
think of the future as the objective counterpart to the way Lacan, understands 
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desire. And the link between writing, and indeed language in general, and 
the future, would be supplied by treating language as the primary. site for 
the investment of that (metaphysical) desire. 
Not only are appeals to the future necessarily expressed in language, 
but it is only as so expressed that we can retain projective clarity and 
focus. Is it an, accident that the response to a philosophical crisis is 
so often the proposal of a new method - in which one further layer of self- 
monitoring, and control is established for writing ?A successful transposition 
of the deconstruction of origin to that of the future as telos would argue 
that such projections are retained and refined only in writing. And if writing 
is thought of as involving a perpetual deferment of presence, then teleolog- 
ical fulfilment would rest on an impossibility of fulfilment, which cannot 
be a satisfactory state of affairs. 
So, whether one thinks of the future as involved fairly generally_ in 
a traditional historical discourse viewed with logocentric suspicion, or as 
subject to a deconstruction symmetrical to that of an arcbe - either way it 
would come out as an essentially logocentric concept. 
We have now outlined both the view that the future is an indispensable 
philosophical category for reasons both hermeneutical and ethical ( there 
are, no doubt , others and the view. that such references to the future 
should be treated with great caution, both for traditional reasons - its 
unpredictability and vulnerability to ideological abuse. - and for more powerful 
and complex reasons linked broadly speaking with post-structuralism. It is 
these last reasons that we. now consider. 
on this. view, which will now occupy our attention in more detail, 
the typical philosophical role of the future is always or typically to project 
the value of presence on what is not present, to reduce the unknown to the 
known, the other to the same ... 
17 We turn now to Derrida. 
His critical interest in the theoretical value of references to the 
future rest without doubt on his linking it with teleological and eschatol- 
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-ological views of history, with linear temporality, and with the metaphysics 
of presence. We shall try 6b: (i) outline the argument more precisely, (ii) 
draw out a crucial topological schema that reinforces the argument, (iii) ask 
whether there is any non-teleological, non-metaphysical way of thinking about 
the future that might emerge from the deconstruction of History, Time etc., and 
(iv) look at the way some of these themes are drawn together in one of 
Derrida's most interesting recent papers. 
First, the argument. 
When I have mentioned'the future in the context of post-structuralist 
caution I have often myself exercised a certain caution. I tried not to talk 
of the future per se, but of the theoretical value of references-to the future. 
Perhaps I should have said textual rather than theoretical. This is important. 
For Derrida, it is not enough to know whether a text uses this or that term, 
but how it is being used. What is metaphysical about a term is the work it 
does, or its textual deployment. There is a difference between a mere prediction 
of a future course of events, and the use of such a prediction to legitimate 
a course of action. But there is a further level, and that is the use of the 
future to satisfy an ontological desire the desire-that history both-past 
and future be seen to exhibit a continuous unity, which he calls the history 
of meaning of its production and fulfilment. The models for such an account 
would for example be Hegel's philosophy of history . and Husserl's account 
of the Origin of Geometry . History is the unbroken transmission and development 
of meaning. Contingencys plurality, death, breaks, circles, regressions, are all 
to be appr6priated within a wider continuity. Progress, truth, wisdom, freedom 
etc. are all names for what history is or can be made to generate. Derrida's 
general interpretive claim is that philosophy as we have hitherto known it always 
understands history in this way, and consequently always interpretes the future 
in this light. His explanation is that history so understood is the recuperation 
of differance, of what has always already exceeded and threatened presence, as 
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well as making it possible, under the value of presence. Origin and 
end are equally examples of this value of Presence. They always function 
as textual legitimations of one sort or another. Once we accept-that 
history so understood exemplifies the structure of presence, Derrida 
then argues that the value of presence is not fundamental after all, 
but'constituted1by the very differences it seeks to appropriate. The 
dependence of a sign's identity on its difference from other signs is 
given the strongest possible reading -a critique of any identity that 
might be deemed original. Where Hegel had criticised Schelling for 
the unmediated nature of his account of Absolute Self-Identity, for 
Derrida it is precisely this principle of mediation, by which time and 
history are reduced to serving the principle of identity, that is 
criticised. 
Derrida's position has much in common here with Lyotard's 
critique of 'grand recits' 
18 
which, in a historical context would take 
the shape of all-embracing narrative structures, drawing every event 
in history into a single story. Derrida's caution , then, is towards 
the subjection of the future to metaphypical ends. What is important 
is that he sees this subjection as almost universal. It is not just 
the mistake of isolated metaphysical excess or a lapse of judgement. 
Moreover, as we shall see, any attempt to break-out of it is threatened 
by reappropriation. Before we come to that, however, I would like to 
fill in some of the complexities of Derrida's position. 
I begin with the reflexive problem lodged within the idea of 
transgressing 'history' - that one does not know how to describe the 
move itself. In his "Exergue" to Of Granmatology 
19 
Derrida is writing 
about science's emerging unease with phonocentric writing. This has 
always been there 
'But today something lets it appear as such, allows it a kind of 
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takeover without our being able to translate this novelty into 
clear-cut notions of mutation, explicitation, accumulation, 
revolution or tradition. These values belong no doubt to the 
system whose dislocation is today presented as such, they describe 
the styles of an historical movement which was meaningful - like 20 
the concept of history itself- only within a logocentric epoch. ' 
This paradoxical position calls for what Derrida describes as a double 
strategy , which we shall shortly outline. 
(ii) Derrida's second ground for caution about the future lies, I believe, 
in his fascination with invaginated topologies. Formally speaking what 
is important about such topologies is that their outside, or part of their 
outside, is also inside, or alternatively, that at certain points the 
distinction between outside and inside becomes problematic, undecidable. 
These structures have all sorts of physical and mathematical exemplars of 
varying complexity, from the rubber ball with a deep dimple pressed into 
it, to kline bottles. It is not perhaps insignificant that all the 
erogenous zones of the body and certainly the typical points of 
fixation, according to Freud are just such structures, points at which 
pleasure and discipline mingle . As models they allow Derrida, to displace 
the metaphysical paradigms of circle and line, which maintain the strict- 
ness of separation of inside and outside, or unity of direction. 
But how do such models get textually articulated in a way that 
bears on the future 7 Derrida writes that there is no possibility of 
doing without the concepts of metaphysics in the attempt to 'escape' from 
metaphysics. 
21 
Theoretically speaking, these concepts-, with all the 
dangers of --recuperation, reappropriation, they bring with them, are the 
only tools we have. We have no choice but to use them. The way out, the 
way of going beyond metaphysics involves a strategy of displacement within 
the metaphysical text. The possibility of something other than metaphysics 
lies within, the outside inside, the future in a mutation of the present. 
Here, we should be clear, references to 'the future' should be read as 
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references to the textual work of disentangling itself from meta- 
physics that post-structuralism would involve. This topology of 
invagination that puts in question the distinction between inside and 
outside, what belongs and what does not, plays a more general critical 
role in the form of the structures of supplementarity, but we do not 
have time to go into that now. 
It is important now to realize that this search for a beyond within, 
which we could call immanent deconstruction, is treated by Derrida as 
just part of the double strategy he recommends in a number of places. 
The second strand attempts to stand outside philosophy, 
I to determine ' from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or 
unnameable by philosophy what this history has been able to 
dissimulate or forbid. ' 
He continues 
I By means of this simultaneously faithful and violent circulation 
between the inside and the outside of philosophy - that is of the 
West - there is produced a certain textual work that gives great 
pleasure., 22 
But this second strand offers us no more assured grasp of, projection of 
the future than the first. To the fivst corresponds Derrida's reference 
23 
to Nietzsche's suggestion that what we need is a changeof style , and that 
there is style, Nietzsche reminds us, itimust be plural'. 
24 
To' the. 
second corresponds Derrida's reference to 
---'what 
is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary 
whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the 
non-species, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form 
of monstrosity., 25 
Either way, the idea of the future as something representable is 
radically undermined. The future can be approached through'the inter- 
weaving of these two strategies, a new kind of 'writing'. 
It is worth saying in passing that Derrida leans heavily on a 
post- or at least -ateleological motivational structure, which again 
displaces the idea of the future as the projected dimension for the 
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achievement of one's goals. 
Heidegger wrote about not wanting to 'get anywhere' but first 
26 of all and for once-' to get to where we are already'. and Derrida, who 
perhaps could not quite swallow that formulation, writes of wanting to 
get to a point at which he does not know where he is going'. 
27 
Thisý 
implied deconstruction of the linearity of our ordinary motivational 
structures undoubtedly owes something to what we have elsewhere 
28 
called 
the intensification wrought by Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, and it is 
again no accident that when Derrida actually does get round to naming 
the unnameable, or at least offering for its nominal effects the term, 
Idifferance' ( which supplants the possibility of a future that would 
be a future present, by denying that possibility ), he refere explicitly 
to Nietzsche. The term 'differance' implies that there will be no 
unique name, not even the name of Being. This 
tmust be conceived without nostalgia, that is, it must be 
conceived outside the myth Uf the purely paternal or maternal 
language belonging to, the lost fatherland of thought. On the 
contrary we must affirm it in the sense that Nietzsche brings* 
affirmation into play - with a certain laughter and a certain 
dance., 29 
Translated into our problematic of the future this means that we must 
not mourn the demise of the future as the horizon of intelligibility; 
rather we should celebrate it. 
I have dealt so far with various motivations for caution about the 
future - the reflexive problem that when one is trying to go beyond 
the very categories of historical understanding it is hard to see what 
terms one should use, the use Derrida makes of an invaginated topology, 
which makes the reference to a 'beyond' undecidable, and his account of 
the need for a double strategy of interpretation and writing, which makes 
utterly obscure any sense of the possibility of representing the future. 
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(iii) Finally I would like to return to the questIon of whether 
Derrida has not'merely' put a particular concept of time, history, 
the future etc. into question rather, than these concepts 'themselves'. 
The two distinct answers he gives to this question seem inconsistent. 
The first one can be found in"Ousia and Gramme" in which he denies 
the possibility of a post-metaphysical concept of time. 
'Time belongs in all its aspects to metaphysics, and it names 
the domination of presence .... In attempting to produce (an) 
other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is con- 
structed out of other metaphysical or ontotheblogical predicates. ' 
30 
But this . As perhaps a little hasty in view of the claim we noted before, 
that there are no metaphysical, concepts per-se, only metaphysical 
moves or modes of textual articulation. It is perhaps this that, 
secondly, allows him to acknowledge in"Grammatology as a Positive Science , 
31 
the possibility of a 'pluri-dimensional and delinearised temporality'. And 
tb. is must be his considered view, because in Positions the title inter- 
view) he is asked whether he can conceive of the'possibility of a 
concept of history that would escape.. [linearity]... as a stratified, contra- 
dictory series 1. He makes precisely our point that it is the 'metaphysical 
concept of history that he is against'. What he endorses is the view he 
attributes to Althusser and to Sollers which criticizes the Hegelian concept 
of history, the 'notion of an expressive totality', and 
-'aims at showing that there, is not one single history, a general 
history, but rather histories different in their type, rhythm, mode 
of inscription - intervallic, differentiated histories'. 32 
The claim is now not , that,, there is no alternative concept of history 
but that we must not underestimate the interconnectedness of the concept of 
history with the rest of the philosophical amoury, nor the difficulty of 
displacing it. He writes: 
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'The metaphysical character of the concept of history is not 
only linked to linearity, but to an entire syste of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and interiorizing accumulation of 
meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of 
truth etc ... ) That being said, the concept of history ... cannot be 
subject to a simple and instantaneous mutation, the striking of a 
name from the vocabulary. We must elaborate a strategy of... 
textual work... ' 33 
His strategy involves constantly reinscribing the term 'history' in his 
own texts, with the aim of transforming it. 
It might seem reassuring to be given back lots of little histories 
having been forced to give up History, and by analogy, lots of little 
futures in place of the Future, but we are still left with one or two 
further questions. First, how possible is it to shake off metaphysics* 
or even to try to do so, just by golng plural 7 Second, is there not a 
sense in which Derrida is offering us two different levels of descriptiont 
one which competes with grand teleological history at its own level, and 
the other which would have more obvious empirical applications ? Third, 
how does this pluralism of histories affect our reading of Derrida's 
understanding of the future of post-structuralism ? 
1. First our doubts about pluralism, and we shall develop the 
argument here with reference to a plurality of histories. The basis of 
the worry, I take it, is that if each of these 'histories' one is left 
with is stamped with logocentrism, then we have merely multiplied the 
heads on the monster, we have not slain, or even tamed it. I think that 
is a misreading. Two points are worth making, (a) that these histories 
would not be, or would not need to be, histories of meaning, constituted 
by guiding ideas etc. They could be documentations of discursive formations 
in Foucault's manner, partial histories of particular institutions within 
a particular society, histories of particular scientific, cultural, agri- 
cultural etc. practices. Any regulative involvement of 'intentions's 
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ideas, or concepts would only have a nominal status, and be readily 
dissolved back into the histories-themselves, (b) that the very pluralitz 
of these histories, histories that do not require, and would almost 
certainly resist appropriation by History, is for that very'reason a 
threat to History. Indeed this would be so even if each microhistory 
were cast in a teleological mould for there would be nothing to guarantee 
their commensurability. 
An, acceptance that a radical plurality of futures was in'itself 
a sign of a post-metaphysical-stance would allow one to forge links 
with a rather different tradition. Consider the words of Bloch 
'The concept of progress ..... requires not unilinearity but a 
broad, flexible and thoroughly dynamic "multiverse": the voices 
of history joined in perpetual and often intricate counterpoint. 
A unilinear model must be found obsolete if justice is to be done 
to the considerable amount of non-European material. It is no 
longer possible to work without curves in the series; without a 
new and complex time-manifold... ' 34 
of course the stress must be on, the word 'radical'. The power of 
pluralism to undermine logocentrism is shown by the considerable, role 
it plays in the work of philosophers such as Lyotard and Rorty, each of 
whom in their different ways offers a new way forward. 
35 In both their 
cases, the pluralism in question is radical in the sense that there is no 
enveloping unity by which this multiplicity can be contained, and no 
theoretical place for such a unity. 
2. Second, the suggestion that Derrida is offering us two 
different levels of description. What I mean by this is that heý is 
prepared to talk about the future-, as if that singular term still made 
some sense. It appears , as he says, as a monstrosity from the point of 
view of logoctntrism, when thought of in terms of radical otherness. The 
passage beyond metaphysics is a certain sort of textual activity which, in 
all its duality of strategy can be straightforwardly described, as we have 
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done. But the future as such cannot. It cannot be represented. And yet 
-is not this talk of pluridimensional time and multiple histories giving 
us precisely that - representations, a promise of a complex cautious 
pluralism where once there was just the'affirmation of the absence of 
meaning ? If this is so, how should we order these two levels. I would 
suggest that we treat the first as opening up the possibility of the 
second. And if something of the'subtlety of Derrida's cautions about 
premature exits can be maintained, this is a really promising suggestion. 
But perhaps we move too fast. There is still the third question. 
3. Can we transfer all we have been saying about history to a 
consideration of the future 7 Are we not caught here in the ambiguity of 
the term ', history'? Does not the pluralism we have seen Derrida embrace 
really only make sense if we think of history as limited to the past ? 
We could hardly have documentations of future discursive formations. 
The answer to this question is surely that one simply admits, indeed 
encourages a plurality of incommensurable and even incompatible projections 
of the future. But then a second question arises: are we not just treating 
the future not perhaps as a future present, but as a future past. by extend- 
ing to it the idea of a plural history. Is one not, in effect, closing off 
the future by acknowledging the multiplicity of possible projections onto it ? 
Is not the future potentially the source of the radically other, the 
unprojectable etc.? This it surely is, but it would seem perverse, at 
least at some level, to expect that an account of the future should 
'take account' of that radical otherness, for it is precisely what cannot 
be taken account of. If anything, it is what the multiplicity of our 
projections are the vain attempt to anticipate. But even with this 
question tentatively resolved there must be a certain unease about 
raeding Derrida as inviting a thousand flowers to bloom. What a naive 
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pluralism forgets is the caution to be attached not just to the idea of 
.a single Universal history, but to its linearity. Plurality could leave 
linearity untouched. What is still required is an account ofýthe complex 
subversions of linear order - of delated effects, inversions of order, 
structures of repetition,, substitution, supplementarity etc. 
For philosophy, surely, the problem of the future is a reflection of 
a crisis of method. We can outline the problem in the following general 
way: philosophy is a'striving after truth, and a striving, as has often 
been noted, marked by constant failure. Philosophy is a history of dis- 
appointment, and disillusionment. Every 'success' is trampled on by what 
succeeds it. The future is bright only to the ignorant, and innocent, the 
children in philosophy, -those who have not grasped the folly of its ways, 
those seduced by its promise. What-is needed is a radically new way in 
which the ideals of phil9sophy can once and for all be realised. What is 
needed is a proper method. 
With the idea, that a proper method could achieve what the undiscip- 
lined wrangling, inspiration, and muddied thought of the past could not 
achieve, the future seemed brighter. With Descarted-Discourse on Method. 
philosophy -ýwas to be systematically purged of what could not be clearly 
and distinctly perceived, and it became a slogan of modernity. Kant too 
turns his back on the mock-battles of metaphysics by directing philosophy 
36 
along 'the secure path of a science' . And he claims to have found 
Ia way of guarding against all those errors which have hithertoe beset 
reason', and that 'there is not a single metaphysical problem that has 
not been solved' -0 
37 
Hegel insists that philosophy cease merely being the 
love of knowledge and achieve knowledge itself . As he put it 
I The systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone 
be the true shape in which truth exists. To help to bring philosophy 
nearer to the form of science- that goal where it can lay aside the 
name of love of knowledge , and be actual knowledge - that is what I have set before me 1.38 
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and Husserl, ( who we should note would violently object to being 
. harnessed with 
Hegel in this way- lie saw Hegel as 'weakening the impulse 
toward philosophical science 1 
39 in that it 'lacks a critique of reason'. 
ý5 trangely Kantian words! kiven that he had only just lamented Kant's claim 
that one could not learn philosophy, only to philosophizeo. 'What is that 
but an admission of philosophy's unscientific character 7] ) aims to 
restore philosophy I to its historical purpose Las] the loftiest and most 
rigorous of all sciences, representing .... humanitýls imperishable demand 
for pure and absolute knowledge. , 
40 
In each case it' is (scientific) 
method that supplies the horizon of the future for philosophy. For it is 
only by a rigorous reaffirmation and redefinition of philosophical method 
that metaphysical desire ( for knowledge, understanding, truth, clarity... 
and fundamentally,, for presence) can be guided in a direction not -, 
immediately guaranteed to disappoint. When Kant decries the mystagogues 
41 
it is surely because they usurp the role of proper philosophical method 
in articulating the horizon of the future. Hegel's attack on Schelling 
is similarly motivated. Philosophical method is a conceptual labour that 
cannot be r9placed by intuition. No royal roads. And if Husserl seems 
to return to intuition, no-one can doubt the work of detailed description 
this involves. It is not the speechless ecstatic revelation of a mystical 
vision. 
And reference to Husserl suggests a rather interesting possibility. 
If we take the desire to avoid philosophy's traditional failure as the 
driving concern of Husserl's philosophy, it suggests at least initially, 
the subordination of the value of arche to that of telos. Secure foundations 
are not ends in themselves; rather, they ensure that the building does not 
collapse when completed. I say 'initially" because of course one can, 
symmetrically, claim. that the goal for Husserl is the re-establishing 
of contact with the 'things themselves', intuitive fulfilment, the 
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reactivation of origin. In that case, the phase of subordination of 
arche to telos would be followed by an inversion of that relationship: 
ends and origins would cycle back into each other. 
What this suggests is that the initial cyclic fracturing of 
linearity we claimed for Nietzsche could be found just as well in 
Husserl. And the case of phenomenology, and of Husserl in particular 
is surely paradigmatic for philosophy . It could be argued that while 
phenomenology may have limitations, it is still the healthiest embodi- 
ment of the ethico-rational ideal, one that has not yet failed for the 
simple reason that it can be seen to have eventually taken the choice 
42 
recommended by Lessing the infinite striving after truth. 
If phenomenology cannot be completed, this could be affirmed 
in a positive way rather than lamented. Is-not the ideal of perpetual 
activation and reactivation of the primal sources of intuition one we 
could embrace ? It would'both'draw in the-'past, deepen the present, and 
give sense to the future. ' The greatest step'our age has to'make is' 
to recognise that with philosophical intuition.;. a limitless field of' 
work opens out... '. 
This-understanding of Husserl's phenomenology-is persuasively 
43 
presented by Merleau-Ponty. The most important lesson ... the' 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. ' 
he suggests. And Husserl often refers to himself as a perpetual 
beginner, and his own constant inventiveness even in respect of majo*r 
concepts would support this self-assessment. Philosophy is an 'infinite 
meditation"and when'faithful to its intention'. 'never knows where it 
44 
is going'. 
The unfinished nature of philosophy and the inchoative atmos- 
phere which surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of failure. 
They were inevitable because phenomenology's task was to reveal 
the mystery of the world and of. reason. 1 45 
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We offered earlier a limited defence of a certain slippage 
between philosophical discussions-of the future, and of the 
future of philosophy. So far we have listed, a little on the side of 
the former. But the more reflexive questions about the future of 
philosophy - to which we briefly alluded when discussing Derrida's 
double strategy. - can profitably engage our attention again. For 
while philosophers such as Rorty and Lyotard chart both, the death 
of philosophy, and, via radical pluralism, its rebirth and reorient- 
ation, and while there is a real chastening of philosophy's coamonly 
totalizing pretensions, radical pluralism leaves linearity untouched. 
However, with the kind of discussion of the end or closure- of phil- 
osophy inaugurated by Nietzsche, and carried through by Heidegger and 
Derrida, this whole question of linearity is put to the test. 
46 
Nietzsche-offered, us both synchronic and diachronic versions of 
the closure thesis: the synchronic in Beyond Good and Evil 
47 
and 
the diachronic in Twilight of the Idols (" How the Real World at Last 
Became a Myth"). There is a mutation of linearity involved in both senses 
of circle involved in these accounts - the circle as a space of limitation 
or enclosure, and the circle as a movement of return. But the most radical 
break with linearity comes in his discussion of the eternal recurrence 
48 
and the possibility of its affirmation . With this affirmation, it could 
be said that one 'opens oneself' to the future without reservation. 
And such opening is no longer captured in linear terms, 
49 
A. full discussion of the question of the end(s) of philosophy in 
Heidegger and Derrida is undoubtedly called for here, but the call will 
have to remain unanswered. Other thinkers have already. applied themselves 
most satisfactorily to the job. 
50 
Important distinctions have to be 
repeatedly emphasized, and further analytical, clarification and distifiction 
between different versions of this thesis would not be out of order.. 'We 
would have to distinguish end as exhaustion of possibilities, as extreme 
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focussing of possibility, as termination of activity, as fulfilment, 
- as-goal..... and'so on. 
What from our point of view it is worth extracting from this 
discussion is the double inscription of what we have called 'caution' 
about the future, one response among many, to crisis. on the one hand 
the announcement of the closure of philosophy ( as metaphysics, as 
logocentrism ) declares a break within the history of thought through 
which no continuous thread may pass. What the future offers (a change 
of style, the step beyond, 'writing', 'thinking' etc. ) lies beyond our 
current projective base, and it is quite the opposite of a fulfilment 
or completion of the present. But in addition - and here we have the 
doubling back - the place of the future is an issue-fundamental to 
determining as distinct the content of what precedes and succeeds the 
rupture. For traditional philosophy, the future is an essential category 
(ethically and/or hermeneutically, as we have described above). For 
post-structuralism it may not be. The question is --is it merely not 
essentialy , is it excluded altogether, or does the future reappear 
in some mutation or other ? What future has the future ? 
We have tried to develop the idea that the crisis in philosophy's 
future ( and hence its very nature-) has been seen, certainly by a string 
of the most important thinkers in modern philosophy, to be co-extensive 
with a crisis in method, for which a redefinition of its status as a 
'science' is, in each case required. We have suggested that while Husserl 
- in one respect clearly belongs to this series, there is in his work a 
positive recognition of the impossibility of finality , of completing the 
task of philosophy., Where would this leave post-structuralism ? And where, 
more particularly would it leave Derrida-? Does this eminently reasonable 
restatement of the idea of philosophy as a perennial activity not deflate 
the very project of deconstructing the future ? 
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Let us be clear that Derridean deconstruction'is heavily 
committed to a transformation of our ways of thinking about the future. 
We have already quoted his remark that 'the future can only be antici- 
pated in the form of absolute danger' - which is at the very least a 
radical discontinuity thesis. And while it'always forms part of a 
double strategy and so is coupled with'immanent decon'struction, 
Derrida constantly refers to the need to take the step beyond - 
beyond 'metaphysics', 'beyond manland humanism', beyond presence, 
beyond security, beyond the language of Being. 
Such an alternative philosophical (? ) practice can presumably 
claim to be radically different from everything we have hitherto 
known as philosophy. I have my doubts about this. But a question arises 
here which will help us clarify just what kind of transformation of 
our ordinary view of the future is being proposed. We might ask: 
leavingýaside the radicality of the destination, surely the nature of 
the transition, and of the language in which it'is announced is very 
far from being radical. Indeed it is very traditional. The name for 
it is apocalyptic; discourse 
On the last day of the 1980 conference at Cerisy, Derrida 
presented a paper on Kant's 'lampoon' "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen 
Vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) ( "On a Genteel Tone Recently 
Sounded in Philosophy"), in the title of which the word Apocalyptic 
replaces Genteel. 
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Kant had taken to task those mystagogic pseudo- 
philosophers who by the tone they take and the air they give themselves 
when saying certain things, place philosophy in danger of death, and 
tell philosophy, or philosophers the imminence of their end. ' Derrida is 
not only fascinated by the categories Kant uses to judge these philosophers, 
the fact that it is their tone that Kant is worried about, and the whole 
significance of Apocalypse as Revelation, he is clearly touched by the 
fact that Kant's essay can be seen to apply to him. This is not the place 
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for a detailed analysis of Derrida's paper, but here is a brief account 
of part of the argument. 
For Kant, philosophy's basic commitment is to Wissenschaftlichen 
Lebensweisheit" - the ethico-rational life. The mystagogues borrow the . 
word 'philosophy',, but not its significance. They claim I an immediate and 
intuitive relation with the mystery', they are organised in tiny exclusive 
sects, use coded language, and set themselves apart as superior beings. 
They prefer intuition to concepts, 'gift' to work, and value genius above 
scholarship. Clearly they have a total disdain for Kant's commitment to 
rational inquiry, and indeed to its democratic implications. 
Derrida begins by suggesting in analytic. fashion that we treat 
apocalyptic discourse as essentially predictive eschatological discourse, 
discourse about the end or ends. oi the limit ( ... of the world, of time, of 
philosophy). He'then makes three moves. The first, specific one,. is to 
argue that Kant himself produces just such a discourse in hislImarking a 
limit, indeed the end of a certain type of metaphysics'. 
52 His second 
move, is one of generalization - to argue in various ways thatleschatological 
discourse is unavoidable. It is clear that he means to encompass himself 
and Heidegger) in these remarks. 
'... whoever would come to refine, to tell... the end of the end, 
the end of ends, that the end has always already begun, that 
we must distinguish between closure and end, that person would, 
whether wanting to or not, participate in the concert. ' 53 
54 
A few pages later Derrida repeats this argument, even to the point 
of allowing its force to override the ironic distanced tone which he 
believes is the most he has ever allowed himself when making his apocalyp- 
tic pronouncements. Here it seems neither mental reservations, nor a 
change of style will do. 
The importance of this claim is that it confirms us in our view 
that Derrida is taking up a radical attitude to the future, and it 
rules out the response that his references to a beyond, to the future 
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as absolute danger should be taken with a pinch of French salt. 
The argument, however, and perhaps also his tu quoque response to 
Kant, is surely a little misleading, for it would obscure the difference 
between the Revelation'of John of Patmos, and the claim that philosophy, 
or a certain Western tradition of philosophy has exhausted its possib- 
ilities. Derrida, like Lacan, has little time for the distinction between 
use and mention, or between announcing-the-end , and charting its limits. 
Clearly both are concerned with marking limits, but to identify the 
two would conflate apocalyptic and eschatological discourse completely. 
And when talking of end as closure , the distinctively predictive element 
of apocalyptic discourse makes no sense, for 'closure' does not have 
chronological consequences in-the ordinary sense at all. 
But if that is so, surely we are wrong to try to use the 'end of 
philosophy' debate as the basis of a cliim that these various thinkers 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida ) are transforming or deconstructing 
55 
the future. The point, however, is that the substitution of considerations 
of exhaustion, possibility, repetition, closure etc. for those of phil- 
osophical -progress, is in . -itself-' .a 
displacement of philosophy's 
understanding of its own future. We could say that the' ordinary temporal 
future ceases to dominate. 
It might be replied that the ordinary temporal future never has 
dominated philosophy. Certainly teleological projection is far more than 
an extension of a series of now-points beyond the present. That is quite 
right. What is being claimed is that teleology nonetheless represents the 
preservation of the values of self-identity, of fulfilment, of.... 
'presence'. After Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, we can re4escribe the 
projective scene at two different levels: f 
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(1) Philosophy may well carry on'as always, blind to its own 
limits, like a fly in a fly bottle, perhaps. 
(2) A radically distinct possibility ( of'thinking', of1writing') 
begins. to emerge. This possibility, it may be said, surely gives us hope 
(indeed Derrida even goes so far-as: to endorse what he calls 
'Heideggerean hope' on one occasion! 
56 ) and thus revives, the 'ethical' 
importance of the future! This 'Possibility will reappear at the end of 
the paper. 
We will turn shortly to-a considered interpretation of this 
stereoscopic, or bi-focal projection, but first let us consider the 
third move Derrida makes in the Apocalypse essay. It is a further 
generalization of the invaginated reversal by which apocalyptic discourse 
is no longer seen outside, to be excluded. He asks ( in other words, he 
suggests) 
'wouldn't the apocalyptic be a transcendental condition for all 57 discourse, of all experience itself, of every mark or trace V 
58 I have elsewhere had strong words to say about Derrida's reliance 
on such transcendental manoeuvres. If'his general anti-foundationalism 
is accepted, it'has no force at all: the Isous rature' is no portmanteau 
protection. But this particular argument seems to me to commit a simple 
logical fallacy. The argument essentially is that apocalyptic discourse 
involves an indeterminacy of authorial voice, and of its audience, and that 
this indeterminacy, if only, we were to realise it , is the condition for 
the possibility of any signification whatsoever. But even if one accepts 
that this generalised 'ecriture' could be so characterised, it simply 
does not follow from the fact that'the apocalyptic has these properties 
(among others) that it is the condition of possibility of discourse in 
general, which also has these properties. Structural correspondences have 
no transcenddntal consequences and if by 'the apocalyptic' 
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Derrida means 'apocalyptic discourse' he would have to be claiming that 
a particular discourse was a transcendental condition for discourse in 
general, 'which seems a priori I implausible. If all discourse did share 
this property ( authorial/audience indeterminacy) then nothing would 
privilege the way in which apocalyptic discourses-embodies it. And quite 
apart from this, it is hard to see how one discourse can have a transcend- 
ental relationship to other discourses, unless one has redefined the 
relationship as some sort of mapping, 'or translatability. 
Derrida's difficulty here is that such displacements. and reversals 
are often productively provocative, but that very success can breed 
routinization and even recklessness. 
Having said that, there is still something of interest in this 
last move. I believe it is all to be found in the last pages of his 
paper, in which he offers us a 'meditation' on the word 'Viens', '. come'. 
With a commentary on this we shall draw our discussion to a close. 
Allow me, for the sake of economy of orientation, to merely 
indicate some of the lines of thought condensed in this word. First, 
the apocalyptic gesture could be said to involve a general invitation 
to the reader, to the 'listener to 'come', to follow, to open himself/ 
herself to the light. Second, the word 'come' (Viens) in either English 
or French is immediately linked to the language of the future ( avenir 
itself, and many phrases involving'venir ; in English, consider 'the 
time to come', 'comingevents" and so on. ) Third, Derrida is clearly 
01 using this word, much as Heidegger uses the word 'ereignis and les gibt' 
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to mark a site at which a new kind of thinking might begin to crystallize. 
And here, I claim, we find a clue at least to how the future might still 
have a role - indeed the central role - after philosophy's ciosure. 
As I understand Derrida, the apocalyptic 'Vienst, 'come' has 
the force of a primordial event in a Heideggerean sense, with a fundamen- 
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tal ethical flavour superimposed on it ( in response perhaps to 
Levinas). We could see it as an attempt to bring about a confluence 
of Heidegger and Levinas. At this point, yet another paper could 
begin, but I will try to make brief sense of these obscure allusions. 
, How can-an'event be fundamental ? EverY event, as such, marks aý 
rupture with the past, has its own temporal'integrity. Some events we 
think of as historically ( or biographically ) momentous. They open 
a whole world of possibilities. Such'an idea could be used to understand 
the activity of philosophy: itself - as aný-opening onto, the opening up, 
of possibilities of thinking, indeed of living., 
Philosophy so understood could be-called the 'fundamental event'. 
But so defined, it has the most intimate bond imaginable with the future. 
The common trait of those views of the future ( and of philosophy's 
future) that deconstruction sets its sights on, is their embodiment 
of the value of presence, usually via some anticipatory representation-, 
of What is to Come. For fear of-prejudging the-issue we have not yet 
offered a positive alternative. But the account we have offered of the 
Ifundamental'event' surely supplies'one. The'future 'is' fundamentally 
an event - the opening of possibility. As such, it is, literally speaking, 
a continuous Apocalypse, or revelation. The future opens. onto what is 
other. 
60- 
Something of the force of these-remarks -if indeed they have any 
- comes from what we can call the impersonality of the idea of event 
being employed here. The same can be said, eg. of Heidegger's es gibt. 
We cannot ask who gives or what is given. once again, the attempt is 
being made to demonstrate a space, an opening, and indeed to provide 
one. 'But Derrida's employment of Viens is not simply impersonal. In the 
apocalyptic texts in which the 'come' is uttered, there is to be sure 
a movement away from the personal. 
61 
But equally, the word 'come' 
has an essentially interpersonal significance that Heidegger does not 
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to my knowledge suggest for his focal words. 
62 
There is little 
doubt that what Derrida is_ doing here is trying to bring Levinas into 
the picture 
63 
for the latter's insistencethat the ethical relation 
have primacy over the ontological. For Levinas, the relation to the 
Other the other person) is the scene of the opening onto the infinite. 
And in the discontinuity, the otherness of the Other, we find the 
basis of the discontinuity of time. Moreover in the gift of pardon 
the Other has the power to heallthe past.... 
What Derrida is trying to do. is to capture a post-metaphysical 
sense of the future that does not entirely abandon the ethical dimension 
(that was so prominent at the beginning of our paper) , but rejoins 
it at 
a deeper level. 
We can suppose that this is simply a fascinating topic for philo- 
sophical discussion, but it is'clearly more than this. It is meant, I 
believe, to offer us some sort of basic insight, if I can use that wordi 
into how we might come to think of philosophy or of its successor. It 
suggests to my mind that it will rest ultimately on the invitation that 
we each extend to each other to open ourselves to the adventure 
(ad-venture) of thinking, without the prospect of completion, and without 
ai6ing at some prescribed destination. 
Philosophy would be something of a double event: an invitation to 
the Other, a vulnerable opening of oneself to the Other, on the one hand, 
and a thinking about the open, and about opening itself, ie. about the 
-space and time within which philosophical thinking is at all possible. 
An acknowledgement of the event character of philosophy so under- 
stood, is of -fundamental importance. For it provides both a principle 
of selectivity in reading the history of philosophy - texts vary in their 
grasp of the space of possibility in which they work - and it would tend 
to protect those texts against reductive readings. ( We should always 
ask what they are doing , not just what do they say .) It is this - at 
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least in principle - that prevents the history of philosophy from 
- being totalized prematurely. And interestingly, it suggests a way in 
which a deconstructive history must be supplemented by a parallel history 
of philosophical openings, of philosophy as an opening. Historical retro- 
spection easily suffers from the illusions of objectification. We take 
for granted the space/spaces that the texts we study were in fact in 
part responsible for opening up, and focus on the possibilities they 
foreclosed. This would be a-rather different suggestion for a double 
strategy of reading. 
In . -conclusion, I would like to return to the point at which we 
asked rhetorically, why Husserl's account of the future of philosophy 
formulating it as we did as a ceaseless activity of exploration, of 
reactivation of primordial experiýnce , was not an adequate answer to 
(post-) modern doubts about philosophy as a progressing or completeable 
enterprise. Do not Husserl and Derrida's projects represent the same 
mutation of that future-, -projecting metaphysical desire ? 
Derrida is certainly more the child of phenomenology than many 
care to admit, and the extent of his debt to Husserl's spiritual 
fecundity is easily undereýtimated. Perhaps I could conclude by 
formulating the result of our discussion in the shape of a question 
is it possible that Husserl's logocentric concern with the primordial, 
with origins, ( and indeed Heidegger's increasingly precarious commit- 
ment to the question of Being ) could each be treated as strategies 
subordinated to a conception of the acti, ýity of philosophy - as a 
sustained opening (up) of the space of thinking - that Derrida (only) 
reopens, albeit on new terrain? Where exactly is- the difference?. 
And what would come of guch-a-thought.? 
But these questions I must leave for another day, 
an6ther time. 
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APPENDIX 
Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time 
The position of Nietzsche in this work is somewhat complex. 
He was undoubtedly influential in guiding Heidegger's formulation of the 
idea of the 'end' of metaphysics, and in setting-up the whole problematic 
of its'overcoming'. His radical scepticism about unity, identity, 'integrity 
... has played a critical role at a number of points - in particular our 
readings of both Husserl and Heidegger's ways of reformulating the status 
of time and temporality. We. have endorsed Derrida's general attack on the 
idea of, a more authentic 'primordial' time that would'underlie our everyday 
understanding of time as a succession of moments, and have argued that this 
opens the way for a more complex investigation of the variety of temporal 
phenomena, in which concepts, theories, representations 'of' time are 
embraced as forming part of the temporal itself. 
In this context, our interpretation of Nietzsche's thought of eternal 
recurrence may seem somewhat anomolous. For it may seem like the strongest 
possible re-affirmation of the 'instant', in which it receives a new kind 
of purity, freedom from representation. Certainly Nietzsche might question 
the theoretical motivation of our pluralization of time and its structures 
which does not readily mesh with what we have called 'the intensity of the 
moment'. Nonethelesss we claim Nietzsche's account is instructive, and we 
offer here an interpretation of his self-avowedly 'highest thought', the 
eternal recurrence. 
This presentation relates to the general argument of the thesis in 
the following ways: 
(1) Nietzsche offers us a brilliant example of how to displace a frame of 
reference in this case, the ordinary 'metaphysical' concept of time) from 
within. 
(2)It retains the centrality of the instant only to explode the traditional 
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value of such a primitive concept. For Nietzsche, the instant opens out 
onto what is other. 
(3) At the same time as the instant is a non-recuperative opening out, it is 
also an embodiment of all those identical moments it repeats. This 'repetition' 
could be said to be a most primitive kind of 'representation'. 
(4) If so, Nietzsche's #moment of intensity' builds in representation, in its 
most primitive 'element' ( which is primitively not self-contained). 
(5) Broadly speaking we, treat Nietzsche's account as a reflective intensific- 
ation of our understanding of the 'present', one which successfully subverts 
our everyday 'recuperative' understanding. As such it belongs ( in general 
to the deconstructive phase of the rethinking of time, wh ich, however inter- 
esting, cannot be the end of the story. 
* 
Despite our doubts about Derrida's claim that there can be no non- 
metaphysical concept of time, it is quite true that it is often more product- 
ive to pursue the goal of rethinking time by focussing on other terms and 
concepts than that of Time itself. One is reminded of the way in which Austin 
sought to avoid the quagmire of questions about freedom and determinism by 
looking instead at what at first seem more marginal concerns, like the differ- 
I 
ence between excuses and justifications. Nietzsche does not say all that much 
about Time per se, and yet his most fundamental concept is an essentially 
temporal one: that of eternal recurrence. 
2 
And as is true of hoth Husserl 
and Heideggerg the temporal here is linked with the ontological. However, we 
shall argue that Nietzsche does not, for all that, repeat the metaphysical 
motif of presence. He subverts it instead. His account of the moment is fund- 
amentally at odds with any such value as presence. 
We shall begin by showing how Nietzsche radically questions, subverts 
and displaces 'our ordinary concept of time', at a number of different levels. 
In terms of the Derridean formula, eternal re 
* 
currence is an undecidable term, 
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and I shall use this suggestion as a way of clarifying the various other- 
wise incompatible ways in which he explains it. 
How we might ask is it in principle possible to avoid Derrida's 
strictures ? We have already shown 
3 
that Derrida has to admit that it is not I 
concepts themselves which are or are not metaphysical . but rather their 
textual exploitation and functioning . This opens the way, we argue, to 
Nietzsche's use of such concepts. It may be, if we stick to some rather 
narrow sense of the term , that Nietzsche has not produced a new CONCEPT 
of time, but, that he has replaced its status as a concept, with something else. 
The impossibility of conceptualizing eternal recurrence may turn out to be a 
positive feature. 
It is however worth asking ourselves to begin with whether we can 
properly talk about 'our ordinary concept of time'. This phrase can itself, 
be understood in a common sense way. as our taken for granted understanding of 
time, but as St. Augustine showed-long ago, the attempt to transform this 
tacit understanding into something more conceptually rigorous is somewhat 
problematic. The other way of understanding the phrase would then rest on 
some such view ( shared by Heidegger and Derrida) as that the one ordinary 
concept of time we all share is that derived from Aristotle. But are there 
not difficulties attached to the idea ? Who are 'we' ? Is it to be taken for 
granted that we all share a common concept of time ? Might there not be a 
hidden complicity between the idea of a concept and some particular inter- 
pretation of time ? We do'we suppose there is but one concept of time ? 
Let us develop this last question. 
Far more 'ordinary' than having a unitary concept of time is the fact 
that we distinguish between different kinds of time: subjective /objective, 
existential/cosmic, qualitative /quantitative, time as experienced/ time as 
measured, and so on. But what if each of these oppositions merely distribut- 
ed according to an unahalysed schema ( such as inside/outside), the same 
fundamental value ( such as presence). What if such a distribution functioned 
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to preserve: that value ? It could be argued, for example, that the dist- 
inction between subjective and objective time is a conceptual labour that 
assures under each heading the preservation of the unity of the temporal 
series, and that this is achieved precisely by making this distinction. All 
events can be located in one or other category by distinct rules of integ- 
ration ( such as narrativity for subjective time, seriality for objective 
time ). 
On such an argument, the fundamental unity of time would have been 
preserved precisely by multiplying the frames of reference within which it 
operates. Undoubtedly, one'then needs a further story to integrate these 
multiple frames. The usual one, with only two frames, is a story of derivation. 
Objective time is shown to be dependent on, derivative from subjective temp- 
orality, or vice versa. The point of my remarks here is to suggest that talk 
about 'our ordinary. concept of time' in the singular need not be undermined 
by the fact that everywhere we find a duality or plurality of such concepts. 
But it might perhaps make sense to allow that there are different ordinary 
concepts of time, and fall back on a more fundamental claim - that they each 
embody a common basic set of values, which we could call lunityl, 'integration', 
'identity', or even more fundamentally, that of 'presence' as the condition 
of such values being realised. On Nietzsche's account these would be the 
values pertaining to Being. The traditional betrayal of time would consist 
of subjugating the values associated with Becoming to those of Being. 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida share, in our view, ( and they are 
not alone) the-view that the ordinary concept(s) of time embodies values which 
are more ontological than temporal. But in each case the lesson this insight 
teaches is that questions about time and questions about Being collapse into 
one another and cannot be separated, as Plato long ago made so apparent. 
Each of them is also engaged not merely in a critique of the ordinary 
concept of time, but in what we might call, borrowing from Nietzsche, a 
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transvaluation of time. And for Nietzsche especially, this is presented as 
the key to a human transformation, indeed a transformation which would point 
beyond 'man'. The focus of this transformative projection is the thought of 
eternal recurrence, announced in the Gay Sciences claimed ( in Ecce Homo 
to be 'the fundamental conception! behind Thus Spake Zarathustra , and the 
title of an incomplete book project bequeathed to us in his Nachlass. One 
could avoid the analytical task of separating the various versions by saying 
that the thought of eternal recurrence is not a single thought at allsbut 
a constellation orfamily of 'thoughts' . But this would only be a temporary, 
because largely uniformative, way of legitimating the diverse and seemingly 
contradictory accounts Nietzsche offers. Moreover there are other considerat- 3'- 
ions. 
(1) Nietzsche's mode of discourse and style of presentation varies from 
from account to another, which makes a comparison of the abstract 'thesis' in 
each case'problematic. How, for example, should we compare the 'poetict 
versions (e. g. in 
I later parts of Thus_S2ake Zarathustra4) and the scientific 
proofs in The Will to Power .5 
(2) The rhetorical strategy varies, and may indeed be the subject of crit- 
ical disagreement. Againg that there was a 'content' to be drawn out for 
comparison would be made questionable in principle. 
(3) The audience/ level of exposition varies. Would we necessarily expect 
esoteric and exoteric versions to be consistent ? 
One can make a virtue out of contradictions (vide Walt Whitman, for 
whom contradiction was a sign of his spiritual abundance). Jaspers reading 
of Nietzsche does just this. Or one can offer general arguments drawing on 
the thesis of semantic indeterminacy or of the fictionality of truth and 
hence of consistency (both of which Nietzsche held). But these are mere 
slogans, signposts, the husks of thought; they are not in themselves arguments. 
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And to constructively sieve through Nietzsche's various presentations of 
eternal recurrence a discriminatory classification of the various'accounts is 
essential. This will not be free from one's own theoretical interests, but 
where they coincide with Nietzsche's, the reading can be productive. Our 
theoretical interest, to make it explicit, is in understanding the role of 
eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's transvaluation of time. The value of such 
a guiding interest remains to be seen. It is also an open question whether it 
can be sustained as such, as a 'theoretical interest'. or whether the cool 
analytical security that such a phrase suggests is not itself fundamentally 
at risk. Placing what Nietzsche called the 'greatest weightt on the scales 
is not an act free from danger. Nonetheless I shall begin by arguing 
(1) that the various ways in which eternal recurrence is formulated 
reflect the different modes (levels, dimensions) at which time needs to be 
7 
transvalued or Ideconstructed' 
(2) that the question of the status of eternal recurren ce'( whether it 
is a concept, a theory, a thought, an experience, a test... ') will vary with 
the level in question above. 
(3) that we ought to take seriously the sugges. tion that eternal recurrence 
is lundecidablel'in'terms of the conceptual framework it subverts. (What 
that implies is that only only would eternal recurrence be a 'moralltest 
Ctry and affirm that! 
] but an intellectual test [try and think that throughý. ) 
To give some structure to this account .I propose, perhaps unoriginally 
to distinguish three levels or ways in which eternal recurrence is presented: 
(a) cosmological, (b) psychological, and (c) ontological. It might be objected 
that this framework is not complete ( what about the historical, for instance 7) 
but I would not accept that it is 'naive'. Of course, Nietzsche might put 
these very distinctions in question ( especially a/c. and b/c ). But in my' 
view the different presentations of eternal recurrence do work within such 
traditional categories,, if only to dissolve them. And these categories also 
correspond to three different dimensions of time: (i) universal ( including 
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historical) time, (ii) what, I will call 'motivational' time, (iii) time as 
lin. ked with identity ( both of things and persons). If the ordinary schemast 
concepts of time can be understood to rest on the value of unity guarant- 
eeing it, reappropriating it, making it possible, etc. - then the deconstruction 
or revaluation of time will invert and displace this value as it is specific- 
ally embodied in each mode, level or dimension. 
Thus we find corresponding to the category of universal time the idea 
that time stretches infinitely in both directions, that it is one dimensionalt 
and that every event has a uniquely determined place in it. Ordinary motivation- 
al time can be glossed as a structure of asymmetry between past and futurel in 
which the past is complete and unaffectable and the future the scene for the 
projection of one's freely chosen ends. Time understood ontologically, in 
I 
relation to identity, is understood either as a neutral container in which 
things or persons endure as they are ( substances), where their identity is 
independent of time, or as productive of identity by making possible the 
development of a being's identity to fulfillment or completion. 
It is a sign of the polysemic depth of the idea of eternal recurrence 
that it can be transformed to transvalue each of these settings. Let us now 
look at some of Nietzsche's remarks that would bear out this reading. We shall 
turn first to the cosmological version of eternal recurrence. 
The Cosmological Version 
This is most explicitly formulated in The Will to Power 0 10629 010660 
and in various notes dating from 1885-8. Let me quote, as countless others 
have donev Nietzsche's 'most scientific' argument for eternal recurrence 
'If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of 
force and as a certain definite number of centres of force - and 
every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless - 
it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass 
through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite times every 
possible combination would at some time or another be realised; more: 
it would be realised an infinite number of times. And since between 
every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations 
would have to take place, and each of these combinations conditions the 
entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement 
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of absolutely identical series is thus , 
demonstrated: the world as a 
circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often 
and plays its game in infinitum. ' 8 
We begin our discussion of this passage with two observations. First, it is 
not convincing, and second, it is not clear what difference it could possibly 
make if it were true, and consequently, it is not entirely clear what it would 
mean for it to be true. 
Th I ere are a number of different claims to be distinguished in this 
passages some more plausible'than others, even allowing for his premises 
(a finite number of forces and infinite time ). As it stands, we are not 
persuaded"either that'a finite number of elements could not generate an 
infinite number of qualitatively different states, thus making the necessary 
infinite repetition of each state a non sequitor. Nor, if everything were to 
be repeated infinitely, can we see why it must take the form of exact cycles 
of complete sequences of permutations. We are not the first to have had 
doubts about this proof. Others have found it more acceptable. Danto, 'for 
example 
9 believes that with the addition of various other plausible pr'em- 
ises it can be made to work. We shall argue, however, that Nietzsche does 
not need the precise repetitions that this argument, if successful would 
prove. But first-we shall look at another problem with the idea of eternal 
recurrence as so conceived: what would it mean for it to be true ? 
We can pose our worry like this: what would it be to be in one cycle 
rather than another ? The request for some distinguishing feature by which 
one cycle could be distinguished from another must always be refused, for 
ex hypothesi there can be none without violating the principle that what 
returns returns identically. There is no point outside such a series to mark 
one's place. The hypothesis could not, then, be confirmed or refuted by our 
ordinary experience. Yet unlike the hypothesis of a divine beingo it does 
not posit a transcendence, a higher plane of existence, just a horizontal 
extension of this one. Eternal recurrence is minimally, it seemst an untest- 
able hypothesis, consistent with ordinary experience, requiring no higher 
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being, and one the mere truth or falsity of which has no effect on our 
experience of the real world. This sounds like an empty, uninteresting idea 
which might at best occupy a marginal place in the dreams of an idle mind. 
And yet Nietzsche himself claims it to be his most powerful insight! Thus: ' 
(1) He claims The Will to Power, 055 it is 'the most scientific 
hypothesis'. We shall have something to say about this shortly. 
(2) In the plan of the book on eternal recurrence outlined in The'Will, to 
Power 01057 , section 2 is entitled . 
'Proof of the doctrine'. He clearly 
takes the cosmological argument seriously. 
(3) He clearly contends that belief in eternal recurrence does make an 
enormous difference. In a letter to Overbeck,, he wrote 
'If it is true - or rather if it is believed to be true - then 
everything changes and turns around and all previous values 
are devalued. ' 10 
What we propose is a strategy of reading Nietzsche's cosmological 
presentation of this doctrine which will both explain the importance with 
which he credits it, and resolve some of the difficulties we have with it. 
First, Nietzsche is not just offering this proof of eternal recurrence in 
an intellectual vacuum. He is opposing it both to the traditional conceptions 
of nineteenth century mechanism , and to the teleological conceptions of 
traditional theology. Let us take mechanism first. Nietzsche has a number 
of reservations about the idea of the world as a network of causes and 
effects. He is sceptical about the very concepts of 'cause' and 'effect' 
as varieties of fiction ). And if as Kelvin argued ) mechanism leads to 
a final state ( entropy) , it must in infinite past time, have already 
reached it. As it clearly has not, mechanism must be false. 
Coming. 1rom Nietzsche, and especially where they concern eternal 
recurrence, which was after all the subject of a vision ( see below) these 
arguments raiseýcertain questions of evaluation. Nietzsche is not parodying 
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scientific discourse; but nor is he committed to its concepts, its 
aI ssumptionsq its standards. Indeed, he elsewhere pours scorn on I those 
conclusions that need proving. What he is doing, -surely, is showing how 
eternal recurrence can be argued for even in terms that he did not himself 
endorse. 
Some sort of. co'nfirmation of his willingness to adopt such a strategy 
can be found in the way he haindles the other main view to which eternal 
recurrence is opposed- - theological teleology. In 0 1062p for'example 
we find the following argument. - 
If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were 
for it some unintended final state, this must also have been reached. 
If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of 
"being", then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along 
with all thinking, all "spirit" . The fact of "spirit" as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is 
incapable of being. ' 
The language here is, surely that of theology. The argument can be 
constructed by substituting the opposition between Being and Becoming 
f or that between Being and non Being in Aquinas I Third Way. Where Aquinas 
argues that a necessary being must be posited to explain how , in infinite 
past time, we have not been swallowed up by a coincidence of non-Being, Niet- 
zsche argues that the'. absence of a goal must be posited to explain how, in 
infinite past time, the'fifiiverse did not cease all becoming. Aquinas did not 
think that such proofs were necessary, only convenient for some. No more 
did Nietzsche. That Nietzschets attitude to the frame of reference in which 
such arguments are constructed is something short of-total commitment can 
surely be seen in the next paragraph in which he continues 
'The old habit ... of associating a goal with every event and a 
guiding, creative God with the world is so powerful that it requires 
an effort for a thinker not to fall into thinking of the very aimless- 
ness of the world as intended. ' 
Howevep-there is clearly a sense in which the cosmological version of 
eternal recurrence moves within this frame of reference. In our view 
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t 
the cosmological argument for eternal recurrence can be seen as subversive 
of both teleology and mechanism in that it can be shown to be no less 
plausible in the very same terms-ýý-And that is the point of my saying that this 
proof is not offered in an intellectual vacuum. It may be quite as important 
that it challenge the existing contenders for our intellectual assent as that 
it finally convinces us in its own right. 
The second consideration we would offer towards a more receptive 
reading of the proof of eternal recurrence is that it can be seen as an attempt 
to give a rigorous', scientific justification for believing something which in 
a more rgeneral form we might find far more plausible. And Nietzsche himself 
at the beginning of the very passage from which this proof comes offers, us 
just such an account of his 'new world conception' which depends,.. not on any 
detailed argument, but on a model of a closed economy of-forces. Does Nietzsche 
really need more than this ? He writes 
' The world exists; it is not something that becomes, not something 
that passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has 
never begun to become and never ceased from passing away - it maintains itself in both. It lives on itself: its excrements are its food. ' 
12 
It might however seem that repetition is entirely missing from this picture, 
which would make it deficient in a vital respect. As we shall see later, the 
abandonment of exact cycles is "a price, -, some think'Nietzsche has--to, pay-to 
give eternal recurrence psychological force. But for this picture here to 
be sufficient we would have to find in the fact that becoming 'never ceases' 
a sufficient embodiment of becoming. We shall come back to this question. 
We have cited Nietzsche's remark in a letter that if. it is believed 
true, eternal recurrence turns everything round. It might be suggested that 
a comparison with heavenly salvation would be appropriate here. For that too, 
true or not, makes an enormous difference if one believes it possible. And 
it shares the feature of unverifiability. 
Heavenly salvation is usually thought of as a reward, or at least as a 4 
consequence of having led a certain sort of life. The reward is to be led,, to 
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another life distinct-fr6m the first, on in which, one presumes, suffering is 
absent ( or in the case of hellg-in which'suffering is eternal and hopeýis 
absent). In this case too, it is arguable that the truth or falsity of the 
existence of an afterlife has no direct bearing on the facts of this life, 
while belief in such a state can have an'enormous 'effect'. Is eternal 
recurrence justla'kind of inversion of salvation 7A kind Up upsidedown 
theology 
Surely on this first cosmological version sno. Because on this account 
it can be'shown that the connection between one cycle and the next is neither 
causal nor moral, so nothing I do will have the slightest effect on the next 
round. This is true whether I believe eternal recurrence or not. And further- 
more if one did suppose the relationship between one-cycle and the next to be 
one of cause/effect in whatever loose form, one could not call it salvation 
( or damnation) for what one does merely to be repeated infinitely. Eternal 
recurrence--does not offer a version of heaven or hell. It can offer in itself 
neither punishment nor reward. It is a horizontal move. ' not a vertical one. 
It is this feature - the horizontality of eternal recurrence - that ,aS, I we 
shall'now explain, allows, -the, -cosmological version of eternal recurrence to 
play its special role in what we'have called the transvaluation of our ordinary 
concept of time. II 
We seem to be able to think of eternal recurrence as a loopy arrow, 
as a single temporal series of a strange loopy shape. And yet without depart- 
ing from seriality, Nietzsche has thereby generated a structure that threatens 
it. When we talk of a loopy shapeg we'think representationally of something 
like a coil, a spfing shape. On such a model we would possess a way of dist- 
inguishing between the different cycles, 'even if there were no clear point at 
which one cycle begins and ends . But on the cosmological model, there is no 
external point of vision, and indedd we are not simply dealing with a model. 
There is no way of distinguishing between one cycle and the next etc. We are, 
or are insideq the coilq and to us the entire history of the universe as we 
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know it could just seem like a straight line, the arc of an immense circle. 
Why do we labour this literal interpretation of the eternal recurrence 
as a cosmological hypothesis 7 Should we not just feel its unfathomable 
power and not pause to analyse its reflective implications 7 We claim that 
this cosmological version is the first stage ( or can be so construed) of 
Nietzsche's deconstruction of ordinary serial time. The key to this operation 
is that Nietzsche has managed to construct using ordinary serial time, a 
plausible account of the structure of time which provides the basis for the 
transvaluation of that 'ordinary time'. Eternal recurrence seems merely to 
be a very powerful modification, extension of seriality. But in fact it puts 
in question the assumed self-contained status of its units - nows - and their 
fundamental successivity. For as well as being located on a horizontal axis 
of succession, each 'unit' also appears to be a member of a vertical series 
of repetitions. 
Psychological"'Time. It is hard to contain this version, as it appears 
in so many guises. Perhaps the'key to it is the role of eternal recurrence 
in undermining and displacing the idea of'purp6se-be it personal or histor- 
ical. As such, however, it is merely negative, and much more needs to 
be said about the idea of affirmation and the transformation of the will. 
We begin with an account of what we might call the lintensity of the moment1v 
which provides something of a template for self-affirmation. 
(a)-The-intensity'of'the'moment 
The cosmological version of eternal recurrence functions in such a 
way as to extend serial succession (in'loops') so that each individual 
moment acquires membership of an additionalp vertical series. 
12a 
Consequently-and we take this up more fully in the next section-the identity 
of such units will also be divided along these two axes. 
'Has time flown away? Have I not fallen... into the well of 
eternity? ' 13 
This second, vertical dimension to each moment, opens up 
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the possibility of, depth and, experientially, intensity. Let us first 
look at some_of the formulations Nietzsche has given of 'the intensity 
oi the moment'. Writing of the aesthetic moment of 'rapture', Nietzche 
says, 
'... in this condition one enriches everything out of one's own 
abundance: what one sees, what one desiresp one sees swollen, 
pressing, strong, overladen with energy... I 
he goes on 
'... the entire emotional system is alerted and intensified so- 
that it discharges all its powers of representation, 'imitations, 
transfiguration, transmutation, every kind of mimicry and play- 
acting conjointly... ' 14 
And the first account Nietzsche gives of eternal recurrence 
15 is the 
occasion for another account of a 'privileged moment'; (we discuss this 
at length below, p. He imagines a demon suggesting that the 
'eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again' 
and suggests two possible reactions - (a) utter despondency and misery, 
(b) exhilaration. The latter he puts like this: 
',,, or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when y6U 
would have answered him: "You are a god ... "? I 
and elsewhere 
16 he tells of 'attaining' the Ubermenschl for one moment' 
and of the immortal 'moment ... in which I produced return' . 
The question I would like to put is this: how far are we confronted 
here with a new general account of the moment - and how far only of. cer- 
tain privileged moments? And if the latter in what way is Nietzsche 
offering a more general revaluation of time? One thing must be true- 
any 'general account of time' must allow the possibility of these self- 
expansive moments. But are they special cases or the general rule? 
Clearly at one level they must be special cases, or they could not exist 
distinctively, or in contrast eg. to the depressive moments of anguish 
at the possibility of eternal recurrence. And yet I think it is clear 
that for Nietzsche they are special in a special sense - they realize 
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the highest possibility'of temporal experience - an intensity 
16a 
of 
vision and/or self-mobilization and affirmation* But what of all the 
other moments that never achieve this status? Do we not have to accept 
that they too are part of time, and so we cannot say that Nietzsche's 
account of time in general, is ecstatic and affirmativeýetc? Should we 
just say that he offers an ideal way of living (the moment) based on 
possibilities intermittently realized? 
This would not be a dull view. By itself, it would require and 
justify some sort of existential temporality just to accommodate these 
peak experienceS. ' 
I But we cannot rest with this picture, for a number of reasons: 
(1) The cosmological version of eternal recurrence'has already compromised 
the idea of time', simp'ly as a sequence of distinct moments. The addition 
of a depth to each moment redirects our attention away from relations 
of succession towards the possibilities of intensification. When Nietzsche 
writes of the 'eternity' of the moment, this is not just a reference to 
its infinite recurrence at other times. The picture we might have of life 
as'a sequence of moments, some high, some low, still depends on giving 
seriality the last word. ''. Given that model, leaping from peak to peak 
would correspond more closely to Nietzsche's picture, But Nietzsche 
does not retain that picture. The variable intensity of the eternally 
recurring moment constitutes an alternative, We return to this shortly. 
(2) There is a second crucial reason why these peak moments are not 
just differento but privileged in relation to those of the plains or the 
valleys. Part of what makes for the experience of exhilaration is that 
they project their own ecstatic affirmative vision onto the rest of time. 
If we think of time from within the ecstasy of such moments, then those, 
moments that do not actualise this peak possibility simply do not figure. 
This gives us a way of understanding the eternity of the moment 
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(I joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deepl deept deep 
eternity') (in a way quite different from, say# Goethe, 
17 
and in a way) 
that seems to conflict with the supposition that in eternal recurrence, 
everything returnsg even the meanest, Here we approach Klossowski's 
18 
reading of the eternal return as a selective operation. 
(3) It is possible to argue that it is not the privilege of peak experiences 
that they project their own temporality onto the rest of time. Do not 
such experiences as boredom, ' depression, and-self-destructive feelings do 
the same* But if they do so there is a major difference. Only this 
affirmative rapture'wills'itself enough to will its own infinite repetition. 
Only this total self-affirmation-wants itself more and again. 
Let us now turn to the role of eternal recurrence in undermining and 
displacing the idea of purpose - the transformation of the will. 
The-transformation't)f, thie*will 
If we consider that structure of action (and the temporality 
that underlies it) in which goals are Pursued, ideals aimed at ,,, it 
is hard to see it as avoidable, let alone as being flawed in some way. 
For Nietzsche, this simple structure - the pursuit of values - very 
easily takes a pathological form, which he calls nihilism. -' For the posit- 
ing of ideals - especially those that could never quite be realized - 
is a tacit'deVAluAtion of this world. Plato, in this sense, is a 
nihilist* Similarlyt the belief in the perfectibility of man, utopian 
thinking, the search for truth, can be seen as valuations of the futýre, 
that, negatively* devalue the present. But the mere recognition of the 
negative nature of ordinary human values merely leads to a second stage of 
depressive nihilism, in which the world has no value, and there are no 
values for it to have, * As we shall seel the thought of the eternal 
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recurrence is meant to be able'to' take'this crushing idea to it's limit, 
and in so doing setting' a challenge to our attitude to the past. For 
the will finds in the past an obstacle that it finds impossible to 
overcome: the past, it seems, is over, is not subject to my will, cannot 
be changed. 
However in the section "Redemption" in*Thtl6'SpAkd'ZArathustra 
Nietzsche charts the-course of the liberation of, the will. In his 
What is Called Thinking Heidegger'devotes some five pages to a discussion 
of this section, in which, broadly speaking, he tries to show that the 
will's liberation consists in a iriumphant victory over all obstacles 
by which victory it instates itself unchallenged in the'seat of metaphys- 
ical subjectivity. 
19 .1 
Zarathustra speaks to his disciples: 
'Will - that is what the liberator and bringer of joy 'is called: 
thus I have taught you my friends. * But now learn this as well: 
the will itself is still a prisoner. ' 
why is it still a prisoner? 
'Powerless against'thatwhich has been done, the will is an angry 
spectator of all things past ... it cannot break time and time's desire'. 20 
There follows an account of a sequence of moves the will makes in revenge, 
as Nietzsche puts it, for this obstacle to its powerp concluding with the 
position we could attribute to Schopenhauer and to Buddism - 'willing 
become not-Willingl. Zarathustra's comment on this is 
'I led you'away from thase fable-songs when I taught you: "The 
will is a creator". ' 
'All "It was" is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until 
the creative will says to it: "But I willed it thus". * 
'The will that is the will to power must will something higher 
than any reconciliation - but how shall that happen? Who has 
taught it to will backwards too?, 21 
The question is left unanswered. Zarathustra"looked like a man seized 
by extremest terrpr', It will turn out, or course that the'Ubermensch 
is the answer to the question. 
540 
Our own view is that this sentence: 'the will that is the will 
to power must will something higher than any reconciliation' - which 
Heidegger does not to my knowledge allude to (in What is Called Thinking 
poses a difficulty for his reading of Nietzsche's account as a metaphysics 
of will. What Nietzsche is insisting on is that the aim of this new 
creative willing is not merely reconciliation to the necessity of time's 
passing away, but an active affirmation of that fact, The question is 
whether this'affirmative willing can importantly exceed the identity- 
seeking, reconciling, appropriating gestures characteristic of the 
rationalizations that had preceded it. 
22 
Clearly this transformation of the will already subverts what I 
have called 'ordinary motivational time'. We are to will, not just 
accept, but will, what has been, and the fact that time will continue 
to pass over into the past. This is an idea it is almost impossible to 
to think. One can accept that it might in theory satisfy the condition 
of going beyond mere reconciliation, but what can it mean? The idea 
sticks there, 'undecidable in terms'of our ordinary understanding of willing, 
and will not go away. 
I mentioned before the importance for Nietzsche of a transformation 
of nihilism - he saw himself as moving beyond. nihilism only in his latest 
work (Ecce Homo). And in this move, we find the greatest challenge to-- 
our ordinary understanding of motivation. The thought of eternal recur- 
rence has two faces: a face of terror and a face of exhilaration. The 
test that eternal recurrence poses is whether one can say yes to it, and 
transcend terror. 'Couragetv Nietzsche writes 'destroys even death, for 
it says "Was that life? Well then, once more". 123 But the passage I have 
just been alluding to is Nietzsche's first real announcement of the eternal 
recurrence. 
When one first grasps eternal recurrence-all hope is extinguished. 
Everything incomplete, ill-f ormed, unwanted etc. will return. But there follows 
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an, expansion Va tremendous momentl in which one finds oneself strong 
enough to affirm*all this. We learn something, I believe, from Nietzschets 
precise words: If * this * thought'gained 'po. 4se. 4si6n'6f 'you, * it, would * change 
you as you are, or perhaps crush you', or 'What does not kill me makes me 
strongert - as he wrote in Twilight of the'Idols24. 
The idea of eternal recurrence is both a test of onels strengthp' 
and also, a source, an inspiration, The demon, on the second reading, 
is recognized as 'a god'. The idea can 'take possession'. At this 
most vital point, Nietzsche is taking as seriously as he could the idea 
that the consequences of believing something are more important than its 
truth (if indeed they can be distinguished from it). The eternal recurr- 
ence may be a trial; it is also a ladder. 
But can it really*make'sense to believe it? In this form? And 
could it, after all. really make any difference, except by a misunderstanding? 
We have already come across these questions- they-are important in their 
own right, but also for judging whether Nietzsche has really succeeded in 
displacing the ordinary motivational time we usually take for granted. 
There are at least two ways of articulating a critical attitude to 
the value or significance of eternal recurrence: 
(as we saw above) that eternal recurrence cannot make any difference 
because we will neverhave any memory of past cycles,, nor will our actions 
ever affect future cycles. Indeed it could be said that experientially 
it makes no. difference whether I do this self-same thing once or an 
infinite number of times, if each time is independent of the other, and 
each occasion is identical; 
(2) that it makes an enormous difference, because if the doctrine is true 
then I have no real possibility of transforming, or transvaluing anything, 
unless, of course, I have already done so before. This view Nietzsche 
calls 'Turkish fatalism'. 
When one reads commentaries on Nietzsche, and indeed Nietzsche him- 
self, one is given the impression that these questions have sadly 'missed 
the point'. Two different general responses are offered, which are 
not, in my view, mutually consistent. The first, Nietzsche's own, which 
applies both to fatalism, and also to the indifferentism of the first 
objection, is basically a form of compatibilism. 
tThe truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when 
he thinks he is stirring against fate in the way described, fate 
is being realized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is 
resignation to fate- all these imaginary ideas are-included in 
fate'. 
'You yourselft poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira 
reigning far above the gods ... In you the whole future of the 
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human world is predetermined- it will not help you if you are terrified 
of yourself, I* 'Thd'Wdriddrdt 'arid But the second explanation 
of why they are misplaced, involves a further step away from the idea of 
eternal recurrence as a scientific hypothesis about repetitive cycles. 
The eternal recurrence is neither a mechanical, nor Ilogicall, nor mathe- 
matical 'repetition'. Rather. it can exercise a'selective power. 
This, selectivity can be understood in two different ways: one 
? moral$ and the other ontological. The first, 'moral' way is the more 
obvious. On this account, only what can affirm its infinite, repetition 
deserves to return. Clearly such an idea can function as a principle by 
which one regulates one's words and deeds, a kind of su erviligant- IP 
conscience. The ability to affirm eternal recurrence is a moral test* 
Nietzsche clearly offers us this version, but it has its difficulties. 
It seems to leave open the prospect of a gap between what ought to happen 
and what does. This is especially true if we take seriously the idea 
t 
that actually'everything, deserving or not$ returns. And the, problem is 
that for Nietzsche, such a gap*invites nihilism. 
26 The second, less obvious 
way, we will call"ontologicall. On this accountwilling eternal recurrence 
actually does operate as a selective procedure, such that certain events, 
objects -, relations, moments will return and some will not. Clearly this 
is a significant modification of the original cosmological account of 
eternal recurrence. And there are clearly difficulties with it. For a 
start, it undercuts the heroism of the original affirmation that wills 
the return even of the lowliest and meanest thing* For that would no 
longer return at all. 
There are two rather different ways of thinking through this second 
alternative. The first would concentrate on such Nietzschean remarks 
as that the thought of eternal recurrence licenses most men to self- 
erasure (crushed by'the greatest weight). There will be some people 
who continue who -af firm themselves and the worlds and some also who do not. 
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(I take it this can be understood either physically or existentially. ) 
27 
But here 'continue' is relative'to a-particular lifeg and, on the standard 
version of eternal recurrence, those'acts (or conditions) of self-erasure 
would themselves return eternally just-as much as the acts of self- 
overcoming. And that would surely spoil the story. The second way of 
pursuing the ontological version of selectivity is not wholly distinct, 
but conceptually far more subtle. 
Deleuze 28 , argues that if 
(a) we take seriously the idea that eternal recurrence i's 'the being of 
becoming' (as Nietzsche himself claims) 
29 
. and 
(b) distinguish (as Nietzsche does) between *active' and 'reactive' 
(forces) and apply this distinction to kinds of 'becoming' then, 
(c) we can say that only 'active becoming' thas being' in the sense of 
embodying the principle of eternal recurrence. So 
(d) only active becoming returns. Why? 
'the eternal return would become contradictory if it were the 
return of reactive forces". 30 
The work here is obviously being done by the relation between 
being and becoming, and we must defer until the next section a proper 
assessment of this position. What we can say is that in Deleuze we 
find for the first time an account of how eternal recurrence would 
function as a selective principle that does not obviously presuppose the 
ordinary model. of time as a succession of point instants. The question 
we will now pose is this: what understanding can we have of the moment 
that will allow the return of only those moments which affirm themselves, 
or perhaps better, in which we affirm ourselves. The clue must lie in 
a way of thinking of time that leaves seriality behind. 
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tontological'Time 
We have suggested above that the clue to how we can understand 
'The moment' in such a way as to allow the return only of those moments 
in which we affirm ouselves lies in a way of thinking about time that 
leaves seriality behing. But how is such a thought to be realized? 
Would we not be trapped In a perpetual present? Consider the following: 
(1) What is at issue, what is valuable, what is at*stake in any exper- 
ience is always'the same - it is the intensity of self-affirmation that 
it contains. In this sense, other moments, moments that don't make the 
grade, just don't Come into the reckoning. 
(2) If I we ask of 'the moment' whether it is one or many, we find ourselves 
embroiled in the most difficult thoughts. It is not enough to distinguish 
qualitative and numerical senses; we are left with, and I think Nietzsche 
means to leave us with, a genuine lundecidablet. I would like to spend 
a little time on this, focussing on a famous passage from*Thus. 'Spake-. t,., -, 
Zarathustra ('Of the Vision and the Riddle') in which Nietzsche explains 
the eternal return in relation to the gateway called 'Moment'. where the 
paths of the. infinite past and the infinite, future meet. The account 
proceeds in increasing tones of horror, and then turns to the vision of 
the shepherd choking on a snake, who bites off its head and is a trans- 
formed being... Let us look at the text: 
'Then something 
- 
occurred which lightened me: for the dwarf jumped 
from my shoulder, the inquisitive dwarf. And he squatted down 
upon a stone in front of me. But a gateway stood just where we 
had halted. "Behold this gateway, dwarf! ". I went on: "It has 
two aspects* Two paths come together here.:. no one has ever reached 
their end. " 
"This long lane ahead of us - that is another eternity, They are 
in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: 
and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name 
of the gateway is written above it: 'Moment'. " ' 
"But if one were to follow them further and ever further and 
further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal 
opposition? " 
"Everything straight lies, " murmured the dwarf disdainfully. 
"All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle. " 
"Spirit of gravity! " I said angrily, "do not treat this too lightly!.. " 
"Behold this moment! " I went on. 
"From this gateway Moment. a long eternal lane runs back: an eternity 
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lies behing us. " 
"Must not all things that can run have already run along this 
lane?. Must not all things that*can happen have already happened, 
been done, run past? " 
"And if all things have been here before: what do you think of this 
moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, toog have been here - before? " 
"And are not all things bound fast together in such a, way that 
this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore draws 
itself too? " 31 1 
I would like to select three sections of this passage for comment: 
(1) 'They are in opposition to each other, these paths... and. it is here 
at this gateway that they come together', 
(2) 1 ... what do you think of this moment, dwarf, Must -not this gateway 
too have been here before? And, are not all things bound fast together in 
such a way that this moment draws after it all future,, ihings? Therefore 
draws itself too? 
(3) 'The name of the gateway is written above in. 'Moment'. 
We first note that the moment is the coming togethýi-of two paths (past 
and future) in opposition. And yet this coming together is not as such a 
reconciliations but a tension. It is left to the possibility of eternal 
recurrence to alleviate their oppositional character. Second, the question 
of the gateway. When Zarathustra asks 'Must not this gateway, too, have 
been here beforeV is he talking of this'particular moment, or is he 
talking of the moment as the basis of a structure of repetition? What would 
it be to talk of this moment, to talk of this moment? Nietzsche has 
already given it metaphorical substantiality by calling it a-gateway. 
And we can suppose that the vertical parts of the gateway will symbolize 
the vertical dimension of time. But there is a third point. 
it is a commonplace of a structuralist view of language to suppose 
that it has to be understood as comprising twoaxes syntagmatic/paradig- 
32 
matic, metonymic/metaphoric etce The serial articulations of a word 
are supplemented by paradigmatic relationships of substitutability 
relationships in which substitutions of other words would retain some 
important features same meaning, same grammatical category, still forming 
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an intelligible sentence etc. Now it might be thought gratuitous to sug- 
gest a parallel between the double axis Of language, and the double axis 
of time that eternal recurrence would generate. But consider the sentence 
'The name of the gateway is written above it: "Moment". ' 
At this critical point, Nietzsche introduces not just 'language' but 
writing. What is the force of'this appearance of writing? It is tempting 
to compare, it-to, that point in the first chapter in_Hegells'Phenomenology 
of Mind at which he is demonstrating thatIthe Universal is the truth of 
sense-ýcertaintyl. He writes: 
'It is as a universal ... that we give'utterance to sensuous fact. - 
What we say is "this" ie. the general this ... we do not present before 
our mind in saying so the universal this, or being in general, 
but we utter what is minimal.. language ... as we see is the more 
truthful. ' 33 
For Hegel, the moment of language is the moment of universality. Can 
we say the same of Nietzsche? Is not Nietzsche suggesting that the 
structure of"m6ment' is as independent of any'particular experience as 
is writing of any particular intentional context? Might it not then be 
that it is precisely the'moment that eternally returns the same? But 
what is the moment? When'he writes"this gateway' should we read it as 
one or as many? It is tempting to read him as saying there is just one 
moment, but then we have to add vwhich gets repeated'. So there are 
many., 
I would suggest first of all that the moment of writing in Nietzsche 
as in Hegel's reference to the 'utterance' of 'this' puts in question the 
_presence 
of consciousness ('We do not present before our mind in saying 
so the universal this') but unlike Hegel, we are not led to another presence 
that of the realm of universality (which will ultimately be subsumed 
under that general self-presence of Spirit). For Nietzsche, the moment 
of writing is the moment of undecidabilitys'undecidabilitys that is, 
and as always, within the framework that insists on a clear answer to 
the question - one or many? 
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We can recall here Nietzsche's suggestion that eternal recurrence 
is 'the being of-becoming', or 'the closest approximation of being in 
becoming'. Abstractly, it might suggest (and we might conclude) that 
eternal recurrence is the way the force of becoming is finally'betrayed. 
Becoming, we might say, is the one thing that never changes, and hence 
enbodies the value of'permanence, which is the hallmark of-Being. 
But there is something very strange about such a formulation. 
'Becoming is the one thing that never changes' seems like a perfectly 
intelligible sentence. What if becoming was'the greatest threat to all. 
thinking involving an 'is'? The 'approximation' of the becoming of eter- 
nal recurrence to being should be read neither as Nietzsche's confession 
of a new metaphysics., nor as a naive admission of that fact, 
Rather the approximation of the becoming of eternal recurrence to 
being should be seen as a, disruptive substitution of an'undecidable 
term into metaphysical discourse. tBecominj in Nietzsche functions in 
the way in which, for example, f writing"functions in Derrida. 
34 Becoming 
is no more in simpleýopposition to Being than'writing (in Derrida's 
new sense) can be simply*opRosed to speech. 
35 The function of eternal 
recurrence is to allow the reinscription of becoming within the discourse 
of metaphysics in a way that undermines that discourse. 
The point is that becoming demands a quite 'different' logic of 
identity to that of being. 
It is now possible, I think, to distinguish more clearly three quite 
different functions' of eternal recurrence. The first, as I have suggested, 
undermines the privilege of seriality by introducing, via exact cycles, 
a vertical depth. The second is to parody the values of a philosophy of 
being, by providing for every particular a kind of universality, But there 
is a third function, and that will require yet another thinking through 
of the meaning of eternal recurrence. 
36 
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We have already heard what Nietzsche has to say about the state 
of rapture as an affirmative projectivity. The Dionysian poet could be 
said to 'go out of himself', 
37 
and when Nietzsche discusses the will to 
power, he says 'it must will something higher than any_reconciliationt. 
In each case the basic structure is one of a self-exceeding which is not 
appropriated, but which, precisely, risks the self, and does not aim at 
a higher reconciliation, This, I would argue, is the fundamental structure 
of the moment for Nietzsche. And corresponding to this futural element 
of risk is the importance of forgetting; both are aspects of non-approp- 
riative thought. 
How is this idea of a self-exceeding that is not appropriated 
compatible with talk of the eternal recurrence of the same? 
38 Doesn't 
the reference to sameness imply, if not identity, at least a continuity? 
And is that not precisely what is put in question by an exceeding that 
doessnot 'return'? 
There is-a way of reading this reference to the eternal return of T 
the 'same' that does make sense. We can treat it as a description not 
of repeated contents of experience, but of the dynamic structure of 
experience - the rhythm, the pulse of excitement and fatigue, of arousal 
and consummationj of exhilaration and passivity, of the rising and setting 
of the passions... It is this movement, the movement of becoming that is 
repeated eternally. Or. with Deleuze, 
39 
we can say that it is-. the-returning 
that returns. But what of our reference to a non-appropriating exceeding, 
a nonreconciliatory will? Surely the point is that sameness is not what 
is repeated, not what returns, but, again, is constituted by that return. 
The 'return to self' operates without a selfv*is the self. 
40 
Sameness 
is this eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence is the condition of and 
not merely the extension or prolongation of sameness. 
I now want to return to the question with which I began - whether 
Nietzschevs thought is another kind of philosophy of presence or whether 
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he might be said to have exceeded the parameters of that framework. 
Without wanting to-claim to have mastered the complexities of Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche, it is worth reminding'ourselves that Heidegger 
does claim that Nietzsche's philosophy is in this way metaphysical. 
The-will that wills the past, that affirms all that has been and which is 
then able to will 'the eternal return of the same' is, he says 
'The supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally 
wills its own willing'. 41 
This will to power is interpreted as a form - the highest form - of 
subjectivityp of self-presence. But surely everything could turn on how 
we think of the moment? 
If Nietzsche's account of the moment renders its relation to the 
question 'one or many' undecidable, and if the ecstatic moment can be 
treated not as an exception, but simply as the highest possibility of 
intensification of experience, and if the realization of that possibility 
is, as I believe it is for Nietzsche, the essence (ie. non-essence) 
of time, there surely is a case for saying that'Nietzsche's thought here 
at least aims beyond presence and self-presence. Everything hangs on 
our being able to accept the idea that 
(a) a general description can be given of the various accounts Nietzsche 
gives of the intensities of a moment, and 
(b) that this description is that of a willing/thinking/affirming beyond, 
that does*not aim at its own preservation, but'risks itself perpetually, 
a going out that, even as it anticipates a*return, puts in question what 
it is that will be returned to. 
If this is not Nietzsche's thought, Nietzsche, must be far less 
important than he is supposed. What I would accept - and this remark 
is not meant as a retreat - is that, as Derrida might sayt deconstructive 
theses coexist in Nietzsche with those that remain'inscribed within 
metaphysics. 
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Reading Heidegger reading Nietzsche:, an interim report 
Clearly a challenge is being posed here to Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche, and we devote this last section-to an elaboration of that 
challenge. We continue to draw on the work of Deleuze to that end. 
Unlike Heidegger, he sees the concepts of Will to Power and Eternal 
Recurrence as successfully deconstructing the matrix of metaphysical 
conceptuality. And it must be with Heidegger in mind that he writes 
'We misinterpret the expression "eternal return" if we understand 
it as "return of the same". I. +2- 
To readers of Derridap his argument will be familiar, although the direc- 
tion it gives to the thought of the eternal recurrence is new. He writes 
'The synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past 
and future grounds its relation to other moments. The eternal 
return is thus an answer to the problem of passage. ' (ibid) 
We shall return to discuss this passage (together with "The Vision and 
the Riddle") shortly. He continues 
'And in this sense it must not be interpreted as the return of 
something that is, that is "one", or the "same". We misinter- 
prete the expression "eternal return" if we understand it as 
"return of the same". ' (ibid) 
We must, prepare ourselves for an inversion: 
'It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself 
that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming, 
and of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns 
but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed 
of diversity or multiplicity. In other wordst identiýyjn eternal 
return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, 
on the contraryt'the'fact of =etui=n 'for*that which differs, 
This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis, 
a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity, 
and its reproduction ... 1(ibid) (our emphasis). 
Derrida's position seems very similar here. He wrote 
'And on the basis of this unfolding of the same as differance 
we see announced the sameness of differance and repetition 2. -n 
the eternal return. ' 4.3 
For both Deleuze and Derrida the key underlying idea is that identity 
is not a fixed point we need to presuppose for differences to be possible; 
matters are rather the other way rotmd. And the possibility that a thing 
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can appear again and again at different times is what gives it an iden- 
tity; 
-it 
is not dependent on it having a prior atemporal identity. Time, 
then, is not only constitutive of identity, rather than a mere medium 
in which things unfold, but itself constituted by its role in supporting 
identities and differences. But even if we cannot in any simple way say 
'what' it is that returns, independently of its returning, there are 
still questions that need answering. Perhaps I can put my disquiet like 
this: when Deleuze talks of 'the returning itself that constitutes being' 
is he talking here in fact of Being or beings? Is he referring to Time 
itself, or to things in time? I take it that Nietzsche fairly plainly 
talks about things in timeo or if not things at least events, configura- 
tions of forces. And yet if we take seriously these remarks of Deleuze, 
eternal return is being interpreted as the ground of 'time itself'. 
It may or may not be possible to square this with any account of the 
return of particular (especially non-human) beings, but it would certainly 
suggest thats yet again, eternal recurrence is functioning as a device for 
the deconstruction of time - here time seen as the locus of identity. 
Herev Deleuze raises explicitly, the question with which we began - 
that of presence. I suggested at the'outset that Nietzsche might perhaps 
have offered an account of the present, and'indeed of time based on the 
present, that was not subject to Heidegger's (or to Derridals) criticisms. 
The vital question will undoubtedly be the status of becoming in Nietzsche. 
Let us'now begin to open up this question. 
Heidegger's verdict on Nietzsche is rather different from that of 
either Deleuze or Derrida: 
(a) Heidegger quotes Nietzsche's remark that 'everything-recurs is the 
closest approximation of a world of Becoming to one of Being - peak of 
meditation' 
4-+ 
and comments 
'with his doctrine of eternal, return, Nietzsche in his way thinks 
nothing else than the thought that pervades the whole of western 
philosophy'. 4-' 
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Why? Because he thinks Being as Time without thinking it as the question 
of Being. 
'Eternity,, not as a static "now", 'nor as -a sequence of "nows" 
rolling off into the infinite, but as the "now" that bends back 
into itself: what is that if not the concealed essence of Time? 
Thinking Being, Will to Power, as eternal return, thinking the 
most difficult thought of philosophy means thinking Being as 
Time'. 4.6 
So, Nietzsche, does not think of the question of Being (and Time). But 
might one not justly respond that the thought of eternal return is a 
continuous questioning, that to use such an idea as an explication of time 
as Becoming, is to lodge a question as deep as possible into the heart 
of time. It may be that when understood as ! the mere bending back of the 
"now"' the eternal return no longer had that disturbing-undecidability 
that we have consistently noted, but perhaps that is a deficiency in 
Heidegger's reading. Might not Deleuze be right to query Heidegger's 
reading of eternal return as (always) eternal return of the same? 
(b) Our second source is, What is Called ThinkjM? ' 
+7 
I ... the answer Aristotle gave to, the question of the essential 
nature of time still governs Nietzsche's idea of time'. 
We have already alluded to his argument: that Nietzsche's use of a. 
transvaluing will to affirm the past betrays a traditional valuation of 
Being (including the tBeing' of time) as present. Our response, we may 
recall, was to say that he took no account of Nietzsche's reference to a 
will that did not seek 'reconciliation' - that Heidegger was refusing 
the radicality of Nietzsche's affirmative willing. 
Finally, I would like to suggest a way of reading Heidegger on 
Nietzsche, one that draws on some of the ambiguities in the notion of 
authenticity that we noted in our long discussion of Heidegger's, Being 
and Time (vide supra). In our discussion of authenticityO we noted 
tendencies towards closure (for examplep the idea that one's lownmost 
possibilities' could ever be anything more than a question) and tendencies 
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that would preclude such a closure, such as references to anxiety, the 
abyss, and throwness. '+9 1 would like to show that this, tension. between 
these two motifs is not just found generally in Being and Time, but is 
found specifically connected with the question of that ongoing rupturing 
of selfhood that I have associated, with the Nietzschean moment. Even 
more interestingly, Heidegger offers us, within the space of a few lines, 
though without posing it as a problem, the very question that is most 
pressing - how to understand this 'rupturing' in terms of Being. -Finally, 
he does this at one of the very few places at which he invokes the name 
(in brackets! ) of Nietzsche. These are the sentences in question: 
1. 'Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost 
possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all 
one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. -4-7 
What is this 'giving itself up' ('Selbstaufgabet),? Is, it just death in 
the narrow sense. or is it not precisely the risking of all one is and has 
known? How does Heidegger continue? Doesn't he temper the radicality of 
the suggestion he has just made? 
2. 'In anticipationp Dasein guards itself against falling back behind 
itself and behind the potentiality for Being which it has understood. 
It guards itself against "becoming too old for its victories". 
(Nietzsche)'. (ibid). 
The iaportant thing here is how we understand 'falling back behing one- 
self"and the 'potentiality for Being' (which it has understood). 
These remarks can be given a direct Nietzschean interpretation - 
the 'understanding of Being' which it has understood is of course not a 
self to which one clings, but, I would suggest, a grasp of the sense and 
responsibility of the lintensitylof experience. The problem about 
'not falling back' is the same problem as that of selectivity'.. only 
what can will its own return can/should return. 
The clear Nietzschean influence here suggests what will seem 
obvious when stated - that we would be wise not to divorce Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche from his continuing attempts at a self-interpretation, 
50 
554 
We would like to have shown that if we suppose that the model of 
Dionysian excess provides. a standard by which to measure the, intensity of 
the moment, and if that excess is a non-recuperable rupture with all 
'presence', then Nietzsche's 'moment', so far from being the reworking 
of the metaphysical value of presence, is the scene of its explosion. 
But is that what we should conclude about Nietzsche?, Does he achieve 
the magical result of a non-metaphysical philosophy of the present? 
Perhaps matters are not quite so clear cut. What he does do, I believe, 
is to force us to make a distinction between two levels at which we can 
understand the meaning of 'presence' as a metaphysical value. The first 
we might in modem terms call foundationalist, and the second we could 
call appropriative. To each corresponds a different stratum of that mode 
of textual inscription that Derrida insists makes for metaphysics. By 
foundationalist, I mean a kind of thinking that reduces to or derives 
from one fundamental point the entire developed structure of some theor- 
etical field. Arguably, Nietzsche does this at least in a formal, and 
perhaps only strategic way, if we are right in giving the moment the sta- 
tus we have. Nonetheless we could say, in Levinasian language, that 
for Nietzsche, time, in the shape of this 'moment' is an opening onto the 
other, onto otherness, onto what may never be appropriated, made identicalv 
brought back. Here Nietzsche does break with the second characterisation 
we have given of the metaphysical value associated with presence., 
Nietzsche, on this reading would be a non-appropriative foundationalist. 
This characterisation brings back the question we raised when 
discussing whether Nietzsche's was a special or a general theory. And 
for all the value of seeing the ecstatic moment as an ideal, it surely 
does not actually capture the general structure of time. It is precisely 
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because it does not that it can function as an ideal. And what that 
suggests is that we may learn more about the possibilities of exceeding 
metaphysics from the non-appropriative stratum of his thinking than from 
its foundationalism. 
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NOTES for Introduction 
1. "Ousia and Grarrme" , in Mames de la Philosophie, Paris: Minuit, 1972, p. 73. Margins of Philosophy,, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, 1982, p. 63 
2. This view of metaphysics and its determination of the history of philosophy is shared in broad outline by Derrida and Heidegger, and will be discussed in 
a critical way below. 
3. The presuppositions of unity and continuity in the idea of tradition will be disaussed in the course of the thesis. 
4. It is only for the sake of simplicity of presentation that we assume for the mcment that there is only concept of time. 
5. See our ( unpublished) manuscript: "The Status of Textual Temporality". 
6. The precise sense of 'critical' here will emerge later. It is closer to the 
Kantian sense of 'critique' than to any negative sense of criticism, but it 
cannot be identified, with the Kantian sense. 
7. See "De la Grammatologie Ccmme Science Positive" p. 130 in De la Grammatol 
Paris: 11inuit 1967 ( "Of Gra=, utology as. a Positive Science", Of Grammatoloqy, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976, p. 87 
8. Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaftenund die transzendentale Phanemon- 
ologie The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962 ( actually written in the mid-30's). ( The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental PhenomenolMý, Evanston: North- 
Western, 1970. 
9.06, "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology" 
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NOTES to Part I Chapter one 
This is mostly closely matched by Husserl's Ilebendige Gegenwart, 
(living present), and was illuminated as a value central to the 
history of metaphysics (ie. Western philosophy) by Heidegger 
(variously as Praesenz, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart), and then again 
by Derrida. See later chapters. 
2. The drying up of the well-springs of philosophical thought was itself 
only a symptom of a culture-wide crisis for which phenomenology was 
to be the cure. Husserl suggests this evangelical point of view at 
both ends of his career. See 
, 
Philosophy As a Rigorous Science (1911) 
and his The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1936). - 
3. Although Heidegger made this distinction (eigentlich/uneigentlich) 
central to his Being and Time, it was important to Husserl too: 
'since authentic experience, i. e. the intuitive and ultimately adequate$ 
provides the standard for the evaluation of experience, the phenomeno- 
logy of "authentic" experience is especially required. ' (Phenomeno- 
logy of Internal Time-Consciousness (hereafter PITC), p. 28) 
4. The stabilization of meaning through language is an important theme 
for Husserl (see eg. his Origin of Geometry 0669 and our discussion 
in the next chapter), but this is regulative rather than a creative 
or productive phenomenon as it would be for one such as Nietzsche. 
5. Mohanty in 
, 
Husserl and Frege, Indiana U. P. (1982) convincingly disputes 
FOllesdalls commonly accepted account of the decisiveness of Frege's 
review. See eg. p. 13. 
6. A version of such a, reduction can be found in a paper by Y Bar-Hillel. 
7. For an excellent account of the difference, which amounts to a defence 
of Husserl's solution, see Dallas Willard, "Logical Psychologism: 
Husserl's Way Out", APQ vol 9 No. 1 Jan. 1972. 
8. For such a version of such a general anti-foundationalism see Richard 
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Blackwell 1980. 
9. See eg. Ross Harrison "The concept of Prepredicative Experience" in 
Edo Pivcevic (ed. ) Philosophy and Phenomenological Understanding 
C. U. P. 1975. 
10. This statement is meant to mark a position in what has become known 
as the lend of metaphysics' debate that has arisen from the work of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida and was much discussed in the late 
19601s. Are such interventions really of any avail? I would accept 
that they can be confusing. If we compare, for example, Kant's 
discussion (B21-23, First Critique) of how metaphysics as science is 
possible, we can find him castigating a use of reason that transcends 
the limits of its proper application as dogmatic metaphysics. We 
558 
are generalizing that ideal of adequacy 
,, 
while jettisoning the ideal 
of philosophy (or metaphysics) as a science. Our suggestion that 
$metaphysics' should be understood as a blindness to the question of 
limits rather than as having recourse to the value of 'presence' has 
the merit of releasing experience from the demand that it perform an 
impossible (foundational) task, all by itself. 'Presence' is indeed 
an illusion if seen as an absolute origin or foundation, but that 
experience can both at the time and on reflection seem to have this 
value, that 'presence' is phenomenally real, is not an illusion, but 
a fact. What we have to assess are the limits of its significance 
where none were once even suspected. 
It might be thought that Husserl's emphasis on the descriptive aspect 
of phenomenology would make the reference to this theory of time inappropriate. Hy reply would be four-fold: (i) while he does 
write all the time of his 'analysis' of time-consciousness, when he 
discusses Brentano's account of time, he uses the terms 'analysis' 
and 'theory' interchangeably, (ii) he is quite happy writing of his 'theory' of noetic/noematic structures at a point at which phenomeno- 
logical description is still to the fore (Ideas sect. Ill ch. 4), (iii) if we were to conclude that Husserl is not offering a theory 
of time, I think it could only be because the term 'theory' was 
inapplicable in principle to an account of time, not that Husserl 
had not gone that far. Certainly none of the other 'interesting' 
ways in which one might study time that he enumerates (PITCt 01 
"The Exclusion of Objective Time" pp. 22-3) could more suitably wear 
the mantle 'theory of time'. (iv) finally, there is an important and 
straightforward sense in which his 'analysis of time-consciousness, 
is, or is part of, a 'theory of time' in that he wants to argue that 
our grasp of the 'Objectivity of time' is predicated on internal time- 
consciousness. 
12. Of course these alternatives might be quite distinct. One might, 
eg. come to credit 'intuition' with pride of place as a hypothesis 
generating procedure, while giving it no value whatsoever as an 
epistemological foundation. Yet interestingly, Popper, to whom one 
might attribute such a view, does speak of the continuing need to 
'clarify' the 'foundations' (of differential and integral calculus). 
See Conjectures and Refutations RKP, 4th (revised) edition, 1972 p. 70. 
13. It is precisely here that Heidegger can be seen to have diverged from 
Husserl. For Heidegger this is no mere formal or even methodological 
circle, but one with a vital ontological dimension, in which the 
preliminary considerations are seen as both rooted in our existence, 
and fore-shýdowing the later reflexive elaboration. See his 
' 
Being 
and Time 068f and the discussion of phenomenological method in the 
introduction, especially 07(C). 
14. It would perhaps be stretching the point to describe Derrida as 
being to Husserl what G6del was to Hilbert, and yet... 
15. Thus in Philosophy as a Rigorous Science Husserl attributes the 
confusi mathematics and physics in the early 20th centruy to 
a failure to adequately (- intuitively) ground their basic concepts. 
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What he was clearly not prepared to accept is that it was precisely 
the status of such intuitive foundations that was in crisis. 
16. See note 10 above. 
17. Ideas section IV ch. 20 0136f. 
18. After analysis into simple truths, 'what I have to do is to run over 
them all repeatedly in my mind, until I pass so quickly from the 
first to the last that practically no step is left to the memory, and 
I seem to view the whole all at the same time'. 
Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XI. 
19. This involves transforming 'consciousness' from an adjectival form 
qualifying a particular type of worldly existence to being an inde- 
pendent field of investigation with only contingent worldly 
embodiment. Husserl's precise position on the authonomy of conscious- 
ness underwent certain shifts as his thought developed. The following 
three positions seem to stand out of an undoubtedly more complex 
picture: 
i.. (Logical Investigations and first decade of 20th C. ).. The shift 
to studying the formations of consciousness could be described as 
purely methodological, without commitment to the existential autonomy 
of consciousness. 
ii. (Ideas and after) Husserl talks of the realm/sphere of trans- 
cendental subjectivity as logically prior to any positing of the 
existence of an 'objective' world. See eg. Ideas 046 (p. 145) "1 
myself or my experience in its actuality am absolute Reality, given 
through a positing that is unconditioned and simply indissoluble", 
and 049 (p. 151) "the Being of consciousness, of every stream of - 
experience generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified 
by a nullifying of the thing-world, would not be affected thereby in 
its own proper existence". 
iii. Crisis_of European Sciences (1936) Husserl attempts to correct 
the W6-r-ldlessness of the 'reduced' ego in Ideas, introducing the idea 
of the 'life-world' as the complex worldly involvement that all our 
philosophical activity takes for granted. See for example 044f. 
20. 'no direct experience can ever deceive the understanding if it restricts 
its attention accurately to the object presented to it, just as it is 
given to it either at first-hand or by means of an image; and if it 
moreover refrains from judging ... for in ... judgements we are 
exposed to error'. Rules for the Direction of the Mind Rule X11 
(in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. Haldane & 
Rossl Cambridge, 1911 p. 44. 
21. A science of necessary truths, established with certainty and clarity. 
Kant had used the term before Husserl. 
22. It might be thought that echoes, or at least parallels to 
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a logically private 
language are to be found here. But perhaps oddly, I think Husserl 
would not disagree with Wittgenstein. The intutive adequacy my words 
ideally have to me is a private but not an idiosyncratic relationship. 
Such privacy is a condition of significance logically generallizable 
to all other language users. 
560 
23. Husserl's solution, much discussed by Derrida, is to separate 
two forms of such 'clothing' - indication and expression. In 
the latterv such problems of adequacy are supposed to disappear. 
Derrida claims indication is ineliminable. See discussion 
below (ch. 5 ). 
.-. NOTES to Part One Chapter 2 
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Hegel The Phenomenology of Mind trans. Bailey George, Allen & 
Unwin 2nd edition 1949 p. 133 (Introduction) 
2. Even though this is not the place for a discussion of the 
varieties of hermeneutic theory, it ought to be said that even 
within 'hermeneutics' there are considerable differences of 
opinion as to its scope and its basis. Broadly speaking, one 
may distinguish those for whom hermeneutics is a supplementary 
method of 'scientific' inquiry, specially adapted for the human 
sciences -a view derived from Dilthey, and continued by Betti 
and Hirsch, and those for whom it has an ontological significance, 
in which the main question to be answered is always man's 
relation to Being. This latter track we associate more with 
Heidegger and Gadamer. (See R. E. Palmer's Hermeneutics, ch. 4) 
The account we have given that focusses on the inadequacy of the 
subject/object schema is common to both. 
3. Even Husserl's own discussion of the Absolute Flux, developed 
especially in section 111 of PITC marks within the text itself 
a limit to the phenomenology of time because it suggests that 
time-consciousness is itself foundeO on a more fundamental flux 
to which temporal predicates are at best only analogically or 
imperfectly applicable, Does this mark the point at which the 
phenomenology of time deconstructs itself? 
4. Freud of course claims (in his account of the Dreamworlý that the 
unconscious is oblivious to both logic and time, but might it not 
be a particular kind of time that it ignores? (After all in 
talking about dream-interpretation he tells us that we must be on 
the look out for temporal inversions, sequences, for example, which 
begin with their conclusion). Husserl's answer to this possibility 
can be deduced from Fink's brief Appendix VIII to The Crisis of 
European Sciences ... "On the Problem of the Unconscious". 
He claims that for Husserl,. the common (including the Freudian) 
understanding of the unconscious rests on a naive (ie. pre- 
phenomenological) understanding of consciousness. The concept 
of the unconscious can only function adequately at all after 
the phenomenological clarification of 'consciousness'. This 
seems a reasonable claim, but is it compatible with the radical 
(Freudian) claim that phenomenological clarification of the 
unconscious helps us to see just why and how consciousness is 
merely a layer floating on top of it, like froth? 
5. We gratefully acknowledge a general scholarly debt to two previous 
commentators in particular: John Brough (especially his "The 
Emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings 
on Time-Consciousness", Man and World, vol. 5 Wo. 3 Aug. 72) 
and Robert Sokolowski (in particular The Formation of Husserl's 
Concept of Constitution (esp. Ch. 1117 The Hague, Nijhoff 1964. 
6. This shorter collection, translated as 
, 
The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness, edited Martin Heidegger, trans. 
James S. Churchill, Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1964, 
is in many ways to be preferred to Rudolf Boehm's definitive 
longer edition Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins 
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(1893-1917) Nijhof, The Hague 1966, published as vol. X of the 
Husserliana. It already contains quite as much as we need to 
grasp the character of his thinking about time - indeed there is 
already considerable repetition in the shorter version; it is 
also the manuscript with which, as editor, Heidegger was most 
familiar, the one that is commonly referred to in the literaturep 
and the one to which Derrida in his Speech and Phenomena (see 
below, ch. 1II) refers to. 
7. Sokolowski, op. cit. p. 75 n. 3. 
8. He goes some way towards this in 033. 
9. Oscar Kraus Toward a PhenomenognosX of Time Consciousness 
(1930) reprinted in The Philosophyof. -. Brentano ed. Linda L. 
McAllister, Duckwor London 1976. It was Kraus who edited 
and introduced Brentano s Psychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkt (2nd edition; in 1924 and can be regarded as a 
disciple. 
10. William James in his Principles of Psychology (1890) endorses 
this view of time, aitributing the phrase to E. R. ClaY. See 
vol. 1 p. 609. 
11. tAc+xsche, -rwlSht &F the- Mdols, Pcrnomin, p-'50 
12. 'If we now again take up the question of whether a retentional 
consciousness that is not the continuation of an impressional 
consciousness is thinkablej we must say that it is impossible, 
for every retention in itself refers back to an impression'. 
It is just such a logical impossibility that Derrida 'braves' 
(or perhaps 'flaunts') in his term 'trace', which is, in effect, 
a retention of what has never been present. See below p. 
13. "in primary remembrance I see what is past" 013, p. 56. 
14. By 'presentification' Husserl means a reproductive (i. e. non- 
originary, non-self-giving) mode of givenness. 
15. "In mere phantasy there is no positing of the reproduced now 
and no coincidence of this now with one given in the past" 
0230 p. 74. 
16. Within an experimental psychological settingo for all its alien 
conceptuality, it has been shown that ability to recall number 
sequences is considerably dependent on whether, sub-groupings 
of numbers are made use of by the subject. These enormously 
expand one's power, and*might well take the form of spontaneous 
glancings.... - 
17. our point in bringing out the dual way in which Husserl is 
operating here is ultimately to suggest that the foundationalist 
ambition of phenomenology - to pr6vide for philosophy (and indeed 
for Western thought and culture, if Husserl's Philosophy as a, 
Rigorous Science is to be believed) a new grounding, cannot be 
Thought of as being totally reconstructive. Very many rational 
principles and procedures and schemas are taken for granted, and 
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it is not enough to say that they can, one by one, be scrutinized, 
because they are not independent of one another, as such a strategy 
would require. Husserl takes for granted not just the existence, 
but the value of concepts like 'unity', 'reliability', 'identity' 
Igenuineness', lauthenticityli 'certainty', the part/whole 
relationship, form/content etc., even at the very point at which 
he subjects such concepts to a phenomenological elucidation. 
What is then in question is not necessarily Husserl's procedure, 
but his claim as to its status. He believes it is possible to 
'begin again', to put all previous philosophy in brackets, to 
immunize oneselfagainst history. But it may turn out that a 
much more plausible view would present phenomenology as a procedure 
that always and only can work with and from what is already given, 
with strictly limited powers of radical recommencement. 
18. Derrida's name for this field of operation is 'presence'. 
19. Our language here is reminiscent of that of Strawson in his 
Individuals. There are strong affinities between Strawson's 
Kantian position and that of Husserl on both time and experience. 
The chief difference is that for Husserl the necessary independent 
temporal series is constituted subjectively. 
20. Brough's "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's 
Early Writings on Time-Consciousness", from which our title page 
quotation is drawn, is a paper to which we referred at the 
beginning of this chapter. It supplies one of the best accounts 
of the moves that lead Husserl to posit ah Absolute Flux. See 
Brough (1972). 
21. Brough interestingly notes Husserl's shift from 'now-consciousness, 
to 'primal impression' at this point in his discussion. We may 
perhaps link this shift to what could be called Husserl's deconstruc- 
tion of the 'now', as we discussed it above (circa 0-25 ). 
22. This reader, at least, finds it curious that when this problem re- 
appears in Appendix VI (p. 154), "self-constitution" is not pro- 
posed as a way of avoiding infinite regress. He seems to be 
concerned that reflection inevitably objectifies absolute flux, 
and so makes it something temporal and in need of constitution. 
Abstaining from actual reflection leaves the possibility unaffected, 
and the possibility is sufficient to. keep the regress problem 
alive. His concluding remarks suggest he has not solved the 
problem. 
23. One important point to realize about 'retention' which allows it 
to play its part in Absolute Flux , is brought out very clearly 
in Appendix IX. In particular, retention is not an act; it* 
does not objectify. It is an intentionality. It is not an 
act because that would be 'an immanent unity of duration consti- 
tuted in a series of retentional phases' (and that would be a 
confusion of levels). 
The act of apprehension qua objectifying consciousness is not the 
same as primal impression. For the act of apprehension is a 
unity of some sort. 
Retention is a condition for becoming aware of the original 
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impressional consciousness, but that is itself a consciousness, 
not something requiring retention to bring it out. This all 
suggests the possibility of talking about an 'unconscious' and 
Husserl's important rejection of this idea we shall quote in 
full: 
'It is certainly an absurdity to speak of a content 
of which we are "unconscious", one of which we are 
conscious only later. Consciousness is necessarily 
consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the 
retentional phase was conscious of the preceding one 
without making it an object, so also are we conscious 
of the primal datum - namely in the specific form 
of the "now" without its being objective ... were this 
consciousness not present, -no retention would be 
thinkable, since retention of a content of which we 
are not conscious is impossible'. (p. 162) 
These remarks, as we shall seet have had some notable readers. 
Sartre's account of pre-reflective (self-) consciousness would 
seem to be modelled on it, and Derrida, (who also quotes this 
passage, see Speech and Phenomena p. 63) brings it into critical 
focus. 
It might, f inally be worth quoting someone else, who most likely 
never read these words of Husserl, though he could be read as 
referring to theme, 
'To most people who have had a philosophical education 
the idea of anything mental which is not also conscious 
is so incon6eivable that it seems. to them abýurd and 
refutable simply by logic .... They have never studied 
hypnosis or dreams' ýSigmund Freud, The Ego and the 
Id p. 10 Hogarth Press 1949]. 
24. These remarks might be compared with the following: 'the existence 
of what is transitory passes away in time, but not time itself. 
Time (is) itself non-transitory, and abiding ... 1. Kant is here 
drawing parallels between time and substance, insofar as each are 
non-transitory. It is perhaps such a parallel that allows Husserl 
to generate an account of transcendental subjectivity that will 
displace the idea of an absolute self-constituting flux. Trans- 
cendental subjectivity gives a substantialist interpretation of the 
timelessness of the form of the flux. We could add that in 
Appendix VI, Husserl talks of the flux as 'abiding' (Verbleibendes) 
and adds th4t what is abiding above all is 'the formal structure 
of the flux, the form of the flux ... an abiding form (which) 
however, supports the consciousness of a continuous change'. 
from his Critique of Pure Reason ('Schematism' B 183). 
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NOTES for Part One- Chapter Three 
1, LA Voix et le Phenomene 
,, 
PUF, 1967 (trans. 
, 
Speech and Phenomena. 
by David Allison, Northwestern U. P. j 1973) 
2. It might be thought that the obvious word to use here would be 
'critique'. But while Derrida's readings are clearly 'critical' 
in a number of senses, including 'historically momentous', 'dis- 
cerning', and 'careful', he has taken pains to dissociate decon- 
struction from the negative (or indeed positive) implications of 
$critique'. 
3. See below, ( Part III ch. 2 for a discussion of the status of 
Idifferancel. 
4. See Part III, 2(b), "Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: 
Heidegger and Derrida". 
5. R. Rorty, in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature suggests that 
the risk any 'edifying' philosopher runs is that of having one's 
work transformed into a 'systematic' form. This possibility is 
surely the counterpart to the possibility of a deconstructive self- 
unravelling latent in any theoretical text. Perhaps such 'system- 
atization' should not so much be deplored as treated as a valuable 
index of decline in the 'edifying' power of the original text, and 
one thatis rooted in possibilities necessarily contained in every 
text, however eccentrically transgressive. 
6. Derrida's arguments in thisbook could be seen to reformulate the 
criticisms made by French existentialists of the Husserlian project 
of phenomenological reduction, which similarly attempts to exclude 
what cannot be excluded, namely 'the world'. Merleau-Ponty's 
version, somewhat different from Sartre's - that the reduction is 
a proper part of philosophical method, but can never be completed 
(see the Preface to his Phenomenologie de la Perception) converges 
with Husserl's own eventual position. The relationship between 
Sartre and Derrida is surely worth pursuing. (Derrida has only 
rarely mentioned Sartre and has seemed touchy about the subject 
('Is this an interview about Sartre? ') see 'Interview with Derridal 
-in Derrida and Differance ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Parousia Press, 
1984T. An excellent start can be found in Christina Howells' 
"Qui Perd Gagne: Sartre and Derrida"t JBSP vol. 13 No. 1,1982. 
7. See eg. "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" in Of 
Grammatology. 
8. See M. Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander", Holzwege, Klosterman, 
1950 (trans. by David Farrell Krell, Early Greek Thinking, Harper 
and Row, 1975). 
9. This strategy has previously been announced in the shadows of a foot- 
note, from which we here quote 
In affirming that perception does not exist or that what 
is called perception is not primordial, that somehow every- 
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thing-'begins' by Ire-presentation' (a proposition which 
can only be maintained by-the elimination of these last 
two concepts: it means that there is no 'beginning' and 
that the Ire-presentation' we were talking about is not 
the modification of a Ire-' that has befallen a primordial 
presentation) and by reintroducing the difference involved 
in 'signs' at the core of what is 'primordial', we do not 
retreat from the level of transcendental phenomenology 
towards either an 'empiricism' or a 'Kantian' critique 
of the claim of having primordial intuition; we are here 
indicting the prime intention - and the ultimate scope - 
of the present essay. ' (La Voix et le Phenomene p. 50, 
n. 1, ET p. 45 n. 4) 
What these remarks leave open - perhaps deliberately, is whether there 
is any retreat at all from transcendental phenomenology. Derrida 
will continue to make many of its moves while denying certain of 
their vital implications. 
10. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 2nd edition, Blackwell 
1958. 
11. F. de Saussure Cours de Linguistique Generale (Course in General 
Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, Fontana, 1974). 
12. The question of whether or not we ought 'in the last analysis' to 
treat these relationships (as inverted by Derrida) as 'constitutive' 
ones is, as we shall discuss latert quite crucial. We will argue 
that the philosophical strength of Derrida's arguments rests on their 
being transcendental arguments that contest the direction of constitu- 
tion. To accept the Isous raturel, Derrida's denial of their being 
transcendental arguments, is to render their course uncompelling. 
Moreover we claim that the orientation to a transcendental level 
(albeit now formulated in terms of presence and absence) is such as 
to impede the development of a positive alternative understanding of 
time. Instead we are left with the emptiness of terms in which the 
varieties of representation (and hence of the invasion of presence by 
representation) are lost. See the end of this chapter, and below, 
Part III . 
13. See especially Derrida's long footnote ( pQj ET p. 84, fn. 9). 
14. See our discussion ch. 111 035 above. 
15. For a discussion of the broader issues involved here - the inter- 
connection between philosophical strategy and the limits of language, 
with its consequences for our discussion of temporality, see below, 
Part III, ch. 2(B)"Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: 
Heidegger and Derrida"). 
16. See, for example, David Krell's "Engorged Philosophy" in Derrida and 
Differance, ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Parousia Press, 1984, as well as 
a major forthcoming work on the subject (personal communication). 
17. The two chapters are "... Ce dangereux supplement" and "Du supplement 
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a la source: la theorie de llecriture". 
18. De la Grammatologie (p. 2079 ET p. 144) quoted from Rjusseauls 
Essay on the Origin of Languages.. 
19. Further investigation of ousseau reveals that the issue is not so 
simple. Rousseau after all has taken up writing because of the 
way in which, in speech, in the immediacy of social interaction, 
he constantly misrepresents himself. He is forced into positions 
in which he says things he does not mean. Far better to write, 
when one can give considered thought to one's words. From this 
point of view, writing helps us to restore presence; culture comes 
to the aid of nature. 
But equally, Rousseau sees writing as a threat. For it can 
easily be seen as a distortion of what is natural, a mere technique 
added to natural speech, which threatens to displace it. This theme 
of the two-fold sense of the supplement as completing an original 
presence, and as a substitute that threatens it, is apparently re- 
peated over and over again in Rousseau, usually centring on the 
nature/culture opposition, and it underlies his account of education. 
20. Compare, for instance, Nietzsche's account of reversals in the 
cause/effect relation, in his G6tzen Dammerung (1889) (Twilight of 
the Idols) ("The Four Great Errors"). 
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Notes to Introduction (Part II ) 
1. We here correct the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, which for 
some reason has 'unity' instead of 'temporality' for Zeitlichkeit. 
2. "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft" trans. as " The Concept 
of Time in the Science of History" in JBSP vol. 9, No. l. jan. 1978. 
3. See W. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to ThoucTht The Hague: Nijhoff 
1963, pp. 28-9 
4. Die Gnmdprobleme der PHAnanenologie (1927) Frankfurt: Klostermann 1975 
(as vol. 24 of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe ); trans. The Basic Problems of 
Phenanenoloqv , by A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana, 1982 
5. See. Beinq and Time part II ch. 5 n. xxx (H432-3) 
6. in Marges de la Philosophie; (Margins of Philosophy) ý 
7. See eg. The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinki (1964) included 
in Zur Sache des Denkens (1969) Tubingen: Nierneyer ( On Time and Beinq, trans. 
J. Stambaugh,, New York: Harper, 1082) 
8. (see our Appendix) Nietzsche , Zweiter Band, Pfullingen: Neske, 1961 (trans. Nietzsche ,4 vols. by David FarrellKrell, New York: Harper and Row, 1979.1982fl984 (the translation of voline II has yet to appear). 
9. Was Heisst Denken ? Tubingen: Nianeyer, 1954 (trans. J. Glenn Gray and 
F. Wieck, New York: Harper and Row, 1968. 
10. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes"(1935) Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960 (trans. "The Origin 
of the Work of Art",, by A. Hof stadter, New York: Harper and Row, 1971 . 
11. L. M. Vail, Heideqqer and the Ontological Difference, 
l, 
University Park: 
Pennsylvania University Press 1972 
12. see Time and Being (1962) 
13. See Identity and Difference (1957) bilingual edition, New York: Harper 
and Row, 1959. 
14. See The Question of Being (1955) bilingual edition trans. W. Klubach and 
J. Wilde, New Haven: College and University Press 1958. 
15. Notethat at the very moment at which Being is crossed out, Heidegger 
stresses that man is far fran being cKcbded frcm Being. 
16. Heidegger makes agreat deal of the word 'as' and has a long discussion of 
the 'as' in understanding, interpretation etc. (H150f) 
17. See Heidegger's Unterwegs Zur Sprache 4. Aufl. Pfullingen: Neske, 1971 
(On the Way to Lanqua , trans. Peter D. Hertz, New York: Harper and Row, 1971) 
and see also Robert Bernasconi's Where Words Break, New Jersey: Humanities, 
forthccming, 1985. 
18. See his La Condition Postmoderne, Paris: Minuit, 1979 (The Postmodern 
Condition, Manchester-University Press, 198, + )- 
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19. For an excellent discussion of this opening , see John Sallis, "Where 
Does 'Being and Time' Begin ?" in 
, 
Heidegger's Existential Analvtic ed. 
F. Elliston, The Hague+Paris+New York: Mouton, 1978 (? ). 
20. This position is given a more more positive form in the idea of the 
hermeneutic circle . See esp. H314-5. 
21. See his very dificult first chapter of Ideas (1913) "Fact and Essence". 
22. ' This is a productive logic - in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it 
were, into some area of Being, discloses it for the first time in the const- 
itution of its Being, and after thus arriving at the structures within it, 
makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments for- 
their enquiry. ' (H10) 
23. Heidegger distinguishes the term, 'existenzial' ( existential) and 
lexistenziell' ( existentiell) . We follow him in using this terminology, 
and yet will question his ability to keep these two separate. His most 
explicit account of the difference can be found in H12-13. The existentiell 
relates to an ongoing understanding of oneself in terms of one's possibilities 
of existence. The 'existential refers to an analytical or theoretical study 
of the structure of existence. The 'existential' presupposes the 'existentiell' 
24. op. cit. n. 19 
25. See "Die Sprache" (1950) (trans. as "Language") in Unterwegs zur Sprache 
op. cit. supra n. 17 (E. T. p. 190) 
26. 'Provisionally' because for Heidegger the historical is already 
existential, and vice versa ( see esp. his II. ch. V 'Temporality and Historic- 
ality'. ) 
27. See Nietzsche's The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (1874) 
(see Bibliography). 
28. Again,, see Being and Time II. ch. V (seenn26 above). 
29. This is taken up in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929) 
Frankfurt: Klosterrnam, 4. Aufl., 1973 ( Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
trans. J. Churchill, Bloomington: Indiana 1962. ) 
30. See his Basic Problems of Phenomenology op. cit. supra (n. 4) 
31. II. ch. 6 n. xxx (H432-433). This is the footnote alluded to in the 
sub-title of Derrida's"Ousia and Gramrn&" (see n. 6 above). 
32. op. cit. supra (see n. 29) 
33. 
34. Jenseits von Gut und BÖse: Vorspiel einer PhilosoPhie der Zukunft (1886) . ' trans Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future 020 
Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1967. 
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35. See eg. "Von Wesen der Vlahrheit" (1943) in Weqmrken , Gesamtausgabe 
9, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1976 ( "On the Essence of Truth" (1949) trans. 
aohn Sallis in Martin Heideqqer: Basic Writings ed. D. F. Krell, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1977 
36. See his "Le Retrait de la Metaphor" in Poesie, 1978 ("The Retratt of 
Metaphor", Enclitic, vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1978). 
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NCYIES to Part Two Chapter One 
1. Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) with 
the now famous lines: 'Die Welt ist alles , was der Fall ist. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen , nicht die Dinge'. 
2. The parallel with Hegel here must not be missed . For Hegel, Spirit has to make the detour of historical aarticulAti0w_ And to the extent 
that the parallel holds, we can ask of Heidegger the question that has often 
been put to Hegel: does not the need for the detour presuppose the validity 
of the destination ? It is quite true that self-understanding, self-kn6w1edge 
or self-appropriation are not available to ir=ediacy. But is there not a 
danger that the articulation of modes Qf. mediation will only reinforce the. --- 
value of the ideal, rather than put it in question. The scheme of Heidegger's 
thought is surely such as to warrant our questioning . It is because every- dayness is only the necessary mediation of our authenticity that the danger 
of losing oneself in it arises. But what if the very value of selfhood and-, 
hence authenticity itself were ultimately bound up with a philosophy of 
identity that after Heidegger we have come to call mertaphysical ?, 
3. We refer of course to the English translators of Being and Time . They 
offer this geometrical analogy on p. 185 n. 1 
4. See our unpublished manuscript Philosophy and Metaphor in which these 
claims are dscussed in more detail. 
5. -'To any willing there belongs something willed , which has already made' itself definite in terms of a "for-the-sake-of-which". If willing is to be 
possible ontologically , the following items are constitutive for it: 0) the 
prior disclosedness of theTor -the-sake-of-which" in general ( Being-ahead- 
of -itself ); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern , 
oneself (the world as the"wherein"of Being-already); (3) Dasein's projection 
of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility= 
of the entity 'willed' . (H194) 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
f. No general account of Derrida's reading of Heidegger could dispense with 
the idea of a double reading. He ack=-iledges Heidegger's enormous achievements 
at the boundary of philosophy and non-philosophy and yet will maintain that 
Heidegger's is perhaps the most powerful rearguard action in defense of 1presence'. (See Positions ) Derrida's treatment of Heidegger in De la 
Grammatology is perhaps exemplary. Therea. critical reading is progressively 
deepened by a series of defences of Heidegger against prematurely negative 
diagnoses. 
2. see David Farrell Krell, 'Death and Interpretation' in Heidegger's Exist- 
ential Analytic. ed. F. Elliston, The Hague+Paris+New York: Mouton,, 1978(? ). 
3. Ihis is also of course the title of as essay of Heidegger's (1959) trans. 
by J. M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund as "Mamrial Address" in Discourse on Thinki 
New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 
4. He seems to be arguing for what Ryle in his Concept of Mind (perhaps 
not uninfluenced by Heidegger) called a 'category mistake'- although Heidegger 
would say that what is at stake is not a disrtinction between one category 
and another, but rather between a category and an existentiale. An interesting 
general account ol, " the Ryle/ Heidegger relationship can be found in Michael 
MurrayIS "Haidegger ard Ryle: Two Versions of Phenanenology" in Haidegger 
and Modern Philosophy ed. 11. Murray, New Haven and London: Yale U. P. 1978. 
5. See his L'Etre et le Nbant Paris: Gallimard, 1943 ( Beinq and Nothingness 
London: Yjethuen, 1957 ) See Part 1V ch, l section E. "My Death" . 
6. Many distinctions need to be made here- most notabkly between two senses 
of possibility. We can distinguish (1) the case in which it seems on the basis 
of others' longevity and their successful conquest of fatal disease and replace- 
ment of organs that no-one has to die. We may be immortal, but we cannot be 
sure - no-one has ( or ever will) live 'for ever'. Inductive immortality; (2) 
We believe that death is no longer necessary , but it might nonetheless be hard to avoid some fatal accident. Immortality bar accident. 
7. Ilia OED gives us much food for thought here: 
' exuberant a. 1503 ( ad. L. exuberantum, exubera-re, f. ex+uberare to be 
fertilelf. uber adj. conn. w. uber udder ) 1. Luxuriantly fertile or prolific 
; abundantly productive. Also fig. 1645.2. Growing or produced in superabundance 
1513 3. Overflowing, as a fountain etc. 1678. Also fig. 1503. ' 
8. Further notes fran underground can be found in John Sallis, "Tunnellings" 
( unpublished manuscript ) and David Farrell Krell 11 Der Niaulwurf: Die 
Philosophische I-Mlarbeit bai Kant, Hegel und Nietzsche" ("The Mole: ? hilosoph. - 
"s T-X ical Burrowing in Kant, Heidegger, and Nietzsche")in Bounda-cy 2,, vr-)J- 
No. 3,, and X, No. 1 Spring/Fall 1981 ( Why Zietzscýhe Now ?). 
9. See his Totality and Infinity , Duquesne University Press , Pittsburgh, 19G9. ej. =. -7MiMMTy7F5d-7r-aternity): ' The I breaks free from itself in 
paternity without thereby ceasing to be an I,, f. x- Vrie I is its son' (p. 278). 
10- See Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (1929,1933) trans. D. Cairns, The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1960,044f. 
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11 . See eg. "Brief uber den Humanismus" (1947) in Wegmarken ( Gesamtausgabe 9, Frankfurt: Klostennam, 1976) ("Letter on Humanism" (1962) -in Martin Heideqqer: Basic Writings. trans. F. - Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, New York: Harper 
and Row, 1977 ; and "Zeit und Sein" (1968) in Zur Sache des Denkens, Tubingen: 
Niemeyer, 1969, ('Time and Being" trans. J. Stambuagh, in On Time and Being, New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972. 
12. Here specifically and elsewhere more generally, we are clearly indebted 
to the pathbreaking work of J. Derrida, and particularly to his La Voix 
et le Phenomene, Paris: P. U. F., 1967 ( Speech and Phenomena trans. D. Allison,, 
Northwestern,, 1971 ). See Pt. l. ch. 3 above. 
13. Vie might suggest a critical allusion here to Kierkegaard's discussion 
of a 'Power' in his SicknessUnto Death , New York: Anchor, 1954. 
14. If man were to be his own ground, the second kind of despair he disting- 
uishes- 'despairingly willing to be oneself' would not be possible . Op. cit. 
supra n. 13. Kierkegaard seems to ignore the possibility that this despair 
night simply be unfounded, based on an error. 
15. This may have other implications. It may for example be thought to 
provide sane basic answer to the question with which other philosophers have 
wrestled: Why be good ? or Why ought we do our duty ? 
16. Of course many others now make this point. 
17. Death has been understood as ' the possibility of the impossibility 
of existence', and this transformation of the future into a 'toward-which' 
might seem to betray a certain denial of tle reality of death rather than 
taking it seriously. Does he not say: 
'When, in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up (Eingeholt) 
the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's 
authentic existence can no longer be outstripped (uberholt) by any- 
thing. ' H 307 
18. Kierkegaard offers accounts of such moments of projected intensity in 
his, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. 'Swenson, Princeton, 1941. 
19 i See 'n. 5- ýýve. 
20. A ccmmon cause of complaint by authors against reviewers. Derrida in 
particular laments such moves in his Positions. 
21. No doubt this reference could be made at an even more telling point 
but consider this remark of Heidegger's: 'The inner relationship of my own 
work to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and 
irreplaceable rootedness in the Alemannian-Swabian soil. ' in "Why Do.: -I---Stay- 
in the Provinces ?" (1934) trans. Thcmas Sheehan in Heideqger: the Man and 
the Thinker ed. Thcmas Sheehan, Chicago: Precedent, 1981. 
22. ibid. 
23. Heidegger gives no value to speed; he laments the fact that people 
today value only what goes fast and can be grasped with one's hands . Clearly he would have little in ccmmon with those other Futurists... 
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24. Vie have suggested that 'ambiguity' might not be resolvable as 
Heidegger suggests. The brief essay we are considering here is a case in 
point. Heidegger castigates the sentimentalizing of peasant life, and yet one 
is tempted more than once to accuse him of it in this very passage. Indeed, 
it can seem hard to avoid. Is not much of, the silence of the peasant the 
result of him ( or her) having nothing to say, rather than being silent about 
what he ( or she) could say ? Is there not also the silence of dullness ? 
Heidegger's extraordinary preference for the old woman who calls him Herr 
Professor, over those who read his books, suggests a quite incomprhensible 
status for his chosen life activity - writing- of which the woman has no 
comprehension. 
25. This gets dropped later. 
26.032, 'Understanding and Interpretation'. 
27. See "Was ist Metaphysik? " (1929) ("What is Metaphysics" (1949) in 
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 1977 (op. cit. supra) ) 
28. See De la Grammatologie / Of Grammatology Part 11.2 
29. See below Part III ch. 2 ("The Question of Strategy") 
30. See Part II ch. 4 below. 
31. He rejects other specific points too: (1) the temporality of spatiality, 
(2) the possibility of a fundamental ontology . 
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Notes to Chapter Three 
1. 'At the very start ... our analytic was oriented rather by the average way.. 
of existing, which has nothing conspicuous about it. ' (H370) 
2. Indeed Heidegger at one point (H372) even goes so far as to equate them: 
'... at bottom we mean by the term"everydayness" nothing else than temporality 
while temporality is made possible by Dasein's Being... '. 
3. As we have already suggested, its value may not lie in its possible 
accomplishment, but in the way it disturbs the seeds of complacency. 
4. See for example, Derridals essaybifferance". 
5. See below, Part III, ch. 4 "Sane Temporal Structures of Language: Proleg- 
omena to a Future Theory of Time". 
6. See Part III ch. 1 "Derrida's Deconstruction of Time and its Limitations". 
7. '... in laying hold of an item of equipment, we cane back to it from 
whatever work-world has already been disclosed. ' (H352) 
8. op. cit. supra 
9. Is not this whole level of discourse (projection, disclosedness) an expan- 
sion of Kant's reference to schemata ? 
10. What would our doubts about authenticity do to such a laminated temporality 
we are predisposed ( see our discussion below in Part III, ch. 4 , of "nesting" to encourage the awareness of multiple levels and recursivity in '-temporal' 
btructures' . (Words like 'nesting', 'levels' and 'structures' are all 
representations of multiple temporality. ) The question is whether 'forgetting 
would not itself have to be forgotten after a systematically sceptical treat- 
ment of authenticity. Arguably not. For if, as we shall suggest, we emphasize 
risk, danger, the possibility of fragmentation over the ultimately self-ful- 
filling sense of 'caning towards oneself', there is still a questioning 
'relation to self' that a totally unselfconscious absorption in the world of 
things could be said to be 'forgetting'. 
11. For example: '... when one is making present sanething ready-to-hand by 
awaitiLig , the possibility of one's getting surprised by sanething is based 
on one's not awaiting something else which stands in a possible context of 
involvement which is lost. ' (H355). We might ask, however, how he would , handle ontological surprise. This is surely not covered by his remarks at H264. 
12. Such expressions as 'a priori' open up the most diffrult question of 
the relat= between the logical and the chronological. on the one hand logical 
priority clearly cannot be reduced to ---temporal priority, and yet seems to 
draw on the sense of irreversible linearity it provides, on the other, the 
necessity of me-way temporal order seems to approach the logical,, and for 
someone like Freud could be thought to be the result of the imposition of 
a conscious demand for order. 
13. Such a distinction could be drawn from Barthes Le Plaisir du Texte, 
Paris: Seuil, 1973. 
14. Consider Barthes on Fourier: 'Uhat I get fran Fourier's life is his liking 
for mirlitons (little Parisian spice cakes)... ' Preface to his Sade, Fourier, 
Loyola, Paris: Seuil, 1971. 
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15. In "Ousia and Grame", op. cit. supra. 
16. See for example his discussion of the "Grammar and Etymology of 'Being"' 
in Einfuhrunq in die Metaphysik, (1953). (Tubingen: Niemeyerp3. Aufl., 1966); ý8a Introduction to Metaphysics (1959) trand. R. Manheimr Garden City: Doubleday,, 
1961. (See E. T. p. 48. ) 
17. See Part'III, ch. 2B below ("Style and Strategy at the Limits of 
Philosophy: Heidegger and Derrida") and see'also the discussion in Erasmus 
Schofer, " Heidegger's Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical 
Specialities", in On Heideqqer and Lanqua ed. J. J. Kockelmans, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 1972; and his book Die Sprache Heideqqers 
Pfullingen: Neske, 1962. 
18. See eg. his Positions , Paris: Minuit, 1972 p. 75 (Positions trans. A. Bass 
London: Athlone, 1981, p. 55): 'I sometimes have the feeling tha the 
Heideggerean problematic is the most "profound" and "powerful" defense of what 
I attempt to put in question under the rubric of, the thouqht of presence. ' 
19. Derrida, makes the same claim about tle ideal repeatability of the present. 
See above Part I, ch. 3. 
20. "Ousia and Gramme", op. cit. supra. 
21. op. cit. supra 
22. See Part II, ch. 4. 
23. Brouer, for example, thought the relation was precisely the reverse: that 
arithmetical succession was based on temporal succession. 
24. We are surely getting perilously close here to the sort of problems 
attached to Kant's idea of 'schematism' - by which he meant something like a 
temporalised concept. 
25. See our (unpublished ) paper, "The Status of Textual Temporality", B: 
The Programme of Tense Elimination. ( on Goodman and Quine ). 
26. It echoes in this respect and at one level, part of Mdraggart's 
famous argument for the derivativeness of the 'B-series' from the 'A-series'. 
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NOTES * 'to 'Chapter Tdur 
* This is revised version of a paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the British Society for Phenomenology, Oxford 1980. 
1. Kant und das Problem der MetaRhysik (1929), Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
4. Aufl. 1973 ( Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics trans. J. S. 
Churchill,. Blooým-ington: Indiana, 1962. ) 
2. See a much fuller discussion in David FarrellrKrell's most 
important paper"Rapture: the Finitude of Time in Heidegger's Thought" 
in Time and Metaphysics ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Warwick: Parousia 1982. 
3. Einfuhrung in die MetaphXsik (1953) Tubingen: Niemeyer, 3. Aufl. 1966 
( An Introduction to Metaphysics (1959) trans. R. Manheim, Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1961 
4. ibid. (ET) p. 172 
5. ibid. p. 169 
6. ibid. pp. 171-2 
7. ibid. p0172 
8. J. Derrida,, De la Grammatoloay, Paris: 
Of Grammatology trans. G. C. Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976 p. 17) 
9. W. Marx, Heidegger und die Tradition, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961 
( HeideEger and the Tradition, trans. Kisiel and Greene, Evanston: 
Northwestern, 1971 
10. op. cit. 015 
11. "Zeit und Sein" (1968), in Zur Sache des Denkens , Tubingen: 
Niemeyer, 1969 ( "Time and Beirýg-Tr -trans. Joan Stambaugh in On Time and 
Being Nev York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 12 
12. ibid. p. 7 
13. W. Marx, op. cit. p. 145 
14. Vom, Wesen der Wahrheit (1943) in Wegmarken G. 9, Frankfurt: Klostermann 
1976 ( trans. J. Sallis, as On the Essence of Truth' in Martin Heidegger: 
Basic Writings, New York: Harper & Row, 1977 ) 
15. Brief uber den Humanismus (1947) in Wegmarken G. 9 ( as above) 
(trans. F. Capuzzi, Letter on Humanism in Basic Writings (as above). 
16. See the Logos essay in Vortrage und Aufsatze (1954) Pfullingen: Neske 
3rd ed. 1967 (trans. D. F. Krell in Early Greek Thinking New York: Harper 
& Row, 1975) 
17. W. Marx, op. cit. p. 155 
18. "Die Onto-theologische Verfassung der Metaphysik", in Identitat und 
Differenz Pfullingen: Neske, 1957 ( trans. J. Stambaugh, in 
Identity and Difference New York: Harper and Row, 1969 ) 
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19., Zur Seinsfrage (1955 ) in*Wegmarken , G. 9 , Frankfurt: Klostermann 1976 The Question of Min; trans. Klubach and Wilde, London: Vision 
1959 
20. Nie tzsche,, (2, vols. ) Pfullingen: Neske, 1961 ( Nietzsche 4 vols. ) 
trans. D. F. Krell, New York: Harper & Row, 1979,198191982.. 
21.. 'ý Der Spruch des Anaximander " in HolzwSge (1950) Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 5th ed. 1972 ("The Anaximander Fragment" trans. Krell in 
Early Greek Thinking op. cit. supra 
22. Die Grundprobleme der Phenomenologie , Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975 ( Basic Problems of PhenomenologX, trans. A Hofstadter, Bloomington: 
Indiana, 1982 ) 
23. See Part I, ch. 3 above 
24. See Saussure's Cours de Linguistique Generale, Paris: Payot, 1973 
trans. W. Baskin, London: Fontana, 1974 
25. See Part I, ch. '3 above 
26. "Ousia and Gramme" op. cit. supra p. 88 
27. In Of Grammatology ý,, op.. cit. 
28. op. cit. supra 
29. Beware the first Engligh translation here included in Speech 
and Phenomena)in which this term gets thoroughly lost. 
30. "Differance" in. Speech and Phenomena op. cit. p. 142-3 
31. ibid. p. 147 
32. ibid. 
33. Derrida's mixture of charity and critique towards Heidegger can 
be found well illustrated in "The End of the Book and the Beginning of 
Writing" in Of Granmatology . The issue is whether Heidegger interest 
in. the SueLtýion of Being is sufficiently different from a pursuit of 
Being as such to enable him to escape the charge of reinscribing 
presence, in a metaphysical way, in Being. 
34.. Surely here there is a startling convergence with Husserl's most 
extreme conclusions ( see our Part I, ch. 2,036 above ) in which he 
talks of a 'one dimensional quasi-temporality', a' pre-phenomenal, 
pre-imminent temporality'. 
35. See Part III, ch. 5 " The Philosophy of the Future" below. 
36. See Of GrammatoloZZ 
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NOTES to Part Three Chapter One 
1. See "Linguistique et Grammatologiell (hereafter'LG) p. 103 ( ET p. 103). 
This essay and "De la Grammatologie comme Scierýc--e Positive" 
hereafter GSP are both to be found ift'Dd'lA'Gra=atolo&ie (1967). 
2. Am I myself not guilty of a psychologizing interpretation of Derrida 7 
Sometimes, this is just what his words invite. But whether references to 
Desire are ultimately psychological is an important question. The 
history of its metaphysical and ontological treatment ( from Aristotle to 
Hegel to Lacan ) would suggest otherwise. 
3. See our I'Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflection" JBSP vol. 11. No. 3, 
October 1980, pp. 225-238, and, slightly modified, chapter two below. 
4. "Ousia et Gramme" in Marges, Paris: Minuit, 1972 ( in Margins, trans, 
A. Basso Chicago, 1971. ) 
5. See eg. Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (1953)'('An Introduction to Meta- 
physics, trans, R, Manheim,, New York: Anchor, 1961 ). 
6.1 Time is not. There is, it gives time. The giving that gives time is 
determfn-ed by denying and withholding reserve. It grants the openness of 
time-space, and preserves what remains denied in what-has-been, what is 
withheld in approach. We call the giving which give s true time an 
extending, which opens and conceals. An extending is itself a giving, 
the giving of a giving is concealed in true time. ' "Time and Being" p. 16 
in On Time and Being trans. J. Stambaugh, New York: Harper and Row, 1973 
(sJ_ Bibliography for original. ). 
7. If the parallels with Kant's transcendental imagination and Heidegger's 
es gibt hold up, and if Derrida is right in thinking that logical 
Fr-in-Firp--les break down when describing the trace structure or differance, 
how. did Kant and Heidegger avoid this consequence ? In the case of 
Heidegger the answer is that he creatively distorts grammar, and exhorts 
his reader /listener 'not to listen to a series of propositions, but 
rather to follow the movement of showing' (ibid. p. 3). Kant, as I read 
himp utilizes the fiction that the operation of the fundamental facultieg 
of the mind can be described like the working of machinery. 
8. "Differance" in Marge 
-s-, 
Paris: Minuit, 1972 p. 14 ("Differance"in Margins 
Chicago, 1972, p , 13). 
9. The usual I superficial criticism of Derrida .... overlooks the invisible 
erasurel . says Gayatri Spivak ( note 121p. 318 of her"., . =. Z. ý. 
translition* of 
Of Grammatology 
10. It will be said that this is a notorious error. Ordinary language, 
Nietzsche has told us, is no less metaphysical than' grand theory. It is 
just more complacent and naive. Does not this view inflate 'metaphysics, 
into a mere vapour, an empty term ? Surely only a deployment of language 
can be metaphysical. Consider Derrida's important remark II have never 
believed that there were-metaghysical concepts in and of -Ahemselves. No 
concept is by itself metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which 
it is inscribedl. 'Pdgitions trans. A. Bass, Chicago, 1981, p. 57 (from 
--Positions Paris: MGMit, 1972 ). 
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11. LG p. 105 ( E. T. p. 72) 
12. GSF p. 127f (E. T. p. 85-7) 
13. LG p. 105 (E. T. p. 72) 
14. Speech can indeed be seen as a sequence of sounds, But on such a model, 
distinctions between semantic units may not be apparent, the temporality 
of meaingful speech production and comprehension will not be registered 
and there is no scope for acknowledging the different levels of temporal 
order in speech other than that of the succession of sounds. 
15. See our "Prolegomena to a New Theory of Time"q Research in Phenamenologyt 
vol X 19809pp. 177-191, and chapter three below. 
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NOTES to Chapter Two- ( A. Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflexion) 
1. While that phrase has obtained considerable general currency in English 
philosophy it is interesting to note that Husserl too - Derrida's first phil- osophical concern - gives a central place to redeeming meaning-claims, as one might take vouchers to a bank. 
2. see"Hors Livre" in La Dissemination, Paris: Seuil, 1972 ( Dissemination 
trans. B. Johnson, Chicago: Chicago U. P. 1981. 
3. see "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" in Of Granmtology (op. cit. supra) eg. ' ... all that Hegel thought within this horizon Lthat of 
absolute knowledge-vvý , all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as 
a meditation on writing '. (p. 26) 
4. see below, n. 13, n. 14. 
5. see Speech and Phenomena op. cit. supra 
6. For a more systematically introductory account of Derrida's philosophy in 
which some of these issues are devloped,, see my "Introduction to Derrida". 
Radical Philosophy No. 21 (Spring 1979); reprinted in Radical Philosophy Reader 
London: Verso, 1985 (forthcoming). 
7. It is worth pointing out that the extent to which one's language comits 
one to a particulart, ontology is, the way this very same issue has been concept- 
ualised in Anglo-American philosphy. I am thinking of the contributions of 
Whorf, Whitehead, Quine, Strawson and Davidson. 
8. From "On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense" trans. M.? L. Mugge, 
reprinted in The Existentialist Tradition ed. Nino Langiulli,, Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1971 
9. see "Structure,, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in 
writinq and Difference. Op. cit. supra. vide T). 280 of the 1ýiglish trans. ) 
10. This procedure is explained at greater length in Positions., Paris: Minuit 
197Z, p. 56. 
11. "Differance" op. cit. supra. 
12. See the paper by Christopher Macann, "Jacques Derrida's Theory of 
writing and the Concept of Trace", in JBSP vol. 3. No. 2. May 1972. But more 
particularly see our Postscript below. 
13. "Differance" (p. 159 in the Speech and Phenomena translation 
14. Newton Garver makes an analogous point in his "Derrida and Rousseau on 
Writing", Journal of Philosophy Nov. 1977 p-671 note 10. 
15. See Of Grammatoloqy p. 12 
16. See the title interview in Positions. 
17. op. cit. n. 9 
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18. ibid. p. 280-1 
19. We reserve for another occasion a discussion -of Derrida's Eperons: Les 
Styles de Nietzsche, Paris: Flammarion, 1978 (Trans. B. Harlow as Spurs: 
Nietzsche's Styles, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979. 
20. See Chapter B. "Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy: 
Heidegger'and Derrida" below. 
21. Without endorsing the rest of his paper, Foucault-,,, does have apoint when he accuses Derrida, ( in his " Mons corps, ce papier, ce feu. ") of failing to 
analyse'the modes of implication of the subject in discourse'. I take this 
from Spivak's excellent introduction to her translation of Of Grammatology p. lxi. 
It lies behind Paul de Man's essay on Rousseau ("The Rhetoric of Blindness: 
Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau") in his Blindness and Insiqht, Methuen, 1971. Derrida is blind to Rousseau's own self-deconstruction. 
22. See Jean Marie Benoist,, "The End of Structuralism" , Twentieth Century Studies, 1970, p. 52 
23. Speech and Phenomena (E. T. p. 3) op. cit,. 
24. Of Grammatology op. cit. 
25. Speech and Phenomena-' (E. T. p. 103) op. cit. 
26. The question of course is whether there would be sucha thing as philosophy 
in the wake of these moves. 
27. See "Structure, Sign and Play... " op. cit. supra. (E. T. p. 278-9) 
28. see n. 19 above. 
29. We have already made this point; see n. 21 above. 
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NOTES to Chapter' Two (B) " Style and Strategy at the Limits of Philosophy" 
1. For a fuller account, see Newton Garver's preface to the translation 
of Derrida's La Voix et le Phenomene; Speech and Phenomena, trans. 
David Allison; ', Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 , p. xi. 
) 
2. Included in Earl; L Greek Philosophy and Other Ess!! Xs, trans. It. A. 
Magge, vol. II of The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. 
Oscar Levy (New York: Russell & Russell 1964). Reprinted in The 
Existentialist Traditon ed. Nino, Langiulli (New York: Anchor Books, 
1971). 
11 
3. We refer to both textuality and intentionality because each offers 
an account of how the relation between word and thing (when it occurs) 
is mediated. While we contrast them here, we would also hope to be 
able to relate these often opposed perspectives on some other 
occasion. 
4. See J. Derrida Eperons: les Styles de Nietzsche, trans. (with the 
original (1978i French text in parallel), SEurs: Nietzsche's Styles_ 
by Barbara Harlow (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1979). 
5. Heidegger understands language in the broadest. possible way so as to 
include dreams, actions and gestures. Man is always speaking. See 
e. g., Die Sprache trans. as Lan - uage, 
Sec. VI of Poetry, Language,, 
Thought translated and edited by Albert Hofstadter TN-ew York: Harper 
and Row, 1975). 
6. From Language Pp. 191-92. 
7. What are Poets For? in Poetry, _Language, 
Thought. 
8. Translated by Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambough (from Unterwegs zur 
Sprache) (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
9. See The Question of Being (published with the original Zur Seinsfra&e 
1956ý -trýn-slated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven: 
College and University Press, 1958). 
10. Erasmus Sch6fer's valuable work is represented by his HeideEger's 
Language in On Heide&ger and Language ed. J. J. Kockelmaus (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1972). 
11.1 draw here on Derrida's remarks at the end of The Ends of Man 
translated Edouard Morot-Sir et al. in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 30 (1969): 31-57. 
12. consider this: "Heidegger's text is of extreme importance, and 
constitutes an unprecedented, irreversible advance and we are still 
very far from having exploited all its critical resources. " 
(translated from Derrida's Positions [Paris, Minuit: 19721). 
13. (a) The Ends of Man (b) Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences 
in Macksey & Donato (ed. ) The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: 
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Johns Hopkins, 1970). 
14. In part the thematics of strategy is only a recognition of the limited 
economy of such texts. 
15. Included in Speech and Phenomena. 
16. For an, expanded treatment, see my 18 Introduction to Derrida, ' Radical 
Philosophy, no. 21, (January 1979). 
17. From Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: 
John To-pk--irns, 1976); compare Heidegger's list in Time and Being 
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) p. 7. 
18. For Derrida's'account of this procedure, see Positions. 
19. A more detailed account would plot the development in Derrida's 
general strategy of deconstruction from (a) the display of the 
structure of a text (leaving everything as it is) (see e. g., Speech 
and Phenomena) through (b) disruptive intervention (e. g., parts of 
of Grammatology) to (c) parasitical production (Marges, 
_Glas). 
20. See her introduction to Of Grammatolo&X. 
21. Derrida talks of it, as a strategy without a telose 
22. In Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. ý40-41., 
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NOTES to*'Pottgdr_ipt 
1. A condensed and amended extract from another paper "Differance and the 
Problem of Strategy" to appear in*Ddrrida *and 'DiffdrAhce$ Parousia Press,, 
Spring 1985. 
2. In'Margesq Paris: Minuit, 1972 p. 7 ( Margins trans. A, Bass, Chicago, 
190-tp. 7 
3. See Richard Rorty; 'Philosophy and the *Mirror *of'Nature, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1980 eg. pp. 372,37i-. 
4. This'PostscriEt for example, gives centrestage to the term Idifferancel 
in pý-R be-cause Derrida's paper by that name was the focus of the 
colloquium in which it was originally presented. 
5. See eg. M. Foucault, " Mon corps, ce papier , ce feull (1972) trans. 
Oxford Literary Review 4: 1 1979 pp. 9-28 
6. See eg. P. Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production (1966) trans, 
G. Wall, London: RKP, 1978 
7. "Differance" ( 1967) in Marges, Paris: Minuit . 1972. 
8. Derrida writes'. 'There is no such thing as a "metaphysical concept".... 
The"metaphysical" is a certain determination taken by a sequence or 
"chain". It cannot as such be opposed by a concept, but rather by a' 
process of textual labour and a different sort of articulation'. 
"Hors livre" in*La'Dissemination, Paris: Seuil, 1972 p. 12 ( quoted 
here frod'Outwork" in*Dis-s-emination trans. B. Johnson, Chicago, 1981, 
p. 6 
9. -Positions (1972) pp. 37f (E. T. 26ff). 
10. To be fairv, Derrida elsewhere in Positions distinguishes playing the 
role of a concept from producing conceptual effects. It is the latter 
that, more guardedly, "differance" can produce. (Fr., pp. 54ff, E. T. 4off. ). 
11. See De la Grammatologie, (1968). 
12. See "Differancell in Marges (1972) pp. 25-6 (E. T. p. 157). Derrida uses 
the word 'differenceW7 rather than differance) because he is working at 
-t-;. this point with 
Heidegger's ontologico-ontýlogical. difference6ýý 
13. " La Structure, le Signe, et le Jeu dans le Discours des Sciences 
Hilmni-neG-11 (1966) in'LlEcriture et la'Differencev Paris: Seuil, 1967, ' 
( Writing'and'Differýn-cýeý-(1978) p. 292 ). 
14. See David Krell's translation in*Martin'Heidegger: 'Basic Writings, 
London: RKP, 1972 p. 100f. 
15. ibid. p. 101f. 
16. see note 
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17.1',, De VEconomie Restreinte-a VEconomie Generale; un Hegelianisme Sans 
Reserve" iri'L'Ectiture'dt'Id'Differ. ýtfice. -I Paris: -Seuil, 1967 ("From 
- Restricted to General Economyes, el' in*Wtitihg'Arid*Diffdr6nce trans. 
A. Bass, Chicago, 1978. 
18. See the title interview in this book. 
19. op. cit. p. 376-7 (E. T. pp255-6) 
20. "Ousia et Gramme" (1968) in Marges (p. 78; E. T. p62) 
21. "Differance" in Marges1p. 21 (E. T. p. 20) In fact we have used in 
preference David A-1-1-irson's translation ( included in the English 
translaticn of Speech and Phenomena, Evanston: Northwestern, 1972) 
in the text. 
22. op. cit. note 13 p. 412 (E. Top. 280) 
23. In his paper"Joining the Text: From Heidegger to Derrida" in The 
Yale Critics: Deconstruction. in America eds. AracpGodzich & Mar-Un 
Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1983 ) Rodolph Gasche'reminds us of 
Derrida's claim that the thought of the trace can no more 'break with 
" transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it', and argues, in 
" way intended as an explication of Derrida's position that the concept 
of 'text' allows something like an appropriative displacement of the 
value of transcendentality. Thus: 'the transcendental gesture in Derrida 
simultaneously seems to escape the danger of naive objectivism and the 
value of transcendentality itself. ' or again I The notion of text, as 
already in the Heideggerean notion of Being, literally "occupies" the 
locus of the transcendental concept, which is to say that the former is 
not identical with the latter. Thus the notion of the text corresponds 
to a transformation of the transcendental concept and of the very locus 
it represents ... the notion of text in Derrida can be understood only if 
one is aware of its function and effects with: regard to the transcend- 
ental. ' (Pp. 160-1) Nothing Gaschg writes can be ignored, and this in 
particular seems like a definitive reply to our attempt to circumscribe 
Derrida within a renewed transcendentalism. What it-would. require of us 
is that we abandon any attempt to attribute transcendent-al' causality 
to particular operations, functions or activities ( such as Idifferancel 
and concentrate on thettext', the field in which such 'operations' would 
'take place'. The question then is how successfully one can explain a con- 
cept of text that is neither an empirical object, nor an ideal object, nor 
a dialectical concept etc. Gasche's solution proceeds via the idea of a 
displacement. The text loccupieS the locus of the transcendental concept 
which is to say that the former is not identical with the latter. ' We 
would make three responses to this approach: (1) that the question remains 
of what kind of acquiescence or acceptance is required by the reader for 
the concept of text to have the force that derives from its occupying 
such a position without satisfyi7n-gthe condition ( of being 'transcend- 
ental') that the 'position' requires.; (2) Cascheo says that the text 
'literally"'-occupies-", the locus ...... . What sort of schema is being 
deployed here? Is it not transcendental space 7 (3) Gaschdf denies that 
the text supplies Ia priori conditions of possibility... for meaning'. 
But how does he deal with those remarks of Derrida in which 'presence' is 
said to be the 'product' of Idifferancel , *,? 
And surely Gasche Is 
committed to textuality as the condition ( in some sense) of mean"Ing ? 
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23. (cont'd) Is the argument over 'a priori' ? 
In our viewg, Gasche' correctly relocates our question, ( in brief. from 
Idifferance' to Itextualityl)but the problems we found do not go away. 
24. "Ousia and Gramme" (1968) in, Marges (p. 75, E. T. p. 65) 
25. ibid. p. 52ff (E. T. p. 46ff) 
Notes to Part III Chapter 3 
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I refer to my Prolegomena to a New Theory of Times Research in 
Phenomenology, vol. X, 1980, reprinted here below. 
2.1 say imperfect because calendars always have a non-arbitrary 
zero point, which introduces a new asymmetry in the series, and 
because the linearity of calendars is enriched by the addition of 
various annual cycles (year, month) and is itself based on a unit 
which is a cycle - the day. 
3. M. Heideggerp The Conce2t of Time in the Science of History (1916) 
translated in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenologyp 
vol. 9 No. 1, Jan. 1978. 
4. See for example Bertrand Russellq Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy, Allen and Unwin, 1919. He describes the features 
of an ordered series as 1. aliorelative (or asymmetrical 
2. transitive 3. connected. (p. 33). 
5. 'It may further be an interesting study to establish how time which 
is posited in a time-consciousness as Objective is related to real 
Objective time... " PITC p. 23. 
6. Being and Time H 329 
7. See the preface to his Sade, Fourier, Loyola, trans. Richard Miller, 
Hill and Wang, 1976 pp 8-9. 
8. The mouthpiece for this discussion being Roquentin in Sartre's 
novel Nausea. 
9. See Being and Time H 233 on the need for an account that treats 
'Dasein... as a whole'. 
10. Sade, Fourier, Loyola (see n. 7 above) p. 9 
11. This remark appears as part of the answer to a question in the 
Introduction to the collection of translations titled The End of 
Philosophy trans. Joan Stambaugh, Harper and Row, 1973 p. xii 
12. For example: 'what characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds 
the ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking departs 
from what is present in its presence, and thus represents it in terms 
of its ground as something grounded' in The End of Philosophy and 
the Task of Thinking included in the translation of Time and Being, 
Harper and Rowp 1972. 
13. Jacques Derridal 'Linguistics and Grammatology' in Of Grammatology, 
trans. Gayatri C. Spivak, Johns Hopkins, 1976. 
14. Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences' in 
Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Basso Chicago, 1978. 
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15. For example, Derrida remarks I the concept of time belongs entirely 
8 
to metaphysics and desiýnates the domination of presence' , in "Ousia and Gramme" (1968 in Marges, Paris: Minuit, 1972 (Margins, 
trans. A. Bass, Chicago, 198 We have quoted this passage before 
- Pt. III. ch. 1. 
16. See our discussion above, Pt. I, ch. III "Derrida's Critique of 
Husserl". 
17. See his lGrammatology as a Positive Science' in Of Grammatology 
(see above n. 13) 
18. This point is made at length in my Prolegomena to a New Theory 
of Time, see the next chapter. 
19. "-There will not be books in the running brooks until the advent of 
hydro-semantics. 1 J. L. Austin in 'Truth' p. 94 n. 2 in 
Philosoophical Papers., 1961. 
20. See his Twilight of the Idols 'Maxims and Arrows' 031 'When it is 
trodden on a worm will curl up. This is prudent. It thereby 
reduces the chance of 
, 
being trodden on again. In the language 
of morals: 'humility. ' 
21. It is worth noting that Heidegger's increasing distance from the 
existential and the ontic is accompanied by the growth of a range 
of expressions (opening, clearing, dwelling, house, givings granting) 
in which an existential content seems to be preserved metaphorically. 
(I,, offer a fuller account in 'Style and Strategy at the Limits of 
Philosophy: Heidegger and Derridal, The Monist vol. 63, No. 4) 
see above Pt. III, ch. 2 [A] where it is reprinted with minor changes. ) 
But in a number of places Heidegger raises certain obstacles to a 
straightforward metaphorical reading. The best discussion of this 
is to be found in Jacques Derrida's The Retrait of Metaphor in 
Enclitic, vol. II, no. 2 Fall 1978. 
22. In all fairness one must mention that Heidegger himse 
* 
lf discusses 
these remarks of Nietzsche. In brief, he interpret , 
them as 
accurate reports of the nihilistic state of Western culture. See 
his Introduction to Metaphysics, Anchor, 1961 p. 29f. Nietzsche's 
remarks are to be found in Twilight of the Idols. 
23. The present form of this paper owes a great deal to the perceptive 
and helpful comments of Robert Bernasconi and Hugh J. Silverman. 
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NOTES to Chapter Four 
1. See the beginning of 111.3 "Time and Interpretation", above. 
2. P. Geach, "Some Problems about Time", in Logi6 Matters 10.2 p. 302f. 
3. M. Foucault's Introduction! to The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: 
Tavistock, 1972, p. 3 
4. "Textual Reflexivity and Totalization"in Hegel", D. C. Wood, unpublished 
paper. 
5. M. Merleau-Ponty Le Visible et l'Inviiibleg Paris: Gallimard, 1964 
(The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern, 
1968 ). 
6. See above 111.2 "The Question of Strategy" (especially the Postscript) 
7. See A. Schutz, "Making Music Together: a Study in Social Relationship" 
in Collected Works, vol. II, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966. 
8. The following two papers are extremely similar: (a) Paul Ricoear, 
"The Human Experience of Time and Narrative" in Research in Phenomenology 
vol. IX, 1979, (b) "Narrative Time" in On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell, 
Chiacgo, 1981. 
See W. 
1'F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic 0. 
Act, London: Methuen, 1981, p. 93. 
11. J-F. Lyotard: La Condition Postmoderne, Paris: Minuit, 1979 ( The 
Postmodern Condition, trans. Bennington'and Massumi, Manchester U. P. 1984 
12. R. Barthes, "Introduction a llanalyse structurale des recits " in 
the (famous) Communications 8( Recherches Semiblogiques L'Analyse 
Structurale du Recit ), Paris: Seuil, 1966, p. 1 trans. Stephen Heath 
in Image-Music-Text . Fontana, 1977, p. 79 
13. W. J. T. Mitchell's introduction to his collection On Narrative, Chicago, 
1981. 
14. op. cit. p. 12 ( ET p. 98-99) 
15. op. cit. p. 12-13 (ET p. 99-100 
16. C. Levi-Strauss, Mythologiques, Paris: Plon ( 1964; 1966; 1968; 1970) 
trans. J. and D. Weightman, Ney York: Harper and Row, vol. I 1969 etc. 
17. R. Barthes, in Essais'Critiques. Paris: Seuil 1964 ( trans. R. Howard, 
as Critical Essays, Evanston: Northwestern, 1972 
18. ibid. p. 158 
19. nthologiques, vol. I, ( Le Cru et le Cuit op. cit. p. 24. 
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20. ibid. 
21. op. cit. in 8(a) p. 17 
22. ibid. p. 22 
23. Both Barthes (op. cit. ) and Genette ( in his "Time and Narrative in 
A la recherche du temps perdu ", in Aspects of Narrat ive ed. J. Millis 
0 Miller, New York: Columbia 1971 ) suggest that narratives are expansions 
of simple sentences ( such as 'Marcel becomes a writer', I am walking' ... 
Barthes writes that'a narrative is a long sentence'. 
24. J. P. Sartre, La Nausee, Paris: Gallimard, 1938 Nausea, Penguin, 1965) 
25. J. P. Sartre, Les Mots, Paris: Gallimard, 1964 The Words, New York: 
Braziller, 1964) 
26. J. P. Sartre, (a) Saint Genet Paris: Gallimard, 1954 ( Saint Genet, New 
York: Braziller, 1963) (b) 
, 
ET-I-diot de la famille: G. Flaubert de 1821 a 
1857 3 vols. 1971.1972. 
27. H. J. Silverman, " The Time of Autobiography" in Time and Metaphysics 
ed. Wood and Bernasconi, Warwick: Parousia, 1982. ' 
28. C. Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, Paris: Plon 1955 trans. J. Russell 
NewYork: Atheneum, 1961 ) 
29. See William Golding's The Fall Penguin, and the film Incident at Owl 
Creek. 
30. op. cit. p. 20 ET p. 113) 
31. op-cit. 
32. op. cit. 
33. see the film Rashamon directed by Kurosawa 
34. A good example would be Shevek in Ursula Le Guin's novel 
The Dispossessed, Panther , 1974, 
35. See JakobsDn's "Linguigtics and Poetics" (cited by Barthes, op. cit. ) in 
Style and Language ed. T. A. Sebeok, New York, 1960 
36. See J. Derrida's discussion of Blanchot's Le F61ie du . 7our in his 
"The Law of Genre" in on Narrative op. cit. supra. and in Glyph 7, Baltimore: 
. Johns Hopkins, 
1980. 
37. ibid. 
38. An analogous claim is harboured in (a) Barthes'claim ( contra Saussure) 
that semiology is enclosed within a more general linguistics (Elements of 
Semiology, Cape ), (b) and Lacan's denial of the possibility of a meta- 
language. To the re-appropriating power of narrativity here corresponds 
a theoretical and practical necessity to explain, introduce and locate 
one's models, structures, and matrixes via 'ordinary language'. We claim 
this is no temporary requirement. 
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39. Derrida (op. cit. ) writes 'There is no madness without the law: 
madness cannot be conceived before its relation to the law. Madness is law: 
the law is madness'. Cf. Pascal's 'Men are so necessarily mad that not to 
be mad would be another form of madness', cited by Foucault in his 
Histoire de la Folie, preface. 
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NOTES to Chapter Five 
1. Ludwig Feuerbach, Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft (1843) 
Principles of the Philosophy of the Future trans. M. H. Vogell Indianapolis/ 
New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1966.065. 
2.1 'adopt' this term for public expediency. I take it to include post- 
structuralism, certain of the writings of the 'Yale critics', Rorty, modern 
Nietzscheans etc. The term's currency has been enhanced by issues of 
Boundary 2 being devoted to its, manifestations. I do not attempt to give it an 
a--nalytical treatment. 
3. Cornel West , "Nietzsche's Prefiguration of Postmodern American Philosophy" in Boundary 2, (Why Nietzsche Now? ) spring/fall 1981. 
4. The Will to Power trans. W. Kaufman, New York: Randon House, 1968. For 
brief bibliographical note see n. 5 in the Appendix, below. 
5. Preface to, The Will to Power, op. cit. 
6. ibid. 
7. The Will to Power op. cit. 074 
8- See the Discussion printed after his presentation of "StructureSign and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in The Structuralist Controversy, 
ed. R. Macksey and E. Donato, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970/1972, p. 271. - 
9. It could be suggested that Levinas supllies the obvious objection to 
this position.. 'We do not agree. His use of the terms finite and infinite is 
distinctly idiosyncratic, and at some critical point my actual finitude is 
surely presupposed by the inportance of fecundity. 
10. See his Introduction to 
, 
Habermas' Legitimation Crisis, London: Heinemann, 
1976. In this quotation he is in fact referring specifically to Horkheimer. 
11. "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", op. cit. p. 71. 
12. ibid. p. 72. 
13. ibid. p. 72-3. 
14. An English translation of this (1795) essay can be found in 
Kant's Political Writings,, ed. Hans Reiss,, Cambridge U. P. 1971. 
15. See the end of theExergue' to Derrida's Of Grammatology 
.,, 
op. cit. 
16. It does not mean death, but the structure of such a paradigm shift, or 
epistemological break would mirror Heidegger's reading of the existential 
bearing of death. 
17. This is thegLiding thematic of Vincent Descombes' Modern French Philosophy 
cambridge, 1980, more revealingly titled in French Le Meme, et l'Autrer Paris: 
minuit, 1979. 
18. See his La Condition Postmoderne, op. cit. 
19. of Grammatoloqyl, op. cit.. 
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20. ibid. p. 4 (E. T. ) 
21. "Structure, Sign and Play... " op. cit. (Writinq and Difference, p. 280) 
22. Positions Fr. p. 15; E. T. p. 6-7 ) op. cit., 
24. See Marges de la Philosophie, op. cit. The Ends of Man" , Margins of Philosophy, p. 135 
23. 
25. "Structure, Sign and Play... " op. cit. (Writing and Difference,, p. 293 
(1950) 
26. See "Language"/in Poetry, Language and Thought, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, p. 190. 
27. See the Discussion following "Structure, Sign and Play... " as printed in 
The Structuralist Contraversy ( see n. 8) p. 267. 
28. see our Appendix, below 
29. See "Differance", in Speech and Phenomena, op. cit. p. 159. 
30. "Ousia and Gramme", in Marqins of Philosophy p. 63 
31. In Of Grammatoloqy op. cit. 
32. Positions op. cit. E. T. p. 58) 
33. ibid. p. 57,59. 
34. Ernst Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, trans. J. Curmting, New York: Herder 
& Herder, 1970, p. 143 ( Orig. Tubinger Einleitunq in die Philosophie, vol. 1, 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1963 
35. See eg. J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, and R. Rorty, Philosophy. 
and the Mirror of Nature , Oxford: Blackwell, 1980,, esp. Part III. 
36. Critique of Pure Reason, Bxix. 
37. ibid. Axii, Axiii. 
38. - Phenomenoloqy of Mind,, trans. Baillie, London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1949, 
P, 70 
39. "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" op. cit. supra p. 70 
40. ibid. p. 72 
41. "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) (" On a Genteel Tone Recently adopted in Philosophy"), 
42.1 have Kierkegaard to thank for this reference. See his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Princeton, 1941, Part Itch. 2,04. 
43. See the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception,, London: RKP,, 1962 
( trans. fran Phenom6nolocrie de la Perception by Colin Smith ) 
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44. The parallel with the remark from Derrida we quoted earlier (n. 27) 
is worthy of mention. 
. 
45. Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception, Preface p. xxi. 
46. It is only fair to point out that Hegel's 'circular' understanding of 
his thought and method already puts this-- into question. 
47. Section 020 
48. See our Appendix below. 
49. It has to be admitted that Nietzsche cannot always be interpreted 
along these lines. Consider: 'A yes, a no,, a straight line, a goal ... Formula. -. 
of my happiness Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows 044 
50. For example, John Sallis, "End(s)", Research 1: nPhencmenology, vol. XIII,, 1983 
51. "D'un ton apocalyptique adopte naguere en philosophie", in Les Fins de 
-llhcnne ( proceedings of the 1980 Cerisy Colloquium) Paris: Galilee, 1981 
A translation has appeared in the Oxford Literary Review, and in Semeia ZS [iq923 
We shall quote the Semeia translation. 
52. ibid. p. 80 
53. ibid. p. 81 
54, ibid. p. 90 
55. This should be unpacked as a 'deconstruction'. of the textual deployment 
of the term 'future' and its cognates. 
56. See the last page of his "Differance" essay. 
57. Semeia op. cit. p. 
6. 
59. Derrida's focus on the word 'come' could be said to embody the very power 
he attributes to it. For further thoughts on the question of reflexive 
exemplification see my (unpublished manuscript) "Philosophy as Performance". 
58. See Part III, ch. 2 above: "The Question of Strategy". , 
60. Here we would lead in to our account of Nietzsche's Transvaluation of 
Time (see Appendix, below). 
61. Derrida, makes a great deal,, as we have not, of what Xant disapprovingly 
called the 'tone' of apocalyptic discourse. And the apocalyptic 'come' is 
inseparable from a kind of tone. Tone for Derridal could be said to relate 
to the performative, ethical aspects of 'ccme', in the way that 'style' relates 
to'content' . In isolating the 'tone' of apocalyptic utterance, Y%antj unsuspect- 
ingly , made quite a revolutionary move. For tone is unrepresentable,, and yet 
of (arguably) enormous importance. 
62. The 'es gibt' is'only' metaphorically interpersonal,, and Heidegger does 
not, to my knowledge, exploit this., 
63. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity(4 (G) "The Infinity of Time" 
op. cit. supra. 
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NOTES for 82pendix: "Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Time" 
I. See J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses" in Philosophical Papers, Oxford U. P. 
2. Nietzsche uses two different expressions - return (Wiederkunft) and 
recurrence (W-bderkehr). One could use these expressions to mark a strict 
distinction - between the recurrence of events and the return of people or 
things. But no such systematic usage is found in Nietzsche, and our various use 
of these two terms reflects the preferred terms of different commentators on 
Nietzsche at different times. Joan Stambaugh, whose book Nietzsche's Thought 
of Eternal Return is one of the best things written on the subject,, further 
points out that (pp. 29-31) in his critical passages, Nietzsche usually uses 
the expression Wiederkunft and thathe hardly ever talks of Wiederholunq 
(repetition), which, again, suggests that exact reruns were not part of his 
favoured version of eternal return. 
3. See Part IIIch. 2 above. 
4. See for example "The Intoxicated song" C' Das trunkene Lied"), the 
penultimate section of the fourth and last part of Thus Spake Zarathustra. 
References will be to the Penguin edition translated by R. J. Hollingdale 1961. 
5. A selection of Nietzsche unpublished writings - his Nachlass - was 
assembled under the title of Der Wille zur Macht (1901). We quote in this 
chapter from the Hollingdale and Kaufman translation of The Will to Power 
New York: Vintage (Random House), 1968. The section containing the most import- 
ant attempt at a scientific proof is 01066, see below. 
6. An excellent paper by R6bin'Small, 11 Three -- Interp . retations'i)f'Eternal-- 
Recurrence", Dialogue XXII (1983) 91-112, makes this point more systemat- 
ically. 
7. The original title for this chapter was to have been"Nietzsche's 
Deconstruction of Time" .I have been persuaded that this may be too loose a 
use of the term to jyustify the prominence that a place in the title would give 
it. But there are parallels with even the technical account Derrida gives of the 
general strategy of deconstruction ( in.. Positions ). I will suggest that 
Nietzsche reinscribes 'becoming' in a way parallel to the way Derrida 
reinscribes'writing'. I claim, too, that the concept of eternal recurrence 
is undecidable in terms of the framework it puts in question. 
8. Will to Power, 01066 
9. Arthur Danto, "The Eternal Recurrence" in Nietzsche: a collection of 
critical essays , ed. Robert Solamn, Garden City: Doubleday, 1973. 
10. The letter is dated March 8th,, 1884,, cited bY Stambaugh,, op. cit. supra. 
11. It is quite true that Nietzsche was strongly and positively influenced 
by Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus ... (1863) (see Hayman,, Nietzsche: 
a Critical Life ., 
Quartet, 1980, p. 82 ), but we prefer to treat such positiv- 
istic and scientific streaks as there are in Nietzsche as weapons in an anti- 
metaphysical struggle rather than as beliefs strongly held in their own rightý 
Causal determinism eg. would be hard to square with his account of causation 
in "The Four Great Errors" in Twilight of the Idols . Where Nietzsche's 
rehetorical and scientific tendencies clash,, we favour the former. 
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12. Will to Power 01066 
j 2a. And the signif icance of the horizontal axis - the serial order of time - is itself compromised by the addition of the second. A parallel to Nietzsche's 
construction of an account that is deconstructive in its effects, by a 
simple modification of seriality, can be found in the Moebius strip, beloved 
of Lacan, in which the absolute difference between the two sides of a ribbon 
is transformed into a continuity merely by a twist and a join. 
13. "At'Noontide" in Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 288 
14. See Twilight of the Idols "Expeditions of an Untimely Mlan" 09. See 
also Heidegger's Nietzsche vol. 1 section 14 "Rapture as Aesthetic State". 
15. The Gay Science 0341. 
16. The references here ( Nachlass XIV: 306; XII: 371 ) are taken from 
Stambuagh (op. cit. ) p. 23. 
17. " the eternal is present with us in every moment; the transitoriness 
of time causes us no suffering", quoted by Karl 1; ý; with in his From HeSLel 
to Nietzsche trans. David Green, Garden City: Doubleday, 1967 p. 211. 
16a. In this word 'intensity' we should hear the work of condensation 
( which latter word is itself a kind of intensification) - primarily of 
the ideas of tension and concentrated focus, a felt intensity - ideas that 
both inhabit and displace a psychological interpretation insofar as they 
suggest all sorts of difficulties with any traditionally substantive account of 
the'subject!. 
18. Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le Cercle Vicieux, Paris: Mercure de 
France, 1969. 
19. For Nietzsche, Heidegger writes, and clearly with Schelling in mind 
'will is primal being. The highest product of primal being is eternity. The 
primal being of beings is the will, as the eternally rec urr ent willing of the 
eternal rec urr ence of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same is the 
supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally wills its own 
willing'. What is Called Thinking ?, Lecture X, p. 104. 
20. "Of Redemption",, Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 161. 
21. ibid. 
22. This problem is plausibly represented by Vincent Desccmbes in his 
Le Meme et lAutre ( op. cit. supra) as the problem inherited by the 
'desirants' - the French philosophers who took up Nietzsche's problems in the 
'70's - especially Deleuze, Lyotard and"Klossowski. 
23. " Of the Vision and the Riddle", Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 178. 
24. "Maxims and Arrows", 8 
25.1 am grateful , again, to J. Stambaugh Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal 
Return for this quotation. 
26. Vincent Descombes (see n. 22 above) argues brilliantly that this 
problem haunts French Nietzscheans and that they do not escape its grip. 
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27. We could find here a parallel in Heidegger's account of authenticity 
and his contrast between finding oneself and forever losing oneself. 
28. Giles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la Philosophie, Paris: P. U. F. 1962 ( trans. 
Hugh Tmlinson as Nietzsche and Philosophy, London: Athlone, 1983. ) See Pp. 
71-2 of the English translation. 
29. Will to Power 0617 
30. Nietzsche and Philosophy p. 72. 
31. See n. 23 
32. The locus classicus of this view is probably Roman Jakobson's (with 
Morris Halle) The Fundamentals of Lanquage, (in particular "Two Aspects of 
Language: Metaphor and Metonymy") The Hague: Mouton, 1956. 
33. Phencnenoloqy of Mind, op. cit. p. 152. 
34. See the early essays in Of Grammatoloqy op. cit. 
especially "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing',, and 
. 
"Linguittics and Grammatology1l, 
35. The non-dialectical possibilities of Nietzsche's thought rest on 
such a relation. 
36. see n. 14 
37.1 allude here to a paper "Dionysus in Excess of Metaphysics" presented 
by John Sallis to The New Nietzsches ,a workshop held at Warwick 
University, July 1978-4. 
38. See Deleuze op-cit. E. T. p. 48 
3 9. ibid. 
40. One could usefully compare Kierkegaard's position here, when he 
writes (Sickness Unto Death) that the Self is the relation that relates 
itself to itself. 
41. What is Called Thinking ? p. 104 
42. Deleuze, op. cit. E. T. p. 48 
43. "Differance" Qlargins of Philosophy . 17) . 
44. M. Heidegger , Nietzsche (2 vols. ) Pfullingen: Neske,, 1961,, in course of trans- 
lation ( in 4 vols. ) by David Farrell Krell for Harper and Row These remarks 
cane fran vol. 1 section 4, " The Unity of Will to PowerEternal Recurrence and 
Revaluation ", p. 19 
45. ibid. 
46. ibid. p. 20 
47. What is Called Thinking ? op. cit. p. 101. 
48.1 have David Krell's remarks ( in discussion) to thank for this point. 
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49. Being and. Time , H264* 
"Way Back into 
50. There are very many Of these: The Fundamental Ground of Metaphysics"j, 
his "Letter on Humanism, "j, "Time and Being" etc. 
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